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ABSTRACT 
Providential Capitalism: Heavenly Intervention and the Atlantic’s Divine Economist 
By Ian Green 
 
 Advisor: Duncan Faherty 
 
Providential capitalism names the marriage of providential Christian values and market-
oriented capitalist ideology in the post-revolutionary Atlantic through the mid nineteenth 
century. This is a process by which individuals permitted themselves to be used by a so-called 
“divine economist” at work in the Atlantic market economy. Backed by a slave market, capital 
transactions were rendered as often violent ecstatic individual and cultural experiences. Those 
experiences also formed the bases for national, racial, and classed identification and negotiation 
among the constellated communities of the Atlantic. With this in mind, writers like Benjamin 
Franklin, Olaudah Equiano, and Ukawsaw Gronniosaw presented market success as proof of 
divine election. At the same time, writers like Richard Henry Dana Jr., Royall Tyler, and the 
anonymous author of Humanity in Algiers offered hegemonic expansion as an integral part of a 
divine capitalist plan. However, writers like Ottobah Cugoano, Venture Smith, John Jea, and, 
later, Edgar Allan Poe, in The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, and Herman 
Melville, in Redburn: His First Voyage, recognized the dehumanizing potential of this power 
arrangement. They described the ways in which humans could be commodified or rendered 
invisible by the operations of a market that used individuals for its own ends and maintained the 
aegis of divine sovereignty. Urban Gothic novels like Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn 
or Memoirs of the Year 1793 and George Lippard’s The Quaker City, or The Monks of Monk 
Hall likewise commented upon the unsettling nationalist stakes of this power structure. This 
project reorients Atlantic critical and literary studies around this conflation of interests, 
philosophies, and theologies, which became culturally formative in the revolutionary period, 
blossomed throughout the post-revolutionary era, and reached a point of crisis by the mid-
nineteenth century. Building upon current Atlantic scholarship, it uses a disparate array of 
authors and texts to demonstrate the diversity of responses to the emergence, proliferation, and 
watershed of providential capitalism for Atlantic cultures and individuals. 
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Shortly after presenting his plan to efficiently systematize the virtues and behavior of a 
model individual in his autobiography, Benjamin Franklin reflects upon his legacy in order to 
outline his vision of an ideal citizen in a revolutionary age. He writes, “What reverses may attend 
the remainder [of his life] is in the hand of Providence.” He continues: “to Temperance he 
ascribes his long-continued health, and what is still left to him of a good constitution; to Industry 
and Frugality, the early easiness of his circumstances and acquisition of his fortune.” Finally, his 
conclusion arrives with an optimistic and forward-looking flourish: “I hope, therefore, that some 
of my descendants may follow the example and reap the benefit” (70). Although Franklin claims 
to have avoided “the mark of any of the distinguishing tenets of any particular sect,” he describes 
himself and his model citizen residing in a world in which capitalist ideology and providential 
theology act completely and emphatically in concert. He articulates a model of personhood that 
is market-oriented, upwardly mobile, and, in its indebtedness to “providence,” undoubtedly in 
communication with a form of divinity. That is: he describes the individual who resides within 
the world, the market, and, indeed, the church of what I shall call Atlantic providential 
capitalism. 
The major intervention of this project is to reorient Atlantic critical and literary studies 
around the conflation of interests, philosophies, and theologies, which became culturally 
formative in the revolutionary period, blossomed throughout the post-revolutionary era, and 
reached a point of crisis by the mid-nineteenth century. My goal is to build upon current Atlantic 
literary scholarship but to demonstrate that Atlantic spirit and market cultures cannot be viewed 
in isolation and must be seen as elements of the same structure of power and sociality that 
dominated life and letters in the Atlantic. I will use a disparate array of authors and texts to 
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demonstrate the diversity of responses—some celebratory and some quite pessimistic—to the 
emergence, proliferation, and watershed of this system for Atlantic cultures and individuals. 
New critical approaches to topics ranging from national political ideology, literary 
genealogy and connectedness, and especially Atlantic history, have invited and necessitated 
reappraisal of the individual and the society that Franklin describes. Where generations of 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth-century American literary and historical critics often told a 
story of American foundation rooted in the morality espoused by early colonial groups—
particularly groups like the New England pilgrims—and adopted by revolutionary writers like 
Franklin, more recent critics have told a more complicated story about commerce, social 
mobility, cultural exchange, and frequent, often violent encounter events.i Critics like Paul 
Gilroy, Anna Brickhouse, Lisa Lowe, Marcus Rediker, and Peter Linebaugh have revealed the 
story of Atlantic social, political, and ideological formation as one of syncretism, mobility, 
hegemony, and disruption, rather than one of seamless genealogical transmission leading to 
national emergence. Writers like Ian Baucom, Colin Dayan, and Vincent Carretta have produced 
formative accounts of Atlantic cultural, economic, and literary history, by taking seriously the 
many ways in which capital produced and shaped individual identity, social organization, and the 
philosophies underpinning Atlantic cultural interactions. I will use the work of such scholars to 
extend Atlantic literary studies and to integrate the syncretic providential spiritual cultures of the 
Atlantic and its exchange-oriented market cultures into one overwhelming power arrangement, 
as well as to show the different ways in which individuals and communities contended with it. 
The focus of the scholarship to which I will respond already represents the work of an 
ongoing and necessary shift away from older generations’ assertions of normative and, at times, 
monolithic American Studies organized around the expansive triumphs of both capital and New 
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England “Yankee” religious traditions. Perhaps the most famous representative of this older 
school of literary and historical analysis was Perry Miller, but subsequent generations of scholars 
have effectively complicated Americanist studies to represent the diversity often occluded by 
Miller’s triumphalist narratives. In fact, critics, particularly following Paul Gilroy’s The Black 
Atlantic, have reconceived these ideas to such a degree that American Studies, themselves, feel 
somewhat antiquated in light of broader Atlantic concentrations.   
Scholars like Amy Kaplan were critical to the process of attaining this more expansive 
critical perspective, helping later scholars to contextualize Miller and his contemporaries’ views, 
while moving American Studies forward toward its current, more polyphonic position. She takes 
on “Miller’s conception of America as well: that America—once cut off from Europe—can be 
understood as a domestic question, left alone, unique, divorced from the international conflicts—
whether the slave trade or the Mexican War—in which that national identity takes shape” (7). To 
view American colonial and proto-national development without consideration for broader 
transnational political movements is indeed shortsighted. Moreover, to view that development 
without recognition for the many people and communities that it marginalizes or consigns to 
subaltern status is to participate in the ongoing Americanist project of reinstantiating power 
relations that have produced many of the most dehumanizing elements of Atlantic political 
ideology. Critical histories like Kaplan’s that challenge and reform older interpretations of 
Atlantic Americanist and literary history offer a key to understanding the position of the Atlantic 
subject within the context of competing Atlantic political and ideological power arrangements. 
The abandonment of narratives of victorious American historical and literary tradition is, 
therefore, a crucial turning point for both Atlantic literary studies and for this study in particular. 
Randall Fuller, for example, notes, “[Sacvan] Bercovitch discerned…the rhetoric of an 
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‘exceptional’ national mission designed to foreclose competing figures as well as competing 
possibilities of the self and of society. Animated by this insight, Bercovitch transformed the 
‘classic’ writers celebrated by Van Wyck Brooks and enshrined by American studies as irascible 
individuals revolting against convention into a collection of cultural spokespersons whose 
demands for social change, however charged with the fire of prophecy, were made nevertheless 
on behalf of the dominant culture of liberal democracy.” He continues, “The force of this new 
reading, however bracing and suggestive of new interpretive energies, however likely to compel 
revisions of categories and assumptions, contained within it the seeds of a despairing loss” (124). 
This loss contains, potentially, the loss of American Studies altogether. It is the loss that 
necessarily attends transforming American exceptionalism into an expression of hegemonic 
ideological power structures. It is not, therefore, altogether to be mourned. Yet, even this 
interpretation of American historical and literary historical movement implies something worth 
revisiting—something scholars miss if they neglect the spiritual dimensions of Atlantic econo-
politics and the econo-political dimensions of Atlantic spirituality. 
After Kaplan and, especially, after Gilroy, is it still possible to consider an American 
power structure? Perhaps not, but the insights offered by these and other scholars invite further 
scrutiny of the theological alongside the economic, social, and political routes of Atlantic 
cultural exchange. In this study, I will argue for an ideological and philosophical power structure 
that does remain active in the formulation of Atlantic identity. However, that power structure 
extends beyond the borders of nation. It extends even beyond the borders of race and political 
organization. It is, instead, the source of energy at the center of intersecting Atlantic cultures. 
This is why the subjects of this study respond to it in such different ways. To see capitalism as 
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providential is to see it as the figures in this study must have: as something impossibly powerful 
yet also impossibly baffling. 
Carretta, for instance, offers up a perspective of transnational Atlantic expressive culture 
that is multivocal and highly mobile. This defies older versions of singular, genealogical, and 
nationalist cultural and literary histories. In fact, criticism like Carretta’s may go some way 
toward dismantling the logic of American Studies altogether. In light of the prevalence of 
narratives from individuals who traverse the borders of nationality, community, and even liberty, 
what use are nationalist interpretations of history and literature for a period of history in which 
the ideological, philosophical, and geographic borders of nation are in flux? Moreover, how 
representative of actual history are narratives of national advancement that focus upon the voices 
of the empowered classes to the exclusion of the perspectives of the authors and communities 
that those classes sought to make invisible? Carretta’s work suggests that history and literary 
criticism that obeys this logic perpetuates its blindness. I will, therefore, use a similarly mobile, 
transnational, and multivocal approach to Atlantic history and to my readings of the literature 
produced by mobile individuals and populations around the Atlantic. 
Baucom similarly establishes the birth of Atlantic political, economic, and individual 
subjectivity not in a fixed space or political body, but upon and beneath the shifting waters of 
trade. In fact, he locates it in the exchange of human bodies, the transformation of those bodies 
into things, and in the market-mandated destruction of those bodies. My study will take up these 
ideas as well. However, I will demonstrate the deep spiritual significance of these transformative 
exchange and sacrifice events. Earlier generations of Americanist scholars saw the advancements 
of political entities organized around shared religious traditions as triumphs of proto-national 
culture. Later generations of scholars like Baucom see the organization of Atlantic societies 
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around the ideologies of dehumanized market practices as hegemonic impositions of the market 
upon the individual. I will argue that, in fact, the market practices that Baucom and others 
identify attend the very same sites where earlier scholars located religious and political 
advancement. I will demonstrate that those moments of religious and political advancement are 
markers of economic encroachment and market sovereignty, and vice-versa. How could it be 
otherwise? For, in the providential capitalist Atlantic, the worlds of market and spirit are one in 
the same. 
In place of Miller’s cohesive American exceptionalist evolutionary perspective, in place 
of Bercovitch’s cohesive advancement of expansionist belief systems, and in place even of 
Baucom’s vision of Atlantic history as a fully depersonalized event, I will argue that it is 
disruption, confusion, uncertainty itself that remains common to the individual and social 
experiences of the providential capitalist Atlantic. Furthermore, I will argue that, even as later 
critics have reshaped Atlantic discourse by abandoning overly simplified, hierarchical, and even 
sometimes ahistorical older narratives of social progress, they have also too frequently 
deemphasized the crucial role that spirituality played in the evolution of Atlantic politics, 
philosophy, community, and, perhaps above all, economics. I will argue that the sometimes 
confusing social disruption, which later critics identify as the productive force engineering 
Atlantic community, exists because the market operates upon society through forces that seem 
invisible to the individual, foremost among them being the market-oriented economy. This 
mutual invisibility and interventionism lends the market supernatural power. I will, therefore, 
take seriously the Atlantic subject’s interpretation of the market as a divine but inchoate force 
that connects ordinary and supernatural worlds and its presentation of the divine as an invested 
actor in the market. 
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Later scholars have expanded the critique of cold war-era representations of a more 
cohesive American Studies even beyond the Atlantic context proposed by scholars like Gilroy, 
and so will I, while reasserting the need for a comprehensive view of providential spirituality and 
market exchange working together to produce Atlantic community and power arrangements. Lisa 
Lowe, for instance, uses “intimacy” to locate transcultural and transcontinental encounter 
throughout Europe, Africa, and the Americas, as well as Asia. Her criticism demonstrates that 
the cultural productions of eighteenth and nineteenth-century maritime societies represent social 
interactions that extend even beyond the slave markets of the Atlantic. I will build upon her 
insights in order to see the mixture of societies inculcated by transnational mobility as the site of 
possibility and peril for both individuals and social groups. Furthermore, I will argue that the 
processes of personal, social, and national identification and curation created ambivalent 
distinctions between home and frontier, so that even metropolitan spaces that were posited as the 
home sites of nationalist states remained influenced by the frontier. Such spaces maintained the 
moral ambiguity and spiritual uncertainty that arose from the displacement and synchrony of the 
broader Atlantic world. As a result, the geography of the mobile Atlantic also contributed to the 
development of a philosophical and ideological marriage of spirituality and capitalism, for good 
or ill. 
Wendy Warren offers a different view. She notes that “at some point, historians have 
generally argued, the concept of mercantilism gave way to a nascent system of capitalism. 
Looking closely at the trade records of midcentury New England indicates just how that 
transition happened in the daily lives of people living in the rollicking Atlantic world…the New 
England merchants drew their power by bucking the state-imposed economic order and operating 
instead as the market rewarded. Though the metropole may have regarded the New England 
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colonies as peripheral to the real economic action, it turns out that those peripheral colonies may 
in fact have driven the move to full-fledged capitalism” (57). However, Warren’s and Lowe’s 
interpretations of modernity need not clash, if readers approach the periods under discussion with 
providential capitalism in mind, and recognize the ways in which providential capitalism evolved 
to direct the philosophy, politics, theologies and subjectivities of societies and expressive 
cultures in the Atlantic. 
Mercantilism did indeed give way to capitalism. Moreover, this turn did, as Wendy 
Warren indicates, hasten the approach of New World independence. At the same time, the 
universal application of market-oriented commerce as not only an economic mechanism, but also 
as a driver of spiritual culture kept societies linked in “intimate” relation. Edward E. Baptist 
places this connection in purely economic terms, writing that “empires emerged to dominate the 
first three centuries of American history: Spanish, Portuguese, French, and British. Once all the 
gold and silver had been thoroughly stolen, the empires found even greater sources of wealth by 
laying a belt of plantation colonies from Brazil north to Virginia. Many were small in size, but 
all were huge in economic and political significance” (42). Warren would rightly include New 
England in this list of small but significant slave economies. And so, New England, Philadelphia, 
Le Pac, or Liverpool could all appear as both central to Atlantic culture and as seemingly distant 
frontier spaces, could all appear bound in an intimate relation of exchange. I will add that such 
transnational closeness arose largely because of shared beliefs in the interventionist divinity of 
capital and in economic interpretations of interventionist divinity. 
In order to see the ways in which Atlantic communities and cultural productions are 
productions of the synthesis of Atlantic spiritual cultures that posited divine intervention and 
providential arrangement with the economic realities of Atlantic market capital, I will look to 
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diverse literary sources spanning the period from the revolutionary age to the mid-nineteenth 
century. I will do so in order to offer a broad and varied picture of individual and community 
responses to providential capitalism. Fuller writes, “After Bercovitch, culture no longer seems to 
many critics the disinterested location for abstract reflection or political opposition but rather the 
place in which American power most pervasively resides. In this vision, power permeates and 
therefore shapes individuals, coercing compliance not through the crude energies of force but 
rather through those media previously thought to be the very grounds of resistance: language, the 
aesthetic, literature” (124). This is a perceptive analysis of the push-and-pull of individual and 
social power. My study will continue in this vein, but it will take literary sources as its focus to 
examine the many unique ways in which different authors attempted to comprehend the 
seemingly-incomprehensible forces of economy and spirituality that shaped their world. 
This disruptive synchrony of spirit and market emerges from a period of intense 
disruption that extends largely from the revolutionary era, through the United States’ 
simultaneously productive and unsettling Jacksonian period, and right up to the point of the 
United States’ Compromise of 1850 and passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, along with Europe’s 
mid-nineteenth-century revolutions— particularly in France still reeling from the destabilizations 
that began with the Haitian revolution and continued through its period of autocratic rule—, and 
Marx’s and Engels’ mid-century diagnosis of capital’s supernatural underpinnings and probable 
advancement toward crisis and reformulation. This is not to say that these latter events did not 
produce their own social disturbances. They undoubtedly did. Indeed, the future that Marx 
predicted actually transformed into the violence of the mid-nineteenth century, which, in turn, 
produced an even more globalized version of capital that largely echoed the Atlantic power 
structures described in this study. I am concerned with examining the disruptive operations that 
   Green 11 
 
preceded this political, social, and spiritual reckoning. The revolutionary period of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries produced ripples and then waves that simultaneously 
necessitated the construction of national and transnational polities and undermined the basis 
upon which those polities were constructed. By the time that Marx surveyed and diagnosed 
capitalism, he observed a social system already organized around received notions of an ordained 
social economy ripe for renewal and reconsideration. Providential capitalism’s victory was total, 
if only occasionally explicit in the various political contracts that developed out of the 
Enlightenment revolutionary age. By the middle of the nineteenth century, capital and capital as 
an implicitly or explicitly divine social force was the unifying philosophical ethos that linked the 
various cultures of the Atlantic and that extended, by then, beyond the Atlantic itself.  
Hastening drastically during the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras, individual, 
social, and political interactions in the Atlantic intentionally and unintentionally bound the 
values of market capitalism to those of providential Christianity. Such interactions produced 
societies and configurations of power that established the spiritual virtue of market-driven 
mobility and divinely ordained capitalist practices. The values that underwrote those interactions 
generated social polities through the early part of the nineteenth century. At that point, as Marx 
noted, and as events like the European revolutions of 1848 and the chaos of the American 
Compromise of 1850 demonstrate, a reckoning with divinely asserted capital was in order. 
By that point, the fissures in that foundation became too massive to deny. Unfreedom, 
personal commodification, cultural syncretism, ideologies of ordained upward mobility and 
racial and classed hierarchy—these cultural elements clashed and converged in the years 
immediately preceding and following the most intense period of Atlantic revolutionary action. 
They then became the very forces around which individual and social identities attempted to 
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cohere. That they eventually exploded into widespread social violence by mid-century should 
come as no surprise. 
This is not an attempt to revive the Miller-ite perspective of universal social values on the 
march. Fuller, for instance, reveals the social critical limits of Miller’s historical and literary 
analyses when he observes, “The first volume of The New England Mind…emphatically 
proclaimed Miller’s underlying assumption that ideas construct reality, that a society’s way of 
knowing is framed more by its system of beliefs than its material reality” (104). This critique 
recognizes the contributions of Miller and the Miller-ite cold war critics to historical studies of 
American colonial politics and culture, while also rejecting their assumption of homogenous and 
agreed-upon “ideas” at the root of proto-nationalist societies. My study will perform a similar 
function: permitting the contributions of older Americanist studies, building upon newer and 
broader scholarship, and looking ahead to what comes next. For example, that a critique like the 
one that Fuller presents also raises a question: what if a society’s “way of knowing” is shaped 
emphatically by its “material reality?” 
In this study, I will insist that the movements of Atlantic capital reestablished the terms of 
individual, social, and spiritual subjectivity. This was true for the Puritans in Miller’s studies, but 
it is especially true for the persons and communities that contended through the disruptions of 
revolution and that continued to navigate the shifting waters of early market capital during the 
early Jacksonian period and into the middle of the nineteenth century. ii An emphasis upon 
individualism matched with election in the context of a market culture organized around slave 
economies helped local and national polities of the Atlantic to establish and cultivate the borders 
of community. In the Atlantic, these same values became the engines upon which both the 
economy and the forces of racial and ideological hierarchy vastly expanded. Yet these forces 
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always also produced oft-unacknowledged anxieties. By the mid-nineteenth century, those 
anxieties could no longer be denied by individuals or by the communities of which they were 
part. 
It was, therefore, always left to the individual to contend with the confusing currents of 
power and social exchange that would lead to this moment. However, this dynamic between the 
individual and the social has not always been the focus of Americanists. Fuller again notes, “The 
shift to culture would shrink the imaginable grounds of oppositional criticism to smaller and 
smaller increments, eventually endangering the concept of agency altogether” (124). This, even 
as Fuller suggests that older studies like Bercovitch’s indicate a kind of longing for a return to 
the cohesion provided by narratives of American exceptionalism, or at least of coherent 
American identification.iii In this study, I wish to return to the issue of agency, without negating 
the influence of larger power structures on the construction of the modern Atlantic subject. This 
agency is exactly the problem with which the figures in this study contend: how, in a world 
governed by seemingly divine forces of economy, can an individual survive, thrive, or find 
community? The answers are, as this study will demonstrate, diverse, divergent, and disruptive. 
No two authors seem to come to the same conclusion. Nor should they, for their experiences are 
very different. Yet they all live in and respond to the providential capitalist forces of the Atlantic 
and, as a result, reveal different facets of providential Atlantic capitalist culture.  
The signs of evolving social institutions and their concomitant ruptures are evident in the 
narratives of individuals who lived in and traversed these transnational Atlantic cultures. They 
recognize, for example, the supernatural significance of allegorical mechanisms of capitalist 
equivalence through often anxious productions of speculative, autobiographical, travel, and 
political literature. They respond to cultures that presented the captivity and the sacrifice of 
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individuals as necessary transactions by which a divine community enlarged itself. They contend 
with the fact that these cultures insisted upon a social, geographic, political, economic, and 
sacred community in which capitalism was a spiritual practice, and in which Christian 
spirituality functioned according to the logic of capitalism. Finally, they give expressive life to 
their societies’ assertions of a universal Atlantic cosmology—a web of geographical, economic, 
and philosophical intimacy—in which the divine interacted with the ordinary through the 
exchange-oriented capitalist marketplace.  
The individuals who experienced this moment would have to learn to exploit this network 
of belief in order to survive in an emerging Atlantic economy. Moreover, writers from this 
period frequently reproduced or interrogated this belief system for reasons of individual survival, 
nation formation, and even exploration of social anxieties that emerged among the inhabitants of 
this greater Atlantic. Simply put, they experienced and expressed the most important, the most 
generative, and the most awful force at work in the production of Atlantic cultures during the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary period: this conflation of spirit and capital, this philosophy 
of providential capitalism. 
This philosophical power arrangement would come to foreclose other possibilities for 
community creation, personal identification, and even literary representations of the liberal self 
in the post-revolutionary Atlantic. In a period of intense flux, during which colonies violently 
transformed into nations or nations came apart at the seams, in which racial identities were both 
codified and challenged, in which huge masses of laboring individuals—both free and unfree—
found themselves mobilized in a circulating economy of culture and commodity, this philosophy 
would emerge as the guiding political, social, and expressive engine in the Atlantic world. 
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There were other options. Post-revolutionary Atlantic societies could have coalesced 
around purely secular liberal value systems. Hegemonic nationalism could have resisted 
narratives of divine right. Individuals could have seen themselves either as masters of their own 
fate or as true collaborative laborers and members of cooperative societies. Hannah Arendt, for 
example, looks to non-Christian classical philosophy to explain the emergence of capitalist 
modes of social and individual production and meaning. At the same time, she gestures toward 
the largely secular Adam Smith, John Locke, and Karl Marx as the primary theorists of the 
modern post-capital age. However, although she recognizes that these thinkers looked to 
invisible forces to explain the seemingly disembodied nature of financial social interactions, she 
never arrives at the conclusion that truly empowered the post-revolutionary era. What emerged 
from the competition among post-revolutionary Enlightenment philosophies was a mechanism of 
social expansion and control, a tool of political hegemony, a justification for working conditions, 
a way of seeing the self that presented experiences of Atlantic economic conditions as divinely 
ordained. 
As John Locke imagined labor and political organizations, he observed a still-malleable 
Atlantic world in the process of settling upon a useful mode of social, political, and ideological 
formation and expansion. He imagined a socio-political world arising through consent, through 
liberty achieved through freedom defined and protected by law. Implicit to his theory was an 
understanding not only of unconstrained freedoms, but also of a lack of freedom altogether.iv 
Thus, unfreedom was integral to his perspective and to the many Enlightenment texts that took 
him as a touchstone. Moreover, even though Locke espoused a practiced secularism, his theories 
demonstrated that that secularism was deceptive. It relied upon invisible forces acting within and 
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through social political interactions. The providential capitalist mindset would not abandon 
Lockean notions of liberty altogether, but would seize upon these intangibles as material reality. 
Similarly, Edmund Burke argued for social legalism based upon past legal precedents, 
but set the stage for a philosophy that would take up legality as an expression of covenant 
theology. Enlightenment society was absolutely organized around binding contracts that derived 
their power from social beliefs in legalism. The sanctity of that legalism, however, derived from 
religious traditions that instantiated the word of God in sacred texts. This too would become one 
of the essential elements of providential capitalism. 
Thomas Paine also argued for revolutionary energies that emerged from natural law. 
Once more, social theorists, politicians, writers, and individuals could interpret this in secular 
fashion, or they could see natural law arising from the divine ordination of the material and 
supernatural worlds. As providential capitalism came to dominate post-revolutionary expressive 
cultures, the latter interpretation would take hold. The spirituality contained within seemingly 
secular Enlightenment theory would achieve social authority through more explicitly 
supernatural application.  
Friedrich Hegel too bore witness to a materially and philosophically evolving society—
or, perhaps, an archipelago of connected societies—that pivoted around theories of natural social 
hierarchy. In his case, this meant implicitly or explicitly addressing the facts of an Atlantic 
economy rooted in slavery and racial domination. In effect, his interpretation of Atlantic social 
construction yoked theories of consented liberty, legalism, and natural law to a recognition that 
all of those concepts rested upon the backs of the excluded. The implications of this fact are 
troubling but formative: if social hierarchies reflected natural law, and natural law derived from 
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the will of God, then the social exclusion—even the death—of the unfree was also an expression 
of divine intent. 
Susan Buck-Morss has demonstrated the degree to which Hegel developed his theories of 
social arrangement in response to the very real circumstances of Atlantic slavery, in which the 
tug-of-war between freedom and unfreedom played out not as thought exercises but as the 
material conditions of living persons and communities. Hegel responded to this by presenting 
society locked in a competition over freedom. However, the providential capitalist ethos 
positions freedom extended or retracted as an expression of election and, more importantly, of 
election within a marketplace. With this in mind, I will build upon Buck-Morss’ insights about 
the roots of Hegelian theory, and upon Hegel’s own dialectical interpretation of society, by 
adding economic, spiritual, and, more importantly a fused econo-spiritual culture to the body of 
material realities to which Enlightenment philosophers and writing individuals responded. 
Perhaps most pressing for this discussion, Adam Smith described invisible and 
complicated social forces acting within and upon the market, and, in so doing, articulated a 
vision of the market as a theater for supernatural activity. He could never have imagined the 
ways that Atlantic commerce would instantiate around a literal interpretation of immaterial 
interventions into the material world through the marketplace. Probably the most important 
insight to be gained by viewing the revolutionary, post-revolutionary, and early nineteenth-
century Atlantic through the lens of providential capitalism is that the invisible hand was, in the 
minds of many if not most inhabitants of the Atlantic cultural marketplace, quite literally the 
hand of God.  
Writing generations later, Max Weber retrospectively described a largely secular 
economic system that merely benefitted a particular religious group. He glimpsed but never fully 
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explained the full fusion of economic and spiritual cultures that took place in the revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary eras, which allowed the various communities and polities that arose 
during that period to establish themselves and to flourish throughout the early part of the 
nineteenth century. Nor did he see the many individual anxieties contained within the 
arrangements of providential capitalist power. What Enlightenment thinkers saw coming into 
being and what Marx and, later, Weber saw as already in place was not simply capitalism as an 
ideological force, but capitalism as a theology, as a lived personal and social experience, as a 
mode not only of social instantiation, but also of interaction with the world beyond seeing. The 
force that goes beyond the unity of “labor power” to the “invisible hand” or other nominally 
secular theories of labor and value is a latent belief that the economy is backed by divine intent 
and that divine intellect uses the economy as its primary mechanism of interaction with the 
ordinary world. The revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods through the early nineteenth 
century saw polities driven by a productive belief in a divine intelligence acting—literally, 
materially, sometimes, briefly, visibly—through the marketplace. Individuals and communities 
responded to the emerging exchange-oriented capitalist market of this era not as they would to a 
secular political or labor theory, but as they would to dispatches from an unseen and often 
mysterious god.  
Michael Taussig has identified a tendency among societies undergoing the transition 
from precapitalism to capitalism to describe capitalist mechanisms in supernatural terms (11). 
Taussig focuses his analysis upon pre- or proto-capitalist indigenous societies as they confront 
the encroachments of modern industrialization. I will demonstrate that, throughout the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, Atlantic societies underwent a similar transition and experienced 
similar anxieties, leaving individuals and groups to use spiritual language to explain the effects 
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and absences of an increasingly post-human market, and to use market language to explain a new 
relationship between God and humanity. However, this fusion was more than theoretical or 
expressive. It was, instead, the central motivating premise of the post-revolutionary Atlantic 
society up to the mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, as it is in the societies that Taussig 
examines, this fusion remained ambivalent. In some cases, it was socially productive and 
stabilizing; in others, it was personally destructive and destabilizing. In their often groping 
search for understanding of and in the providential capitalist world, these texts explore and help 
to illuminate both sides of this unique cultural innovation. 
Even secular presentations of self or constructions of community adhered to the logic of 
interventionist providence situated within the Atlantic marketplace. Franklin, among the central 
figures in the formulation of the United States’ Enlightenment political thought about the 
individual and the state, presented the modern liberal self as lucky, virtuous, and upwardly 
mobile. That figure, however, is still ascendant or descendant within an economy that appears to 
be guided and ordered before its arrival. In fact, it is positioned by the hand of the economy—
through luck—and recognized by the economy as elect—through the rewards that attend virtuous 
interactions with the social marketplace. Franklin’s ideal citizen is, like the providential soul, 
positioned within the social and economic cosmology of the post-revolutionary Atlantic, uses the 
market to exercise virtuous characteristics, and is shown signs of divine favor. Moreover, that 
citizen is already implicitly elected by inclusion within the hierarchies of race, gender, and 
economic success. The luck of Franklin’s text is no accidental phenomenon. Similarly, the 
invisible hand of Adam Smith’s is not some unnamable power of economy. I suggest that we 
name these forces: in a world in which economy shapes theology and theology shapes economy, 
luck is providence; the invisible hand is God.   
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This notion of election was premised upon but also challenged by the presence of the 
unfree within societies that espoused special economic and divine sanction. Atlantic history, 
literature, and literary history attest to the inextricability of works by authors canonical, 
noncanonical, white, nonwhite, enslaved, and free. My reading, therefore, will offer a 
perspective of Atlantic society as interactive, multivocal, and, in many cases, confused. The 
dissimilarity of responses to the impositions and opportunities of providential capitalism reveals 
both its centrality to Atlantic politics and culture and its seeming impenetrability for the subjects 
caught up in its ever-hastening current. With good reason, critics like Paul Gilroy and Anna 
Brickhouse have described the associations that linked North America, Europe, West Africa, and 
the Caribbean through slavery, commerce, social mobility, and cultural exchange as “Atlantic,” 
the “Black Atlantic,” or even the “Red Atlantic.”  
Gliroy famously draws readers’ and critics’ attentions to the cultural syncretism that 
defined Atlantic life and culture, even as it so often remained occluded by histories that looked to 
the highest members of the Atlantic’s hierarchies of race, class, gender, and nationality, rather 
than to the figures whose lives more fully represented those of the great bulk of Atlantic 
denizens. West Africans were kidnapped from kingdoms and villages by people who asserted 
their own Christianity alongside their capitalist purchasing and trading powers, and they were 
then forced to navigate the economies, religions, and polities that depended upon the value of 
their labor and their bodies, even as those polities often attempted to erase them from recorded 
sight. Caribbean slaves and maritime free black sailors all encountered the Americas not as a 
fixed state but as one of flux, of economic transaction, of political incubation, at once rigidly 
hierarchical and socially porous. 
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Brickhouse builds upon these insights to recognize the similar navigation experiences of 
Aboriginal Americans who were wrenched from their traditional homes, exchanged as slaves and 
servants, and returned to the Americas, already conversant in the languages, and religious and 
economic customs of Europe, to meet a new influx of foreign colonists. These individuals 
likewise encountered a social world held together through economic links given the aegis of 
divine authority. As a result, they were forced to traverse routes of trade and cultural exchange 
that mandated their position as embodiments of the Atlantic’s syncretic, exchange-oriented 
character.  
Whatever name readers and critics apply to this space and to this historical moment, such 
figures truly embody the social demands and experiences of Atlantic life, particularly in the 
period surrounding the convulsive revolutions taking place throughout the Americas, Europe, 
and the Caribbean. Often politically excluded, frequently the targets of narrative and historical 
erasure, the enslaved, the only partially free, the marginalized classes of Atlantic economies and 
polities encountered mobility, social disruption, personal commodification, and struggles to 
cultivate community at the centers of and at the fringes of the evolving social institutions that 
constellated the Atlantic. Their voices reveal the more truthful and more common experiences of 
life in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary providential capitalist Atlantic. I will investigate 
some of the necessarily innovative approaches they brought to bear upon a world that was 
organized around the dual significance of value, conversion, and economy, as terms to indicate 
both the marketplace and the divine intelligence within it.  
The central figures of Atlantic history are not necessarily white, wealthy, and politically 
empowered figures, but the individuals and groups these classes often exploited in an effort to 
order history around themselves. Olaudah Equiano, Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Briton Hammon—all 
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of these are names that writers like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson would just as soon 
relegate to subordinate roles in the history of the foundation of Atlantic society. Yet, as recent 
scholarship by critics like Brickhouse, Toni Wall Jaudon, Kelly Wisecup, and Saidiya Hartman 
demonstrates, these were the individuals who navigated the tense, buffeting currents of Atlantic 
cultural, spiritual, and political history in order to climb the ladder of providential capitalism or 
to carve out alternative communities within the providential capitalist Atlantic.vvi  
In fact, Jaudon and Wisecup reveal the ways in which Atlantic religious practices, both 
occult and normative both came into being as a result of and helped to produce the syncretic 
exchanges of Atlantic community. Their investigation of Obeah practices demonstrates the fact 
that the free and the unfree developed spiritual and supernatural beliefs in response both to each 
other and to the hermeneutic of power, economics, community, and polity in which all found 
themselves bound. These cultures all even came to believe in the supernatural influence of 
objects infused with social power, commodities, in short, given divine authority. These insights 
challenge assertions of normativity and difference in regard to supernatural cultures, further 
dismantling narratives of homogenous Americanism, and demonstrating the links of economy, 
social interaction, and theological interpretation that bound the cultures of the Atlantic. 
Hartman similarly reveals the tense but interactive power arrangements that defined the 
social life of the communities of the Atlantic. Her examination of the often bloody 
communication between the free and the unfree establishes the grounds upon which Atlantic 
societies formed—shared but violent, syncretic but exclusionary, hierarchical but permeable. 
This too presents a challenge to histories that locate American origin in the words and deeds of 
the powerful. In my study, I will similarly detail the emergence of Atlantic subjectivity through 
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the accounts of individuals who navigated the shoals and climbed the rigging that simultaneously 
linked and distanced freedom and unfreedom or even life and death. 
Building upon this work, I will use chapter one to discuss Olaudah Equiano, not as part of 
an English, West African, or North American polity, but as a prototypical Atlantic individual, a 
man defined by his mobility within and around the maritime Atlantic, who used that mobility to 
insist upon his own humanity, liberty, and spiritual transcendence. Equiano utilizes the language 
of covenant, election, and conversion to present himself as a man ascending both within an 
economy and within a Christian spiritual typology. In so doing, he stands in implicit contrast to 
the American revolutionary writers, like Jefferson and Franklin, who would seek to use 
providential capitalist ideology as an exclusionary social compact. Rather, Equiano uses it as a 
universal promise of election that transcends borders of race and class, and cares not for 
distinctions of nationality. 
At the same time, Equiano capitalizes on the same tactics as colonial writers in order to 
gain personal advantage within the Atlantic marketplace. He conflates the will of God with 
market directives, not only to negotiate and to argue for his own transcendence above slavery’s 
obliterative machinery, but also to extend projects of capitalist colonialism. Even after he finds 
release from slavery’s grip, he uses the language and ideology of providential capitalism to 
subdue others and to bend them to his will for financial gain. He also posits a system of colonial 
uplift for the African continent, a notion that builds upon the logic of hegemonic colonialism to 
empower and spread the hierarchies of providential capitalism throughout the Atlantic. 
Nevertheless, perhaps because he contains these seeming contradictions, Equiano embodies the 
modern Atlantic individual that revolutionary writers like Benjamin Franklin envisioned, albeit 
in a vessel they explicitly did not imagine. Thrifty, literate, lucky, and mobile, he takes full 
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advantage of the opportunities and pitfalls of providential capitalism in order to arrive at a place 
of freedom, self-expression, and advancement within the greater Atlantic. 
In chapter two I will further examine the kinds of mobile, alternative communities at sea 
of which Equiano was a part. Authors like Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Briton Hammon, John Jea, 
Venture Smith, and John Marrant reveal the different ways in which enslaved maritime laborers 
attempted to create community around common experiences of suffering, commodification, and 
Christian spiritualism. I will use the writing of these figures to complicate a picture of the 
communities that grew out of and gave power to the maritime providential capitalist Atlantic. 
Not all efforts at Atlantic community creation were successful. Some of these writers, 
especially Venture Smith, described potential humiliations, dislocations, and ruptures that could 
prevail in the maritime Atlantic. Such writers demonstrate that, just as some individuals could 
use the experiences of commodity conversion, exchange, and mobility to rise within the spiritual 
and financial hierarchies of the Atlantic, others could be crushed, dehumanized, and excluded by 
those same experiences. These authors demonstrate the ambivalent nature of individual life and 
attempts at community within economic and increasingly national Atlantic cultures that present 
themselves as divinely ordered. Their successes and their failures attest to the fact that the 
Atlantic as a market and as a social space remained both tantalizing and treacherous, a space in 
which individuals could succeed or fail, and in which communities could come together, or find 
themselves shattered or marginalized. 
The persistence and even struggles of such figures reveal the deceptive class and, 
particularly, racial binarism of many Atlantic texts. As Jace Weaver contends, “Atlantic world 
studies, which Gilroy so skillfully opened up, remain…largely a conversation about blacks and 
whites…an analysis of the Anglo-colonial world” (8). This is a fair critique, especially given the 
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prominence of texts like Olaudah Equiano’s in conversations about American and European 
literature and canon. Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the providential capitalist machinery and 
mindset is such that it transcends and, in some cases, even dismantles the borders of race, and 
certainly extends beyond a simple black-white dichotomy. The divine economy upon which 
Atlantic societies formulated notions of statehood, self, and spirit, empowered colonialist 
impulses, even as it forced individuals to navigate the labyrinthine routes of exchange and 
conversion in the Atlantic. Like Brickhouse, Weaver points out that “Western Hemisphere 
indigenes” traversed the same Atlantic routes as did black and white bodies, and with differing 
degrees of freedom. This group includes some 600,000 enslaved natives who circulated amongst 
the Caribbean, Europe, and North America (17). The same core elements of providential 
capitalism maintain their grip on this population as well. Conversion—forced or willing—, 
mobility, equivalent value and exchange, all became the primary means by which the self was 
measured, defined, and positioned by an economy that appeared divine and by a divinity that 
acted through the market. This is a fact that holds true for white sailors, black slaves, and 
aboriginal translators, alike. 
Nonwhite authors further insisted upon their own centrality in Atlantic culture through 
writing that demonstrates the blunt utility of providential capitalist tropes and ideas. Equiano, for 
instance, narrates his involvement with a proposed colony on Florida’s Miskito Coast, as one in 
which the author invokes his providential god for economic purposes. In so doing, he 
concentrates his own narrative of transcendence around a reenactment of the drama of encounter, 
exchange, and divine invocation with native peoples. I will use moments like this one in order to 
demonstrate that providential capitalism was both a shared cultural context for Atlantic writers of 
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all races, free or unfree, and a tool to be wielded for competitive purposes in the hierarchies of 
the Atlantic.  
Furthermore, the experiences of figures like Equiano often highlight through reflection 
both the promises and anxieties of other, ostensibly mainstream, communities within the 
Atlantic’s political, social, theological, and racial hierarchies. His voyage from slavery to 
freedom and along the routes of Atlantic trade, religious community, and publication market, for 
instance, puts into practice the ascension of Franklin’s imagined heroic socio-political citizen. He 
articulates the providential nature of the Franklin-esque figure of upward economic and personal 
ascension, and, in so doing, challenges the racial hierarchism underpinning that hero’s imagined 
journey. At the same time, his victory and even his proposal for the extension of Christian-
capitalist colonial adventure tests the ideological assumptions of white authors and individuals, 
many of whom never found themselves in the position to command the market as their supposed 
racial and classed inferior ultimately could. As is uniformly and undeniably true of life in the 
Atlantic, all of these groups interacted with one another, defined themselves with, among, and 
against one another, and worked both collaboratively and combatively to produce the Atlantic 
world. 
Meanwhile, a very different sort of ambivalence attends white slavery narratives by 
Royall Tyler, and maritime laboring narratives by Richard Henry Dana, centered upon the 
possibility that the commodifying logic of the slave markets might philosophically, 
economically, and, perhaps, spiritually attend white individuals and classes as well. Such texts 
offer a unique perspective from the ones presented by black maritime sailors. Rightly so, for 
their experiences in the market and in the cultures of the Atlantic are radically altered by their 
relative racial, class, and national status. Nevertheless, they too respond to frequently 
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dehumanizing power arrangements that come into being and that come to dominate Atlantic 
political and philosophical discourse through the marriage of economic ideology to providential 
theology.  
The often violent personal stakes of life within a system that commodifies bodies and 
souls become vividly clear later in works by Herman Melville and Edgar Allan Poe. These 
author’s works highlight the personally obliterative stakes for the individual caught up in the 
providential capitalist Atlantic system, a system in which the market makes demands upon the 
entire person, as a laborer, as a commodity, and as a spirit. These authors too offer very different 
perspectives on providential capitalism, but their conclusions—coming as they do on the cusp of 
another period of intense violent social rupture in the mid-nineteenth century—highlight the 
darker implications of that system. They demonstrate that the confusing and intersecting flux of 
syncretic spiritual and economic practices that emerged from the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary moments was coming to a head by the mid-point of the nineteenth century. If 
bloody and disruptive revolution initiated and necessitated new relationships of subjectivity and 
power in a socio-economy granted divine authority, these nihilistic accounts suggest that a new 
period of social and political rupture and violence was, perhaps, inevitable and that the individual 
may not—perhaps should not—survive it.  
The social perils for a national society attempting to use the philosophy of providential 
capitalism to announce and to expand itself would look different for readers of another sort of 
text—one that shifts the oceanic perspective to the shores of the urban metropole. Narratives by 
writers such as Charles Brockden Brown and George Lippard offer just this sort of vision, even 
if they too are strikingly different and emerge from unique literary and socio-historical traditions. 
These texts helped to develop and then to critique the American urban gothic genre. Brockden 
   Green 28 
 
Brown’s texts often contend with the relationship of the urban individual to the American 
frontier. Meanwhile, George Lippard’s investigate and critique many of the race and class 
hierarchies of the metropole, while looking forward to the probable apocalyptic termination of 
capitalist democracy. And yet, in their own way, each attests to the thrust and essential victory of 
providential capitalist power structures and beliefs in the post-revolutionary Atlantic. 
It is critical not to conflate these texts, as if they all speak in one voice or come to one 
conclusion. They resolutely do not. What they share, however, and what they help to illuminate, 
is the social context that emerged from the revolutionary Atlantic period, proliferated in the post-
revolutionary and Jacksonian periods, and came to a head by the middle of the nineteenth 
century. These are individual, and therefore unique, responses to the inescapable fact of a form 
of capitalist economy that operated as divine machinery upon individuals and communities.  
Some narratives from these periods vocally and enthusiastically articulate an ideology 
that unites capitalism and providential Christian virtue. These represent the ostensibly normative 
urtexts of Atlantic providential capitalism, even if, under scrutiny, they let slip much of the 
uncertainty and anxiety that was always latent in them. Weber, for example, quotes Benjamin 
Franklin’s dictum that “time is money,” to demonstrate the philosophy and quasi-theology 
beneath economic action (Weber 15). This is an innovation, Weber says, over older forms of 
capitalism, because it applies morality to market participation (17). However, Weber fails to 
acknowledge Franklin’s strategic and self-justifying motivations for invoking this ideology. 
Franklin and the other founding writers and politicians of the United States applied a moral 
imperative to capitalist economy not merely because contact with providential Christianity made 
an individual or a nation uniquely suited to succeed within capitalism, but also because the 
interrelation of capitalism and Christianity justified the creation of an expansive state, whose 
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identity, morals, and operations, especially with regard to its selective embrace of liberty, could 
be presented as sacred and inviolable. However, this need to assert divine sanction belies the 
author’s tenuous claims to authority. In a world governed by an economy of providential design, 
all individuals, slave, free, empowered, or commodified, were subject to the whims of forces 
they could never command to the degree that they might claim to do. 
Such texts are as much documents of their authors’ pursuits of racial, economic and 
hierarchically selective election as they are of their fears that those ideals might be out of reach. 
In the process of carrying forward myths of national foundation, earlier generations of 
Americanists also reinstantiated the biases, anxieties and superstitions embedded in such 
documents. What later chapters in this study will suggest, therefore, is that the anxieties the 
providential capitalist writers sought to suppress have always been more features than flaws of 
providential capitalist expressive culture. As time goes on, although thinkers, writers and critics 
will look to providential capitalist successes to envision national futures, their texts will reveal 
that the failures to ever truly master a system that, by definition, cannot be mastered, equally 
defines the providential capitalist age to follow. Fuller rightly points out that “Again building 
upon Miller’s work on the Puritans, Bercovitch would rewrite the earlier critic’s notion of the 
jeremiad as a dark and glowering id-like expression of the despairing New England Mind, 
portraying it instead as an essentially affirmative rhetoric designed to renovate the national 
mission by generation consensus” (134). My analysis will go even further than Fuller’s critique 
by essentially making that dissensus its subject. Indeed, the Puritans were in search of cohesion 
in a changing political, cultural, and spiritual world. However, their solution—celebrating the 
marriage of profitable expansion to public displays of election—was only one of many. Some 
individuals and communities would find this union similarly profitable. Others would find it 
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deeply and personally disturbing. Some would yoke it to projects of political establishment. 
Others would see it as an impediment to the instantiation of community. The revolutionary 
period would force individuals and communities to reckon with the emergence of transnational 
economies and their supposed divine origin in personal, social, and political terms in a much 
more pressing and widespread fashion. The evolution of mobile-market economies throughout 
the early part of the nineteenth century would make the project of contending with the 
overwhelming authority of transnational and divinely-ordained market logic urgent to the point 
of fearful inescapability. 
Chapter three will subsequently address the unsettling realities and social importance of 
white maritime captivity narratives for writers concerned with the production and cultivation of a 
racially-ordered Atlantic nationality, in order to explore the political, economic, and theological 
significance of this failure. In particular, I will discuss the anonymous Humanity in Algiers: or, 
the Story of Azem, along with Royall Tyler’s Algerine Captive, and Richard Henry Dana’s Two 
Years Before the Mast. These narratives at once formulated a white, nationalist identity, and 
revealed the destabilizing forces that would challenge or undermine that identity. The writers in 
this chapter could use the experiences of white slavery to assert white superiority or to cultivate a 
superior national identity. However, they could also reveal the instability of race, nationality, and 
class as signifiers of election. 
In particular, white slave and white wage-slave narratives reveal the tenuousness of 
whiteness, free-laborism, or national paeans to liberty in a system that thrives upon the 
dehumanizing commodification and exchange of even ostensibly free persons. Dana, for 
example, relates his experiences under a sadistic captain who threatens to “make” a white sailor 
into “a negro slave.” The captain’s threat is telling, for life among the maritime laboring classes 
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revolved around violent episodes of power and submission that simultaneously endangered 
claims to freedom and reasserted the distance between white laborers and black chattel slaves. 
Such episodes sketched the limits of freedom even within whiteness, while also reasserting the 
logic of racial hierarchy. At the same time, the threat reveals the imaginary, and, therefore, 
unstable, nature of racial formulations in the maritime Atlantic. Whiteness and liberty could be 
conferred and, just as easily, withdrawn. 
So too could definitions of election, and these texts demonstrate the spiritual dimensions 
of their racial, national, and class anxieties. In light of the potential reversals of race and class at 
sea, these writers admit that commodification could render any individual a thing, could take 
away their supposed special status, and could evacuate ostensible signifiers of election—like 
race and contract—of their stabilizing power. The superstitions surrounding commodification in 
these texts demonstrate the extent to which sailing laborers understood the philosophical 
implications of their potential depersonalization in the market. Moreover, these texts subvert the 
protective ideals of election to see it as, potentially, only the promise of exploitation and 
suffering. 
And so, I will explore both the explicit promise and the implicit anxiety of providential 
capitalist writing in the Atlantic maritime. Generations of critics, including Miller and 
Bercovitch, saw both capitalism and puritan Christianity as important but relatively discrete 
elements of the background context from which an Atlantic state evolved. This study, however, 
will argue that the more important development has larger transnational and transhistorical 
stakes, including stakes for the present global economy, and the globalized societies that take 
their cues from this crucial Atlantic moment. Mobile maritime cultures crucially demonstrate the 
oceanic landlessness that helped such a system to evolve. 
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The oceanic perspective, therefore, raises both theological and political questions. Kaplan 
responded to Miller by investigating “what Miller relegated to the unnarrated background.” With 
frank assertiveness, she names “the multiple histories of continental and overseas expansion, 
conquest, conflict, and resistance which have shaped the cultures of the United States and the 
cultures of those it has dominated within and beyond its geopolitical boundaries” (4). I will argue 
that, the geopolitical issues that Kaplan raises should embrace, rather than reject Miller’s 
contention that religion functioned as the driver of national expansion. The spiritual cultures that 
Miller and, later, Bercovitch celebrate, actually fit into the wider, messier world that Kaplan and 
even more recent critics, including the post-Gilroy wave of Atlantic scholars suggest that they 
ignore. The spiritual perspective is precisely the thing that allowed individuals and communities 
to contend with the political, personal, and social disruptions that exploded in the revolutionary 
period, expanded into the first half of the nineteenth century, and set the stage for the fights of 
national and social meaning in the second wave of bloody upheaval that rocked the Atlantic 
throughout that century’s second half. It is also precisely the thing that keeps these issues so 
current for today’s political and social climate. It was, indeed, reductive to position Christian 
spirituality as a driver of celebratory expansion, but it was not wrong to recognize its central role 
in the production of Atlantic community and identity. Wedded to the rise of transnational market 
capital that occurred during and after the revolutionary period and continued apace into the first 
half of the nineteenth century, a spiritual frame of reference and mode of interpretation 
established community parameters, presented daunting challenges to the situation of the self 
within social hierarchies, and offered individuals the puzzling issues with which they contended 
most personally and most potently. 
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To demonstrate this, I will also take up more recent scholarship from writers who place 
this political transformation in its mobile—and frequently oceanic—context. Indeed, central to 
this study will be the work of critics like Alexander Byrd, Sean X. Goudie, Edward E. Baptist, 
Lauren Benton, Vincent Carretta, Paul Baepler, and Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, who 
accept Paul Gilroy’s challenge from The Black Atlantic, to trace the routes of thought and lineage 
that defined the mobile reality of Atlantic history. Byrd, for example, focuses critical attention 
upon both the cultures of West Africa and the Caribbean that were disrupted and formed by 
diaspora, and the colonial enterprises of Sierra Leone and Nova Scotia as the sites of Atlantic 
cultural formation. Baptist, likewise, moves the terms of Atlantic discourse and subjectivity from 
the routes of trade to the plantation cultures that served as the social ports linking those routes.  
This study will likewise insist upon the importance of the synthesis of spiritual and economic 
processes to these mobile maritime encounters. Building upon such works, I will do more than 
trace the economic, political, or even spiritual movements and moments of Atlantic history 
throughout the Atlantic. Instead, I will demonstrate the diverse ways in which the maritime 
literature that emerged from this period of intense change would not and could not have 
developed if not in response to the deliberate but deeply ambivalent marriage of providential 
spirituality to market-oriented capitalism. 
I will also use these critical works to demonstrate that the moral questions related to 
economic systems—especially those dependent upon slavery—were not merely provincial or 
denominational concerns. Rather, they were demonstrative of a larger process by which 
capitalism transformed Christianity itself, and by which, simultaneously, Christian principles 
guided the evolution of capitalism in the Atlantic as a potentially colonizing hegemonic force. At 
the same time, I will expand upon the work of critics like Samuel Otter to reveal the fraught local 
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and national experiences of social and economic transformation in the post-revolutionary locales 
and ports that constellated the Atlantic, in order to draw links between economic and religious 
movements, and local and national historical events. Scholars like Brycchan Carey and Anna 
Brickhouse likewise demonstrate the contentious interrelation of spirituality, colonialism, 
national expansion, and commerce in the early colonial and later revolutionary periods, but they 
address neither Atlantic economy nor transnational spiritual traditions as the fully imbricated 
social structure that this study will illustrate. Building upon the work of such critics will allow 
me to demonstrate the theological implications of this, the most important of Atlantic economic 
and theological transformations. I argue that the analysis of that event, its production, its 
maintenance, and its social and personal effects is the major project of Atlantic studies.  
The following chapters will also take inspiration from critics like Ian Baucom and Avery 
Gordon, who discuss the uncanny aspects of both finance and Atlantic social formations that 
allowed the ghostly essences of individuals and communities to circulate within the material 
world, especially within a market that saw bodies and souls—whether alive or dead—as 
commodities open to trade, transportation, transaction, and disposal. In these chapters, I will take 
up Baucom’s work of situating history around moments of uncanny capital signification, rather 
than around moments of political breakthrough. At the same time, I will draw upon Joseph 
Roach’s work, recognizing that beliefs about death and the dead reinstantiated social and 
economic hierarchies throughout the Atlantic.  
Baucom observes the tragedy of the Zong massacre and finds in it evidence for the 
totalizing and dehumanizing logic of commodity allegorization. He sees the transformation of 
persons into things in the market and in the ledger books of the insurance trade as defining 
eighteenth-century innovations. I will look to Baucom’s analysis, but add a spiritual critique. 
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This market transformation initiated a new perspective of the body and its soul, as elements of a 
person trapped in the market-turned Kingdom, even after death.  
Roach uses spaces marked by death, such as the killing fields, the parade-grounds for the 
dead, and, in particular, the cemetery, to recognize the intersections of class and spiritual beliefs. 
He observes that class-distinctions in the social and power relations among the living are 
replicated in rituals surrounding death, throughout the slave-holding, and post-slavery Atlantic. 
This observation further dismantles early interpretations of Americanist social foundation 
emerging from triumphant religious and political events, by recognizing the inescapability, even 
across the boundaries of life and death, of the very class formations that those earlier histories 
ignored. I will use this scholarship to demonstrate the fact that, in the providential capitalist 
Atlantic, class itself became one more register of divine election, and one more sign that the 
divine hand operated through the marketplace. 
Avery Gordon similarly recognizes the supernatural resonances in social interactions, 
when she observes the “haunted” continuance of social and personal trauma. Haunting, for 
Gordon, maintains the social traumas, the histories, the personal appearances and disappearances 
attendant to societies whose constructions of power and sociality are more infused with 
supernatural uncanny than they might admit. I will situate these notions specifically in the 
Atlantic during the revolutionary, post-revolutionary, and early nineteenth century periods, 
because there too polities developed around beliefs that were often supernatural, even if they 
were not invoked as such. Moreover, I will build upon her ideas to present the Atlantic as a space 
supernaturally haunted by the seemingly ordinary actions of day-to-day market capital, and to 
see individual persons as vessels haunted by their immaterial existence in both the market and in 
the mind of the god that controls it.  
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Moreover, I will reinterpret Colin Dayan’s discussion of sacred fetish objects and 
ritualistic practices as not only responses to, but endemic parts of an Atlantic spiritual culture 
that was inextricably tied to Atlantic economic culture. Dayan describes a kind of reliquary 
religious tradition among the diverse racial and class groups of Haiti during and after the 
revolution. She uncovers tantalizing links between vodou ritual and storytelling practices, and I 
will focus, in particular, upon her readings of traditions related to supernatural embodiment. I 
will argue that the same logic that leads these spiritual cultures to view material objects as 
repositories for sacred, supernatural, and social forces pertains in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century market practices. There too commodified objects and even human beings take on the 
sacred forces of the market that orders their movements throughout mobile Atlantic societies. 
Stephen Greenblatt observes a similar fetishization process in a colonial context, writing, 
"Where Roman law had seen objects transformed into possessions through bodily presence, here 
objects—the mute rocks—are transformed through such presence into sacred artifacts, that is, 
into objects infused with the manifest will and residual power of their maker" (39). I will reframe 
this fetishization process as a form of spiritual commodification: the transformation of a 
transactional thing into a repository for social interactions through a process that is equally 
economic and spiritual. I will build upon this logic of the sacred aspect of fetish objects, apply it 
to market commodities, and then, using Baucom and others, apply the logic of commodification 
to human bodies. In this way, I will demonstrate that, within the Atlantic system, human beings 
held both sacred and economic value, no different from the sacred stones or fetish objects that 
Dayan and Greenblatt describe, or even from the socially communicative fetishized currency that 
Marx describes. The body becomes all of these things, a home for a soul and for potential or real 
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labor interactions, and, therefore, becomes a valuable commodity in the providential capitalist 
Atlantic marketplace. 
 Indeed, the concept of the word made flesh anticipates and haunts a central conceit of 
commodity fetishism—that of the value embodied in the fetish object. Greenblatt, observing the 
power of objects to contain this sort of social value in colonial contexts, writes that, "replacement 
and renewal are possible precisely because the representation does not depend upon the claim of 
an intrinsic, material value...but solely upon…authority…Conversely the magnitude of that 
authority is constantly reaffirmed in the subjects' willingness to treat worthless objects as signs 
of wealth and tokens of exchange" (37). Greenblatt here describes contracts, speech acts, totemic 
exchanges—the technologies that announce colonial encounter, peaceful or, more frequently, 
violent. However, the same logic applies for the commodities that travel throughout the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary Atlantic market, as well as for the individuals who, 
themselves, act as commodities in the very same ways. With this in mind, Arendt is correct when 
she writes, “value consists solely in the esteem of the public realm where things appear as 
commodities, and it is neither labor, nor work, nor capital, nor profit, nor material which bestows 
such value upon an object, but only and exclusively the public realm where it appears to be 
esteemed, demanded, or neglected. Value is the quality a thing can never possess in privacy but 
acquires automatically the moment it appears in public” (Arendt 164). However, the individual 
saw the public both as a marketplace and as a divine kingdom, both potentially ennobling and 
obliterative. I will both examine individual responses to this market-oriented society, and use 
those responses to sketch and define the parameters of that transnational society. 
I will, therefore, use chapter four to explore the symbolic and literal human sacrifices that 
served as the communion events in the church of sacred capital. Herman Melville’s Redburn: 
   Green 38 
 
His First Voyage and Edgar Allan Poe’s The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket both 
revolve around uncanny moments of commodification, communion, and sacrifice. As they do, 
they comment upon the commodity anxiety of white authors and audiences, as well as upon the 
necessary violence of consumption, exchange, and loss that secured Atlantic capital.  
Redburn, for example, offers the story of a naïve youth’s first humiliating encounters 
with Atlantic maritime capitalism. The titular Redburn does find election, but finds it among 
similarly suffering and commodified laborers. Likewise, he comes of age with knowledge of the 
natural order of the world and society, but discovers that it is eternally possessive, unreliable, and 
sharkish. Finally, he learns, in moments of shocking and uncanny violence, that his 
commodification is total, both bodily and spiritual, and that there is no escape from his 
commodity status within the Atlantic market. 
Poe’s Pym learns similarly harsh lessons about his place within the cosmology of 
Atlantic providential capitalism. Even more explicit than Redburn, Pym is a text interested in the 
supernatural causes and effects of commodification. Pym’s maritime market is, it seems, 
supernaturally ordered and ordained and, as such, the violence and sacrifices that occur in the 
text serve dual economic and spiritual functions. As Pym finds himself engaged in ghastly rituals 
of cannibalistic communion, he discovers that the universe revolves around the logic of 
consumption and that he must learn to consume, lest he be consumed by the inescapable 
providential capitalist cosmos. 
I will produce a reading of this text that will uncover the personal, political, racial, and 
social significance of capitalist practices cast into pre-capitalist terms, such as sacrifice and 
haunting. I will demonstrate that this narrative articulates an understanding of the self that rests 
upon the dual economic and moral significance of “value,” which pertains on both sides of the 
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ledger board of the living and the dead. Divinity and the market work in concert upon one 
individual, exerting the same pressures and elevating the same values upon him or her and upon 
the society in which he or she lives, works, and dies.  This is not an endorsement of the Atlantic 
economy’s most destabilizing or dehumanizing tendencies, but a recognition of an emergent and 
increasingly potent philosophy uniting capitalism to providential theology, and a roadmap for 
how to survive it.  
Of course, personal, social, and ideological survival remained a pressing matter for the 
metropoles bound by Atlantic commerce, as much as for the individuals and communities whose 
mobility linked them. I will therefore also add to early contextual explorations of capitalism and 
spirituality by examining the ways in which an imaginary frontier helped to construct 
relationships of core and periphery that, as scholars like Jennifer Rae Greeson, have pointed out, 
had important consequences for state-creation and identification. To offer just one example, 
Walter Johnson describes the way that the failure of a supposed slave-rebellion, or “apocalypse,” 
organized by the famous bandit and con-man, John Murrell, suggested the full Atlantic scope of 
slavery as an economic and social threat to national unity in the Atlantic. Johnson writes, “The 
sovereign boundary drawn around the slave South at the beginning of the nineteenth century was 
exposed in Murrell’s plan as a comforting illusion of territorial and historical isolation” (68). 
This is true, but the significance of boundary status goes beyond questions of political 
sovereignty. New England, the American South, the Caribbean, West Africa, and Europe were 
linked in a transactional economy and culture from the first moments of encounter and cultural 
exchange. Moreover, as Wendy Warren reminds readers, commodities were of value at all points 
in this economy. As a result, narratives of social encounter and frontier are also stories of 
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economic transaction, and, more pressingly, of the individual’s and the state’s positions in and 
responses to a cosmology of divine economy. 
Geographical, economic, and spiritual frontiers invited writers and politicians to argue 
over the meaning of nationalism built upon exceptionalism, colonial hegemony premised upon 
Christian vocation, and capitalist expansion developed through personal and social virtue. Those 
who embraced this conceit echoed the sentiments of the “English Traveler” that Bercovitch 
quotes describing the nation in terms of “Wealth and Conquest...striking traits of grandeur and 
magnificence, which the Divine Economist...reserved to crown the closing scene” (114). 
Bercovitch’s vision of an “American Jeremiad” also premised “American exceptionalism...in 
terms of an increasingly pervasive middle-class hegemony” (xiii). This extends such that many 
see “the city on a hill as a model of middle-class economy” (110). This also includes expansion: 
“it implies a form of community without geographical boundaries, since the wilderness is by 
definition unbounded, the terra profana...yet to be conquered, step by inevitable step, by the 
advancing armies of Christ” (26). Thus, any territory not annexed to this American state was 
wilderness, demonic, and peopled with demons. Any projects to expand the American territory 
were projects of bringing God to a godless wilderness. 
However, as many later Atlantic scholars will demonstrate, this view of colonial America 
as an outpost within or against the unclaimed wilderness is deeply misleading. In fact, colonial 
America was just one part of a wide-ranging system of Atlantic commerce that brought ideas 
along with goods from all of the far-flung ports of Atlantic society. Even in the most “Yankee”-
centric texts, which attempt to assert stability against the instability of Atlantic life, the mobile 
displacement of Atlantic authors’ experiences reveals the endlessly peripheral nature of Atlantic 
community. At the same time that writers like Franklin used the language of providential 
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capitalism to assert the importance of their citizenry in history, they were being used to calculate 
a system of Atlantic commerce, which they described as divinely ordered, but which saw them as 
only one part in a grand economic cosmology. 
Claims to geographical isolation or ideological purity were open to critique, especially as 
the nation attempted to define itself in the wake of revolution. Accordingly, writers like Charles 
Brockden Brown narrated the intimate connections between the supposedly morally superior 
North and the supposedly decadent South, as a result of continued economic codependence. In 
fact, as Warren points out, those links were always present. She observes that “John Winthrop’s 
brother-in-law Emmanuel Downing, a lawyer of the inner Temple in London, and a prominent 
member of his church, had profit on his mind when he wrote in 1645 to Winthrop to encourage 
war with the Narragansett Indians in order to eventually create profits in Barbados” (95). And so, 
from the very start of North American colonialism and broader Atlantic expansion, economics, 
cultural exclusivity, and the church, were all mutually involved in the same transnational 
ideological system and the same attendant moral and theological challenges.  
Chapter five will consequently follow the routes of Atlantic providential capitalism back 
to shore, to examine how they reveal the peripheral status of the post-revolutionary-era North 
American metropolis, and pose troubling questions for the emergent nation. In Charles Brockden 
Brown’s Arthur Mervyn or Memoirs of the Year 1793, the logics of commodification, mastery, 
and abuse become central tenets of the national self. Moreover, Brockden Brown crafts a 
narrative that reconceives the city at the center of the new American nation’s political and 
imaginary self as a frontier space, an area through which flows Atlantic capital, and which 
remains connected to the broader Atlantic through business, personal relations, and even disease. 
In particular, white women in peril become the focal points through which to examine and to 
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critique a national culture that is subservient to and dependent upon an Atlantic economy of 
racialized subjugation, violence, and captivity. Brockden Brown’s focus upon these captive 
figures also permits him to challenge the nostalgic urge that framed the United States as an 
outpost of safety in an imagined frontier, even as it actively imperiled its own subjects and 
citizens. 
It is difficult to overstate the utility of a past that provided a providential basis for the 
extension of both capitalist markets and national polities as the post-revolutionary period 
evolved, and those polities attempted—and often failed—to stabilize into the nineteenth century.  
As Bercovitch wrote, “The American was not...a member of ‘the people.’ He stood for an errand 
that was limitless in effect...Thus (in the notorious paradox of the Declaration of Independence) 
he could denounce servitude, oppression and inadequate representation while concerning himself 
least (if at all) with the most enslaved, oppressed and inadequately represented group” (153). 
From the earliest moments, this view of a fallen state and a promised future was central to the 
American project. It was also central to the study of that project. Perry Miller, for instance, 
explained how the jeremiad inculcates a sense of struggle to be overcome, and argues that the 
same principle becomes confused in the moment of victory (33). However, Miller stopped short 
of noting the way that capitalism offers an endless thrust, which allows jeremiad to go on 
forever. In providential capitalism, there is no ultimate victory to recover from, only endless 
potential victories to look forward to in the future. Even so, this is a system defined by mobility, 
exchange, by the transferrable value of the individual, and by the construction of the state as a 
part of a constantly reassembling transnational market. Consequently, it appears that that victory 
belongs not to the individual, or even to the society of which it was a part, but to the divine 
market that enfolds them both. 
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The approach to history and to literary history that Miller and even Bercovitch 
entertained has elicited significant critical pushback. Rightly so, for American Studies and 
broader Atlantic studies have revealed a world of intersecting cultures, power arrangements, and 
expressive literary communities that cannot possibly be contained by readings that offer voice to 
writers like Mather or even Emerson but deny it to writers like Equiano. Nevertheless, this work 
was onto something: the revolutionary era exploded proto-national cultures with providential 
religion at their heart. What these earlier critical responses failed to see, however, was the way in 
which that explosion initiated a period of competitive confrontations between the individual and 
social subject and the econo-spiritual world in which they were housed—confrontations that 
were at the very center of the Atlantic metropole. 
Brycchan Carey, for example, describes the long period of struggle through which 
Philadelphia Quakers had to pass in order to disentangle themselves from the economy of 
Atlantic slavery. Similarly, Johnson reminds readers that, during the nineteenth century, “the 
history being made in the South was not the history that the slaveholders and cotton factors told 
themselves they were making, but another sort of history entirely. It was a history being made by 
their black slaves. And though that real history was evident every day in the physical labor with 
which those slaves created ‘the country,’ it was yet hidden from view by the forced conversion 
of their labor into wealth credited to the substance of their masters and by a stage-prop 
sovereignty designed to convince them they were alone in the world” (68). Attempts by people 
like John Murrell to disrupt the hierarchies of power in the Atlantic economy would further 
underscore the extent to which ostensibly marginalized individuals were actually central to the 
cultural and economic life of Atlantic societies. Johnson writes that Murrell “would pry the 
history of the South away from that of the United States and reattach it to the history being made 
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in what we would today call the Black Atlantic: in Haiti, where blacks had been ruling 
themselves for forty years; in the West Indies, where the slaves had gained their full freedom in 
1834; and in South America, where, he would assure them, there were many thousands ready to 
join them in arms” (68-9). Both Johnson and Carey offer valuable insights into the processes of 
cultural formation and disruption that took place among different communities within the 
Atlantic economy. However, if readers approach these histories in isolation, they will fail to see 
the full scope of Atlantic society and its impact on individuals and social groups. The Atlantic 
was an economy run on the backs of the enslaved, and a community of mobile displaced 
individuals. It was also a kind of church. Nationalist rhetoric produced and clashed with 
democratic ideals. Economic entanglements created moral questions. Spiritual beliefs directed 
economic behavior. Individuals and individual souls were commodified or empowered. All of 
this happened within a constellated geography of one culture, composed of many cultures, all 
abiding by the same universal truth: that the market was divine and that the universe was market-
oriented. 
These Atlantic spaces, their inhabitants, and the individuals who spent their lives 
traversing the routes that connected them all shared a belief in the natural ordination and 
application of economic principles as social and even spiritual truths, and believed that evidence 
of divine order appeared in the market that bound them all together. Indeed, this had to be true in 
order for the economy of the Atlantic, along with the cultures that fed into that economy, to 
function. These cultures were rigidly hierarchical, often oppressively violent, and committed to 
an economy that used the individual to enlarge the Atlantic marketplace. To exist as such, these 
societies also had to demonstrate the spiritual dimensions of the market, and the market 
dimensions of the spirit-world. Vincent Brown, for example, notes that “slave masters 
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throughout the Caribbean used spiritual terror to deter Africans from self-destruction” that would 
allow them to escape slavery. They also used this “spiritual terror” in order to ritualistically 
perform their mastery over slaves even beyond the boundaries of life and death (133). Moreover, 
Brown observes, “the rites of legal practice likened judges to God, and thus they seemingly 
derived their authority from the divine” (138). Legal, economic, and spiritual authority were 
bound together in the Atlantic, whether in New England, the Chesapeake, the Caribbean, or West 
Africa, as different faces of the same universal system, the same divine economy or economic 
divine kingdom. And yet, as cohesive and unifying as that system could be, it was also 
dangerous: for it made the moral perils of slavery, commodification, and violence universally 
inescapable. 
Indeed, as chapter six will demonstrate, in the economy of Atlantic providential 
capitalism, the nation’s very soul was at risk of violent assault. George Lippard’s The Quaker 
City: Or, The Monks of Monk Hall amplifies the supernatural and spiritual resonances of the 
nation’s continued involvement with and reliance upon Atlantic capital’s most abusive structures 
and demonstrates their inextricability from the metropole’s claims to productivity and cultural 
authority. Lippard’s Philadelphia is a society that proclaims the virtues of providential capitalism 
but remains deeply involved in the violence, vice, and abuse of commodity capital at its worst. 
The prophecies and dreams that occur in the novel therefore critique the ostensibly virtuous basis 
of covenanted capitalism seized upon by opportunistic capitalists and politicians throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even as they look forward to an apocalyptic clash of 
democratic and capitalist ideals. Society, the novel posits, is a series of rigged games, in which 
everyone and everything is open to exploitation, capture, and commodification. 
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Moreover, the nature of that commodification suggests the deepening of long-held 
providential capitalist anxieties over the status of the body and the soul in Atlantic society. 
Lippard’s hybrid, seemingly post-human Devil-Bug thus asserts his claim as the prototypical 
Atlantic individual—syncretic, vicious, and dehumanized. Looking back to what colonial and 
revolutionary thinkers promised and forward to what was to come, Lippard insists that 
providential capital does not produce a society that mirrors the Kingdom of Heaven, but, instead, 
produces one that resembles Monk-Hall, a debased hive of mutual deceit, zombie-like 
dehumanization, and universal depravity, careening toward divine judgement and apocalyptic 
ruin. 
The revolutionary moment produced possibilities for secular expansion, for national 
hegemony, for new arrangements of labor conditions, for new hierarchies of race, nationality, 
sex, and spiritual affiliation. The moment also exposed the instability and competition that was 
always already there and that would produce collisions of race, citizenship, and liberty by mid-
century. Fuller writes, “In hindsight, what [cold war] studies share is a critical exploration of 
what was described as the distinctive nature of American thought and writing: its 
‘Americanness’ In the process, they often blended historical and aesthetic concerns in ways that 
strengthened and consolidated a set of themes and myths, authors and canons” (123). This study 
will not reengage such blanket social and political assertions. However, it will recognize that, 
from the competition over ideas, over social arrangements, over property, and over the self 
emerged the defining and most productive philosophical union of the post-revolutionary age: of 
providential theology to capitalist ideology in the form of providential capitalism. Providential 
capitalism, materialized as the historical, ideological, and theological trends, to which the works 
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in this study respond, foreclosed other possibilities as it came to dominate Atlantic life and 
letters.  
All of the texts that this study examines take different approaches to the challenges of 
situating the self or the society within a divine-economic cosmology. Narratives that use the 
language of exchange and covenant to define an upwardly mobile self within a system that 
would otherwise deny their authors’ humanity revel in the promises extended by this system. 
Conversely, narratives that probe the anxiety produced by the conflation of spirituality and 
finance reveal the dark undercurrents of personal and social peril at the heart of the selfsame 
structures of power, economy, and society. These texts are quite different, the circumstances of 
their production are unique, but their subject is, in some ways, ultimately the same: the 
individual confronted by a divine economic social world. 
In the wake of the revolutionary, post-revolutionary, and early nineteenth-century 
periods, in response to the mass experiences of social disruption, commodification, and exchange 
that defined those periods, individuals would learn how to assert their value, with its multiple 
economic, spiritual, and cultural meanings, within a divine, commercial, and increasingly 
nationalistic context. Other individuals would find themselves marginalized by these forces, 
attempting to create bonds of community, only to find their efforts frustrated by the same forces 
that elevated other individuals and other groups. Still others would learn the harsh truths inherent 
to the philosophy of providential capitalism: that the economy of market and spirit requires 
sacrifice and dehumanizing commodification, and enlarges itself whether individuals succeed or 
fail. 
This is the tradition with which these figures had to contend and to which they turned. 
Enlightenment thinkers, Atlantic authors of fiction, maritime explorers, and diasporic 
   Green 48 
 
autobiographers all addressed the post-revolutionary Atlantic by explicitly or implicitly invoking 
a philosophical position that flowered during their historical moment, that competed with other 
possibilities for social organization, and that became dominant, stabilizing, and self-justifying in 
the wake of revolutionary disruptions. They did so by recognizing the power not only of 
generalized spirituality, not only of capital, not only even of the marriage of the two. Rather, they 
faced the marriage of a particularly market-oriented capital exchange to a particularly 
providential vision of divine order and intervention. This was an explanation of and justification 
for Atlantic capital on the grounds that it contained prearranged logic and extended signs of 
election to those who fit within the plans of a divine intelligence.  
In this study, therefore, I will position providential spirituality fused to market economy 
at the center of the social history of Atlantic discourse and expressive production—a centrality 
too often ignored—while resisting the overly reductive gestures toward national foundation 
mythology found in the scholarship of earlier generations. As the forces of nationalism became 
more pronounced during this period, the conflation of providential and capitalist definitions of 
“value,” and the dual economic and divine mechanisms by which individuals and societies were 
positioned and ordered raised pressing questions about the future—questions that readers and 
critics, alike, miss if they ignore the spiritual basis of revolutionary Atlantic market development, 
or the capitalist operations of Atlantic spiritual culture. Would liberty extend to all? Was liberty 
even possible in such a system? Were humans made powerful by their value in the marketplace 
or were they reduced to mere things to be exchanged for other commodities? In ways large and 
small, positive and negative, individuals and communities learned the same lesson: that the 
Atlantic world announced by colonialism, enlarged by trade, and fomented by revolutionary 
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social identification was engineered by a new philosophy in which the economy was divine and 
God was alive in the market.  
In today’s political and social climate, in which the philosophy of divinely ordained 
wealth, of value demonstrated through economic success, of election as economic reward is 
ascendant, a study that engages with the emergence of that philosophy is more vital than ever. 
Understanding the ways in which Atlantic societies organized their politics, their ideologies, 
their social hierarchies, their theologies around a simple but revolutionary idea—that individuals 
were placed within an economic world by an interventionist god—will allow readers, critics, 
historians, and citizens to understand this current moment, as well as to comprehend the 
significance of the spread of Atlantic social arrangements to the broader world. For post-
revolutionary thinkers and writers, and, indeed, for current politicians, writers, societies, and 
individuals, God acted through the market and that market was an expression of God.  
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Chapter 1 
A Particular Favourite of Heaven: Olaudah Equiano and the God of the Marketplace 
   Green 51 
 
Sometime in the year 1765, during one of the brief periods ashore that punctuated his 
long circuitous life at sea, Olaudah Equiano, a slave, an able sailor, and respected member of a 
merchant ship’s crew, had two visions of his impending freedom. The presentation of these 
visions could not be more different: one arrives in the form of a commercial evaluation, a 
performance review that portends a bright future for a laborer who goes out of his way to make 
himself indispensable; the other appears in a dream, requiring interpretation by a local “Wise 
Woman,” who promises an imminent end to a period of suffering. One of these predictions is 
announced by the cold calculating language of commerce and value, the other by the awed tones 
of the supernatural divine. By 1766, Olaudah Equiano would accomplish his manumission and 
find himself legally converted into a free man. As a result, these visions—these very different 
ways of interpreting and interacting with the concepts of liberty, providence, election, and 
finance—coalesce in Equiano’s fateful narrative. The logic of the capitalist market and the belief 
systems of supernatural providence cohere, through Equiano’s autobiographical history, into 
equal parts of a grand cosmological whole that works upon and within individuals to position 
them in an Atlantic that is divinely ordered and economically animated. Equiano’s narrative of 
conversion sees him transform from a subject upon whom the logic and mechanisms of the 
Atlantic market are forced, into an agent of the Atlantic market, who gains mastery over and 
eventually learns to manipulate the rhetorical power of providential and capitalist language for 
his own ends. For Olaudah Equiano, the mobility and exchange logic of the Atlantic market are 
expressions of providential intelligence and allow him to ascend ever closer to election.  
The Olaudah Equiano readers meet in The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah 
Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the African is both an evidently elect individual and an explicitly 
marketable commodity, making him ideally situated to demonstrate the personal effects of 
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eighteenth-century capitalism and providential Christianity, when they work in tandem through 
providential capitalism. Equiano’s status as a racialized and commodified subject both aids and 
delimits his navigation of the Atlantic’s networks of trade, religion, and migration and he 
interprets all of his movements through a firm belief in his own providential election. He writes, 
“I regard myself as a particular favourite of Heaven, and acknowledge the mercies of Providence 
in every occurrence in my life” (9-10). Equiano also articulates a nuanced critique of the 
mysterious workings of this system, which privileges special knowledge, requires faith in 
inscrutable logic, rewards mastery based upon domination, and encourages exploitation. While 
contemporary critical debates over Equiano’s originary or national status belie the hegemonic 
and nationalist impulses to claim successful participants in Atlantic history, Equiano’s narrative 
is one of circular Atlantic mobility reimagined as personal transcendence. For Equiano, the 
invisible hand of the market is paired with the invisible hand of an interventionist Christian god, 
and faith is revealed as a matter of mobile commercial competition. 
It is unfortunate that so much of Equiano’s curated narrative of self has been obscured by 
questions of its authenticity or anthropological importance.vii Brycchan Carey, for example has 
outlined the bitter debate about Equiano’s narrative’s anthropological verifiability, especially 
surrounding his description of his birth, early life, and experience with the middle passage. In 
truth, this critical fight to claim Equiano is about more than asserting “firstness.” Rather, it is 
about subsuming Equiano’s individual success story into one hegemonic national myth or 
another, in order to transform his narrative into proof of American or English or even West 
African cultural primacy, rather than to see it is a product of broader Atlantic mobility and 
displacement. However, as a narrative figure, Equiano presents himself as a truly Atlantic 
subject, an active participant in the culture and commerce of the Atlantic world. Wherever he 
   Green 53 
 
was born, he is a product of Atlantic modernity and comes to embrace its possibilities and suffer 
its perils. Though it provides fascinating anthropological insight, his narrative is less interested in 
documenting Atlantic history than it is in articulating a philosophy that makes sense of that 
history. Yes, he acknowledges, the systems of trade, exchange, and finance produce violence and 
dehumanization, but, he argues, they also offer individual opportunities to successfully navigate 
the market and to find salvation through acceptance of a providential intelligence that operates 
through market economy.  
Furthermore, Equiano uses his autobiography to grant himself a voice and volition, and to 
demonstrate his own fulfillment of a providential promise of ultimate salvation. Even as his 
narrative shows readers a commodity figure, a body with a transactional value, the textual 
version of Equiano is empowered by his dawning awareness of his authorial self. He is a man, 
made into a commodity, and reawakening to and reasserting his humanity through authorship. 
He does so gradually, by accruing value as both a commodity subject and as an elected vessel of 
divine providential will. As Ian Baucom makes clear, this reliance upon the allegorical is a 
unique feature of capitalism, capitalist modernity, and the modern novel (215-219). The 
eighteenth and nineteenth century systems of exchange transformed, for example, grain from a 
consumable food source into a commodity with a variable exchange rate, and permitted that rate 
to change, depending upon the logic or caprice of an immeasurably complex invisible network of 
trade and commerce. This system also transformed individuals into commodities with equally 
variable exchange rates. This was true of all individuals who participated in the capitalist system, 
but, for obvious reasons, especially so for slaves. Recognizing this, Equiano treats himself, both 
allegorically and literally, as a commodity to be evaluated, traded and exchanged, who, over the 
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course of the narrative, uses his special status as God’s “particular favourite” to take control of 
his own trading and exchange processes.  
Given Equiano’s examination of the personal effects of the market’s allegorizing logic, 
the autobiography reads as, at once, a history of Atlantic exchange, a personal examination of the 
slave experience, a roadmap toward a particular mode of self-liberation, and a proposal for the 
further advance of a kind of capitalist humanism. Stephen Shapiro notes the importance of 
allegorical evaluative exchange logic for the formation of the novel as a generic mode and, 
though it is, perhaps, not right to call Equiano’s autobiography a novel, it is also not quite right 
to call it an anthropological history. Rather, it contains elements of both, using a novelistic sense 
of the self as developing entity in order to personalize historical experiences, and commanding 
control over the text to position the author within a larger Atlantic history. As much as Equiano’s 
text is an examination of his own life or a creative work of identity-curation, it is a meditation 
upon the ambivalent process and meaning of conversion for a commodified individual embedded 
within the eighteenth century’s most important marketplaces: both the slave system and the 
merchant trading economy.  
The process of conversion—from one unit of exchange to another, or from unbeliever to 
believer—works as both the narrative arc of the text and its major theme. Moreover, the text that 
Equiano produces serves as proof of his conversion and a kind of commodity note in its own 
right, a covenant document asserting his freedom and symbolic value in Atlantic society. Finally, 
Equiano’s autobiography is not a blanket endorsement of capitalism. Capitalism, after all, 
produces the slave system he so vocally opposes. Rather, Equiano argues for a form of capitalist 
humanism that is virtuous and vocational, that uses the market to realize the will of God. There 
are, in this text, bad capitalists just as there are bad Christians. But Equiano presents himself as a 
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model virtuous Christian capitalist, at once made wealthier because of his adherence to Christian 
virtues and blessed for his effective navigation of the capitalist marketplace. He is specially 
selected and protected by God, so that he can use the marketplace to advance divine causes in the 
material world. The text and its protagonist wind a circular path around the Atlantic, even as they 
advance incrementally toward embodying an ideal of providential capitalism. 
This narrative arc is as important as any anthropological insights the text might contain, 
for it allows Equiano, the author, to critique slavery, and to examine capital’s role in the 
institution, even as he, ultimately, presents capitalism as a divinely ordered system by which 
individuals might attain liberty and salvation. In Freedom’s Empire, Laura Doyle argues that the 
literary and cultural fixation upon freedom and liberty develop out of an articulation of racial 
consciousness as a means of solidarity and individual striving for freedom and come at the 
expense of denying those virtues to others. She writes, “In Atlantic modernity, freedom is a race 
myth” (Doyle 3). This remains true for Equiano, whose narrative exploration of the routes of 
Atlantic trade notes and challenges the racial contours of liberty, mobility, value, and 
providence. He knows that Atlantic freedom isn’t extended to everybody, but imagines a 
providentially ordered form of capitalism that might redeem Atlantic modern societies from the 
sin of racial slavery and offer individual escape routes from racial barriers.  
Still, it is worth wondering whether he contributes a novelistic history that does as Doyle 
claims most Atlantic novels do: challenge paternal power structures without dismantling them 
(10). The same philosophy of individual providential election represented by the accumulation of 
economic value that Equiano champions, will also be taken up by proponents of racially, 
economically, and ideologically exclusive nationalist societies. If Equiano personalizes the 
conflation of providence and capitalism to show its treacherous but ultimately salvific potential, 
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other writers, politicians, and critics, including the founders of the United States, will use the 
same logic to erect political states that preach virtue and populism, even as they protect racial 
and economic power structures, and extend colonial hegemony abroad. 
Although Equiano evolves into a vocal abolitionist, his text also propounds the same 
capital-colonialist projects that relied upon and empowered the prodigious spread of slavery 
throughout the Atlantic. As a result, critical readers of Equiano should be willing to ask whether 
his narrative is a true forceful critique of the economic and philosophical roots of slavery or 
whether he too converts the “awe and terror” of exploitation into a personalized experience of 
sublime colonial and capitalist victory (Doyle 87). In The Intimacies of Four Continents, Lisa 
Lowe comments on the way Equiano’s autobiography participates in the literature of 
“liberalism” a form which “requires mediation through an aesthetic form that encourages readers 
to understand the emancipation of the individual as if it were a collective emancipation” (50).1 
This is essentially what Lowe, quoting Laura Doyle, calls a “liberty plot,” in which one man’s 
ascent toward liberty stands in for the implicit progressive liberation of a people, and occludes 
their continued bondage (Lowe 48).1 This corresponds with eighteenth and nineteenth century 
efforts to draw emancipation into the narrative of self and national liberation. As Lowe writes 
“the narrative of freedom overcoming slavery was canonized in British and European political 
and economic spheres, in discourses of citizenship, free labor, and free trade.” Nevertheless, “the 
desire for promised freedoms came to discipline and organize varieties of social subjects” (Lowe 
46). And so, Equiano’s was hardly the only black Atlantic subject to comment upon the 
liberationist peril and potential of the Atlantic marketplace. 
Indeed, readers might counter Equiano’s narrative with that of Ottobah Cugoano, whose 
Narrative of the Enslavement of Ottobah Cugoano, a Native of Africa, from 1787, explicitly 
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rejects the notion that slavery, an innately sinful and lawless practice, could be redeemed, even 
as it acts as a vehicle by which individuals find Christianity. He calls it in every way “not natural 
and innocent” despite the fact that it brings the unreformed into contact with the Christian God 
that he venerates and honors (51). He writes, “Sovereign goodness may eventually visit some 
men even in a state of slavery, but their slavery is not the cause of that event and benignity” (23). 
Nor does Cugoano shy away from wishing divine, even violent retribution upon enslavers who 
“are those cooks and men that would be roasted and saddled, it certainly would be no unpleasant 
sight to see them well roasted, saddled and bridled too” (16). Equiano is, by no means, a slaver 
of this sort, but his text is much more complicated than its antislavery reputation suggests, and, 
indeed, more ambivalent than Cugoano’s fierce antislavery discourse. Equiano challenges 
readers to reconcile his belief in the economy as an expression of God’s plan with his 
acknowledgement of capital’s abusive potential and, furthermore, with his own embrace of 
capitalist colonialism. 
Pilgrim’s Progress: The Conversion from Narrative to Authorial Self 
Even as Equiano, the protagonist, experiences capitalism at its worst, Equiano, the 
author, alludes to it at its best. He turns crises of identity into monuments to transcendent 
conversion, and traumas of displacement into opportunities to achieve individual liberty. 
Equiano learns through successive steps and conversions to navigate the Atlantic capitalist 
system, to leverage his own value as a traded commodity into the purchasing power necessary to 
buy his freedom. Then he uses his labor and value as a free laborer in the Atlantic marketplace to 
embrace and fulfill a vision of Christian providence and even goes on to promote colonialist 
schemes of reform based upon the mingling of Christian and capitalist ideals. The Interesting 
Narrative… is, therefore, a deeply ambivalent text, at once enthusiastic in its embrace of the 
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mobile possibilities of capital, and circumspect in its awareness of the dehumanizing brutality of 
human commodification. 
The authorial Equiano uses his narrative self to expose the worst elements of Atlantic 
capitalist trade, but also to assert and to model the ways an individual might navigate that system 
successfully. He writes that if the text “affords any satisfaction to my numerous friends, at whose 
request it has been written, or in the smallest degree promotes the interests of humanity, the ends 
for which it was undertaken will be fully attained” (Equiano 10). The autobiography is, at its 
heart, an argumentative performance, using personal anecdote and social history to promote 
specific interests. 
Indeed, the text emphasizes this split between author and subject, encouraging readers to 
engage with his account not as a strict autobiography, but as an imaginative and deeply personal 
argument for the union of Atlantic capitalism and providential Christianity. Gerard Genette uses 
the term, metalepsis to name this sort of experience, in which the walls between “the world in 
which one tells and the world of which one tells” break down (33). For example, to emphasize 
the distance between author and character, the authorial Equiano repeatedly quotes text with 
which the narrative Equiano could have had no experience, including Homer and Milton 
(Equiano 54; 81). Notably, the quotes the author chooses contextualize the character’s 
experiences as classical and humanist, the results of an ongoing developmental synthesis of 
Equiano’s West African heritage with European classical culture and Judeo-Christian religious 
traditions, that could only have come about through his immersion in the mobile routes of 
Atlantic trade. The text’s perspective is that of an author who has achieved the rewards of grace, 
literacy, and wealth, looking back at a character who has yet to receive these gifts. And they are 
gifts—providential signs of grace and election, that conflate freedom, special knowledge, and 
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economic success into the definition of Atlantic humanity. As Equiano says: “I blessed the Lord 
that I was so rich” (85). Freedom is a goal that Equiano can achieve only through economic 
means, through exchanges and purchases that build upon conversion logic, toward his own 
ultimate conversion into a free and elect man. At the same time, he attributes his successive steps 
toward that goal to providence. “Every day now brought me nearer my freedom” he writes, “and 
I was impatient till we proceeded again to sea, that I might have an opportunity of getting a sum 
large enough to purchase it…I laid in as large a cargo as I could, trusting to God’s Providence to 
prosper my undertaking” (97). In this way, he argues, the market can operate as the means of 
expressing providential will personally and in the world. 
Nevertheless, the narrative arc of Equiano’s life sees him plunged, by the Atlantic’s 
capitalist slave system, into terrifying isolation, separated from his family, and cut off from his 
ancestral culture and traditions. Whatever the real circumstances of Equiano’s enslavement or 
capture, his harrowing account of the middle passage demonstrates the essential depravity of a 
debased capitalism that has produced slavery. When he writes, of his “anxious wish for death to 
relieve me from all my pains,” Equiano personalizes the worst potential results of slave 
capitalism, while also exercising argumentative control over his autobiography in order to 
prepare readers to embrace a better, divinely ordered, capitalist experience (27). Such moments 
allow the author not only to relate (or invent) his life story, but also to present the Atlantic 
market’s dehumanizing abuses in the starkest possible terms. This is a system that strips him of 
family bonds. It transforms white Christians into figurative—and potentially literal—cannibals. 
It even strips Equiano of his identity. The authorial Equiano reasserts himself, so that his 
narrative’s subtitle, “the African,” is as much an act of defiance as it is of relation. He claims an 
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identity that is at once racially and geographically specific, and staunchly expressive of the fluid 
Atlantic mobility that has produced both the author and his work. 
As much as Equiano’s text uses his own shifting identity to argue for the salvific benefits 
of the mobile Atlantic market, it also uses a detailed catalogue of gains, losses and figures to 
demonstrate the intersections of commodity value and evolving Christian selfhood. The 
autobiography is, therefore, also a ledger book that uses economic events to narrate the 
conversion processes Equiano undergoes—from nonbeliever to believer, commodity to trader, 
and illiterate slave to free-laboring author. He tells readers, “I had but a very small capital to 
begin with…however I trusted to the Lord to be with me” (84). After a number of trips 
throughout the “general mart for the West Indies” he describes “finding my tumbler so 
profitable, with this one bit, I bought two tumblers more, and when I came back I sold them for 
two bits…when we went again I bought with these two bits four more…so that my capital now 
amounted in all to a dollar, well husbanded, and acquired in the space of a month or six weeks” 
(85). Equiano frames this catalogue of gains with invocations of trust in God, announcing his 
view of economic success as a sign of grace. He also primes the reader to view his economic 
exchanges as a kind of pilgrim’s progress toward a divinity that is communicated to the world 
through wealth, and toward the freedom that must be purchased at a particular price. As if to 
underscore the dual transformative significance of this potential exchange, Equiano relates it as a 
form of rebirth. Of a master’s promise to let him purchase his freedom, he writes, “The speech of 
the captain was like life to the dead to me” (93). The conversion and purchase process he 
outlines is here presented as a resurrection. Through sale, the commodity Equiano will die so that 
the expressive and freely purchasing Equiano may be born. 
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Choosing Salvation 
Still, though providence presents Equiano with opportunities to advance, he must actively 
choose to embrace them. Perry Miller explains that “covenant theory was an extremely 
subtle…device within the framework of predestination for arousing human activity; it permitted 
man to conceive of divine grace as an opportunity to strike a bargain, to do himself a good turn, 
to make a sure profit, as an occasion that comes at specific moments in time through the agency 
of natural means” (Miller, Seventeenth Century 394). Miller’s decision to use the language of 
business here is not coincidental. Acceptance of grace was, for providential Christians, a matter 
of negotiation: accepting the offer of election by realizing God’s plans and seizing momentary 
opportunities for personal advancement toward salvation. Though Miller directs his gaze 
squarely upon New England settlers, this logic maintains, perhaps, even more currency among 
subjects like Equiano, who undergo constant dramas of exchange, conversion, and circulation 
around the Atlantic marketplace. The life Equiano narrates in his autobiography is replete with 
the kinds of negotiated opportunities Miller names, but, as an unfree subject striving for freedom, 
the stakes of the bargain are always higher. Naturally then, Equiano performs the same act of 
conflation as the Plymouth writers, viewing economic transactions as moments of potential 
spiritual conversion toward grace: each transaction in which Equiano was involved was, quite 
literally, a moment in which the terms of his life were up for negotiated debate.   
So choice is both a sign of power and freedom, and a necessary precondition for 
accepting grace. To demonstrate this, Equiano narrates a debate over predestination with a fellow 
Christian. He asks “whether salvation by works, or by faith only in Christ” should ensure 
redemption. He allows his debate partner to answer in such a way as to reinforce Equiano’s own 
need to prepare actively for election. The man tells him “‘the law is a school-master to bring us 
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to Christ,’ who alone could, and did keep the commandments, and fulfilled all their requirements 
for his elect people…God would appear faithful in his judgments to the wicked, as he would be 
faithful in shewing mercy to those who were ordained to it before the world was” (141). 
Ultimately, Equiano concludes that, though elect, he must actively accept the role offered to him 
by God and undergo the trials of preparation that God sets before him, in order to test and train 
him for salvation.  
Equiano’s belief system allows the logic of commodification to reside comfortably within 
the logic of providence. A person is a valuable thing to be owned by God, a thing which can, 
through acts, enhance its value, and accept but not demand grace. The very first pages of his 
autobiography assert his elect status, but he still spends a great deal of the narrative preparing 
himself for salvation through conversion. He explains: “I determined to make every exertion to 
obtain my freedom…for this purpose I thought a knowledge of Navigation might be of use to 
me; for, though I did not intend to run away unless I should be ill-used, yet, in such a case, if I 
understood navigation, I might attempt my escape in our sloop” (90). This education process will 
prove necessary in his quest for liberation, and will also enable him to understand and freely 
embrace providential grace. He makes himself more and more valuable for the sake of a God 
who already owns him, hastening his union with his divine master.  
However, Equiano suffers under human owners who deny God’s spiritual and legal claim 
on his body and soul. His antislavery position actually evolves from a sense that human pride 
raises one individual over others and, in so doing, “gives one man a dominion over his fellows 
which God could never intend! For it raises the owner to a state as far above man as it depresses 
the slave below it” (80). Here Equiano employs a similar logic to that of an older generation of 
abolitionist writers. For example, Samuel Sewall’s 1700 The Selling of Joseph also notes the 
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illegality of human sale by essentially arguing that morality is a contractual obligation between 
humanity and God that overrides any bill of sale made between man and man. Sewall describes 
“This law being of Everlasting Equity, wherein Man Stealing is ranked amongst the most 
atrocious of Capital Crimes” (Sewall 9). He also explains that “Joseph was rightfully no more a 
slave to his brethren, than they were to him: and they had no more authority to sell him than they 
had to slay him” (8). Equiano makes a similar point of collapsing the barriers between legal 
freedom and divine election through text when he insists that baptism means he is no longer the 
sort of body that can be legally sold as property (Equiano 64). Essentially, he cannot be 
purchased as a slave, because he already belongs to God. Nonetheless, he must work to achieve 
the legal right to free choice in order to extricate himself from an illegitimate state of ownership 
and accept the grace that comes with God’s possession.  
Compact, Contract, and Literacy: Learning to Read and Write in the Market 
Equiano sees value accumulation and legal negotiations as the means by which to transfer 
himself into the hands of God, his sole rightful owner. To complete this process, he must remain 
open to constant upward conversions, but also develop the necessary understanding of how the 
legal and economic systems of the Atlantic operate. Perry Miller explains that, for the puritans, 
“the gracious man must acquire a knowledge of good and evil before he can will the one and 
reject the other” (Miller 282). Similarly, the processes of value accumulation detailed in 
Equiano’s autobiography are also imbricated with Equiano’s developing literacy. This is 
essential because, if Equiano hopes to navigate the market, he must learn to understand the way 
language can be used to oppress or to liberate, depending upon how it is used, and by whom. He 
must learn to utilize and, ultimately, to produce the necessary textual proof of conversion from 
slave to free, from unpaid to paid, from unreformed to baptized, that signals his conversion into a 
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man with liberty, grace, and purchasing power. Such texts are his personal covenants, promising 
legal and spiritual freedom, manhood, and inclusion.  
He first introduces the topic of literacy in the form of the hoary “talking book” trope, but 
subtly anticipates his growing desire to become an expressive writer, rather than just a passive 
reader. Though he admits putting the Bible to his ears and being disappointed to find “it 
remained silent,” he also explains that “I had a great curiosity to talk to the books” (42). From 
the start, Equiano’s relationship to books and, in particular, to divine text, is dialectical, premised 
upon a conversational back-and-forth that will continue throughout the narrative and culminate 
in the production of his own autobiographic account of providential deliverance. Later it will 
become clear that this dialogue must be carried out through the language of commerce and 
market economy, when a captain’s clerk teaches him to write “and gave [him] a smattering of 
arithmetic, as far as the Rule of Three” (62). This last point is essential, for it alludes both to the 
trinity and to the essential numeracy Equiano will need in order to navigate financial 
transactions. The language of Christian and capitalist symbolism collapses here into one 
overarching knowledge base that Equiano must master if he hopes to master himself. This lesson 
will make him a valuable member of any ship’s crew, but also empower him to challenge his 
commodified status and to claim his place among the Christian elect. In the Interesting 
Narrative, Equiano’s mastery of contract matches his mastery of text, and both allow him to 
overcome the power hierarchies of special and exclusive knowledge in the Atlantic world. 
Vincent L. Wimbush, referring to Equiano’s textual “scripturalization,” notes that the text 
presents reading as a kind of “magic,” practiced by specialized priests and guarded from 
unproven or unsanctified intruders. Wimbush observes that “insofar as the magic of the priests is 
held to be without limits, its operations and calculations held to be dazzling, mystifying, and left 
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unquestioned—to this extent it is lord and master” (Wimbush 47). Perhaps inadvertently, 
Wimbush’s language connotes the degree to which this gnostic interpretation of text explains 
Equiano’s relationship to the market as well. The “calculations” of priests are economic 
calculations, transactions that determine the course and nature of the lives of human beings like 
Equiano. Thus, Equiano’s growing ability to read and, subsequently, to lift the veil of secrecy 
surrounding scriptural knowledge parallels his increasing agency in the market. Atlantic trade is, 
like the Holy Bible, a text to be interpreted and understood only by the most acute and learned 
individuals, the priests of the new faith of Atlantic modernity. As his text wears on, Equiano 
inhabits this role ever more fully.  
When Equiano, for example, invokes Columbus in his interactions with Mosquito 
villagers, he associates himself with the specialized knowledge systems of white Atlantic 
societies, among them literacy, scriptural fluency and, implicitly, capitalist economy. Wimbush 
explains that “insofar as the power is white men’s magic, Equiano understands his quest to be to 
pursue and obtain white men’s magic” (Wimbush 165). This is to say that Equiano deliberately 
sets out to use literacy and European Christianity as tools by which to position himself in 
mastery over the unlearned natives he encounters. Wimbush deemphasizes the economic nature 
of this mastery but, as Equiano’s many accounts of accumulation, exchange, and transaction 
make clear, economic knowledge went hand-in-hand with scriptural knowledge as the twin 
modes by which to achieve power and agency in the Atlantic. Wimbush writes, “Equiano 
understood that there really was no object or thing that contained power in either his or 
Columbus’s situation with the natives. All Columbus had, all that Equiano had, was a suggestion, 
an idea, an image” (Wimbush 165). That idea had to be housed in commodities, in 
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proclamations, contracts, currency, and bodies like Equiano’s that could be traded on the Atlantic 
market. 
Equiano uses textual proofs, especially contracts for sale and manumission, as modern 
versions of the covenant, promising liberty, inclusion and protection by God, but in the legal and 
economic language of the Atlantic marketplace. When he buys his own freedom, for example, 
Equiano needs a bill of manumission, in order to instantiate his master’s promise as a legal 
reality. As if to reiterate his value and worthiness for freedom, Equiano writes that his captain 
tells his master “I know GUSTAVUS has earned you more than a hundred a year, and he will 
still save you money, as he will not leave you.” Then, he demonstrates the way a document 
necessarily functions as a covenant, embodying the promissory social arrangements that ensure 
freedom, protection, and inclusion. He writes “My master then said, he would not be worse than 
his promise; and, taking the money, told me to go to the Secretary at the Register Office, and get 
my manumission drawn up” (101).  Finally, as if to reproduce this covenant for his own readers, 
Equiano transcribes it in full in the autobiography (122). Readers might also interpret his various 
catalogues of commodity exchange as performances of the roles numeracy and literacy play in 
ensuring his freedom and deliverance. The meticulous records he keeps demonstrate his own 
ability to understand and communicate the conversions he has both negotiated and undergone in 
preparation for grace. So the autobiography itself becomes the proof, the bill of sale containing 
the social processes that have permitted his freedom, and demonstrate its veracity. The 
autobiography becomes the covenant, the text that announces his deliverance and assures his 
election, and readers become its legal witnesses. 
This is not to say that Equiano loses sight of the way that writing, the mysterious ability 
over which he slowly gains mastery, is a technology deeply and explicitly implicated in his own 
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subjugation and that of others. Indeed, Equiano understands legal processes, but remains 
beholden to the logic of racial exclusion, because white people with more market power retain 
control over the text agreements that should function as sacred words. He argues, for example, 
that people like his Captain Pascal are untrustworthy and ignore the validity of freedom and plain 
dealing when they choose to ignore documents and agreements with their crews and enslaved 
laborers (123). Elsewhere Equiano comes to the defense of a freed man who has been robbed of 
his wages and liberty, only to find that the captain “did not in the least assist to recover him, or 
pay me a farthing of his wages, which was about Five Pounds. I proved the only friend he had 
who attempted to regain him his liberty” (136). He writes, “I proceeded immediately to that well-
known philanthropist, Granville Sharp, Esq. who received me with the utmost kindness, and 
gave me every instruction that was needful on the occasion. I left him in full hope that I should 
gain the unhappy man his liberty, with the warmest sense of gratitude towards Mr. Sharp for his 
kindness. But, alas! My attorney proved unfaithful: he took my money, lost me many months’ 
employ, and did not the least good in the cause” (136). Finally, he notes that the unjustly 
captured man remained enslaved “till kind death released him out of the hands of his tyrants” 
(136). All of this suggests the essential perilous nature of the market and admits that 
understanding its processes is not enough. Literacy is necessary preparation, but Equiano 
understands that he must also be delivered providentially by divine command. For Equiano, this 
deliverance stems from his supernatural status as “a particular favourite of Heaven” and the 
traders and captains with whom he interacts should—but frequently do not—recognize the text 
agreements that communicate that divine favoritism (10). He writes “I made my obieisance to 
my master, and with my money in my hand, and many fears in my heart, I prayed him to be as 
good as his offer to me, when he was pleased to promise my freedom as soon as I could purchase 
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it” (100). His use of the word “pray” belies his belief that proper economic exchanges should be 
sacrosanct. Financial agreements, including and especially those concerning manumission, are 
built upon a foundation of covenant of inclusive election made with God, and to break them is to 
break the basic divine compact that sustains society. By focusing solely on Equiano’s status as a 
racialized and unfree subject, the men who ignore his covenanted legal and spiritual liberty also 
ignore his special status as a member of the elect and defy the will of God.  
A failure to do as God and contract command can have profound and haunting effects. In 
fact, Equiano goes so far as to suggest that the refusal to honor legal contracts produces ghosts, 
an interpretation that illuminates his use of supernatural language and ideas to explain market 
forces and vice versa. He writes “Two gentlemen, who had been in the West-Indies, where they 
sold slaves…confessed they had made, at one time, a false bill of sale, and sold two Portuguese 
white men among a lot of slaves.” Later, the crew believe they see the men aboard the ship but 
“some time afterwards…found the man had been drowned at the very time [a crewman] thought 
he saw him” (62). This implies the constitutive nature of legal, economic and spiritual logics. 
Moreover, Equiano uses a supernatural frame to emphasize both the talismanic power of texts 
and the disordering gravity of disobeying their promises. Receipts and bills of sale are, for 
Equiano, sacred texts, pronouncements of conversion from one state to another, and they carry a 
sacred bond. To ignore this responsibility is to ignore the very foundation of the moral universe 
Equiano inhabits. The ghosts, then, are the social processes that should have been settled with an 
owner by text-based exchange, but find themselves loosed by betrayal. This interpretation carries 
special weight for Equiano as an enslaved person. If Equiano cannot trust the exchanges that 
dictate his fate, he too might be lost to the market, never to find a place to rest or identity to 
claim. He may never find his way through the market to God, his rightful owner, and might thus 
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be damned to an eternity as a powerless, nameless commodity—the ghost of a man who could 
have been.  
When he commands text, Equiano ensures that he will have enough control over his own 
destiny to receive the rewards offered by providential election. In fact, later in life, he will use 
this same mastery of text to make himself into an extraordinarily rich man in England and he will 
take this as, perhaps, the clearest sign of God’s favor. viii Writing allows him to change his own 
“value.” Literacy is imbued with mystical properties, and, when he can wield it, he too has 
power. That power, however, only exists due to the presence of his own covenant, his proof of 
contract with society and with God, born of conversion, and announced by the autobiography. 
Equiano’s ideas about how to use literacy and negotiation to navigate an economic system that 
he believes reflects providential design coalesce in, perhaps, the pivotal episode of the 
narrative—the moment in which his freedom is promised and the process by which it is 
delivered. ix 
A Valuable Fellow: Exchange, Negotiation, and Ascension 
Equiano tells readers that, while preparing for a voyage to Philadelphia from Montserrat 
with “double alacrity,” as he hopes to purchase his freedom, he is summoned to his master’s 
house. There, his master, Robert King, tells him that he suspects Equiano intends to run away 
and explains, “I must sell you again…you are a valuable fellow” (91).  King goes on to detail 
exactly what Equiano is worth (“one hundred guineas”) and why (Equiano “knew something of 
Navigation”) (91-92). Equiano, protesting, looks to his captain to defend his character. After the 
captain speaks in his defense, Equiano writes, “the speech of the captain was like life to the dead 
to me, and instantly my soul glorified God.” Then he tells readers that, despite his earlier 
suspicions, King now “thought by carrying one little thing or other to different places to sell I 
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might make money: that he intended to encourage me in this, by crediting me with half a 
puncheon of rum and half a hogshead of sugar at a time.” The ultimate end of all of this is “so 
that, from being careful, I might have money enough, in some time, to purchase my freedom: 
and, when that was the case, I might depend upon it he would let me have it for forty pounds 
sterling money, which was only the same price he gave for me” (93). This is a negotiated form of 
grace, a prophecy foretelling salvation and liberation. Equiano recognizes that, although grace 
originates with the divine, it must be prepared here on earth through market functions. If he 
wishes to command freedom, he must also command commodity exchange. His freedom and his 
body have an explicit and equivalent market price: forty pounds. So, he must exchange his body 
for the money that buys his freedom.x  
Such is the personal experience of commodification in the Atlantic marketplace that 
Equiano narrates: he must sell his body, time, and labor in order to purchase the freedom 
necessary to achieve God’s grace. In this way, the market of commodity exchange in which 
Equiano is trapped presents itself also as the potential medium of communication between 
worlds material and divine. Equiano’s miraculous accrual of value arises from a sense that his is 
a blessed body in the church of providential capitalism. He is a skillful agent of capitalism, a 
successful laborer, and a recipient of capitalism’s benefits. He is also an elect member of the 
divine Kingdom, the supernaturally protected property of God, and the recipient of grace as 
God’s “particular favourite.” He is a “valuable” man and, as such, accrues value wherever he 
goes. All of these attributes demonstrate his preparation and election, and will grant him the 
necessary leverage to bargain for his freedom on earth.  
King’s assertion that Equiano is a “valuable” fellow, therefore, surely contains a double 
meaning: he is valuable in that he actually has a dollar value in the marketplace, and he is 
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valuable in that he is useful, indispensable, trustworthy, and favored by God. By realizing and 
exploiting his monetary value, Equiano can leverage it and negotiate to put himself in a position 
to receive expanded self-determination, personal agency and, eventually, providential favor.  
This then is the turning point, the place in the text and in Equiano’s life, in which he makes the 
most profound in his series of narrative and personal conversions—from commodity to buyer, 
and from unreformed to elected soul. The scene of transactional negotiation in the masters’ 
office allows the author to answer philosophical questions of the imbrication of value, 
conversion, and election, through legal processes, and to reveal the way those legal processes 
reflect and respond to divine will. The philosophical and moral questions of freedom, autonomy 
and mastery are questions of legal ownership of a commodity and vice versa. The bill of sale the 
master promises Equiano is, ultimately, written by the hand of God. 
Moreover, the market of commodity exchange is a market of free and unfree persons and, 
as such, freedom itself becomes a commodity to be bought or sold, traded for an equivalent value 
of money, rum and sugar, and human bodies, including Equiano’s own. Equiano and his traders 
are acutely aware of his multivalent significance and “value.” He retains his direct use value as a 
laborer, even as his body becomes the symbolic repository for its trade value on the market, 
allowing him to purchase freedom at the price of work, and salvation at the price of his 
commodified body, and his soul is marked by a proprietary claim by God. In his overdetermined 
state as a commodity, a laborer, a buyer with agency within the market, and an object of 
providential interest, Equiano transforms himself into what Colin Dayan calls a fetishized 
“relic,” a repository of social memory, religious meaning and—here—economic power. God and 
the market are cooperative, working together to protect valuable assets—Equiano’s soul and 
body, literal and figurative—to deliver him, transformed, into a new position as a powerful self-
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possessed agent in the market. Indeed, he insists that he “could very plainly trace the hand of 
God; without whose permission a sparrow cannot fall” in all the events of his life (59). For 
Equiano, providence is no dim abstract placeholder for a remote divine intelligence. Rather, he 
sees it as a very literal and actively interventionist manifestation of God in the real world. In 
particular, providence works through the economy to deliver Equiano to the place he needs to be, 
and converts him into the form he needs to take, in order to receive and accept grace. 
Conversion and the Importance of a Name 
Because covenant is premised upon negotiation, mobility, and conversion, from unbound 
to protected by God, from excluded to included membership in a divine community, and from 
damned to saved, conversion is entirely central to the argument of the text—so much so that 
Equiano claims that his given name means "‘vicissitudes or fortunate’ also, ‘one favoured, and 
having a loud voice and well spoken.’” (18). Equiano's name combines fortune with favor to give 
him voice, essentially anticipating the major arc of the narrative but also suggesting that 
providence has marked Equiano for conversion from a young age. He was meant to experience 
conversion, and, via that experience, to carry out God's plans. Later, he was meant to use his 
position to spread conversion abroad. The title of the autobiography implicitly retains and 
memorializes the conversion process. He is nominally both Gustavus and Olaudah, one man 
converting into another, in order to become himself. 
He repeats this act of transformative renaming again and again in the narrative. As he is 
reshipped, traded or sold, he is constantly renamed. He tells us, “I was called JACOB; but on 
board the African Snow I was called MICHAEL” (37). Later, after his master sets his price at 
“thirty or forty pounds sterling…[his] captain and master named [him] GUSTAVUS VASSA.” 
He protests and insists “I…refused to be called so, and told him, as well as I could, that I would 
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be called JACOB; but he said I should not, and still called me Gustavus. And when I refused to 
answer to my new name, which at first I did, it gained me many a cuff; so at length I submitted, 
and by it I have been known ever since” (39). Ultimately, he will earn the opportunity to name 
himself, but only after he has ascended to the position of a buyer in the market, someone with 
enough value and capital to purchase back his own identity.  
The engine of constant personal, economic, and religious conversion that Equiano 
performs in title and narrates in text is an integral part of eighteenth-century black Atlantic 
narratives, and a powerful tool by which figures like Equiano transform experiences of 
displacement into trials of ascension. Similarly, the latter sections of John Marrant’s 1785 
Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings with John Marrant… assert the need for these kinds 
of conversion experiences to be repeated as religious ritual and, in so doing, underscore the 
prevalence of the themes Equiano explores for other displaced Atlantic figures. Marrant’s is a 
narrative of sudden spiritual awakening, surprising reversals, and providential events that, like 
Equiano’s, suggests the way providential protection, special knowledge, and conversion might 
help one to navigate and even to escape the racist confines of eighteenth century mobility. For 
Marrant, it is not enough to be a Christian; he must convert himself into a Christian and replay 
the experience as much and as frequently as possible in order to reaffirm his faith. This focuses 
his religious feeling on the act of becoming, rather than upon being. Just as Equiano invokes a 
dual-state identity as Equiano and Vassa, Marrant embraces the flux that leaves the individual 
open to possibilities, but requires providential direction in order to produce positive personal and 
social outcomes.  
Equiano also recognizes the way this play of identity conversion intersects with the 
hierarchies of race that dominate the economic system in which he lives. In the tragic story of 
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Equiano’s comrade who has gone unpaid and been jailed, he even describes wearing whiteface to 
gain access to means of legal assistance (136). This suggests the way these systems of race, 
power and trust are both assertive and malleable, fraudulent and intractable. So too does the fact 
that Equiano’s negotiation with his master requires the interpretation of his captain. And so, 
Equiano’s narrative of conversion and ascension still recognizes the capricious and arbitrary 
circumstances of racial exclusion that have allowed some men to use the language of 
providential capitalism to defy the will of God in the market, by transforming elect souls like 
Equiano into soulless, nameless commodities, even as Equiano’s status as an elect soul should 
ensure his freedom to accept grace. 
A Dangerous Commodity 
As the text continues, providence forces a confrontation between these competing claims 
on Equiano’s identity, by empowering Equiano as a commodity to such a degree that he must 
transform, and must escape the grasp of worldly owners, to be reclaimed by God. In this, the 
master’s description of the “valuable man” becomes a tacit admission of the slave’s Hegelian 
power to transform, through the kind of conversion undergone by Equiano, into a person with the 
potential and even necessity for liberty. A “valuable man” is a desirable commodity but also a 
dangerous potential liability. Hegel describes the way that the master becomes ever more reliant 
upon the slave until it is really the slave who wields the potential power to liberate, over the 
master who faces only the potential to lose.xi Here, Equiano performs that dialectic through 
dramatizing the power shift in his economic negotiation with his master. His overabundance of 
material and divine value accrues to such an extent that he becomes potentially dangerous to the 
system of ownership and commodification by which he is bound: thus the need for his master to 
rid himself of him; thus the need to direct Equiano’s energies toward the logic of the market—
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toward saving and labor, to transform him into an agent of capital rather than an object of capital. 
Equiano becomes ever more valuable and his masters become ever more reliant upon him, 
forcing them to take him into the community of free business partners and religious persons, so 
as not to disrupt the power hierarchies co-instantiated by capital and religion. He realizes his 
providential freedom by making himself into a potentially explosive figure, a commodity with 
such great use value that he has leverage over his master, a commodity with the power to 
negotiate—even if through an interlocutor—and a commodity with the expressive power to insist 
upon his humanity. 
In fact, at one point, Equiano’s emerging expressivity becomes literally explosive, 
dramatizing the destabilizing potential of such an empowered commodity by nearly destroying 
the ship that carries him. He describes his perilous and furtive attempts to read: “As I was writing 
my journal, that I had occasion to take the candle out of the lanthorn, and a spark having touched 
a single thread of the tow, all the rest caught the flame” (130). Equiano’s symbolic “flame” 
suggests that his emerging understanding of the world—his “illumination”—threatens the system 
that holds him in its grasp. The anecdote also subtly addresses the close metonymic conflation of 
Equiano with the ship’s cargo in order to further emphasize literacy’s role in his escape from 
commodification. He explains that “I had no other place…but a little cabin, or the doctor’s store-
room, where I slept. This little place was stuffed with all manner of combustibles, particularly 
with tow and aquafortis, and many other dangerous things” (130). These are doctor’s 
implements, but gesture toward the other combustible materials housed throughout the ship, 
including powder, rum, and, implicitly, the bodies and minds of crewmembers slave or free, who 
could potentially wake to their own powers to liberate, convert, and accept admission into the 
community of the elect. With Equiano on the cusp of transforming from the confused witness of 
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the talking book and into the knowledgeable reader or even author of the book, the power of 
literacy is revealed as a spark with the potential to make knowledge explode out of the confines 
of the Atlantic economic system. His literacy and numeracy, his shipping and trading acumen, 
and his religious feeling all must be given space in the market, if they are not to become 
dangerous social revolutionary forces. So Equiano’s liberation at once rewards his forcible 
negotiation of self, fulfills providence’s dictum, and neutralizes him as a threat to the larger 
system of trade and finance. 
This focus on literacy is just one of the ways in which Equiano argues that, if he can 
harness the same tools that have contributed to his confinement, he may come to master the 
system that has confined him. Nevertheless, the text is still rigidly structured to keep Equiano 
from full explosive mastery, until the very end, so such moments only hint at the potential that 
has been, thus far, contained within a rigid and crushing system of dehumanizing control. Aware 
that he must find some way to overcome the barriers to his escape from commodification, 
Equiano uses the faith-based promises at the heart of capitalism to realize his providential 
destiny. He crafts the covenants and exploits the sacred and exclusionary rites of capital in order 
to effect his own escape from capital dehumanization. 
Faith, Trust, and Mastery: Negotiating the Unfree Body 
Through labor, through “careful” husbanding of resources, through belief in the 
essentially divine logic of the market economy, capitalism promises that each individual may 
effect his or her own liberation, and, with it, become a fully realized autonomous person. 
Through faith in the trustworthiness of contract exchange, through a belief that such a testimony 
and compact reflects the covenanted will of God, the economy offers a stable basis of trust for 
society. If Equiano’s success in the market hinges upon his ability to believe in the otherwise 
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confounding system of capitalist exchange, it also hinges upon his ability to make others believe 
in the validity of his participation. Recognizing the role is expected to play in the rituals of trust 
and exchange in his society, he performs it in order to transcend it: he uses white men’s faith in 
each other to reward his own faithful service to God in the market. The captain’s station, his 
Christianity, his wealth, and especially his whiteness, all make him more reliable in the eyes of 
the master than Equiano. So Equiano uses the master’s adherence to a racist system of exclusive 
society for his own ends. He performs his subordinate commodified status in order to escape it, 
allowing free white men to engage in a financial negotiation that will present him with the 
opportunity to achieve freedom and grace.  
In Robert King’s office, the legal sanctity of testimony requires two free men to establish 
mutual trust over the contracted body of the unfree third person. Equiano must allow the master 
and the captain to use the presence of his unfree body to reaffirm their own freedoms and mutual 
power to purchase. Moreover, he must permit them to reiterate the validity of their contract by 
announcing it in the presence of a person without the power to engage in such a contract on his 
own. As Saidiya Hartman notes, “The slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the 
existence of the bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, 
citizenship, and the enclosures of the social body” (Hartman 62). So, Equiano’s forced or willing 
scene of subjection and negotiation is both a dramatization of a white culture forming society 
over a black body, and a cannily strategic act of submission for later reward. This isn’t quite a 
revolutionary act; it does not challenge the structures of mastery inherent to the Atlantic’s market 
economy. It is, however, a potentially radical use of slavery’s mechanisms as a means to escape 
slavery’s logic. Equiano allows the white men to assert their social bonds over him, so that he 
can, later, assert his own free agency. Equiano’s status as the documentary proof of the other 
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men’s freedom gives him an opening to negotiate his own. Although this negotiation event is 
forced upon Equiano, it is also the means by which he can transcend the legal limits of his 
commodified instrumental status and ascend to a plane from which he can negotiate his own 
price, with no need for an interlocutor. When he does, he enters into the community of the 
economically and spiritually elect. 
So Equiano’s captain speaks up in his defense, in the form of a kind of interrogation and 
character defense, which utterly reverses King’s suspicions and transforms them not only into 
trust, but also into a new business arrangement. A new price is set—this time forty guineas 
instead of one hundred—to reflect a new relationship that favors Equiano heavily. An offer of 
sale is made—to Equiano instead of to another master. Equiano’s interrogation and the captain’s 
recital of his virtues transform Equiano from pure commodity into a potential buyer within the 
marketplace in which he has heretofore been embedded.  
Equiano’s status as an unfree person attempting to infiltrate a world that trades freedom 
as a commodity illuminates the way individuals can manipulate the market for their own gain 
either properly and in accordance with divine will, or improperly to undermine that will. All 
bodies are in circulation; all souls are the subjects of the divine economic cosmology, but only 
those with purchasing power can make determinations about where to go and what to do. It is 
their responsibility to choose to do God’s will, instead of to dominate or abuse others. Thus, 
choice, the ultimate element of freedom and liberty, is perhaps the most valuable commodity of 
all. The text is quite clear about what a tenuous position this is for an individual like Equiano. He 
writes “Hitherto I had thought only slavery dreadful; but the state of a free negro appeared to me 
now equally so at least, and in some respects even worse; for they live in constant alarm for their 
liberty, which is but nominal; and they are universally insulted and plundered without the 
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possibility of redress” (89). This is not a situation unique to Equiano and, in fact, positions his 
narrative among a number of other texts written by black authors in the Atlantic that argue for a 
Christian-oriented form of economic interaction, in order to gain agency in systems that would 
deny it to them.  
In his 1772 Narrative of the Life of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, Ukasaw 
Gronniosaw, another seafaring black Atlantic writer attempting to use Christianity, contract, and 
literacy to escape commodification, also notes the way ostensible Christians could use the market 
to subvert Christian values and exploit the disempowered.  For example, at one point, 
Gronniosaw entrusts all of his savings to a woman who proclaims herself a Christian woman. 
The woman takes the money and denies it to him when he requests it back, leaving him to lament 
that he “had no friend but GOD” (20). The struggle of such authors, therefore, is not merely for 
liberty or even for grace, but also for security. The waters of the market remain perilous, even if 
they are the only available modes of spiritual transportation for men like Equiano or 
Gronniosaw. Equiano notes, for example, that his attempt to learn navigation, a skill which might 
help him to escape, “was much retarded by the constancy of…work” (90). Labor is the means by 
which he will achieve liberty, but labor for others can also distract him from the work of spiritual 
and personal preparation. Even worse, his legal possession by others leaves him at their mercy, 
even as he hopes to make his way, ultimately, toward his heavenly master.  
Equiano never loses sight of the ambivalent nature of his exposure to the capitalist 
Atlantic. He tells readers “I have set before the reader a few of those many instances of 
oppression, extortion, and cruelty, to which I have been a witness in the West-Indies, but were I 
to enumerate them all, the catalogue would be tedious and disgusting” (82). But only moments 
later he writes, “Kind Providence seemed to be rather more favourable to me. One of my 
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master’s vessels, a Bermudas sloop…was commanded by one Capt. Thomas Farmer, an 
Englishman, a very alert and active man, who gained my master a great deal of money, by his 
good management in carrying passengers from one island to another…this man had taken a 
liking to me; and many times begged of my master to let me go a trip with him as a sailor” (83). 
Thus the market can work either diabolically or divinely, depending upon which men employ it 
and how. On the one hand, the Atlantic market can produce the “disgusting” excesses of the 
slave trade; on the other hand, it can offer Equiano the chance to rise by association with an 
especially profitable captain. It is, therefore, not a matter of capitalism itself being good or bad, 
but a matter of behaving as a virtuous capitalist or of using capital to enhance virtue. The 
mobility and flux of the market that makes it such a potentially dangerous space, also makes it a 
space in which an individual can experiment with identity and theology, test and prepare 
themselves through vocational labor, and even construct a universal understanding of divine 
nature, by drawing upon the similarities among diverse economic practices and religious 
traditions. 
Constructing a Universal Theology of Providential Capitalism 
For Equiano, economy is divinity given material form. And so, as the circulating 
exchange economy brings him into contact with different religious practices, he sees them as 
different interpretations of providential design and folds them into his autobiography’s argument 
in favor of providential capitalism. Equiano traces his development toward market-driven 
spiritual salvation by narrating his various experiments with religions as economic exchanges. 
He takes steps toward accepting providential election, but always punctuated with economic 
considerations. In so doing, he reveals a commonality of Atlantic religious practices, even as he 
makes it clear that both capitalism and providential Christianity are the only acceptable 
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ideological denominations that will bring the author the economic, spiritual, and legal freedom 
he craves, within the boundaries of system in which he lives. He craves personal freedom, 
recognizes the particular means that mainstream Atlantic providential capitalist society offers for 
him to achieve that freedom, and finds a way to navigate the system on offer.   
As a result, Equiano internalizes the terms of evaluation proffered by both Christianity 
and capitalism, and projects them outward upon the diverse and shifting world, into which his 
travels put him in contact. For example, he narrates his time in Naples and Smyrna and 
comments, “Each kind of goods is sold in a street by itself, and I always found the Turks very 
honest in their dealings. They let no Christians into their mosques, or churches; for which I was 
very sorry, being always fond of going to see the different modes of worship of the people 
wherever I went” (127). In Equiano’s eyes, the Turks are good and virtuous because they deal 
honestly in the market, but they are lacking because they fail to permit those market values to 
blend with Christian vocation. Similarly, he tells us, “I went among the people called Quakers, 
whose meeting at times was held in silence, and I remained as much in the dark as ever. I then 
searched into the Roman Catholic principles; but was not in the least edified. I at length had 
recourse to the Jews, which availed me nothing…I really thought the Turks were in a safer way 
of salvation than my neighbours” (135). His travels in the Atlantic market bring him into contact 
with this diverse array of traditions. However, all of the religious practices he discusses touch on 
the values he holds dear, but don't quite arrive at the truth that the authorial Equiano has accepted 
and thus promotes. “I was continually oppressed and much concerned about the salvation of my 
soul,” he writes, “and was determined in my own strength to be a first-rate Christian” (134).  
Equiano presents these religious experiments as insufficient, mistaken or incomplete in 
order to use them as the bricks with which to construct a more universal edifice of Atlantic 
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spiritualism, reflecting his own Christian providential and capitalist biases. Even the local folk 
religion of his earliest memories, before his forced entry into the market, bear similar ideological 
and philosophical features to the providential Christianity he’ll ultimately embrace. Though he 
remarks upon religious and ritualistic differences, he notes that “the natives believe that there is 
one Creator of all things…he governs events, especially our deaths or captivity…some…believe 
in the transmigration of souls in a certain degree” (17). The virtues of rising, predictable 
providence and hierarchy are all present, but in underdeveloped states. In the same way, he will 
find attractive elements in Judaism, Islam and Catholicism. Yet, these moments in particular 
should be read both through the lens of the authorial Equiano's argument for revealed 
providential Christianity, and in light of his mobile and diverse experiences with providential 
capitalism at sea. 
Equiano’s exposure to these religious alternatives suggests the way capital creates 
interactive compatibility among the diverse theologies of the Atlantic world. Just as Equiano’s 
autobiographical narrative draws together the ports and distances of the Atlantic, a common set 
of beliefs connects West Africa, the Americas, and Europe, through trade routes that become 
conduits for theology. This is a point emphasized by Equiano's assertion that he finds true 
spiritual fraternity in Atlantic sea-work itself. He tells readers “Rather than stay amongst the 
wicked ones…as I was walking, it pleased God to direct me to a house where there was an old 
sea-faring man, who experienced much of the love of God shed abroad in his heart. He began to 
discourse with me, and, as I desired to love the Lord, his conversation rejoiced me greatly; and 
indeed I had never heard before the love of Christ to believers set forth in such a manner, and in 
so clear a point of view” (138). Equiano connects with the man both as a Christian and as a 
fellow seaman. So it is Atlantic trade, as much as religious affinity, which brings these diverse 
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religious practices together, and trade which draws out their common philosophical elements. He 
tells readers, “I had some further discourse with the old Christian, added to some profitable 
reading, which made me exceedingly happy” (138). His use of “profitable” here should be 
considered doubly significant, for, as he finds religion, his rewards are both spiritual and 
material. 
He shows readers the way that networks of faith, virtue, and commerce offer material 
benefits to the people who learn how to navigate them. In his first negotiation over the price of 
his freedom, King offers to put Equiano into contact with his “two amiable sisters in 
Philadelphia” who will help him when he arrives (93). King likewise gives him “a large piece of 
silver coin, such as I had never seen or had before, and told me to get ready for the voyage, and 
he would credit me with a tierce of sugar and another of rum” (93). In London, the Quaker 
Guerin sisters recommend him for a job as a hair-dresser (124). Trust, relationships based upon 
family and religious affiliation, and, crucially, the bonds of labor and credit, create the necessary 
social relations to support Equiano, and help him to realize his providential destiny.  
Moreover, he concludes subsequent editions of his narrative by informing readers of the 
way the autobiography itself has contributed to his profitable mobility, writing “Since the first 
publication of my narrative, I have been in a great variety of scenes…I was every where 
exceedingly well treated” (179-80). This leads to his political involvement when he “heard the 
debate in the house of Commons on the slave-trade” (180). He even marries “Miss Cullen, 
daughter of James and Ann Cullen, late of Ely” (180). Equiano believes that market-driven 
mobility has helped to correct his own belief, redeem his own soul and, consequently, make him 
a wealthy man as a sign of his special selection by God.  He tells readers, “I could not but admire 
the goodness of God, in directing the blind, blasphemous sinner in the path that he knew not of, 
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even among the just; and instead of judgement he hath shewed mercy, and will hear and answer 
the prayers and supplications of every returning prodigal” (139). From commodity to trader, 
from ignorance to political engagement, and from national and familial outsider to insider, 
Equiano’s narrative is one of increasing inclusion and broadening autonomy through market 
forces that he credits to divine intervention. Thus, Atlantic capitalism is a vehicle for providential 
Christianity, as much as providential Christianity has, throughout the text, served as a vehicle for 
the successful navigation of capitalism.  
And so, Equiano lives the very conversion process that animated earlier Plymouth texts 
and then uses the backward glance of his own autobiographical narration to fold his experiences 
into a larger narrative of spiritual and economic conversion in the Atlantic. Moreover, he 
recognizes the way that language in this society can function to draw the boundaries of freedom 
and to assert both value and virtue.  In this narrative, the evaluative language of a captain or 
merchant and the predictive language of a prophet or priest work to create and maintain a 
confusing, mysterious web of exchange and uncanny conversion that demands faith in the unseen 
and creates divisions of the blessed and unblessed, the faithful and the damned. Equiano uses his 
awareness of providential capitalist exclusion to ascend as well, to position himself among the 
elect. As we will later see, he also premises this inclusion on the exclusion of others. First and 
foremost, however, he is concerned with proving that his economic successes, his liberty, and his 
power of self-direction, are not bracketed off from the world of divine action, but material 
manifestations of a mysterious, even supernatural providence that speaks through the market of 
human social relations. 
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The Wise Woman, the Unity of Atlantic Religion, and Capital’s Magical Thinking 
In fact, he encourages readers to interpret the economic transaction with his master as 
providential, through a tidy metonymic conflation between scenes that adhere to the same 
providential capitalist logic, but in very different contexts. In the following chapter, Equiano 
essentially restages the negotiated promises of freedom, but in the parlor of an apparently 
supernatural fortune-teller. Arriving in Philadelphia just a page after the previous scene, Equiano 
sees everything working out as predicted: his captain gives him fair treatment and, in the busy 
metropolis, he observes how easy it is to sell his goods “pretty well.” He finds “every thing 
plentiful and cheap” (93). During this period, he writes of “a very extraordinary occurrence.” 
What he describes invites readers to consider a vast and cosmopolitan space that is both modern 
and connected to varied spiritual traditions. This space also reinforces the union of diverse social 
and cultural traditions beneath the banner of providential capitalism.  
Equiano’s text itself serves as a bridge between the economic and the spiritual. One 
chapter follows the other, allowing one form of faith to mirror the other. He explains, “I had been 
told one evening of a WISE WOMAN, a Mrs. Davis, who revealed secrets, foretold events, &c” 
At first, he dismisses the idea of a seer: “I could not conceive that any mortal could foresee the 
future disposals of Providence, nor did I believe in any other revelation that that of the Holy 
Scriptures.” However, the power of the woman is too great to resist: “I was greatly astonished at 
seeing this woman in a dream that night, though a person I never before beheld in my life. This 
made such an impression on me…I then became as anxious to see her as I was before 
indifferent.” Going to her, he is surprised to find that he “beheld the very same woman in the 
very same dress she appeared to me to wear in the vision. She immediately told me I had 
dreamed of her the preceding night; related to me many things that had happened with a 
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correctness that astonished me; and finally told me I should not long be a slave.” Her vision 
becomes more specific: “She said I should be twice in very great danger of my life within 
eighteen months, which if I escaped, I should afterwards go on well; so, giving me her blessing, 
we parted” (93-94). This scene echoes the earlier scene in the King’s office by casting the former 
negotiation as a prophecy and the former declaration of faith in the market’s rewards as credulity 
in supernatural precognition. Equiano finds himself summoned—he does not explain who told 
him of this woman, only that he had been told. Next, he encounters an interpretation of events 
that he resists—here on the grounds that they might undermine his Christian faith, where, before, 
he resisted on the grounds that his character might be misrepresented. The skeptical Equiano is 
convinced through a detailed testimonial of his own past actions and character. Ultimately, 
Equiano receives a vision of the future, promising a series of trials that, if he manages them 
skillfully, will see him rewarded with liberty.  This is the same transaction and negotiation, 
promising the same transcendent conversion, but written in a different generic mode. 
The needs and opportunities of the capitalist Atlantic marketplace bring Equiano from 
Montserrat into the North American metropole of Philadelphia. There, in the heart of the 
burgeoning American republic, at one of its most important commercial centers and active 
trading ports, he finds the Wise Woman. Is she a witch? a mindreader? a practitioner of a 
transatlantic diasporic spiritual tradition such as Obi? It is unclear, but she is certainly imbued 
with magical abilities. However, rather than appearing as an anti-modern anachronism, the Wise 
Woman fits right in. Equiano’s visit to her does not disrupt the vision of modernity that he 
beholds in Philadelphia, but completes it. Moreover, Equiano uses her to demonstrate the way 
that the churning routes of Atlantic capital exchange can reconcile the fortune telling of non-
Christian practices with the belief in revealed providence of Christianity. In essence, she acts as a 
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synthetic bridge between the Christian and non-Christian elements of Atlantic culture and as an 
avatar for the new belief system that increasingly encompasses both through shared faith in 
election, providence, exchange, and mobility, that is providential capitalism. 
The Wise Woman suggests a fluidity of cultural exchange from the peripheral zones of 
the Atlantic world to its more developed centers, a journey enacted by Equiano, and a process 
common to other people living in the Atlantic. Certainly Equiano is not the only liminal nomadic 
figure in this text filled with individuals not easily nationalized or categorized, who navigate the 
complex web of relations that constitute the Atlantic world. Indeed, among the similarly 
displaced travelers Equiano meets readers could include both his captain and his master. The 
Atlantic society that Equiano presents is one in which the periphery is constantly in fluid 
conversation with the core, where the winding paths travelled by individuals and groups coalesce 
in ports and social centers, to mix, amalgamate, and produce something new but always in flux. 
Whatever mainstream there is, draws from these influences and, as a result, defies continuity or 
strict delimitation between cultural traditions. The dense and mysterious web of relations traced 
in the text presents Atlantic modernity not as an interactive society of nations, but as a market 
inhabited by individuals whose only inherent relations are commercial or providential—a market 
defined by the similarities, rather than the differences, between Philadelphia, the islands of the 
Caribbean, and West Africa.  
The Wise Woman’s unique position within the world Equiano inhabits presents her as the 
nexus between the capitalist and religious networks that define Equiano’s journey but she, like 
Equiano, is a product of a very diverse and mobile Atlantic culture. As Toni Wall Jaudon and 
Kelly Wisecup make clear in their investigation of Obi practices in the Americas and the 
Caribbean, the religious traditions of groups and individuals in the Atlantic world were 
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enormously diverse. Equiano inhabits a world fluid enough to permit whatever religious practice 
the Wise Woman represents to fit comfortably beside concepts of Christian providence. 
Moreover, he comes to accept her prophecy because it adheres to the same logic as providential 
capitalism in the larger Atlantic marketplace and suggests the ultimate compatibility of multiple 
traditions under its universal banner. He meets with Quakers and priests and imams, with similar 
equanimity, treating religion itself as a competitive marketplace of ideas—including all the 
diverse faiths, permissive secularism, atheism, and even hopeless abjection. Equiano selects the 
one that best helps him to make sense of the world, to function within it, and to profit by his 
knowledge of it. However, the text allows each tradition to appear as different elements, 
combining in Equiano’s narrative journey, into a coherent philosophy of providential capitalism. 
Equiano implicitly draws all of these traditions together as different interpretations of the same 
divine providential will and uses the rewards of the providential market to reconcile their 
particularities. Acknowledging the compatibility of the full scope of Atlantic spiritual practice 
with Atlantic capitalism allows Equiano’s readers also to acknowledge the magical thinking at 
the heart of providence and capitalism. 
Equiano’s encounter with the Wise Woman is really the culmination of his preoccupation 
with the supernatural aspects of providential capitalism. Here, it fully merges with the prior 
scene’s financially transactional logic, in order to suggest the constitutive nature of 
supernaturalism and market directives in achieving providential design. Nevertheless, Equiano 
presents his gradual acquisition of faith as a process requiring a successive series of conversions, 
including a gradual conversion toward rationalism, while still leaving room for providential faith. 
Commenting upon his first entrance into the Atlantic world, he describes, for example, feeling 
like he has entered another supernatural world. He explains “I was now more persuaded than 
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ever that I was in another world, and that every thing about me was magic” (35). Equiano’s 
interactions in the mobile Atlantic market contribute to his broadening understanding of the 
world, both natural and sublime. He writes “In the variety of departments in which I was 
employed by my master, I had an opportunity of seeing many curious scenes in different islands” 
(82). He likewise attributes earthquakes to supernatural causes, telling his readers, “I was 
exceedingly frightened, and thought it was the visitation of the spirits” (83). This is to say that 
the travels necessitated by his status as an enslaved seaman offer him access to a much wider, 
more diverse world than he otherwise would have known.  
Yet he still must learn to comprehend this world if he wishes to gain any mastery over it. 
The first example of this comes early on and, characteristically, involves Equiano’s development 
of linguistic proficiency and his anticipated literacy. He writes, “I could now speak English 
tolerably well…I not only felt myself quite easy with these new countrymen, but relished their 
society and manners. I no longer looked upon them as spirits, but as men superior to us” (51). 
Although he does not lose his innate feeling of racial hierarchy until later in the text, Equiano 
here demonstrates the way education, mobile exposure to different Atlantic cultures, and a canny 
knack for navigating situations, allow him to incrementally transform from a state of complete 
subjection toward eventual collaboration. He stops seeing the English as magical because he uses 
both capitalism and Christianity to assimilate into the society of his captors. 
Moreover, what begins as magical thinking develops, as Equiano’s text goes on, into an 
allegorical language with which to describe the inchoate machinations of the providential 
market, and into a literal sense that events in the market have divine causes and profound 
philosophical effects. For example, his prophetic dreams, which anticipate danger for his ship, 
signal his special relation to providence, the providential design of events in the market, and his 
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intimacy with the commodities he ships, all at once. He writes, “On the 4th of February…I 
dreamed the ship was wrecked amidst the surfs and rocks, and that I was the means of saving 
every one on board; and on the night following I dreamed the same dream. These dreams, 
however, made no impression on my mind” (109). Momentarily, Equiano will see that he should 
have paid them more mind. He writes, “the next evening, it being my watch below, I was 
pumping the vessel a little after eight o’clock…and being weary with the duty of the day, and 
tired at the pump…I began to express my impatience, and uttered with an oath, ‘Damn the 
vessel’s bottom out!’ But my conscience instantly smote me for the expression. When I left the 
deck I went to bed, and had scarcely fallen asleep when I dreamed the same dream again about 
the ship I had dreamed the two preceding nights” (109).  Here, notably, it is not only Equiano’s 
life at risk, but also that of the other crewmembers and the other commodities for which he is 
responsible and metonymically related by proximity.  The prophetic abilities introduced to the 
text through the Wise Woman become the means by which Equiano can note his symbolic and 
literal closeness to commodities, as well as the means by which he can escape a purely 
commodified status. 
The commodity identification in these scenes of maritime peril underscores Equiano’s 
unique relationship to his crew and cargo as a highly valued, but unfree laborer on the ship. 
Equiano explains, for example, that he remained with the vessel because “I had little inducement 
to remain longer in the West-Indies, expect my gratitude to Mr. King, which I thought I had 
pretty well discharged in bringing back his vessel safe, and delivering his cargo to his 
satisfaction…but Mr. King still pressed me very much to stay with his vessel: and he had done so 
much for me, that I found myself unable to refuse his requests, and consented to go another 
voyage to Georgia” (108).  Equiano’s linguistic apposition of “vessel” and “cargo” marks the 
   Green 91 
 
vessel as, primarily, a means to transport commodities. Equiano subtly draws readers’ attention 
here to the fact that he is both a commodity and a crewman responsible for the safe care of other 
commodities. What endangers the commodity goods aboard Equiano’s ship also endangers 
Equiano because, in ways both literal and metaphorical, he too is a commodity good. When 
providence confronts Equiano with prophetic dreams and challenges, it also implicitly presents 
him with an important philosophical question: is Equiano a thing or a man? A good to be 
passively traded or a buyer with the power to actively trade? Equiano’s moment of crisis requires 
him to assert his status as a capable crewmember, rather than as a good to be shipped, if he is to 
survive or, indeed, to fulfill God’s plans. 
 So he takes control of these prophecies, guiding his crew to safety and developing a 
complicated sense of providential responsibility in the process. He tells readers “All my sins 
stared me in the face; and especially I thought that God had hurled his direful vengeance on my 
guilty head, for cursing the vessel on which my life depended” (110). However, the captain being 
either frightened or ignorant, gives up the ship to be dashed. Equiano responds: “I told him he 
deserved drowning for not knowing how to navigate the vessel…I then advised to get the boat 
prepared…there were only four people that would work with me at the oars and they consisted of 
three black men, and a Dutch Creole sailor…had we not worked in this manner, I really believe 
the people could not have been saved; for not one of the white men did any thing to preserve 
their lives. Indeed, they soon got so drunk that they were not able” (111). His ostensible 
responsibility for the ship’s danger invokes his providentially elect status by presupposing the 
special insult to God of his sinfulness. But Equiano uses the opportunity to reaffirm his faith and 
his value all at once. By seizing agency, Equiano asserts the gifts of grace—his own intelligence 
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and humanity—in the face of a white supremacist hierarchy that would, without his help or the 
help of the black men they ostensibly command, have died.  
In such moments, providence puts Equiano into a position to seize autonomy, humanity, 
and spiritual existence, by forcing him to interact with natural forces. In some cases, those 
natural forces include storms, in other cases, the market. For example, after surviving this trial 
and another near wreck, Equiano and the surviving crewmen find themselves in New 
Providence. Here the market offers Equiano his survival and his escape. He writes “One 
merchant, who had a large sloop, seeing our condition, and knowing we wanted to go to Georgia, 
told four of us that his vessel was going there; and offered us our passage free, on condition of 
our helping to load and work the vessel” (117). Again, he must labor; again he must ship 
himself; again he must use his position in the market to find his way to salvation.  If Equiano is 
to master himself and become a full member of the elect, he must learn to interpret providential 
signs, navigate providential trials and, finally, leverage his own personal value as a laborer in the 
mobile market to move closer to his goals. Natural, supernatural, and economic trials are all the 
same—tests designed by God to allow Equiano to demonstrate his election.  
Thus, Equiano’s belief in his own and the Wise Woman’s prophetic abilities is not a 
deviation from either Christianity or market capital logic, but rather a personalization of both. 
Equiano and the Wise Woman can foresee events because God has created a highly structured 
world and presented it to them in market terms. If the job of the elect is to embrace the grace 
offered, the job of the prophetic figure is to understand and accept the prophesized providential 
will. This too is to embrace the logic of a market economy that proceeds along predictable trade 
routes, even if it makes individual lives appear surprising. The market offers predictability or 
legibility to those with the willingness and acumen to read the economy as a part of nature. The 
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Wise Woman isn’t magical, so much as she is literate. She is capable of reading the cosmological 
cues of the market and putting them into narrative order for her audience. In the same way, 
Equiano’s acquired skill at reading folds in with his acquired skill at navigating the market. It 
was not just another skill acquired along his path toward divine election, but essential 
preparation to read, comprehend, and respond to the texts of God, including the market itself. 
Perry Miller writes that, for seventeenth century puritans, “a special providence differed from a 
miracle in that God wrought it through or with means, by natural instruments, by arranging the 
causes or influencing the agents, rather than by forcible interposition and direct compulsion” 
(Miller 228). Equiano’s interpretation of the market reaches back to this tradition, in order to see 
the economy as the “natural instrument” God uses to arrange his particular providential fate.  The 
market is the text God presents the world, so that readers may know God’s will.  
Christianity and capitalism are two ways of ordering and seeing the world—each with an 
inherent logic of causality, predictability, chance and will. In the providential capitalist Atlantic 
described by Equiano, these systems overlap, creating a singular cosmology that is predictable, 
if, ultimately, unknowable. Essentially, God’s will is the root cause, creating and guiding divine 
systems along relatively predictable ordered paths but never fully exposing itself to human view. 
The economy describes those paths in their clearest terms but requires expert interpretation and 
negotiation to comprehend.xii Trade routes, systems of commerce, commodity exchanges, are all 
the complex but ordered material reflections of the mind of God. The elect are thus drawn to and 
given the tools to navigate these systems. One such tool is predictability and revelation. In a later 
age, readers might call this financial speculation but, here, it is a form of reading God in the 
nature of things and human interactions. Though cloaked in exoticism, the Wise Woman 
essentially serves as the conduit through which God’s will is revealed to Equiano—and that will 
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is economic. It foretells transactions that will result in Equiano’s spiritual and material 
transcendence. 
Equiano as a Collaborator and Colonialist 
As Equiano comes to embrace the possibilities of Atlantic capital to develop a kind of 
universal theology, he becomes something of a collaborator in the project of colonialism and 
colonial discourse. First, his life onboard his ship creates nationalist solidarity despite his status 
as an enslaved sailor, so that he begins to refer to the English as his own compatriots. He writes 
of a battle in Cape Breton in 1758, during which he was “in a small degree gratified in seeing an 
encounter between our men and the enemy” (47). This sense of mutual belonging between 
Equiano and his fellow British sailors develops to such an extent that he actually comments, 
without criticism, upon his participation in an evidently violent colonialist action. He admits “I 
had that day in my hand the scalp of an Indian king, killed in the engagement: the scalp was 
taken off by an Highlander” (47). Such moments anticipate his eventual identification with the 
British and his full embrace of colonialist logic. Moreover, they reveal the way election can 
contort into violence and exclusion—on racial, religious, and nationalist terms—even for 
Equiano. 
As a converted member of the capitalist elect, with all the purchasing power that comes 
from grace, Equiano discovers how to manipulate faith and credulousness in others, in order to 
position or exploit them for his own ends. Once free, he even goes so far as to associate himself 
with the broader colonialist projects taking place in the Americas. For example, while working 
for a trader in South America, he writes of taking inspiration from “A passage I had read in the 
life of Columbus, when he was among the Indians in Mexico, or Peru, where on some occasion, 
he frightened them, by telling them of certain events in the heavens, I had recourse to the same 
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expedient, and it succeeded beyond my most sanguine expectations” (159). He tells a group of 
natives, in no uncertain terms, that disobedience to God will result in their damnation. Explicitly, 
he presents obedience as adherence to the aims of a capitalist enterprise. Equiano writes, “I 
pointed up to the heavens. I menaced [them]. I told them God lived there, and that he was angry 
with them…If they did not leave off and go away quietly, I would take the book (pointing to the 
Bible), read, and tell God to make them dead. This operated on them like magic…I gave them 
some rum and a few other things…When the Doctor returned, he was exceedingly glad at my 
success” (159). This moment is the dark but logical sequel to the fortune-telling scene. Where 
once Equiano was more object of providence and the market than agent, where once he received 
prophecies, where once his faith was required for the successful completion of an enterprise, 
now, after the transformation of his freedom, his position is utterly reversed. He speaks to his 
naïve and captive audience, presents them with a prophecy and, essentially forces their 
compliance by employing the rhetoric of providential capitalism. He demands their faith and 
takes advantage of it for his own gain as a capitalist and as an evangelizing Christian.  
Critics can read this moment to recontextualize and critique Equiano’s embrace of 
providential capitalist logic. Equiano does not quite admit to manipulating his hearers or of 
dealing with them dishonestly, but he plainly does manipulate them. He uses the guileless belief 
of his audience in his words to achieve his own selfish ends. Moreover, he uses their belief in the 
power of divine or supernatural forces beyond their control to achieve economic success. So 
Equiano’s shift from commodity to buyer actually encourages him to collaborate with a system 
of capitalist subjugation, against which he earlier struggled. This is, according to the rules of 
providential capitalism, as it should be. In order not to disrupt this system, the commodity 
person, Equiano, must be empowered as a buyer. After this conversion has taken place, he 
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returns to the Atlantic market and wields its tools—both economic and spiritual—to gain power 
over other potential subjects. 
Similarly, the production and dissemination of his own autobiographical narrative seems 
to buttress the hegemonic systems of providential capitalism. Its appearance in the market seems 
to promise certain things to readers: if you are elect and do as I have done, you too will be 
rewarded with freedom, spiritual salvation, and purchasing power. Such a text is not written for 
an enslaved audience, but for sympathetic, and largely white, readers who, despite their qualms 
about or rejections of slavery, still benefit from the way slavery has brought about the modern 
amenities and political systems they enjoy. These readers wish to see examples of individuals 
raised up by the salvific powers of the divine market, from the lowest levels of dejection. 
Equiano provides just such a narrative.  
Does this suggest that the relationship between religion and capitalism exists on a 
fraudulent basis? Perhaps. Certainly it signals an increasing willingness on the part of Equiano, 
the author, to reveal his own complicity in the darker aspects of providential capitalism as his 
character develops greater understanding of the way they operate. Once Equiano was a 
believer—in providence, in the unseen world, and in the promises of the marketplace; now he 
sees more clearly. Now he sees that all of these systems work mutually to take advantage of 
individuals and to bend them to their own ends.  
Whether this relationship between capitalism and providence is sordid or sacred, the 
effect is the same: the native men accept Christianity and permit a situation whereby Equiano 
and his sponsor will both profit. Equiano clearly sees this as a positive outcome, on the grounds 
that the natives have now been exposed to Christianity through a capitalist exchange that has also 
made him wealthier. In fact, this very same logic will lead him to suggest schemes of African 
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investment that rely upon and advance the cause of colonialism. Far from diminishing the power 
of either providence or capitalist exchange, Equiano proposes a cooperative symbiosis of both 
that can be utilized for the positive end of “civilizing” Africa and expanding markets, freedom 
and Christianity. 
Equiano’s participation in projects of African capitalist colonization recalls similar efforts 
by other figures who hoped to use the extension of idealized capitalism for their own ends. David 
Kazanjian, for example remarks upon the similarity of these goals to those of Thomas Jefferson.  
He writes, “colonization…values U.S. colonialism in Africa by positing an abstract equivalence 
between white Americans and colonized black Americans as abstract bearers of American 
imperialism...on one hand, colonized black Americans are racially different from and subject to 
white Americans...on the other hand, [they] are represented as equivalent to white Americans, 
and thus different from ‘aborigines’” (120). Indeed, in Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson 
suggests a scheme of gradual emancipatory education, with the aim of colonization, in order to, 
at once, extend ostensibly American ideals of capitalist democracy and to rid the nation of its 
racial contradictions (Jefferson 146). If Equiano is unconcerned with American colonialism, in 
particular, he, nevertheless, appears to draw similar distinctions between the capitalist elect and 
the unredeemed, and equivalences between himself and his white colonialist counterparts. His 
mastery of capitalism and his identification with Anglo-centric modes of capitalist and even 
militaristic colonial expansion drift, in both the South American anecdote and in the African 
colonization scheme, toward dehumanizing or diminishing colonized others. The racially and 
nationally objectified figures in the market are necessary for his own success and freedom, and 
the unelect souls are necessary measures of his own providential election. 
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Moreover, Equiano’s perceptions of non-Christians and non-capitalists echo other 
portrayals of base savages to be either redeemed or exploited.  Cotton Mather’s belief that the 
Devil has “hindered Mankind for many Ages, from hitting those useful Inventions, which yet 
were so obvious and facil, that it is every bodies wonder, they were no sooner hit upon,” 
communicates a belief that economy and Christianity must be used to redeem “salvages,” which 
Equiano reiterates in his travels throughout the Atlantic (Mather 61). Just like Mather, Equiano 
sees economic proficiency, literacy, numeracy, and even cultural superiority as preconditions for 
grace, even if he doesn’t go so far as to argue that those who lack these gifts of grace are 
demonic. 
But he is hardly cynical. In fact, readers must here remember that Equiano firmly 
believes in the salvific powers of the Atlantic market.  He insists that he “felt a deep concern for 
my mother and friends…and in the abyss of thought, I viewed the unconverted people of the 
world in a very awful state, being without God and without hope” (145). He firmly believes in 
his own election and, just as firmly, believes that he has not rescued himself, but been rescued by 
a benign divinity that acted upon him through the capitalist market. This is of a piece with his 
period’s view of providence operating through market forces to deliver the elect—a view that 
had special currency among black Christian writers. Gronniosaw, for example, goes even further 
than Equiano, positing that providence moves the elect—even those among non-Christian 
nations—to feel the impulse to God by any means necessary, and will maneuver them into 
contact with Christian teaching, even if God must do so through the mechanism of slavery. 
Gronniosaw’s advocate, Walter Shirley, articulates this point, saying “in the course of wisely and 
most wonderfully appointed Providences, he brings them to the means of spiritual information, 
gradually opens to their view the light of his truth, and gives them full possession and enjoyment 
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of the inestimable blessings of his gospel...he was sold for a slave, and so brought into a 
Christian Land” (2). Equiano stops short of saying that slavery was the means of his salvation, 
but seems fully to believe that the trade routes and systems of finance and exchange that have 
dictated his place in the modern Atlantic world have positioned him to accept the salvation 
offered by God.  Moreover, as Perry Miller points out, sea-trading towns, especially, were the 
targets of jeremiads against sin and vice, during the eighteenth century (Miller, Colony to 
Provence 330). So Equiano’s narrative redeems the ports and routes of Atlantic trade, as much as 
it does its customs and crews—presenting all as vehicles to deliver one soul to providence, rather 
than as dens of vice and iniquity. 
In fact, for many black writers of the period, seafaring offered an escape route from 
slavery and exploitation. Ukasaw Gronniosaw, for example, similarly went to sea, “Privateering” 
as a cook, in order to pay his debts (17). At sea, Gronniosaw also sees providence at work. For 
example, one particularly disrespectful sailor goes so far as to snatch Gronniosaw’s bible out of 
his hand and throw it overboard. Gronniosaw notes that this man is the first to die on the voyage, 
suggesting a providential justice that protects the faithful at sea and which seems to privilege 
literacy (18). Briton Hammon’s 1760 Narrative of the Uncommon Sufferings and Surprising 
Deliverance of Briton Hammon…, also gestures towards providential deliverance, and insists 
upon the liberating potential of the merchant sailing industry. Hammon repeatedly finds 
opportunities to escape slavery and personal peril upon merchant ships when they come to the 
nearest port. His narrative attests to one of the primary elements of Equiano’s narrative: the way 
that an enterprising and knowledgeable enslaved man might make use of the complicated 
networks of maritime trade and war, to participate in a society that remains liminally positioned 
between nations. While jumping from ship to ship, men like Hammon and Equiano achieve their 
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liberty, in due course. For all its attestations to Providence, this is also capitalist enterprise as 
self-preservation. 
When Equiano advances colonialist efforts to spread Atlantic capital to Africa, he does so 
because he has fully invested in a providential capitalist message of universal economic and 
spiritual uplift. He insists that, if British parliament should turn its attentions to Africa, “then will 
be Glory to God in the highest” (177). Then, he goes on to tell his readers that, “A commercial 
intercourse with Africa opens an inexhaustible source of wealth to the manufacturing interests of 
Great Britain; and to all which the slave-trade is an objection” (178).  Economic investment, 
capital exchange, the opening of new markets, these are the means by which humans can glorify 
God and extend a righteous, capitalist imperial dominion. 
Moreover, Equiano embraces the possibilities of capital exchanges in order to advocate 
colonialism while rejecting colonialist violence. The authorial Equiano thus contrasts his 
protagonist’s earlier involvement in violence with his later, more direct, arguments against “the 
inhuman traffic of slavery,” because he believes that “if a system of commerce was established 
in Africa, the demand for manufactures will most rapidly augment, as the native inhabitants will 
insensibly adopt the British fashions, manners, customs, &c” (178). As Equiano becomes more 
adept in the language and customs of capital exchange, he learns that it can be a more effective 
colonizing tool than even the sword or the bullet. 
Equiano believes that this imperial capitalist operation can reverse some of the most 
troubling aspects of commodity market logic, including slavery and its bloody excesses. He 
writes “what a striking, what a beautiful contrast is here presented to view, when compared with 
the cargo of a slave ship!” (178). The imperialist project he proposes for investment in Africa 
will use capital, trade, and exchange to cleanse Britain of its slaveholding sins, but it will do so 
   Green 101 
 
through the very logic of exchange that instantiated slavery in the first place. Equiano writes, 
“Every feeling heart, indeed, sensibly participates of the joy, and with a degree of rapture reads 
of barrels of flour instead of gunpowder—biscuits and bread instead of horse beans—implements 
of husbandry instead of guns for destruction, rapine, and murder—and various articles of 
usefulness are the pleasing substitutes for the torturing thumbscrew, and the galling chain” 
(178). Equiano here trades the capitalism of his history for the capitalism of his imagination. The 
same mechanisms that brought the “thumbscrews” and “guns” to Africa for subjugation can be 
exchanged for the implements of economic development. In this way, he reads the biblical 
invocation in Isaiah 2:3-4 to “beat swords into ploughshares” in the new economic language of 
commodity exchange, literally trading one for the other.  
If the entire autobiography functions as an argumentative narrative, this is its most 
complicated turn. It transforms Equiano’s personal experience with providential capitalism into 
advocacy for that ideology’s Atlantic extension. In so doing, it is possible that Doyle is correct 
and Equiano merely reinstantiates the mechanisms of exploitation he softly critiques (10). 
Perhaps more critically, this suggests the nationalist and hegemonic motivations that tacitly 
underline critical efforts to claim Equiano within a nationalist literary canon. Critical attempts to 
verify Equiano’s description of the middle passage, along with his arguments and political 
actions against slavery, tend to deemphasize his active role in reproducing colonization and 
enhance his role as an antislavery figure. Taken together with ongoing fights to claim Equiano as 
an American, British or African figure, these efforts work to associate a given national literature 
with Equiano’s antislavery progressivism, rather than with his fraught and complex material 
relationship with colonialist business practices. 
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Indeed, readers and critics should be very clear about just what Equiano’s proposals 
entailed and the degree to which they implicate him in the worst aspects of eighteenth century 
capitalism. For example, Alexander Byrd discusses the African colonization schemes developed 
in London in order to deal with the largely male and seafaring black poor, and in Nova Scotia, to 
deal with former slaves and freeborn loyalists who had fled the American Revolution. Equiano 
was deeply involved in the London scheme, although he quickly came into conflict with its white 
managers and even had to be dismissed before the ship carrying the colonists made it to Sierra 
Leone. All the better, because most of the people on this voyage died (122). Meanwhile, some of 
the Nova Scotia settlers, who had fled the Revolution and been promised land and jobs only to 
find poverty and wage slavery, wound up living in literal holes in the ground (Byrd 169). These 
colonists arrived, carrying democratic enlightenment ideals and Equiano’s belief in both 
capitalism and providence, only to struggle with local politics, inclement weather, and potential 
starvation (207). Many of these same settlers even joined the slave trade and a few were sold 
back into slavery (220). 
Nevertheless, the migrations that came about in response to the revolutionary period 
resulted in more urban and more consolidated black American populations, among whom 
Christianity spread and grew in influence, dramatically. Furthermore, Byrd writes, “Settlers 
managed to build a society that honored the forms and practices of enlightenment democracy” 
(220). Equiano embraces these qualified successes and dismisses any concerns when he insists 
that “however unfortunate in the event [the expedition] was humane and politic in its design; nor 
was its failure owing to government; every thing was done on their part; but there was evidently 
sufficient mismanagement, attending the conduct and execution of it, to defeat its success” 
(Equiano 176). Nevertheless, if Equiano’s ideals of Atlantic capitalism imbricated with Atlantic 
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Christianity did spread among both African and urban European and American black 
communities, so too did the problems of urban poverty, displacement, and even slavery. 
Still, it is reductive to call Equiano’s text colonialist or even, simply, “problematic.” 
Rather, it reflects the deeply ambivalent nature of Equiano’s own personal experiences. If 
Equiano appears convinced of capitalism’s restorative, even beneficent, powers, it is because he 
has personalized the conversion and ascent process that he imagines for the entire African 
continent. As Equiano accrues more economic value as a laborer and earns the ability to navigate 
the market more freely, he also becomes a more potentially valuable member of the divine 
Kingdom and has the opportunity to sample and experiment with different means of arriving in 
God’s hands. Both economic and religious systems of value come together in Equiano’s 
moments of choice, in which he settles upon a religious practice, and also settles upon his own 
freely-chosen professional pursuits. The value and the mobility he experiences are both 
codetermined by economy and religion.  He imagines all of these rewards extending to the 
reading public, and to the places where providential capitalist colonialism might spread.  
Because the text actively challenges, even obliterates any distinction between systems of 
economic and spiritual advancement and election, readers are left to conclude that, while these 
systems and their relations might be legitimate or illegitimate, they may not be so 
independently—whatever one is, so too is the other. Moreover, they both operate through the 
same process of conversion to create the conditions—material and spiritual—of the world 
Equiano, his masters, and even the potential colonial subjects all inhabit—a world defined by the 
inexplicable and uncanny, and controlled by those with the ability to comprehend and engage 
with the inexplicable and the uncanny. This is a world that seems at turns magical, profane, 
market calculated and divinely ordained.  
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Nationalism or Universalism: Equiano, Benjamin Franklin and Revolution 
To be sure, Equiano does not write in a vacuum. His belief in the enabling powers of 
providence and capitalism—both to help an individual to rise, and to make that rising individual 
into the model for a broader Atlantic hegemony—has great valence in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. If critics wish to call this the revolutionary period, readers should 
recognize exactly what ideology unites the revolutions in Europe, the Americas, and the 
Caribbean. Beyond vague gestures toward expanding democratic freedom, this period sees 
market capital and commodity exchange become primary mechanisms by which to define the 
individual and by which to expand society. Simultaneously, however, individuals and nations 
increasingly employ those mechanisms to define class, race, and political hierarchies, in order to 
limit the very same democratic ideals they espouse. The language and philosophy that presents 
capitalist accumulation as a divine virtue comes to center diverse cultural traditions around a 
universal philosophy in which God is most present and morality most clearly expressed through 
market interactions. Equiano’s autobiography reflects both the colonialist impulses that this 
philosophy enables and the individualist routes to personal conversion and transcendence it 
potentially offers. It does so by offering a vision in which repeated acts of conversion and 
mobility allow elect individuals to realize their unique providential destiny. Saidiya Hartman 
writes that “chattel becomes man through the ascension to the hallowed realm of the self-
possessed,” a description that could easily be applied to Equiano’s case (Hartman 123). Other 
writers, however, exploit the implicit exclusivity of these ideas in order to steer the politics and 
social eruptions of the revolutionary period.  
As a result, Equiano’s autobiography both mirrors and subtly challenges those of other 
Atlantic citizens, similarly invested in the cosmology of Atlantic exchange, and similarly 
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committed to the idea of capitalist individualism as a sacred virtue, such as the authors and 
political leaders of the American revolution, especially Benjamin Franklin. To be clear, Franklin 
is hardly a random figure to contrast against Equiano. As Sean X. Goudie explains, Franklin’s 
publisher and fellow member of the board that created the Philadelphia public library, Robert 
King, is the same Robert King who sent Equiano to Philadelphia in the first place. If readers 
consider Equiano’s autobiography in tandem with Franklin’s, the radical elements of Equiano’s 
narrative come into sharper focus. Franklin’s promotion of market-driven, mobile, and virtuous 
capitalists as model national citizens helped to usher in and reinforce the racial and class 
exclusivity upon which an American state was founded. In contrast, Equiano uses those same 
ideals to escape strict racial and class-oriented determinism, as well as narrative and historical 
erasure, by remaining mobile and open to constant conversion. Benjamin Franklin’s 
autobiography addresses a number of the same issues raised in Equiano’s, including the value of 
morality and individuality and the importance of literacy but puts them into more explicitly 
nationalist context. This suggests that Equiano’s preoccupations are common to Atlantic subjects 
and citizens of the time and could function either to erect a state or to escape a state’s limitations.  
Franklin, for example, shares Equiano’s experience with perceiving freedom in relation 
to its opposite. He was a bound servant to his brother James, but escaped to pursue his own 
independent fortune as a publisher in another city.  As David Waldstreicher notes “Franklin 
especially had much in common with the slaves and servants whose descriptions ultimately filled 
the advertising columns in his newspaper…in many cases like that of James and Benjamin 
Franklin, master and servant mirrored each other in acts of resourcefulness and guile. One’s 
freedom was, after all, another’s misfortune, even ruin” (17). The key difference between these 
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narratives then, is that Franklin folds his own story of independent liberty into a national project, 
while Equiano continues to identify his with a broader Atlantic culture.  
Franklin and Equiano both premise Atlantic success upon a conversion process by which 
individuals forcefully seize independence and reject servitude. This done, both figures free 
themselves to pursue their own fortunes. Interestingly, they do so by turning their lives into 
model narratives for an Atlantic reading public that increasingly sees individual liberation as a 
model for political, social, and national renewal.  In the Atlantic world Equiano and Franklin 
inhabit, freedom is very much predicated upon self-mastery in relation to others—bosses, 
indentured workers, and slaves. Moreover, if, in the British Empire, including colonial America 
“‘liberty came to be associated with private property,’” as Waldstreicher quotes, both Franklin 
and Equiano attempt to redefine it, even as they embrace the logic of property holding. Property 
remains vital to liberty, but property can also be mobile. In Equiano’s case, it can even be 
embodied in the self. Waldstreicher writes that “the interest of the master class in keeping slaves 
and servants ‘footloose’ helps account for their ubiquity and, at the same time, their historical 
invisibility” (22). However, Equiano insists upon making himself seen, both to his masters and to 
his readers. He does this through financial negotiation and also through asserting his belief that 
he has been seen and watched from the start by God. If Franklin presents his stubborn pursuit of 
personal independence as an essential element of his character and, eventually, a national ideal, 
Equiano presents his own as the result of special providential care. Yet both use their 
autobiographies to model broader projects in the Atlantic; both tell their readers that a citizen 
should look like they look and do as they have done. Yet, for Franklin that citizen is increasingly 
an American citizen, while, for Equiano, it is an Atlantic citizen. 
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We should, moreover, read Franklin and Equiano’s successful mastery of literacy and 
publication as further evidence for literacy’s power to confer autonomous personhood in the 
Atlantic marketplace. Franklin, for example, is quite open about his willingness to exploit 
politics for profit and, importantly, to use his connection to printing, literacy and books for 
economic, political and social advancement (Franklin 80). Literacy and writing are what put 
Franklin in positions again and again to propose civic projects and to advance politically. This 
too is in line with Equiano’s sense of literacy’s ability to expand personal horizons and, indeed, 
to expand ideological and social possibilities beyond the self. Both men travel and become 
wealthy through the circulating publication routes of the Atlantic, and both see a reading, writing 
public as essential to a productive, wealthy, and virtuous polity. 
Moreover, for both Equiano and Franklin, autobiography serves a larger purpose in the 
eighteenth-century Atlantic, allowing individuals to embody the upwardly mobile capitalism 
they propose for the broader world. Even if Franklin uses his to model and argue for a national 
citizenry that would remain exclusive and Equiano uses his to model the universal possibilities of 
providential election, both use narratives of self to argue for the same kind of providential 
capitalism. They both argue for wealth as a sign of inclusion. They both argue for using the 
market to realize personal independence. They both argue for their own freedom by narrating 
their struggle to achieve it through an insistent drama of self-determination that takes place in 
market terms.  
Although Franklin remains suspicious of organized religion, he echoes Equiano by 
arguing that moral virtues coincide with economic value, and vices tend to go hand in hand with 
economic dissipation. He takes up Deism because he is convinced by rational argument which, 
notably, leads to a morality of plain dealing and functional utility (43). He proclaims, “vice and 
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virtue were empty distinctions, no such things existing…I grew convinced that truth, sincerity 
and integrity in plain dealings between man and man were of the utmost importance to the 
felicity of life” (43-4). He is encouraged to write to model “frugality, diligence and temperance” 
as well as “modesty...disintegrates, without which you never could have waited for your 
advancement” (58). Franklin credits and conflates these virtues with economic advancement. His 
“bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection” includes a scheme by which to 
develop the “virtues” of temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, 
justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility (63-5). All of these are virtues 
that, his text makes clear, work toward the dual goals of personal moral development and 
personal economic increase, such that both goals reveal themselves as the same goal: to use 
virtue to become wealthy, and to use wealth to become virtuous. 
Moreover, like Equiano, Franklin sees universal capitalist virtues wiping away 
denominational religious differences, through emphasizing rituals and values that produce 
economic benefits. He suggests that the difficulty of traditional religious practices leaves 
moralists accepting the “speckled ax” approach to morality, rather than attempting to truly better 
themselves. Then he proposes that a new morality, based upon the “essentials of all religions” 
become the basis for a new universal religion, potentially called “The Society of the Free and 
Easy” (74). Given his continued emphasis on disciplined courses of “moral perfection,” readers 
should keep in mind what this morality would entail: thrift, productivity, and upward economic 
exchange—the very values that Equiano saw as bringing him closer to providence.  
However, Franklin openly mocks providence in the same breath with which he mocks 
American colonial efforts at native extermination. He suggests that, if natives drink themselves 
to death and God wishes their extermination, then it must be a form of providence. He writes “If 
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it be the design of Providence to extirpate these savages in order to make room for cultivators of 
the earth, it seems not improbable that rum may be the appointed means. It has already 
annihilated all the tribes who formerly inhabited the sea-coast” (96). Though couched in a joke, 
Franklin’s unsettlingly blasé attitude toward a societal collapse is telling: while he scoffs at 
providence, he firmly believes in the coincidence of moral degeneracy and economic and social 
collapse or, conversely, in moral virtue and economic productivity.  
Furthermore, Franklin’s dismissal of the “savages” illuminates one of the most troubling 
implications of Equiano’s view of providence and its relationship to economic, spiritual, and 
social rewards. If providence has selected Equiano for success and transformation, has it rejected 
the countless individuals caught in the same dehumanizing maw of slavery, yet unable to use the 
mechanisms of capital to their own advantage? In contrast to Equiano’s vision of spiritual and 
economic uplift is Venture Smith’s Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture from 1798. 
This text reads as a catalogue of economic difficulty and ends with grief and exclusion that 
frames Equiano’s optimism in a more critical light. Smith demonstrates an overall emphasis on 
education of all kind as an important tool to elevate man so that he may not be “wholly destitute 
of every noble and generous feeling” (5). This is a theme to which he returns late in life in more 
pessimistic tones when he notes the way he has been “cheated out of considerable money by 
people whom I traded with taking advantage of my ignorance of numbers” (44).Throughout the 
text, Smith works to prove his obedience and dependability, only to have others—especially 
white masters and fellow laborers—cheat him or otherwise ruin his chances (21; 24). 
Even though Smith works to earn enough money to buy his freedom, and then to liberate 
his sons and wife, as well as to employ a few former slaves, he remains frustrated and deeply 
circumspect about the ability of some to manipulate the market to cheat or abuse him. Though, 
   Green 110 
 
like Equiano, he leverages his own commodity value for personal resistance, he does so with no 
trust in providential salvation. On the one hand, when his frustrated master asks what his value is 
if he resists work, he responds “I could not give him the reason, unless it was to convert me into 
cash, and speculate with me as with other commodities” (32). On the other hand, he responds to 
the death of one son who dies whaling by noting that the “Church has never yet paid me the least 
of his wages. In my son, besides the loss of his life, I lost equal to seventy-five pounds” (39). In 
all, Smith’s narrative is deeply pessimistic and rather cynical about the possibilities for 
community or individuality in a market-driven world. All of the people who figure in his story 
can be boiled down to their most rapacious capitalistic characteristics or their most frank 
commodity worth. Equiano’s sense of capitalism’s salvific powers is stripped away, leaving the 
reader to contemplate only the violence at the heart of slave capitalism. Equiano never quite 
answers Smith. Although he suggests that, by reaching his providential destiny, he will be better 
positioned to speak out against slavery, to promote reformist schemes, and even to work toward 
abolition, the specter of loss remains in the shadow cast by Equiano’s paean to economic and 
Christian optimism. 
This points toward the potentially irreconcilable moral contradictions of the Atlantic 
marketplace. Both Equiano and Franklin appear cognizant of this issue, although they draw very 
different conclusions from their own moral convolutions. Franklin comments on them with 
characteristic humor, for example, when he reasons his way out of vegetarianism only to take it 
up again, almost ironically, to challenge his friend to be more religiously pure and, notably, more 
thrifty. Though he begins perversely, writing, “I promised myself some diversion in half starving 
him,” Franklin ultimately discovers that “the whim suited me the better at this time from the 
cheapness of it, not costing us above eighteen pence sterling each per week. I have since kept 
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several Lents most strictly” (Franklin 27-8). Franklin sees moral flexibility as an inherent 
element of the human experience that is open to play, but that might also produce a result that is 
both virtuous and economically efficacious, a “lent” that purifies even as it produces profits.  
Of course, Equiano could be funny as well, and likewise in the pursuit of a larger point 
about moral development. While considering faiths, he writes, “A seraskier, or officer, took a 
liking of me, and wanted me to stay [in Smyrna], offering me two wives. But I refused the 
temptation, thinking one was as much as some could manage, and more than others would 
venture on” (127). However, on the subject of slavery, Equiano is deadly serious, allowing the 
text to reveal his own failure to reconcile his moral disgust with slave-owning with his 
occupational implication in the practice. He tells readers, “I will not suppose that dealers in 
slaves are born worse than other men. No, it is the fatality of this mistaken avarice, that it 
corrupts the milk of human kindness and turns it into gall” (80). Equiano approaches providential 
sanctification by textually presenting moral complexity and even inconsistency, and permitting 
his authorial self to witness the errors of his younger narrative self. The autobiography is 
structured to present a narrative of improvement, away from moral confusion and toward moral 
clarity. Equiano’s advances in the market are necessary to facilitate this shift, so he looks to the 
market as a tool for broader moral improvement, on a national, even international scale.  Only 
after obtaining full liberty and autonomy does he bid “adieu to the sound of the cruel whip,” not 
only the one he felt, but also the one he held in his own hand (123).  
If we forget Equiano’s participation in the slave trade, it is because he subsumes it into a 
narrative of personal and, he hopes, social preparation for grace. However, if we forget 
Franklin’s complicity in the slave market that defined so much of Equiano’s life, it is because 
Franklin wants us to. In fact, as Waldstreicher notes “if Franklin gained an antislavery reputation 
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during the 1760s…it was not primarily because antislavery activists successfully awakened his 
conscience. It was because they cannily fudged the truth” (195). He was antislavery, though slow 
to free his own slaves and slow to divest from business that profited from slavery.xiii Franklin too 
profited from slavery, both holding slaves and through publishing ads for runaways in his 
Gazette (Waldstreicher 24).  In this, he is the living embodiment of Equiano’s fears that literary 
and commercial culture might be employed either for good or bad ends, or even for both at the 
same time. 
As proponents of a specifically national culture, the authors of the American Declaration 
of Independence, including both Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were forced, unlike Equiano, to 
reconcile a sentimental opposition to slavery at its worst, with an official embrace of the slave 
business or even an implicit belief in racist ideology.xiv Goudie reminds readers that, “Franklin’s 
vision of a great white empire in the West relies on negating North American complicity in 
exploiting the British West Indian plantation economies...so too, his project of creole uplift 
depends on a parallel displacement of Southern slavery in North America onto the West Indies” 
(Goudie 42). By blaming the British for slavery, Franklin could denounce it as a form of 
imperialist tyranny, even while carefully protecting the business interests of slave-owning states 
(Waldstreicher 196). Similarly, Jefferson calls slavery “a great political and moral evil,” despite 
his apparent active embrace of that same evil (Jefferson 94). He writes of “most unremitting 
despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other” (168). This does not stop 
him from disturbingly comparing Africans to animals and speculating about their innate physical 
inferiority (147). Nor does it stop him from suggesting the intellectual superiority of white 
classical Greek and Roman slaves to black modern African slaves (149). Both Americans 
presented slavery as a British imposition and, as Waldstreicher notes, emphasized the way “a 
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virtuous America rested on a sense of difference from West Indian planters” (201).  Furthermore, 
“by allying slaves with Indians and…treasonous Tories, Franklin and Jefferson insulated 
America from the Africans (as well as the Indians) who populated so much of the continent” 
(213). These authors therefore found a way to use a rhetorical antislavery position to craft an 
exclusive, pro-business and pro-American identity. 
Equiano, however, hasn’t the authorial liberty or political clout to utterly erase his 
involvement in the slave trade—either as its object or its agent. Nor is he invited to contribute to 
the ideological and rhetorical constructions of nationhood that defined so much of Franklin and 
Jefferson’s bodies of work. He is, notably, “Gustavus Vassa, The African,” a subject whose 
essays into literature and politics will be considered, first and foremost, from the perspective of a 
white audience assessing a black figure. He recognizes that his text will be examined, even in his 
own time, by readers who question the abilities, cultivation, expressivity, and claims to inclusion 
of people of African descent. He understands that his authorial performance will be examined in 
relation to his status as an African, and will be used as a measure of African ability and potential. 
As a result, contemporary readers must approach his account, whether its events are verifiable or 
not, as a self-conscious effort to personalize the experiences of Atlantic African-descended 
peoples and to present them to the reading public. Contemporary readers should also keep this in 
mind when considering whether Equiano’s narrative history coincides with historical evidence. 
His text’s veracity is of secondary importance to its artistic examinations of the pressing 
philosophical issues of his day, and to its performative intent as a personal account and as a 
political proposal. 
From his perspective as a mobile Atlantic citizen, Equiano rejects the compromises, 
which politicians like Franklin and Jefferson make, and posits providential capitalism as a 
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purifying and liberating mechanism that can and must be used for the purposes of extending 
liberty and salvation beyond the confines of nationality and race. In fact, the conflation of 
providential capitalism with projects of expansive and universal social uplift became widespread 
as well among anti-slavery writers and thinkers of the eighteenth century.  John Marrant, for 
example, actually goes beyond Equiano in projecting a universal capitalist Christianity as an 
escape-route from slavery. He imagines a nonwhite counter-public that links black subjects and 
native Indians and actually helps them to share values and connection to the natural world, 
instantiated and sustained by both trade and Christianity.  Marrant offers a number of instances 
of Christian faith operating to create community, a public founded on shared religious faith and 
capital exchange, rather than upon nationality or ethnicity. Like Equiano, Marrant became a 
sailor later in life, “pressed on board the Scorpion sloop of war,” and ends his life engaged in the 
same colonizing schemes that Equiano would help to engineer. He himself traveled to Nova 
Scotia, looking forward to a universal Christian fellowship, which he hoped would equalize all 
societies so that “Indian tribes may stretch out their hands to God; that the black nations may be 
made white in the blood of the Lamb...the kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of 
our God, and of his Christ” (127). Similarly, abolitionist and writer, Ignatius Sancho, for 
example, emphasizes the central importance of knowledge, reading and literacy to self-liberation 
and autonomy (87). He also, like both Franklin and Equiano, presents wealth and virtue as 
constitutive values. He likewise notes that the loss of property precedes a loss of morality (94). 
 By emphasizing the personally and universally salvific nature of providential capitalism, 
Equiano actually anticipates a marked shift that would occur in the way religious speakers wrote 
and spoke about their role in society during the revolutionary period, from envisioning a strictly 
scriptural ordering of society and its laws to imagining a shared cooperative space of religiously 
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motivated antislavery citizens of the state and in the market. For example, in 1786, only a few 
years after the American Revolution, Thomas Barnard, a Methodist minister, speaking at the 
ordination of Reverend Aaron Bancroft of the Second Christian Church of Worcester 
Massachusetts, announced a shift in how the church viewed its role in society (51). Rather than 
argue for a competitive model of religious practice within the shared space of the nation, Barnard 
asks, “Why Ministers of different denominations should not live harmoniously together, and 
even hold ministerial communion, no valid reason can be given; at least the members of their 
Churches would interchangeably participate in special ordinances, were thy not prevented by 
odious bigotry, or worldly policy.” His sermon argues that, as citizens of the same American 
state, different denominations must find a way to cooperate toward their shared religious goals, 
to collaborate for the sake of perfecting the new American state as a moral enterprise. That 
cooperation included both nascent abolitionism and the economic development of the new state, 
so that economic growth became an essential part of Christian antislavery vocation. 
Moreover, after 1776, this scriptural antislavery basis gained new urgency in the United 
States and elsewhere, when linked to the cause of liberty. For example, when minister Jonathan 
Edwards Jr. asserts, “our fathers lived in a time of ignorance which God winked at; but now he 
commandeth all men everywhere to repent,” he typologically links American philosophy post-
Declaration to the New Testament covenant and resigns pre-Declaration ideas as deriving their 
scriptural lessons from the Old Testament (27). No longer viewed as a distraction from Christian 
service, the labor of making and maintaining the nation founded for liberty—including free 
economic prosperity—now becomes the shared goal of the devout, no matter their denomination. 
Equiano, therefore, is not far removed from a larger movement to frame the events surrounding 
the revolutionary period as signs of providential intervention into world history. Where other 
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writers, like Edwards Jr. or Barnard emphasized the military victories of the revolution over its 
economic implications, Equiano sees capitalism as the universal constant, the apparatus that 
allows God to order history, whether in America, England, Africa or the Atlantic more broadly, 
toward the purposes of extending freedom and grace. 
Though all of these figures share rhetorical conventions and even some argumentative 
goals, Equiano’s pursuit of a universal salvific providential capitalism differentiates him from his 
American counterparts. All of these writers regret the inhumane treatment of slaves in the 
Atlantic, especially in the West Indies—or claim to—but Equiano emphasizes the way his own 
personal navigation of the market demonstrates the similarities of Atlantic citizens, black, white, 
slave or free, while Franklin and Jefferson bracket off and protect the white, property-owning 
American patriots, even as they use the populist language of the antislavery movement. Sean X. 
Goudie writes that “Franklin frequently engages in acts of paracolonial negation in his writings, 
anxious to repress the potentially deleterious social and cultural effects of commercial excess on 
the emergent national character.” On the other hand, “[Alexander] Hamilton not only sustains 
U.S. paracolonialism in the West Indies as an affirmation of the United States’ special mission to 
spread liberal and republican values in the hemisphere; he also strives to build a U.S. commercial 
empire there” (63). Readers might see a similar logic in Equiano’s project in Africa. He intends 
to extend capitalism and its colonialist practices even deeper into the continent, and to entwine 
capital-colonialist ideals ever more closely with Christian mission, but not for national empirical 
purposes. Instead, he hopes to develop a universal ideology that he sees as liberating and 
uplifting, across borders of nationality, race, or degree of freedom.  
These ideas coincide with those in the Plymouth texts, presenting expansion as the 
jeremiadic work of both the nation and the community of elect souls. Franklin and Jefferson 
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explicitly use the same language and logic of Bercovitch’s “English Traveler” to argue for the 
establishment and expansion of an American national polity. Later American politicians will lean 
on it even more heavily as the nation expands south and west.  
Equiano, for his part, both participates in and challenges the logic of a godly venture into 
the wilderness. To Equiano, all the world is both a wilderness to be redeemed—especially of its 
slavery sins—and an expansive cosmopolitan space deliberately ordered by the “divine 
economist.” Yet it is also a society already suffused with economic logic, in which God has 
always used the mobility and exchange of the marketplace to make known his will. So, as much 
as providential capitalism offers Christian and capitalist societies opportunities to advance their 
hegemony, it also offers individuals opportunities to navigate, and potentially master that system, 
already in place.  In her review of the rise of American evangelicalism, Christine Heyrman sees 
the projects of enlightenment revolution and born-again spirituality as being at cross-purposes. 
She writes that, the “Language of Canaan...a metaphor evoking the new awareness into which 
believers were initiated by undergoing repentance and rebirth” relied upon a process of 
conversion and reawakening and was specifically in combat with the rationalist discourse of 
deists like Thomas Jefferson and others who believed in a morality founded in good works and 
nationalism (4; 7). But Equiano uses his own body and his own narrative to reconcile these 
perspectives. As a result, he becomes a model for the way that revealed Christianity can 
encompass capitalist and even colonialist morality. Equiano’s readers can see the way that the 
motivating ideology of capitalism throughout the Atlantic draws political, theological, and 
geographical spaces closer together. At the same time, readers can appreciate the way such an 
ideology might be motivated to construct an exclusive model of nationhood, in Franklin and 
Jefferson’s cases, or to escape that exclusivity, in Equiano’s case.  
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That Franklin’s autobiography remains a font of humor and wisdom, while Equiano’s has 
all too frequently been reduced to questions of anthropology speaks to which of these 
possibilities became more powerful as the eighteenth century turned into the nineteenth. 
Equiano’s dream of a humanist capitalism that might cleanse the Atlantic of its slaveholding sins 
is ultimately undone by what he fails either to see or to admit in his own philosophical system. 
Providence and election rely upon the exclusion of some from the Kingdom and from grace. 
Capitalism too relies upon loss, as well as gain. Implicitly, Equiano’s successful navigation of 
the market comes at the cost of someone else’s unsuccessful attempts to do the same. 
Meanwhile, Equiano’s doomed attempts at African relocation reveal the same unstated problem: 
Africa can remain a source for capitalism’s constant churning renewal or even for Christianity’s 
expansion, but the rewards of providential capitalism cannot touch every individual equally, so 
African relocation becomes simply African colonial exploitation, and the providential Atlantic 
individual that Equiano embodies becomes a symbol of exclusive, rather than universal liberty. 
Franklin, Jefferson, and the other American founders seize upon this unstated cost and make it 
the foundational premise of their new and exclusive national culture.  
However, the fact that Franklin and Jefferson felt any need at all to address the 
contradictions of slavery, liberty, grace, and business speaks to their own blindness or even 
anxiety. Nationalist and racist efforts to secure liberty by denying it to others only ever belie the 
fear that the members of the elect might lose their status. Thus, as the nineteenth century 
blossoms, more and more white American writers will see the potential to lose their own 
privileged status relative to the bondage around them. The commodification and indenture that 
they force upon others, in order to escape with their own freedom, will come to haunt them more 
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and more. Increasingly, the narrative of escape from bondage offered by Franklin and Equiano 
will appear reversible. 
Conclusion 
Precisely because Equiano evades easy nationalism, he demonstrates the way that the 
individual liberty, moral flexibility, and blessings of virtuous wealth preached and performed by 
authors like Franklin and Jefferson, could be used by less privileged, non-white, even unfree 
individuals. So his narrative, seemingly so synchronous with those of Franklin and Jefferson, is 
also an implicit rebuke to their conclusions. His success is a testament to their potential lack of 
control over the market forces and divine blessings to which they credit their own liberty and 
upon which they found their American state. Even more than Franklin, Equiano embodies the 
system of trade and commerce, as much as he is embedded within that system. His travels take 
him to every important center of Atlantic trade and he documents every step in the process of 
commerce and trade that the system entails. Moreover, as a slave and a sailor both, he not only 
carries the system’s most valuable freight from place to place, but also very literally is the 
system’s most valuable commodity. So modern readers might reconsider such a narrative to see 
is as a potentially radical performance and model of escape from the personally obliterative logic 
of capitalism and slavery. Equiano recognizes the mechanisms of his subjugation and comes to 
master them effectively. 
When critics reduce Equiano’s text to questions of anthropological authenticity or 
antislavery politics, they do him a considerable disservice as an author. Critics and readers have 
long been willing to give Franklin credit for writing an autobiography that is entertaining, 
contradictory, instructive, and politically and ideologically engaged, even if it is not, properly 
speaking, true. If readers grant Equiano the same leeway, they will also see an author using a 
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narrative doppelganger to interrogate the personal stakes of life in the Atlantic marketplace. 
Moreover, they will find an author raising pressing questions about the philosophical 
possibilities of a divine providential intelligence that acts through the commodity trades and 
exchanges of the market. Just as much as Franklin’s paeans to virtuous saving and systems for a 
virtuous, personally wealthy citizen offer a model for national identity, Equiano’s presentation of 
personal wealth as a route to freedom, autonomy, and elect salvation, offers a model of human 
survival and flourishing in a providential capitalist world. But Equiano also recognizes the way 
that same market drive can work to dehumanize, cheat, commodify, or abuse individuals who 
fail to master it. Even more critically, Equiano recognizes the way that participation in such a 
system imperils the moral convictions of even the elect. 
By presenting providence, prophecy and capitalist prognostication in the same register, 
with no differentiation in kind, Equiano’s text essentially asserts that what Susan Buck-Morss 
calls the “porosity” of the market’s “existential boundaries” defines the fundamental 
cosmopolitan space of cultural exchange. In such a space, religion, spiritualism and mercantilism 
exchange values, language and influence, until they are transformed into one unified system that 
Equiano describes in blended terms and readers, today, recognize as modernity. Capital is as 
much the author of events in this sphere as is the Christian god. In a world that not only permits 
but thrives upon different ideologies, religious traditions and national projects coming together 
for the common goal of capitalist enterprise, capitalism very nearly is the God of the Atlantic 
system. When readers accept this, it becomes easier to accept Equiano’s conflation of providence 
and capital less as heresy or fiction, and more as the nominal conditions of the world in which he 
lives.  
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Current readers should, therefore, reposition Equiano’s narrative as both the culmination 
of an evolving philosophy combining Christian and capitalist values and the vanguard of a 
generic tradition specifically tied to the Atlantic marketplace. Equiano reinterprets the 
redemptive narrative of social conversion and contracted inclusion that helped the Plymouth 
writers to turn their specific political and philosophical circumstances into the basis for an 
expansive but exclusionary society. He builds upon the protestant belief in providential grace but 
reframes it as a story of personal escape from bondage through the conversion processes of the 
capitalist exchange market. Moreover, he personalizes these experiences as autobiographical 
narrative events that serve as models for how the divinely-ordered market might offer individuals 
opportunities for mastery over commodification. Certainly comparisons to Benjamin Franklin’s 
own narrative of conversion are well-taken. So too would be comparisons to, for example, 
Herman Melville’s portrait of a much later Atlantic market that still initiates moments of 
uncanny conversion and still conflates providence and capital gain in such works as Redburn.  
Far from demonstrating an unformed attitude toward the relationship between individuals 
and the providential capitalist forces that act upon him, Equiano’s critique proves him to be, in 
fact, utterly modern, capable of feeling awe and cynicism toward the same unseen forces of God 
and the market, and an early adopter of genre signifiers that would become especially important 
as the Atlantic market grew, transformed and, eventually, prefigured eras of global exchange. In 
the end, it is the text’s ambivalent relation to providential capitalism—sometimes reverential, 
sometimes suspicious—that most distinguishes Equiano as a keen analyst not merely of the 
Atlantic world, but of modernity, itself. 
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Chapter 2 
Uncommon Suffering and Divine Deliverance: Atlantic Labor, Captivity and Community
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Because Olaudah Equiano was especially skillful, lucky, and self-aware, he was able to 
trade on his talents and his virtues to rise in the philosophical and economic cosmology of the 
Atlantic market. He used the commodity value of his body and the allegorical value of his soul to 
achieve freedom and to realize providential design. His proximity to other commodities, in life 
and in text, ironically gave him the negotiating power necessary to take control of his status as an 
article of trade and to resist historical and narrative erasure. For all its complexity and even 
moral ambivalence, Equiano’s narrative is, therefore, an enormously optimistic account of the 
intersection of capitalism and Christianity in the Atlantic. It is a story of capitalism as a personal 
escape route from slavery and as a highly ordered system of divine communication. Even so, 
troubling questions appear fleetingly on the horizon for Equiano’s readers that the author never 
fully answers: if Equiano could use the market to realize his potential as an elect individual with 
unique value to God, what of the countless others who could not? If one man could use the 
market as a ladder by which to ascend toward divinity, could not another plummet in the 
opposite direction? Finally, what community was available to the masses of people displaced and 
uprooted by the mobile Atlantic market? With these questions in mind, it is important to 
remember that Equiano’s is not the only narrative to address the providential capitalist 
dimensions of Atlantic mobility. In fact, a number of writers who, like Equiano, navigated the 
fraught barriers between freedom and unfreedom, including Venture Smith, Briton Hammon, 
John Jea, Ottobah Cugoano, Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, and John Marrant offered more ambivalent 
counterweights to Equiano’s complex but ultimately optimistic perspective.  
Equiano looms large in the narratalogical history of Atlantic literature and culture 
because he has been claimed as an originary figure in black Atlantic studies, a figure who 
Vincent Carretta has convincingly argued belongs both to American and British literary history, 
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and to a broader view of Atlantic literature. Because he told his story at the time he told it, in the 
pivotal period after the revolutionary period, his voice also reminds readers of the individuals 
caught up in the Atlantic’s ongoing competitions over personal and national liberty and mastery.  
Moreover, because he told his story in the way he told it, he has become the most prominent 
black citizen of the eighteenth-century Atlantic—the mobile, displaced, maritime Atlantic, rather 
than one of its many increasingly nationalist ports-of-call—to engage with some of the century’s 
most important generic and ideological traditions and even political movements. He presented 
the trajectory of his life as equally providential and capitalist. He used the dual economic and 
spiritual meanings of conversion to give shape to his mobile life at sea. He survived and even 
thrived along routes of Atlantic trade. Finally, he proposed important colonial investment 
ventures that advanced providential capitalism around the Atlantic as a project of simultaneous 
social uplift and economic and cultural hegemony. All of this goes some way toward explaining 
the importance of Equiano in history and in Atlantic literature. However, readers and critics 
would be wrong to assume that Equiano and Equiano alone embodies these numerous generic, 
ideological, philosophical, political, or narrative trends. Indeed, a rich body of literature exists to 
demonstrate the vibrancy of the Atlantic as a site of cultural creation and curation, as well as the 
source of a diverse array of literary figures who take up many of the same issues that Equiano 
observes, but with unique individual differences. 
To be clear, texts that contend with these ideas cover a large swath of time and space. For 
example, Briton Hammon’s restless 1760 narrative wends its way among multiple nations within 
the Atlantic. Meanwhile, Ukawsaw Gronniosaw’s 1772 text suggests the providential nature of 
not only this sort of mobility, but also of slavery itself. Meanwhile John Marrant’s 1785 narrative 
uses multiple experiences of captivity and conversion to pursue a uniquely unorthodox vision of 
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Christian counter public. On the other hand, Ottobah Cugoano’s 1787 autobiography rejects the 
providential nature of slavery but uses a Christian lens to make sense of life in the maritime 
Atlantic. He was likely assisted in the publication of his work by Equiano, whose own narrative 
came to print in 1789. In contrast to both Cugoano’s and Equiano’s visions of providential 
capitalism as a way out of bondage, Venture Smith produced a deeply pessimistic account of life 
along the corridors of Atlantic maritime trade in 1798. In 1811, John Jea produced a multi-
generic and pointedly abolitionist tract. It makes sense to read these narratives as a network of 
interrelated texts because they represent a network of interrelated and occasionally disputative 
ideas that were current, formative, and productive in and around the eighteenth-century maritime 
Atlantic.  
For example, traversing the same Atlantic waters as Equiano and proposing the same 
colonization projects in Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone as Equiano, Ottobah Cugoano may well 
have relied upon Equiano’s help securing the publication of his earliest autobiographical work. 
Nevertheless, his narrative is much more explicitly engaged in the fiercely debated theological 
elements of antislavery rhetoric in his age than was Equiano’s. At roughly the same time, 
Venture Smith experienced similar Atlantic mobility, and worked with similar Christian 
antislavery groups to publish an autobiography, but came to drastically different conclusions 
about the nature of providence and capital for the enslaved and even for the emancipated figures 
who traversed the Atlantic marketplace. A rough contemporary of both Cugoano and Equiano, 
he appears as a kind of pessimistic mirror, challenging their faith in the uplifting nature of the 
Atlantic market and even challenging their conclusions about the nature of freedom, itself, 
providential or otherwise.   
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It is useful to read all of these authors together because they represent something of a 
tripartite discourse among mobile black Atlantic thinkers who share a window of time, even as 
they share the broad and mobile space of the Atlantic. If Equiano has been imagined as the 
pinnacle of potential literary and economic success within the Atlantic economy and its 
providential capitalist system, Cugoano more fully realizes the antislavery critiques embedded 
within Equiano’s text, while Smith is a frankly pessimistic counter-example, whose experiences 
in the waters he shared with Cugoano and Equiano are painful and defeating. Optimistic or 
pessimistic, these authors share generic and philosophical concerns that are providential and 
capitalist at the same time. They all either advance Christianity through capitalism and project 
capitalism through Christianity, or respond to efforts to do so. But they are not alone in 
responding to Atlantic cultures, whether on land or, more frequently, at sea, that developed and 
projected notions of providential capitalism. As a result, readers, critics, and historians must 
acknowledge the contributions of other writers who more explicitly emphasize the elements of 
mobility, syncretism, and Christian belief that help to instantiate and to structure the Atlantic 
providential capitalist ideology. 
Toward that end, Briton Hammon predates Equiano, Cugoano, and Smith, and represents 
an early example of the liberating possibilities of life in the mobile Atlantic. Although he too is, 
in part, animated by a belief in providential Christianity, his story is much more focused on his 
ability or need to remain mobile, and to curate a social and personal self through the experience 
of mobility. Later, John Marrant, a relative contemporary of Equiano, Cugoano, and Smith, uses 
a similarly displaced captive life to imagine himself within a uniquely heterodox but, to his 
mind, universalist Christian cosmology. 
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Meanwhile, Ukawsaw Gronniosaw uses his own experiences with captivity to propose a 
version of providential Christianity that utilizes even the worst excesses of the mobile Atlantic 
experience, including slavery, to position individuals within a hierarchy of Christian practice and 
election. On the other hand, the latest writer in this body of texts, John Jea, rejects any notion of 
captivity as a potentially ennobling or transcendent experience, but still envisions an advancing 
Christian community borne of the experience of mobile Atlantic life and social interaction.  
There are certainly other writers who could, and probably should, share space with the 
above named writers. Stefan Wheelock, for example, points out that “Equiano would know 
[Phillis] Wheatley’s work, as well as Gronniosaw’s narrative and John Marrant’s writings 
through an Evangelical religious movement and loose connection in white patronage. The 
movement’s patron, Selina Hastings, the Countess of Huntingdon, as well as other Evangelicals 
stressed spiritual rebirth, personal salvation” (Wheelock 66). As a result, these interlocking 
constellations of ideas and generic trends were also material networks of patronage, support, and 
publication. These authors, in particular, represent different perspectives upon a similar 
experience of mobile displacement and the union of capitalism and providential Christianity in 
the Atlantic. In order to gain any clear understanding of the providential capitalist nature of life 
for enslaved and emancipated individuals who lived their lives along the corridors of maritime 
Atlantic trade, readers and critics ought to encounter these authors together. They ought to put 
these writers into a kind of conversational relation with one another that allows Hammon’s 
frantic mobility to share space with Marrant’s roving experience of constant translation and 
conversion, and permits Gronniosaw and John Jea to illuminate very different perspectives on 
the nature of Christian salvation in the Atlantic marketplace. Moreover, a writer like Cugoano 
should be read alongside both Equiano’s more optimistic anecdotes and Venture Smith’s 
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pessimistic diatribes against providential capitalism’s pronouncements of liberty, in order to 
demonstrate the real and material links of working community and solidarity that the Atlantic 
market’s free and unfree authors instantiated and nurtured, as well as the relative degrees of 
liberation provided by those networks. 
This element of community instantiation, finally, is the most important reason to read 
these texts together. It is crucial to remember that Equiano’s was not the only voice responding 
to the experience of life in the Atlantic marketplace. His was not even the only unfree voice. 
However, just as important as it is to see the literary currents of the black Atlantic as discursive 
and conversational, even occasionally combative, it is important to recognize what all of these 
authors sought in common—namely: community. Out of the dense and diverse web of voices 
speaking and writing in the Atlantic, a common desire arose to instantiate community among 
networks of Atlantic trade, Atlantic Christianity, and Atlantic exchange. Sometimes that 
community could only exist at the margins of societies that sought to deny the existence of 
individuals like the writers in this body of text, and sometimes the desire to create community 
remained just that—a desire unrealized or thwarted. Nevertheless, as the voices in this body of 
texts sought to reckon with the providential capitalist Atlantic, they sought, at the same time, to 
find or to create communities of like minds or of like experience.  
In order to understand the place of any one of these writers in Atlantic history and 
literature, readers, critics, and historians must understand it in relation to that of the others, who 
traversed very similar routes of cultural exchange and economic transaction, but who came to 
very different conclusions about the vicissitudes, displacements, reversals, and possibilities for 
community in the Atlantic. At sea, the intimate connection between mobility and conversion is 
made plain and so too are the problems of commodification and even dehumanization that 
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Equiano sought to minimize. Vincent Carretta calls Equiano’s autobiography “the culmination of 
the African-British tradition of the eighteenth century” (Carretta 13). However, taken together, 
autobiographers like Venture Smith, Ottobah Cugoano, Ukawsaw Gronniowsaw, and Briton 
Hammon, and missionaries and preachers, like John Marrant and John Jea, discursively engage 
with what Equiano appears to minimize: the philosophical uncertainty that occurs as a result of 
proximity to and confusion with commodities in a market-oriented moral universe. Moreover, 
Helena Woodard argues that “through personal beliefs and experiences in religious-centered 
publications, Gronniosaw and Cugoano mediate the dialectic between a universalist, moral 
theodicy and a hierarchal, racialist theodicy that was evident in social practice” (Woodard 32). 
Likewise, Stefan M. Wheelock notes that Cugoano actually used his 1787 text, Thoughts and 
Sentiments on the Evil and Wicked Traffic of the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species to 
cast doubts on “the supposed advanced cultures of the Anglo Atlantic.” At the same time, he 
“would historicize race, slavery, and political fate in a way that criticized the progress of 
freedom and civilization in the slaveholding Atlantic” (25). Gronniosaw and Cugoano, therefore, 
embody the tension between attempts to create counter publics, adjacent to the Atlantic societies 
that worked hard to marginalize both the mobile working denizens of the Atlantic and the 
Atlantic’s free and unfree black populations, along with those populations who fell into both 
categories, and the desire to instantiate a universalist Christian cosmology, the “universalist, 
moral theodicy,” which uses even the most abusive elements of Atlantic trade, including slavery, 
forced mobility, and violence, to generate a Christian polity. Uniting the Atlantic as a singular 
divine space was, therefore, very much a subject for debate. Cugoano and Gronniosaw settle on 
quite different modes by which to reconcile the Atlantic’s rigidly hierarchical systems of power 
and submission, and their desire for community instantiation. These writers flesh out and 
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complicate the intricate relationship between religious conviction and capitalist embeddedness in 
ways both personal and abstract, focused on intimate histories but also critical of a broader 
system of providential capitalism. 
Because slave narratives included in this body of work are related in the first-person, 
there is some temptation to consider their descriptions of abusive practices in the corridors of 
Atlantic trade as sentimentalist attempts to develop the sympathies of white audiences who made 
up the overwhelming bulk of the Atlantic reading public. In some respects, this is, indeed, how 
they have been imagined to function. As a result, even these narratives could serve to reproduce 
the very narrative, political, and economic structures they sought to critique. Saidiya Hartman, 
for example, contends that “the recognition of humanity” initiated by the frequent scenes of 
suffering and subjection found in slave narratives “acted to tether, bind, and oppress.” She also 
notes that, “It was often the case that benevolent correctives and declarations of slave humanity 
intensified the brutal exercise of power upon the captive body rather than ameliorating the chattel 
condition” (5). Conversely, Lisa Lowe asserts that “autobiography served as a particularly 
powerful genre for the individual achievement of liberty through ethical education and 
civilization,” and that this narrative mode asserted “a linear understanding of historical progress” 
(Lowe 46). Wheelock also notes that “black memoir was especially adept at manipulating this 
rhetoric —perhaps more adept than its polemical counterpart. If antislavery polemic was largely 
constrained by reason and argument, black antislavery memoir could represent complex 
historical realities as stories with surprising biographical plot twists and turns. These plot twists 
and turns had the capacity to draw out Atlantic slaveholding realities in their material (and 
oftentimes unsettling) complexity” (Wheelock 67). Certainly Equiano’s autobiographical history 
allows readers to trace not only his personal navigation of the networks of trade that structured 
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the maritime Atlantic, but also to see the contours of those networks, and to trace the links that 
held together distant ports and Atlantic societies. Similarly, readers can approach texts like 
Marrant’s, Smith’s, and Cugoano’s, as evidence of a semi-linear progression of ideas about 
mobility, liberty, and election in personalized fashion. Briton Hammon, Gronniosaw, and Jea all 
also use their autobiographies to reflect and to comment upon providential Christianity and 
liberationist Christianity as personal experiences of freedom, election, and Christian 
transcendence. Reading them together allows readers, likewise, to experience the discursive 
development of entwined notions of elect Christian liberty in a capitalist market context. All of 
these narratives use their protagonists’ “ethical education and civilization” to order their 
experiences of mobility, liberation, and interaction with both providence and capitalism in the 
Atlantic market. In so doing, they also provide the “linear understanding of historical progress” 
that Lowe notes, by personalizing the experience of history and by individualizing debates over 
the nature of providential Christianity as they played out in the Atlantic marketplace. 
However, these narratives serve more than an autobiographical function and they do 
more than reproduce the experiences of subjugation and violence they depict. They also allow 
their author-narrators to interpret the logic and imperatives of the moral universe they inhabit. 
Frequently that morality takes on economic features of exchange, equivalence, and conversion. 
Because these narratives are told from the perspective of individuals who are, at once, 
possessions of the market and active members of the economy, they are uniquely situated to 
argue for a very particular interpretation of the lived reality of Atlantic modernity as an ongoing 
struggle to gain personal agency through economic and Christian self-mastery. They show the 
market to be a system in which mobility, disruption, exchange, and transformation are all divine 
forces that work through the economy to position and communicate with the individual. They 
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also express the powerful need to construct community within the disruptive, mobile, and often 
marginalizing Atlantic. 
This was critically important, given that the liminal spaces of the Atlantic that texts like 
these explore remained sites of imaginative possibility and potential moral transformation for 
Atlantic audiences. Catherine Hall describes this marginalizing and exoticizing perspective when 
she argues that, in the minds of many Atlantic denizens, “England was for families, Jamaica was 
for sex” (72). She suggests that the peripheries of empire and Atlantic society were figured by 
the inhabitants of mainland England or North America as places where the normal rules of 
morality might not apply. And yet, mobile figures who traversed the Atlantic, like John Marrant, 
Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, or even Equiano, suggest that distinctions of periphery and core are 
much less stable than Atlantic colonialist writers might like to imagine. Liverpool is a central 
port for these writers, receiving commodities and laborers from other parts of the Atlantic world, 
and always at the mercy of the swiftly changing political and economic currents of broad and 
mobile Atlantic society. xv Indeed, it is for this very reason that Ian Baucom describes Liverpool 
as the capitol of Atlantic modernity. Its position relative to the wide-ranging flow of Atlantic 
commerce and trade is emblematic of the Atlantic port city as a threshold to the culturally, 
economically, and ideologically circulating Atlantic world. Moreover, its close ties to the slave 
trade lay bare the nature of the business at the heart of this economic and ideological community. 
There was essentially no fortune in England or the Americas, for example, that was not, in some 
way, intimately connected to business in the Caribbean, and these writers, who narrate circular, 
recursive, and seemingly endless journeys throughout the Atlantic, attest to the centrality of the 
maritime slave and commodity marketplace to Atlantic societies.  
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In and around the Atlantic, the individual self was constructed in the context of 
hierarchies of power, nationality, economy, and spirituality. So too was the national self. Laura 
Doyle even argues that the racial constructions at play in the formation of modernity were 
expressed in letters and fiction and helped to instantiate the novel as a form. She insists that the 
literary and cultural fixation upon freedom and liberty developed out of an articulation of racial 
consciousness as a means establishing racial and cultural solidarity. Freedom as a subject came 
at the expense of the “other.” Moreover, individual and social liberty, she argues, were as much 
economic concepts as philosophical or religious concerns and rightfully adopted the language of 
contract and contract violation (60). The “Jamaica” that Hall describes, therefore, is an important 
imaginary other, a Jamaica of the mind, a periphery against which the national, ideological, and 
racial home could be defined. However, with the intimate connection between the ostensible 
peripheries to the ostensible core in mind, the moral assumptions of home admit their own 
instability. If, indeed, “England was for families, Jamaica was for sex,” what did it mean for the 
boundaries between core and periphery to break down? What did it mean for home states like 
England to create explicit peripheral colonial spaces, such as Nova Scotia and Sierra Leone, 
which maintained direct links to home, but were forcibly, determinedly marginal? These 
questions suggest that England, itself, or any other Atlantic national space, was more porous and 
more elastic than it cared to admit. The distinction between “England” and “Jamaica” that Hall’s 
sentence indicates with an assertive comma, was an imaginary border between “home” and the 
marginalized, “colony.” Yet one could not survive without the other, suggesting that, rather than 
remain separated across the border of “home” and “colony” or the barrier of Hall’s comma, 
“England” extended to and included its own ostensibly marginalized peripheral spaces. 
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Although Anglophonic literature tended to privilege the perspective of the citizen of 
England or of North America, even the most self-involved texts could not completely evade the 
influence of the larger Atlantic world. Hall, for example, points out that the property in question 
in Mansfield Park derived in the West Indies (74). As North American and English writers 
imagined themselves at “home,” maritime Atlantic writers demonstrated that that home was 
financed and dictated to by business abroad. The imaginary self that these depictions of home 
helped authors to construct was also subject to events in the broader Atlantic. And so, even 
where authors actively marginalize references to the Atlantic marketplace, that marketplace is 
what shapes their stories, and, indeed, what defines the individual lives contained within their 
pages. Discussing other maritime novels, Eve Tavor Bannet notes that “Mercantilist efforts to 
exclude foreigners and unauthorized persons or groups from closed imperial trading systems 
designed to enhance each mother country’s power and wealth, and state efforts to police trade 
and control its flow, not only stymied commerce; they made smugglers and interlopers the true 
champions of international trade” (70). In short, even in the presence of rigidly enforced legal 
and social codes, the eighteenth or nineteenth century self could not exist, in letters or in reality, 
outside of the sphere of Atlantic influence.  
This intersection of competing and overlapping identities led to the proliferation of 
syncretic cultural and religious forms throughout the Atlantic. For example, missionaries drawn 
to the center of the English sugar economy helped to establish “free villages” in Jamaica. Once 
established, however, customs, modes of worship, and even economic exchange practices all 
took on syncretic characteristics. Hall writes, “black men and women and their 
children…brought their own culture, shaped by slavery, the middle passage and the plantation.” 
Once established, these communities “honed through their encounter with Christianity and the 
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missionaries, [began] to build their own syncretic forms of religion, their own rituals, their own 
practices, their own African-Jamaican way of life. The missionary project to ‘colonise the 
interior’ and create a civilization of a new kind, was to be overtaken by the emergence of that 
distinctive [syncretic] peasant culture” (Hall 138). In the most literal sense, these communities 
were created through the marriage of capitalist and Christian directives. That marriage 
immediately produced a syncretic and mobile spiritual and economic culture, held together 
primarily through the logic and machinery of exchange between the different ports of the 
Atlantic.  Given the outsize influence of a place like Jamaica in the economy and geopolitics of 
the eighteenth century Atlantic, it is impossible to dismiss such an experience as fringe, exotic, 
or extraordinary. Rather, it is an endemic and emblematic product of Atlantic modernity. Texts 
written by mobile inhabitants of the Atlantic market, therefore, directly reflect the syncretic 
nature that truly empowered Atlantic societies.  
Economic, racial, and ideological flux challenge Hall’s proposed Jamaica-England binary 
because tight bonds of exchange link the Atlantic’s geographic and ideological centers. Ian 
Baucom’s description of Liverpool, a port city, a central hub of commodity exchange, and an 
important fixture in the slave market, as the capitol of Atlantic modernity also challenges the 
more conservative dichotomous perspective that Hall outlines. Baucom describes “the 
geographies of circulation that supersede and interrupt the borders of the nation-state, these 
spaces of flows thus belong less to the particular cities or states they link or to the individual 
places.” Observing the needs and dictates of such spaces, Baucom explains that “they exist by 
serving the needs of sovereign polities but exist to serve the sovereign principles of exchange 
they embody, the financial flows they regulate, the capital imperative which they incarnate and 
whose chief purpose is the conversion of endless variety into a single, general equivalent: 
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money” (36). This is to say that spaces around the Atlantic serve the needs of sovereign states 
but are primarily directed toward the flow and production of money and transactional economies. 
What narratives of maritime life, both slave and free, underscore, however, is the extent to which 
both Hall and Baucom underestimate the spiritual and philosophical needs and effects of these 
processes. Just as the nation that Hall describes desires a home for the national and social 
“family,” and just as the circulatory economy that Baucom describes desires the production of a 
“general equivalent,” the mobile black writers who circulated within the eighteenth-century  
nineteenth-century corridors of Atlantic commerce desire a spiritual kingdom to call their own. 
Yet that desire remains ambivalent and, perhaps, unresolved. Atlantic writers, writers like 
Equiano, Cugoano, Gronniosaw, and Jea, whose lives occurred very literally within and along 
the Atlantic’s important trade routes, rather than in any fixed national space, find the home they 
seek within the economy and within the expansive frontiers of an empire that largely rejects 
them. In so doing, the alternative communities they create both challenge and adhere to the logic 
of economy, nation, and spiritual community.  
Moreover, the syncretic nature of maritime narratives allows the critiques they contain to 
extend beyond denunciations of slavery, to include arguments about the very nature of the 
modern world their authors inhabit. Saidiya Hartman asks “what if the recognition of humanity 
held out the promise not of liberating the flesh or redeeming one’s suffering but rather of 
intensifying it?” (Hartman 5). This certainly seems to be the question posed in Venture Smith’s 
autobiography, in which freedom only further binds him to the pitiless mechanisms of a 
dehumanizing market universe. If, as Hartman wonders, the suffering depicted in so many slave 
narratives “reinforce[s] the ‘thingly’ quality of the captive by reducing the body to evidence in 
the very effort to establish the humanity of the enslaved,” Smith critiques both slavery and 
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ostensible freedom on the same grounds. Even in his freed state, the encounters and incidences 
of Smith’s post-slavery life insist upon his subjection, his “thingly” position in the market 
(Hartman 19). At their core, both freedom and unfreedom are experiences of subjection to and 
within a market-oriented moral and practical reality. 
In Equiano’s autobiography, his body allowed providential tenets of vocation as virtue, 
and constant conversion through equivalent exchange to thrive and to spread to a community of 
Christians, laborers, and fellow travelers. At the same time, however, his body’s special totemic 
commodity status incarnated all the exclusionary practices and effects of the socio-economy in 
which he lived. The market needed to trade upon or exchange his body as a form of currency in 
order to function. It needed him to exist as a body, both central to economic exchange and 
excluded from social transaction, before he could enter society as a freely participating member 
of capitalism’s elite free class. Sailors, free or unfree, lived under the same dominating hierarchy, 
in which the individual was obliterated for the sake of a more smoothly functioning trade system, 
and in which the persons most necessary to the function and existence of Atlantic societies were 
rendered least visible.  
Equiano knew that freedom was practiced on the backs of the unfree, and implied that 
election necessitated exclusion, but used this knowledge to convert from unfree to free, from 
excluded to elect. However, if the providential capitalist system that united Equiano’s economic 
and spiritual journeys could grant freedom, grace, and revealed divine intent, it could also take 
these gifts away. In fact, even Equiano’s optimistic account tacitly admits the reality that the 
experience of some degree of unfreedom was, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, more 
representative and widespread than that of freedom. Even Equiano’s freedom was exceptional, a 
personal escape from a more common experience of subjugation.  
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Beyond the personal stakes outlined in narratives like Equiano’s, Venture Smith’s, John 
Marrant’s, or Ottobah Cugoano’s, these narratives challenge readers to confront this implicit 
ambivalence as they demonstrate the tense relationship between competing perspectives of 
Atlantic modernity. The binary view, the one that insisted that “England was for families, 
Jamaica was for sex,” relied upon a deceptively distancing logic. That logic forcibly 
marginalized these writers and forced them, if they hoped to avoid becoming the implied 
opposite of the transcendent Equiano, to carve out or to embrace alternative societies, counter-
publics of acceptance constructed around ideals of providential Christianity, and held together 
along the routes of Atlantic trade. That logic also established the official or imaginary geography 
of core and periphery that was so important to Atlantic citizens. At the same time, these writers 
reveal the ways that that logic frequently failed to account for the realities of economic flux, 
spiritual exchange, and cultural production that kept the supposed home state of England bound 
inextricably to the supposed frontiers of empire. Jamaica, as well as Colonial Sierra Leone and 
Nova Scotia are all spaces created in order to facilitate and realize the logic outlined by the 
England-Jamaica binary. Although these colonial projects were championed by writers like 
Equiano, they were still figured as distant, remote, culturally distinct. Jamaica was a space 
reserved for plantation labor and exploitation, including the sexual exploitation that Hall 
suggests. Sierra Leone was a space created as a field for the displaced black poor of England. 
Nova Scotia was intended as a refuge for black loyalists moving North after the American 
Revolution. All of these spaces were, in some sense, imagined as home for populations with 
which a national polity struggled to know what to do. Full incorporation was, evidently, out of 
the question. So they were bracketed-off, made a part of empire but, simultaneously, excluded 
from the full embrace of empire. 
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 At the same time, they were the engines that kept empire running. If the question arises 
whether the binary definition of society presented by Hall or the circular and mobile definition of 
Atlantic culture presented by Baucom is more accurate, readers are forced to consider the power 
of both descriptions at once. The oppositional definition of culture outlined by Hall existed in the 
minds, and even in the legal codes of Anglophonic Atlantic society, even as the market-driven 
definition of mobile culture proposed by Baucom underwrote its expansion.  
These spaces were part of the extensive hegemony of an extending Atlantic nationalized 
polity. The borders of “England” were growing to include colonies in the Caribbean, North 
America, and West Africa. At the same time, England worked hard to maintain racial, political, 
and ideological difference from its colonial holdings. And so, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, and Nova 
Scotia were isolated, even as they were absorbed into the national empire. They became part of a 
national culture, but a subordinate part, without political voice or authority, their inhabitants 
composed of loyalist subjects, fleeing the American Revolution or landless poor, rather than 
fully-embraced citizens, invited into the English home. With this in mind, readers might also 
consider the creation, publication, and dissemination of texts that, like Equiano’s, Cugoano’s, 
and Smith’s, in particular, dealt with the question of colonization and resettlement as assertive 
attempts to resist marginalization. They spoke through text, because they were not supposed to 
speak at all.  
The deep ambivalence about the nature of the economic, political, and, especially, moral 
universe that enslaved or emancipated maritime authors share encourages all of them to seek out 
and to establish alternative communities within the Atlantic market. Whether they view the 
market as obliterative and demeaning, or transcendent and uplifting, whether they view slavery 
as a means toward Christian election or as an innately sinful practice, all of these authors concern 
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themselves with the ambivalent, often tense, relationships they create with other fellow travelers 
in the Atlantic. What holds them together, what binds these alternative communities, is a 
consistent belief in a divine intelligence that acts within the marketplace. Though much less 
certain about the transcendent nature of market exchange than Equiano, these authors use the 
language and philosophy of Christianity and syncretic spiritualism to make sense of their place 
within the market and as a means by which to produce and sustain networks of support, in the 
face of harsh experiences of abuse and alienation. At the same time, they use the ideology of 
market capital to make sense of their souls’ place within the swiftly churning and often 
confusing kingdom of the Atlantic that their god has made.  
Venture Smith’s Alternative Vision of the Atlantic 
Anxiety over the relative liberating potential of the Atlantic is particularly stark in 
Venture Smith’s Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture, a Native of Africa from 1798. 
This text, in some respects the argumentative and even stylistic opposite of Equiano’s, reads as a 
catalogue of economic difficulty and ends with grief, exclusion, and a sense that Christian 
fellowship does not extend as far as it should. If Equiano saw the Atlantic economy as a blessed 
social arrangement that offered him opportunities to advance personally, economically, and 
spiritually, Smith stands utterly opposed. He too inhabits a world defined by finance; he too 
looks for signs of divine intention in the economy. However, he encounters only frustrations, 
disappointments, and betrayals in the ostensibly divine economy he shares with Equiano. With 
his frustrated attempts at advancement in mind, Smith keeps his narrative focus squarely upon 
the economic arrangement of the Atlantic world. Martha Schoolman observes, “Venture came 
from a culture of commerce. Like his father, who gave up his life to not surrender his capital. 
But, as events would later demonstrate, he was not a miser who worshipped money for its own 
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sake (70). Similarly, Robert P. Forbes, David Richardson, and Chandler B. Saint note that 
"Venture was enmeshed in market-based activity and the processes of accumulation that it 
facilitated. Moreover, as he relates his life and describes his journey from Africa to America, he 
provides insights into how markets interacted and, even in a world of mercantilism, became more 
globally connected (Forbes, Richardson, Saint 57). The biography that Forbes, Richardson, and 
Saint outline for Smith helps to locate him, and writers like him, including Equiano and 
Cugoano, in the proper Atlantic context. If Smith had a “home” it was within the “culture of 
commerce,” the Atlantic market, itself. Though he would ultimately look toward stable 
settlement in Connecticut, the formative events of his life transpired within an Atlantic market 
that used free and unfree laborers, like Smith, himself, to link nationalist and colonial ports. He 
lived his life in between places, in a constant state of mobility, so that his home can only be 
described as the Atlantic itself. 
His suspicions about the market are initiated by European instigation of African wars, 
and also demonstrate the transactional, acquisitive and capitalist directives that have empowered 
the commodification, dehumanization, and captivity the author experiences. Smith writes that his 
homeland was invaded “by a numerous army, from a nation not far distant, furnished with 
musical instruments and all kinds of arms then in use; they were instigated by some white nation 
who equipped and sent them to subdue and possess the country” (11). He continues, “The enemy 
laid siege and immediately took men, women, children, flocks, and all their valuable effects” 
(14). In Smith’s account, white invaders have not only instigated violence and captivity in 
Africa, but have also done so through transactional means, through the transfer of commodities 
in exchange for violence and through the conflation of persons with their effects, and the 
essential transformation of people into commodities.  
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Smith frequently notes that capture and violence go hand-in-hand with the processes of 
valuation and commodification. He writes, for example, “My father was closely interrogated 
respecting his money which they knew he must have” (14). Indeed, Ford, Richardson, and Saint 
note that “Venture's narrative also illustrates that his own, apparently relentless, pursuit of 
economic gain aimed at something more than personal freedom and respect, and at something 
still more unobtainable: a sense of redemption and closure from the trauma of witnessing his 
father's violent death in defense of his buried wealth" (Ford et al 75). Here, Smith’s father, a 
resident of a pre-capitalist society, is at once evaluated by and initiated into the violent world of 
Atlantic capitalism. His father remains a figure of resistance who “died without informing his 
enemies of the place where his money lay” (Smith 14). His death allows him to escape the cruel 
transactional and equivalent logic of forced capitalism by denying his captors the money they 
seek in exchange for his life. 
This is of a piece with Smith’s general sense that relationships of transaction within the 
Atlantic world are untrustworthy tools of personal and cultural violence. He learns to distrust, for 
example, the white, Atlantic, capitalists’ “pledges of faith and honor proved no better than those 
of other unprincipled hostile nations” (12). In fact, throughout the text, Smith works to prove his 
obedience and dependability, only to have his white masters and fellow laborers cheat him or 
otherwise ruin his chances. The system in which he finds himself embedded is one of complete 
mastery, premised upon abusive violence and duplicity. Even his attempts at resistance are 
tainted with the logic of competitive advantage inherent to capitalism. For example, he enters 
into a scheme with an indentured Irish workman, Heddy, to escape from an American plantation, 
but, realizing that Heddy plans to betray him and steal what few goods he owns, he rushes to tell 
his master that the Irishman planned the escape and pulled him into the enterprise (25).  Both 
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men are punished. In Equiano’s autobiography, the mutual needs and obligations of co-laborers 
brought them together, even, at times, across the barriers of race and relative freedom. Smith, on 
the other hand, sees the way capital warps these social interactions. If he learns to navigate the 
codes and hierarchies of capitalist bondage, it is only through learning to cheat before he can be 
cheated, to step aside from the lash, even if it means placing another in front of it. 
Smith’s narrative also relays an experience of frequent but remarkable violence that 
appears as a common feature in Atlantic maritime narratives. Alexander Byrd describes the way 
that West African slaves, among whom would have been counted Smith and his fellow survivors, 
regularly “averaged losses per voyage of around 15 percent, [while] ships calling at Biafran ports 
routinely lost more than four percent of the slaves put on board” (Byrd 38). This loss rate was 
noted by buyers in the Caribbean and the Americas and many slave-owners requested other 
sources, knowing that the slaves travelling these routes were exposed to higher levels of disease, 
bad conditions, and violence (54). Like Smith, Equiano gestured toward this pervasive physical 
and sexual abuse, especially in his depiction of the middle passage. However, Equiano 
represented that violence as a kind of trial through which he could pass toward divine election. 
For Smith, that violence only communicates his dehumanization and subordinate status. It has no 
spiritually ennobling function, and has meaning only as the mode of communication for the 
system of mastery and control that holds sway in the Atlantic. 
As a result, the violence that Smith experiences conforms to the logic of capitalist 
commodification. At one point, for example, he notes that his master “took [him] to a gallows 
made for the purpose of hanging cattle on, and suspended [him] on it” (24). Smith experiences 
the same violence usually reserved for animals because, within the system of Atlantic slavery, he 
is a commodity of like kind. The text hints at the deeper symbolic violence of capitalist 
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exchange. That is: in a system in which people can be possessed or used as chattel, in which they 
have a value as laborers that can be traded and exchanged internationally, people can also 
function as currency to be exchanged for and transformed into things. Similarly, Forbes, 
Richardson and Saint observe "that…[an] iconic molasses barrel makes two dramatic 
appearances in Venture's narrative...both of these encounters with molasses, a basic by-product 
of slave labor, seem emblematic of coercion and bad faith...deceit, as well as violence" (69). In 
such moments, Smith lays bare the “thingly quality” thrust upon him by the market, and 
recognizes the coinstantiation of the market’s equivalent logic and its systems of violent mastery 
and control. 
Here readers might also note the significance of the author’s name. Smith explains “I was 
bought on board [the slave vessel] by one Robertson Mumford, steward of said vessel, for four 
gallons of rum, and a piece of calico, and called VENTURE, on account of his having purchased 
me with his own private venture” (18). Smith’s entire identity is shaped by his experience with 
commodification, violence, and transaction. Equiano too noted the way his names and identities 
could shift as he wended his way through capitalism’s labyrinthine trade routes, yet he, 
ultimately, arrived at a place of self-identification as Olaudah Equiano, the African. Venture 
Smith, on the other hand, remains Venture Smith, if not property of Robertson Mumford, then 
still, at least, property of the system that has commodified, violated, and abused him through life. 
Capitalism is a form of violence in this narrative, and a mode of total social and personal 
domination.  
That violence is also a mode of personal identification for Smith, a narrative event that 
both presents the violence endemic to slavery as typical and singles Smith out as an individual 
worthy of the reader’s attentions. Baucom suggests that the rise of capitalist ideologies gave rise 
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as well to conceptions of the individual and his reading helps to illuminate Smith’s presentation 
of self. Baucom writes, “The speculative rise and fall of the value of paper monies function…as 
the preconditions for the invention of an abstract, anonymous, mode of personhood invested not 
in the inalienable claims of the locale but in the well-being of an anonymous collective” (56). 
That conflation of finance and personal identification appears fully alive in Smith’s text. Smith’s 
personhood arises because he is an economic subject involved in economic exchange. Moreover, 
his victimhood within an economic context gives rise to his novelistic subject status and 
generates the reader’s sympathies, all while making the case for Smith meriting a place within 
the collective community that he imagines emerging from the interaction between Christianity 
and capital. 
Smith’s narrative is, therefore, both sentimental and anti-sentimental, an appeal to the 
hearts and minds of abolitionist readers and potential sponsors, but also an implicit indictment of 
the system that forces him to make that appeal. Sianne Ngai addresses this need to perform 
feeling when she writes, “it is the cultural representation of the African-American that most 
visibly harnesses the affective qualities of liveliness, effusiveness, spontaneity, and zeal to a 
disturbing racial epistemology, and makes the variants of ‘animatedness’ function as bodily 
(hence self-evident) signs of the raced subject’s naturalness or authenticity” (95). An emphasis 
on animated “naturalness or authenticity” goes some way toward explaining Smith’s narration of 
his own disappointments in the Atlantic market. Even as Smith performs feeling for his audience, 
he also performs their failure to act. His narrative does not end with a gesture toward salvific 
community, but with a relatively frank assessment of the limits of community. Ngai, discussing 
contemporary examples of animation of racial subjects notes that “there can be ways of 
inhabiting a social role that actually distort its boundaries, changing the status of ‘role’ from that 
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which purely confines or constricts to the site at which new possibilities for human agency might 
be explored” (117). Smith both inhabits and distorts his role as a subject in an autobiographical 
antislavery narrative. He situates himself within a role elsewhere occupied by Equiano, but 
demonstrates the rigidity of its borders. Smith presents himself as a narrative figure, but one who 
has been failed by the very community to which his narrative is addressed. He uses his own 
autobiography to give life to, or “animate” that failure. 
Smith’s account also reveals the fact that the violence he experiences was hardly limited 
to the officially unfree. In fact, as Smith recognizes, freedom could betray the cruelty at the heart 
of the entire Atlantic capitalist labor system, whether for the slave brought from Africa, for the 
slave on the plantation, or for the ostensibly freed man struggling to stay above poverty.  
Alexander Byrd likewise compares the experience of black English subjects emigrating, through 
colonization schemes, from London, North America, and the Caribbean, to West Africa, and to 
British Nova Scotia in the revolutionary period. He notes the way that many of these colonizers 
sought a separate social space after having experienced hardship in America and, later, as 
loyalists fleeing to Nova Scotia who found the promises extended to them never delivered upon 
(Byrd 4). Given this hardship, and the disaster of disease, death, and indigence that greeted 
London settlers in colonies like Sierra Leone, experiences of ostensible freedom frequently 
resembled those of enslaved Africans coming to Jamaica. Smith’s suspicions about the limits of 
freedom, then, are well-founded, and represent an all too common experience in and around the 
Atlantic.  
Smith’s text is also a testament to the scope of Atlantic mobility, including an economy 
of multiple nations, within the grand schema of Atlantic capitalist exchange. At one point, Smith 
notes, “I was sold to Thomas Stanton…to this place I brought with me from my last master’s, 
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two Johannes, three old Spanish dollars, and two thousand of coppers, besides five pounds of my 
wife’s money” (26). Smith is a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, and he finds 
himself in circulation with multiple different national currencies. In fact, his body acts as the one 
stable currency that binds all of the others.  
On its face, this might seem ironic, given that his identity is, in large part, the product of a 
process of cultural mixture and transfer, held together only through the dictates of capitalist 
exchange. Byrd, for example, explains that Igbo, the generalized Africanist identity deployed 
frequently by people involved in the Atlantic slave trade, is a term that came to be a catchall for 
the African in the Americas only during and after the middle passage. Byrd argues, “In many 
parts of the Biafran interior, the term Igbo was an insult and expression of contempt. No village 
group used it to describe their ‘we,’ rather it was almost always employed to denote a ‘they.’” 
(20) For Smith to call himself “A Native of Africa,” is for him to admit the totalizing 
identification of the Eurocentric gaze. Only as African groups came into contact with Europeans 
did their African identity come to define them, so Smith embraces the logic of a system that uses 
his unfree flesh as both a valuable commodity and as a marker against which to define white 
freedom. As Byrd explains, Smith would have come from one of a number of splintered 
disconnected groups among whom “sometimes, for all intents and purposes, cross-dialect 
communication was simply impossible [because] an abiding localism...characterized society and 
culture in the eighteenth-century Biafran interior” (Byrd 19). Thus, Smith’s self-identification as 
an “African” represents his embrace of an identity that has been produced by Atlantic exchange 
and which has meaning primarily in an Atlantic context. He appears to understand the reductive 
nature of his identification as an “African,” but uses that same reductive language and ideology 
in order to instantiate a community within the framework of Atlantic exchange. Given this, the 
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seeming contradiction of Smith’s status as a stable commodity in an unstable, international 
economy is less surprising. European nations defined and particularized themselves against an 
Africanist other that could be lumped together, despite unique cultural peculiarities, at the same 
time that they traded “African” bodies in the equivalent exchange marketplace. Smith, therefore, 
presents himself as the stable African presence at the center of Atlantic trade and through which 
Atlantic commerce can flow and convert from one form of currency to another. 
Indeed, the Africanist identity that Smith claims simultaneously gives him a sense of 
communal, and perhaps resistant, identity, and animates the processes of racial and national 
subordination that Atlantic societies enacted through codes, customs, and laws. Moreover, it 
suggests the way individual and communal identification occurred even amidst efforts to 
marginalize both individuals and communities. Byrd observes, “In British North America, free 
blacks looking for a better place to try their liberty followed news from Sierra Leone as closely 
as they could, and in Jamaica planters and merchants whose livelihoods depended on the slave 
trade paid more than passing attention to the purpose and prospect of free black migration to 
Africa” (4). On the other hand, John Thornton argues that “the slave trade and subsequent 
transfer to New World plantations was not…quite as randomizing a process as posited by those 
who argue that Africans had to start from scratch culturally upon their arrival in the New 
World.” Thornton explains, “Quite the contrary…slaves, although no longer surrounded by their 
familiar home environment, village, and family, were nevertheless not in a cultural wilderness 
when they arrived in America. They could easily find others who spoke their language and 
shared their norms in the new environment” (Thornton 204-5). Smith’s narrative is not strictly 
“New World” or African or European. Rather, it arises from a culture of mobility, labor, and flux 
that persists in the maritime Atlantic. As Byrd puts it, “connections between migrations to and 
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from western Africa were themselves embodied, sometimes perfectly, in the lives of 
contemporaries. Among the emigrants who made for Sierra Leone were settlers who had been 
born in Africa, who were previously slaves in the Americas, and who had themselves survived 
earlier transatlantic voyages as prisoners aboard European Guineaships” (4). And so, Atlantic 
trade remained an engine of simultaneous cultural disruption and production, generating a 
universally syncretic culture bound together by transactional exchange and providential 
spirituality, and embodied by displaced, syncretic individuals like Smith. 
As his narrative goes on, Smith learns that he must use the market for his own ends, but, 
even as he does, his experience remains demeaning. He learns, for example, how to use work 
resistance as well as the innate mobility of his condition to his own advantage. Recalling the time 
he spoke back to an abusive master, Smith writes, “I answered him, No. Well then, said he, I will 
send you to the West-Indies or banish you, for I am resolved not to keep you. I answered him I 
crossed the waters to come here, and I am willing to cross them to return...[eventually] he tried 
no more, and said he would not have me as a gift” (29-31). This was a real and visceral threat 
because of the West Indies’ well-known reputation as a space marked by death. But Smith 
appears willing to embrace this possibility. In this way, Smith learns that he still retains power, 
even in his commodified status. It is a limited and provisional power, but it is a power 
nonetheless—a power to refuse to work, even to court death, and thus to become less valuable. 
He even notes the peculiar circumstances of his life when his frustrated master asks what his 
value is if he resists work, “I could not give him the reason, unless it was to convert me into 
cash, and speculate with me as with other commodities” (32). Unlike Equiano, Smith never 
relates a moment like this as an ascendant or transcendent experience. Rather, it is practical, 
necessary, and forced upon him by a commodifying logic that he disdains. 
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Smith here demonstrates a subtle understanding of the allegorizing apparatuses of market 
capital that structure his own life. In so doing, he bears out one of Baucom’s major contentions 
that “under mature capitalism, allegory is no longer simply a literary technique but is rather the 
phenomenology of the entire social-material world” (Baucom 21). In text, Smith uses an allegory 
of his body being converted into cash in order to comment upon his lived reality as a 
commodified individual with equivalent market value. As Baucom puts it “commodity is, in 
essence, practical allegory—allegory in the sphere of social practice” (Baucom 18). In Smith’s 
narration, direct allegory describes the allegorical nature of Atlantic capitalist modernity. As a 
live commodity, Smith is, in fact, well-situated to understand these allegorizing processes. But, 
for Smith and for other similarly displaced laboring writers, that allegory extended to issues of 
the soul as well. The conversion that Smith describes is primarily economic, but it has profound 
spiritual effects too. When he later converts to a form of Christianity, he expects his value to 
convert in kind. When these hopes are disappointed, when his son, for example, dies without 
material recompense, Smith’s frustrations only grow, underscoring his sense that market 
capitalism has rigged the mechanisms of life and reality, including the divine mechanisms, 
against him. 
As a result, after he has worked to earn enough money to buy his freedom and he uses the 
market to liberate his sons and wife, as well as to employ a few former slaves, his contempt for 
capital logic only intensifies. For example, he responds to the fact that one of his sons dies 
whaling by lamenting that “[Captain] Church has never yet paid me the least of his wages. In my 
son, besides the loss of his life, I lost equal to seventy-five pounds” (39). Despite this frustration, 
Smith's ultimate ability to procure proper burial for himself and for his family allows him to 
become, in the words of Forbes, Richardson, and Saint, "a ranking member of the Yankee 
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establishment [who]...at the end of his life...engaged in one final  estate transaction—the smallest 
and most permanent of his  land purchases and the ultimate signifier of the accomplishments of 
an African-born American whose understanding and respect for his own  father's values helped 
him to transcend the violence that brought him to America" (76). Smith has come to see the 
world and personal relations through the commodifying gaze that he has been taught. Yet, even 
given this final, conditional victory in procuring land for burial, thus establishing himself as a 
member of capitalism’s elect, all he sees is loss, both personal and financial. His capitalist 
success is one he can only look forward to enjoying in death. Even his sense of personal 
development is tinged with the bitterness of a man deeply wounded by his encounter with 
Atlantic capitalism.  
It is important to note that Smith’s gloomy appeal perhaps targets one of the number of 
post-revolutionary charitable organizations, such as The Committee for the Relief of the Black 
Poor, whose membership would have made up his ideal readership. Vincent Carretta points out, 
for example, that “According to a report in the newspaper The Public Advertiser (6 January 
1787), sympathy for the Black Poor was so widespread that White beggars disguised themselves 
as Blacks to increase their incomes” (Carretta 10). Carretta’s annotation also signals the material 
connections that held together the displaced black populations of the Atlantic market through 
publication. Even as individuals like Smith were marginalized, antislavery groups, in their very 
protest against the home state’s treatment of the black poor, maintained intimate connections 
among marginalized subjects. Moreover, implicit to Carretta’s point, and, indeed, implicit to 
Smith’s account is the reality that Smith’s text would never have existed if these networks did 
not work to maintain connections, even across the expanse of the Atlantic, between a mobile, 
overwhelmingly black underclass, and the home that nations like England or the United States 
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imagined to be distinct, separate, and pure. Smith, therefore, both appeals to charity and 
communicates the bitterness of his own experiences when he notes that he has been “cheated out 
of considerable money by people whom I traded with taking advantage of my ignorance of 
numbers” (Smith 44). If Equiano’s experience in the market was one of upward personal 
mobility and freedom as election, Smith’s is of downward mobility and freedom as another form 
of capitalist debasement. Yet both men use the narration of their lives to establish some form of 
financial or communal stability in a deeply unstable Atlantic world. 
Even so, Smith resists extending this charitable appeal to colonial capitalism, as did 
Equiano. In fact, Smith seems to have anticipated the disaster that would come from an 
expansion of capitalism driven by ostensibly productive colonialism that was nevertheless driven 
by local exploitation, if not by deportation, which Equiano proffers at the end of his narrative. As 
Byrd notes, colonizing schemes developed in London to deal with the largely male and seafaring 
black poor, and in Nova Scotia to deal with emancipated slaves and freeborn loyalists who had 
fled the Revolution. Equiano had been deeply involved in the London scheme, although he 
quickly came into conflict with its white managers and even had to be dismissed before the ship 
made it to Sierra Leone. All the better, because most of the people on this voyage died (Byrd 
122) The Nova Scotian settlement plan, organized by Granville Sharp, was similarly disastrous 
(169).  Furthermore, Byrd argues that these schemes did not only fail because of ill-preparedness 
for natural conditions, but were actively destroyed by English companies. He contends that the 
failure of these plans can be explained “because the settlers socialized toward a politics of 
antislavery that...was substantial enough when combined with…growing civil and institutional 
capacity to render the settlement noxious to prominent British and Temne traders in the region” 
(169). And so, the vision of white capitalist traders exploiting differences between West African 
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cultures and inciting violence and ruin that began Smith’s narrative anticipates Europe’s 
relationship to West Africa.  
With all of this in mind, Smith’s thoughts on presumed Christian civilization are 
circumscribed at best. After finding himself cheated by yet another business partner, he writes 
“Such a proceeding as this, committed on a defenceless [sic] stranger, almost worn out in the 
hard service of the world, without any foundation in reason or justice, whatever it may be called 
in a Christian land, would in my native country have been branded as a crime equal to highway 
robbery. But Captain Hart was a white gentleman, and I a poor African, therefore it was all right, 
and good enough for the black dog” (47). Smith’s pessimism offers a forceful rebuke to 
Equiano’s optimistic view of capitalism as a technology of spiritual and cultural uplift. 
Christianity is just one more tool of oppression practiced by untrustworthy capitalist operatives 
and masters in the Atlantic. Smith’s narrative is remarkably similar to that of Equiano: stolen 
from Africa, enslaved in North America, involved in the shipping industry of the Atlantic. And 
yet, he concludes his narrative here, on a note of resolute pessimism about the potential for 
capitalism or Christianity to create social bonds or to lift even a talented and resistant individual 
like himself above depredation and degradation. 
Smith’s disappointment makes him, in some ways, a literary and ideological foil for 
Equiano, surveying similar Atlantic experiences, but experiencing disillusioned frustration where 
Equiano experienced optimistic transcendence. Nonetheless, both authors similarly reflect the 
need and desire of displaced, mobile individuals and communities to carve out personal and 
social identities in Atlantic societies that actively frustrate their attempts to do so. Smith 
endeavors to embody the vicissitudes of Atlantic life that Baucom presents as prototypical but, at 
every turn, finds himself thwarted by society’s insistence upon the distance between the 
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imaginary home of England or the United States and the imaginary Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Nova 
Scotia, or even the only provisionally free Connecticut where Smith settles. Similarly, he tries to 
achieve the same kind of personal liberation and transcendence that Equiano represented so 
vividly, but finds himself tumbling down the same economic, social, and philosophical ladders 
that Equiano ascends. 
Briton Hammon and the Liberating Experiences of Captivity 
Smith’s pessimistic take on maritime life asserts displaced mobility as the central 
universal experience of Atlantic life. Implicit to this perspective is the author’s palpable desire to 
instantiate, through Christian fellowship, through authorial production, and through direct 
appeals, an alternate community that might rescue him from his material and spiritual dejection. 
In fact, this implicit need links Smith to a rich body of enslaved and emancipated maritime 
authors, who similarly seek out the alternate communities to be found within networks of 
religious affiliation and testimonial publications, and along the trade routes of the Atlantic. This 
project was vital particularly in the context of increasing colonial and national expansion. For 
example, Briton Hammon’s 1760 Narrative of the Uncommon Sufferings, and Surprizing 
Deliverance of Briton Hammon, a Negro Man…, makes the same gestures towards providential 
deliverance as does Equiano, insisting upon the liberating potential of the merchant sailing 
industry, but casts its eye toward a displaced mobile community. Just like Smith, Hammon looks 
to this community out of necessity, in response to his relative exclusion by colonialist and 
national capitalist projects. However, the counter-public that Hammon imagines remains held 
together by the market and its divine operations. Hammon repeatedly finds himself imprisoned 
or impressed as a frequently unwilling laborer in the multiple, overlapping economies and 
polities of the Atlantic. He likewise repeatedly finds opportunities to escape from the particular 
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circumstances of his captivity when merchant ships come to the nearest port. All the while, he 
weaves his way among and between national powers that would claim him as property of a 
national economy, and finds fellowship among the Christian sailors who similarly live their lives 
as mobile citizens of Atlantic trade routes. 
Like Equiano’s autobiography, Hammon’s narrative attests to the way that an 
enterprising and knowledgeable enslaved man might make use of these complicated and 
sometimes chaotic networks of maritime trade and war, to participate in a society that remains 
liminally positioned between nations, while jumping from ship to ship, and, in due course, secure 
his own liberty. However, Hammon’s narrative emphasizes experiences of captivity as the 
necessary ports of call toward his final destination of Christian elect liberty, in much more 
explicit terms than did Equiano’s. As a result, Hammon’s narrative uses the experiences of the 
mobile Atlantic economy as the structure by which to draw him toward providential deliverance, 
but presents Atlantic life as a successive series of captivity experiences. 
Even when liberation does come for Hammon, it ironically arrives in the form of new 
experiences of captivity. Early in the narrative, for example, while shipwrecked off the coast of 
Florida, he alone is spared by the natives who kill the rest of the surviving crew and, though they 
“us’d [him] pretty well” he finds occasion to escape when a Spanish merchant ship arrives 
(7).  The Spanish captain makes a bargain with the natives to pay them ten dollars for every 
prisoner they capture, so that they will not simply kill them. After his time among the Florida 
natives and Spanish sailors, Hammon recalls, “At the Havanna I lived with the Governor in the 
Castle about a Twelve-month, where I was walking thro' the Street, I met with a Press-Gang who 
immediately prest me, and put me into gaol…when we were all brought out, and ask'd who 
would go on board the King's Ships…bound to Old-Spain, and on my refusing to serve on board, 
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they put me in a close Dungeon, where I was confin'd Four Years and seven months” (8). The 
reversals come quickly in this narrative, but they retain a consistent sense of international 
mobility for the impressed maritime laborer. Slave or free, Hammon finds himself confined to 
and potentially liberated by the same forces of market need that keep his body in circulation 
around the Atlantic.  
Narratives of travel have long functioned both to extend the purview of the national 
imaginary and to define the nation against what it sees. They continue to serve this purpose to 
this day. Neda Atanasoski, for example, argues that “as cultural documents invested in mapping 
spatial, as well as temporal, fault lines, travelogues were crucial in fashioning new political, 
journalistic, and popular racial fantasies” (35). That she is describing “the postsocialist Eastern 
European landscape,” affirms the persistent importance of narratives of mobility as tools of both 
intranational hegemony and international cooperation. In their day, Atlantic maritime narratives, 
texts written and published for increasingly nationalized readerships, did so as well.  
However, because authors like Hammon were so often nominally excluded from the 
national polity that Atlantic societies attempted to create throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, their travel narratives also demonstrated the way a different, mobile public 
could be created in the Atlantic, at the same time as the landed national imaginary took hold. The 
Jamaica-England dichotomy that Hall describes takes shape precisely because individuals like 
Smith or Hammon were intentionally excluded from participation in the political, spiritual, and 
social life of the ostensible national core. So these writers were forced to create new centers of 
culture, exchange, and cooperation at the peripheries of empire. However, in so doing, they 
retained and even strengthened the links between home and frontier, thus demonstrating that the 
core-periphery model that relegated colonial spaces like Jamaica, Sierra Leone, or Nova Scotia 
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to the margins was only ever imaginary, if still ideologically powerful. Even as their labor helped 
nations to develop and become sustainable, sailors like Hammon were rendered invisible. Forced 
to create alternative communities of inclusion, these communities adhered around common traits 
of capitalist labor and Christian vocation.  
Within an increasingly nationalized context, Hammon retains his sense of the divine 
element of transactional economic and national experiences. He writes, “kind Providence so 
order'd it, that after I had been in this Place so long as the Time mention'd above the Captain of a 
Merchantman, belonging to Boston, having sprung a Leak was obliged to put into the Havanna 
to refit” (9). “Providence” here works both through the intercession of sympathetic parties and 
via the needs and dictates of the maritime market. He continues, “While he was at Dinner at Mrs. 
Betty Howard's, she told the Captain of my deplorable Condition, and said she would be glad, if 
he could by some means or other relieve me…accordingly, after Dinner, [the captain] came to 
the Prison…and after the Captain had Interrogated me, told me, he would intercede with the 
Governor for my Relief out of that miserable Place, which he did, and the next Day the Governor 
sent an Order to release me; I lived with the Governor about a Year after I was delivered from 
the Dungeon” (10). Hammon is a valuable laborer, so he is set free. At the same time, he is a 
valuable commodity, so he is kept in bondage. He remains in this liminal state, somewhere 
between freedom and unfreedom, because of both the opportunities and limits of the maritime 
trade. Nevertheless, Hammon remains committed to pursuing the liberty offered by the maritime 
community. He notes, “I endeavour'd three Times to make my Escape, the last of which proved 
effectual; the first Time I got on board of Captain Marsh, an English Twenty Gun Ship, with a 
Number of others, and lay on board conceal'd that Night; and the next Day the Ship being under 
sail, I thought myself safe, and so made my Appearance upon Deck, but as soon as we were 
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discovered the Captain ordered the Boat out, and sent us all on Shore” (10). Constantly 
challenging his captive status aboard these ships, Hammon is constantly presented with the 
possibility of freedom through mobility. “Providence,” therefore, is the guiding hand, the force 
that uses market mobility to position Hammon in such a place so that he may continue to pursue 
freedom within the international Atlantic marketplace. 
Hammon’s status as a runaway slave keeps him constantly in the process of escape and 
capture. Yet, in this state of flux, he maintains a kind of agency. Hammon recalls, “After being 
on Shore another Twelvemonth, I endeavour'd to make my Escape the second Time, by trying to 
get on board of a Sloop bound to Jamaica, and as I was going from the City to the Sloop, was 
unhappily taken by the Guard, and ordered back to the Castle, and there confined” 
(10). Discussing runaways, David Waldstreicher writes, “The striking mobility of runaway 
slaves reflects their experience of often having served several masters, for slaves and servants 
alike were regularly sold and rented. In a booming economy, strikingly modern mixes of 
bondage and wage labor emerged. Slaves sought to rent themselves out on behalf of their 
masters, often gaining some real autonomy in the process” (Waldstreicher 21). Waldstreicher 
makes clear that Hammon’s experience is emblematic, but hardly unique. “Having served several 
masters,” Hammon is very much used to a life of displacement and forced mobility. What makes 
his narrative unique, however, is the extent to which it demonstrates an unfree person’s ability to 
take the reins of that mobility, to use it as an occasion to curate a personal and social identity.  
In fact, Hammon occupies what Rebecca Ginsburg terms the “black landscape,” a space 
of fugitive black community that thrived among escapees from slavery. Ginsburg describes the 
“black landscape as the system of paths, places, and rhythms that a community of enslaved 
people created as an alternative, often as a refuge to the landscape systems of planters and other 
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whites” (54). This definition might usefully help to describe the mobile experience of many of 
the authors in this body of texts, who sought or were forced to seek community along the “paths” 
of Atlantic commerce, within the “places” often marginalized by Atlantic societies, and in line 
with the “rhythms” of black community that emerged from the blend of syncretic providential 
Christianity and Atlantic commerce. However, the definition is particularly apt for Marrant, who, 
among all of the authors in this body, holds to his fugitive status as a form of identification and 
community creation. Moreover, the paths he followed were carved by other fugitive figures and 
only intersected with the world of white captivating power tangentially and, often, accidentally. 
Again, this issue of adjacency might relate to all of the authors in this collection. 
Ginsburg writes that the black landscape was “a static network composed of discrete places” 
(56). We might think of the refuges of the free but limited Connecticut of Smith’s account or of 
colonial resettlement in Nova Scotia or Sierra Leone as official “discrete places,” while 
Marrant’s encounters with aboriginal tribes and other slave societies occur in unofficial “discrete 
places.” In any case, community springs up adjacent to the captivating forces of white 
slaveholding Atlantic societies. Like the relentlessly mobile Equiano, Hammon maintains agency 
through mobility and gains the knowledge necessary to navigate a system that is both mobile and 
dependent upon his captivity. 
It is not until he finds the sort of work that unites maritime trade and Christian vocation 
that Hammon truly finds the means of self-liberation. He writes, “in a short Time I was set at 
Liberty, and order'd with a Number of others to carry the Bishop from the Castle, thro' the 
Country, to confirm the old People, baptize Children, &c. for which he receives large Sums of 
Money” (10). This work explicitly draws together the goals of maritime economy with those of 
the church. As both Christianity and commodities circulate among the mobile market of souls 
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and goods, Hammon successfully attempts to join in the mercantile and spiritual trade, in order 
to pursue his own liberation. Only through this fusion of divine and commercial goals can he 
transform his captive experiences into the trials necessary to achieve his ultimate reward of 
liberty. For Hammon, election therefore does not mean possession by nation or even by a 
covenanted community, but inclusion among a population that remains mobile, even as 
individuals pass through stages of relative captivity. This is an alternative view of society and 
election that sees providential community in the population of the constantly displaced, the 
liminally free, and the laboring, suffering bodies of Atlantic trade. 
The nature of mobile Atlantic texts allows Hammon to present a counter-public maritime 
culture that is both adjacent to Atlantic societies, and central to the health and production of 
those societies. Atanasoski further explores the meaning of this kind of adjacency when she 
pivots from the Christian separation of secular and sacred time to argue for the “chronopolitics” 
of transition, settlement, upheaval, and redefinition (39). Again, this indicates the prevalence and 
power of the providential capitalist mindset, even as it suggests what was so unique about it. The 
providential capitalist texts written by the Atlantic’s mobile citizenry united secular and sacred to 
create a temporal economy, one that is always in transition, always in a state of becoming, 
always in a state of economic and significatory conversion. The “chronopolitics” that Atanasoski 
describes overlaps with the unique geopolitics of Atlantic life. Writers like Hammon, and, later, 
Equiano, Cugoano, and Smith, were forced to make displacement their residence, finding in 
spacial and temporal adjacency an ironic home. That flux would go on to define the modern and 
postmodern periods to which Atlantic commerce gave birth. 
This too challenges the binary depiction of periphery and core that Hall describes. These 
counter-publics yoke Jamaica to England, and, furthermore, yoke both to Africa and the 
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Americas more broadly. Writers like Hammon use Christian fellowship and economic mobility 
to create alternative communities both within and against the national polities that, on their face, 
reject or marginalize them. In so doing, they challenge the logic of marginalization altogether. 
“England” could not exist without “Jamaica” or without the mobile, displaced communities of 
laborers that link the two together through trade. The philosophical and material realities of 
conversion and flux are not aberrances against which to compare the relative stability of home, 
but signs that that stability was a flimsy ideological construct enabled by a system of mobile 
labor and social displacement. If Smith’s account is a record of failure to find and join a 
community of faith or nationality, Hammon’s is one of conditional success. He does find 
community and does cultivate a relatively liberated identity. However, he only does so by 
remaining peripheral, mobile, and relegated to life as a runaway on the fringes of a society that 
works hard to commodify or dominate him, or even to deny his very existence. 
Ukawsaw Gronniosaw and Slavery as Divine Instrument 
Ukawsaw Gronniosaw’s 1772 A Narrative of the Life of James Albert Ukawsaw 
Gronniosaw similarly presents a non-national community held together by divinity and 
economy, but emphasizes the way that providence maneuvers those it has named among the elect 
to “feel the impulse of God” by any available means, including slavery. In this way, Gronniosaw 
implicates the ideology of transcendent providential capitalism, upon which writers like Equiano 
and Hammon relied, in the very business against which they argue. If we follow Gronniosaw’s 
logic, the ascension of these writers to elect status was premised upon the experience of slavery. 
If Equiano and Hammon stop short of asserting slavery as a part of a divine plan, Gronniosaw 
does not.  
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As he develops the logic necessary to reconcile providential election and the diverse 
religious backgrounds of the mobile Atlantic, Gronniosaw, like Hammon, relies upon 
experiences of captivity to instantiate freedom. But he goes even further, suggesting that a figure 
like Equiano could arrive at his place of personal and social transcendence not in spite of slavery 
but because of it. Stuart Schwartz emphasizes the way theologians and writers struggled to 
reconcile Catholic orthodoxy on the damnation of pagans, with the impulse to convert, by 
questioning how and why God could condemn huge swaths of people who had never even had a 
chance to hear of Christ’s coming. Gronniosaw’s advocate, W. Shirley, answers this challenge, 
saying “in the course of wisely and most wonderfully appointed Providences, he brings them to 
the means of spiritual information, gradually opens to their view the light of his truth, and gives 
them full possession and enjoyment of the inestimable blessings of his gospel...he was sold for a 
slave, and so brought into a Christian Land” (2). Gronniosaw also expands the scope of potential 
election, so that it can include even non-Christians. He writes, “Though born under every 
outward Disadvantage, and in Regions of the grossest Darkness and Ignorance, he most 
amazingly acts upon and influences their Minds, and in the Course of wisely and most 
wonderfully appointed Providences, he brings them to the Means of spiritual Information, 
gradually opens to their View the Light of his Truth, and gives them full Possession and 
Enjoyment of the inestimable Blessings of his Gospel” (3). In this formulation, captivity in the 
Atlantic flesh market is a potentially necessary trial and, certainly, a helpful means by which 
God uses the mechanisms of the Atlantic market to coordinate individuals to conform to divine 
intention. Slavery becomes the means by which individuals achieve personal liberty, and the 
mobile Atlantic slave market becomes the arena in which God collects and organizes his elect 
population.  
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Indeed, Gronniosaw argues that signs of his election were always available to him, but 
that only slavery could reveal the full scope of their meaning. He insists that, from childhood, he 
felt “strongly impressed...that there was some GREAT MAN of power which resided above the 
sun, moon and stars, the objects of our worship” (3). Ridiculed by his disbelieving family, he 
also feels anxiety at his family keeping the Sabbath improperly and failing to adequately 
comprehend divine and scriptural signs and challenges (4-5). As a result, he very willingly goes 
with a Dutch trader who offers to bring him to the Gold Coast. The narrative presents this as the 
first in a series of events that will ultimately bring Gronniosaw to Christ.  
Gronniosaw’s self-presentation is strategic, especially in this passage. In a careful 
examination of Gronniosaw’s likely Muslim heritage, Jennifer Harris notes that “in order for 
Gronniosaw to construct himself as a knowledgeable innocent, he must conceal from the 
audience the tenets of Islam which elevate Allah as the ‘one god’…Instead playing on European 
assumptions about African paganism and ignorance of a ‘one true God,’” Gronniosaw conveys 
the image of a young man dissatisfied with his indigenous religious practices and in doing so sets 
himself above other Africans in his awareness of something ‘more’” (Harris 46). In part, 
Gronniosaw is simply playing to his audience, currying favor among Christian readers and 
potential patrons. However, it is important to note that he is also using generic convention to 
establish himself as a providential capitalist figure, an individual capable of ascension because he 
is capable of navigating the Atlantic’s interrelation of capitalism and Christianity. 
Among those events runs a recurrent conflation of labor, captivity, and Christian self-
sacrifice. Gronniosaw’s paternalistic view of both Christianity and slavery becomes strikingly 
clear when, threatened with being thrown overboard, Gronniosaw clings to the trader saying 
“Father, save me” (9).  He is then sold to a preacher, Mr. Freelandhouse, who essentially makes 
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prayer into his labor, thus explicitly conflating slavery with Christian vocation (11). Helena 
Woodard observes that “Gronniosaw is unable to reconcile the contradiction between his belief 
in predestination or divine providence and his belief in personal responsibility. Similarly, he is 
unable to recognize the contradiction between his own denial of worldly treasures, while his 
[ostensibly Christian] Enslavers…reap great wealth from him and others” (38). But Gronniosaw 
comes close to reconciling these competing ideas by focusing on an economy of value that 
intertwines with the theology of grace. Stefan M. Wheelock even points out that Gronniosaw 
“circles back to the commercialist dimensions of this moment through the way he imagines 
himself as a precious resource among others to be extracted from the African continent” (71). 
Even if he is cheated, he accrues value in the eyes of God, and likewise accrues monetary value. 
However, he does not yet fully understand to what degree, noting at one point, “I was then worth 
about thirty pounds, but I never regarded money in the least” (20). Throughout the narrative, 
Gronniosaw remains filled with self-loathing and doubt that he could be saved until he receives a 
vision of light shining upon him. Immediately following this, he is offered liberation by his 
dying master (16). Readers might see the conflation here as a moment wherein spiritual 
liberation leads to economic liberation from slavery and the two are imbricated as the same 
endpoint, the same reward of acceptance among the spiritually and legally elect, after the 
necessary trial of slavery and captivity. 
Once again, this narrative calls to mind Baucom’s view of the production of the 
individual within a capitalist marketplace, because Gronniosaw’s involvement in and 
participation with the logic and discourse of his economic world have allowed him to carve out a 
narrative space for himself as an individual worthy of attention and remark. We read him 
because he is special. He is special because the market and providence have selected him and 
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given signs of his election. Baucom describes the way that actuarial logic and writing produces 
the “invention of the ‘average’ and the typical.” This, in turn, “most clearly [reveals] a 
preromantic historicism’s intimate entanglements with the operations of finance capital” (44). 
Although he does present his story as a model for how to successfully navigate the divinely 
ordered marketplace, Gronniosaw does not develop or express his individuality only in economic 
terms. Rather, he uses economic language to assert his spiritual significance, and uses 
providential language to assert his economic free-agency. Finance and spirituality are bound 
together and, in order to understand Gronniosaw’s view of his own individual identity, readers 
must recognize the full scope of his providential capitalist identification. 
Ironically, the value of that Christian fellowship was relatively circumscribed. Wheelock 
notes that “Gronniosaw’s memoir, written down by an anonymous woman from Leominster and 
published under the patronage of the famed Countess of Huntingdon, was reprinted at least ten 
times in Britain and America before Equiano’s autobiography appeared on the scene. But 
Gronniosaw died in obscurity” (Wheelock 60). It would be unfair to say that Gronniosaw failed 
to instantiate community either through text or through antislavery political action. At the same 
time, his death should remind readers that the rigid limits to power, autonomy, and self-
expression in the Atlantic placed barriers on the utility and material power of any efforts to 
create such a community in the Atlantic for Christians, for sailing laborers, and for authors, alike. 
Nonetheless, even in moments of frustration and failure, Gronniosaw sees economic and 
spiritual interactions as closely linked. For example, at one point, he entrusts all of his savings to 
a woman who proclaims herself a “Christian woman.” She takes the money and denies it to him 
when he requests it back, leaving him to lament “I had no friend but GOD” (20).  Woodard 
points out here that “Gronnoisaw could only blame himself personally if he could not criticize a 
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society that regarded him as one who was well suited to a fate of enslavement and poverty. 
Numerous inconsistencies in religious, as well as legal practice—had he been more 
knowledgeable of them—might have explained at least some of his personal dissatisfaction was 
not so personal after all but amounted to the protection of profits from slavery (36). However, his 
frustrations reveal his understanding of the economic, political, and practical hierarchies that are 
aligned against him. 
For example, both his attempts at fellowship based on Christian lending and his 
disappointing experience of betrayal suggest the important role that debt played in the 
development and articulation of morality for writers like Gronniosaw. Similarly, Saidiya 
Hartman notes that, in the post-bellum period, “emancipation instituted indebtedness,” a sense of 
owing freedom to the emancipating state (Hartman 131). Moments like this one demonstrate that 
this formulation of debt extends even earlier, to at least the revolutionary period. In an unstable 
and potentially untrustworthy world, the free owe their freedom to the unfree, and the freed owe 
their freedom to those that have facilitated their emancipation. In texts like Gronniosaw’s, 
obligation and debt become literalized to the point that the author finds himself struggling 
against a state of penury. He has purchased his freedom and incurred a debt so great that he may 
not survive it.  
In order to pay those debts, Gronniosaw goes to sea, “Privateering” as a cook and, 
finding, in the experience of mobile Atlantic maritime labor, a route toward divine election (17). 
Gronniosaw finds both class affiliation and Christian fellowship in his experience among the 
other Atlantic sailors. Even given the fact that, as Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker note, 
sailors were relatively “irreligious, “Gronniosaw sees providence at work in his maritime labor 
and among the laboring community (Rediker and Linebaugh 171).xvi For example, one 
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particularly disrespectful sailor goes so far as to snatch Gronniosaw’s book out of his hand and 
throw it overboard. Gronniosaw notes that this man is the first to die on the voyage, suggesting a 
providential justice that protects the faithful at sea (18).  
The co-instantiation of class and faith continues, even when Gronniosaw leaves the 
maritime life. Eventually, for example, he is baptized and brought into a Christian community. 
At this point, the text suggests that baptism is a kind of class advancement because, once he is 
brought into the faith, his fellow Christians advise him against marrying a poor white woman, as 
if association with poverty will be a form of backsliding (24). Indeed, he does slip into poverty 
and, at his lowest, one of his children dies and is denied Christian burial because he is 
unaffiliated. The text here implicitly suggests that his slide into poverty denies him entry into 
Christian fellowship (29). Of course, the text ends on a hopeful note that brings all of these 
elements together, explicitly positioning the text as the thing that will bring about a miracle of 
Christian community and charity to help Gronnoisaw care for his impoverished family. He writes 
“As Pilgrims, and very poor Pilgrims, we are travelling through many difficulties towards our 
HEAVENLY HOME, and waiting patiently for his gracious call, when the LORD shall deliver us 
out of the evils of this present world and bring us to the EVERLASTING GLORIES of the world 
to come.—To HIM be PRAISE for EVER and EVER, AMEN” (39). Even this optimistic 
conclusion to such an ambivalent narrative maintains Gronniosaw’s overall sense of ongoing 
mobility and constant trial on the way toward divine reward. To the very end, market mobility 
has determined the events of Gronniosaw’s life and encouraged his affiliation with a non-
nationalist, mobile community of both laborers and laboring Christians. Even as he looks 
forward in these concluding passages, he looks forward to a mobile economy to bring his 
published entreaty to a reading Christian public who will, hopefully, help him to find both 
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economic and spiritual security. Like Equiano and Hammon, Gronniosaw seeks personal, 
spiritual, and social liberation from within a hostile capitalist context. However, Gronniosaw 
goes further than both Equiano and Hammon, embracing the marginalization and even violence 
of a mobile Atlantic life as necessary trials through which he passes on his way toward 
acceptance into the community of saints in the Atlantic economy. 
Providential Interpretation: John Jea, and Ottobah Cugoano Reading the Market’s Signs 
Gronniosaw’s belief in the power of the market to position individuals to receive grace is 
not unique, but his belief in the ordering function of even the worst abuses of the Atlantic is also 
hardly universal. Even so, his belief in the liberating potential of labor, Christian vocation and, 
particularly, of writing and self-expression, crosses this argumentative boundary. For example, 
John Jea’s 1811 narrative, Life, History, and Unparalleled Sufferings of John Jea maintains the 
signposts of Atlantic life as a series of captive experiences but refutes Gronniosaw’s notion of 
divine election through slavery. Jea, who announces himself “The African Preacher” produces a 
multivalent text, a personal history that frames a moral sermon in such a way as to use the events 
of his own life as allegorical stories of sin and redemption for his audience. The text notes the 
perversions of Christianity and Christian morality so rampant among Europeans, who focus on 
the punitive aspects of the gospel without acknowledging the inclusivity of Christ’s message, and 
who essentially stage dramas of power that, Jea argues, constitute forced idolatry (5). Moreover, 
Jea evinces belief in election on new terms, suggesting that the blessed can squander their 
blessing and vice versa, a suggestion meant to strip election of its racist possibilities. Quite in 
contrast to Gronniosaw, Jea notes that the relations of mastery and captivity can pervert God’s 
essential plan for election. He writes that “This was the case with the man of God that disobeyed 
God by eating and drinking in the place where God had forbidden him. This was also the case 
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with the Jews, who were the chosen and elect people of God; for he hath declared because of 
their unbelief, they should not enter into his rest, although it was appointed for them from the 
foundation of the world; as the Scriptures saith, ‘Let us therefore fear, lest, a promise being left 
us, of entering into his rest, any of you should seem to come short of it’” (87). Throughout the 
text, market dictates determine the course of an individual life and may, in fact, express the will 
of God. Yet the way that individuals behave within that system, whether they use it for abusive 
gain or to develop inclusive and Christian community, determines the state of their providential 
election. 
In response to a remarkably violent, disrupted life, Jea fully embraces the mobile world 
of the Atlantic in which he will see more and more signs of potential providential will and in 
which he will gain power through his ability to interpret those signs.  At sea, for example, he 
witnesses repeated examples of God’s favor or disfavor as men who mock his religiosity or who 
are simply cruel are killed (52). Moreover, life at sea offers Jea not only an escape from his 
failed attempts to establish a home and family, but also the means by which to thrive, and to 
achieve prosperity through the cultivation of special knowledge. Jea passes through numerous 
episodes of imprisonment and impressment, weaves his way through multiple national polities, 
and finds vocation on the merchant trading vessels that traverse the Atlantic. All the while, he 
asserts a sense of community that develops out of labor affiliation and out of networks of 
providential Christian belief. Community is predicated upon proper comprehension of 
providential will and successful navigation of the market. That community also develops out of 
specialized knowledge systems, particularly those centered on reading and scriptural 
communication. 
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This narrative element becomes particularly important in Jea’s inversion of the “talking 
book” trope. Jea insists upon his miraculously developed ability to read the Bible as a sign of 
providential power bestowed, literally, by an angel (35). Implicitly, Jea uses reading to mark 
himself as a particular and elect recipient of divine favor. But Jea goes one step further when he 
claims that, at the time of writing the text, he can still only read scripture and no other texts (38). 
In so doing, Jea uses his ostensibly miraculous communicative abilities as the material from 
which he hopes to create stability in an unstable and violent life. While engaged in the labor of 
the maritime market, God has selected Jea and empowered him as a preacher and as an oral 
communicator. Jea will then go on to use these gifts to establish a presence in the publishing 
market. Jea’s text reflects this, interspersing his autobiography with long digressive sermons. In 
this way, Jea converts his own past into the scriptural material around which he will develop 
Christian community, and into the textual material by which he will, presumably, profit. This 
also calls to mind Jennifer Harris’ point that moments like this one are possibly strategic. She 
argues that Gronniosaw, coming from a Muslim nation, would likely have known how to read, 
despite his narrative presentation of his own early illiteracy (48). Similarly, whether Jea can or 
cannot read may be part of his larger argument but, as literal truth, is a matter that is essentially 
beside the point. He presents his connection to scripture and, therefore, to literacy as providential 
as well as material. For example, Vincent Carretta points out that “For most of the Black writers, 
Protestant Christianity with its emphasis on direct knowledge of the Bible was the primary 
motive for literacy” (Carretta 9).  What Jea’s narrative demonstrates, then, is the way that 
Christian literacy could become an important tool by which to assert agency, community, self-
command, and autonomous voice, in a disruptive Atlantic world. In fact, Jea shares this focus 
upon a text-oriented, mobile Christian community with Venture Smith who similarly 
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demonstrated an overall emphasis on education as an important tool to elevate an individual and 
to instantiate community, so that he might not be “wholly destitute of every noble and generous 
feeling” (Smith 5). Both of these texts use literacy as a sign of election, a tool of communication 
and, implicitly, a means to achieve prosperity. xvii  
Literacy helps these writers to assert personal identities, as well as to establish 
community affiliations. Brycchan Carey notes that both Briton Hammon and Ukawsaw 
Gronniosaw relied upon amanuenses, so there is a greater distance between author, reader, and 
reading community than in a self-authored text like Equiano’s (Carey 61). Nevertheless, the 
publishing market allowed these texts, whether they were directly narrated, or presented through 
the potentially distorting pen of an amanuensis, to function as valuable tools with which to seize 
a greater share of both personal agency and community involvement. Texts like Equiano’s were 
published, in some respects, to demonstrate the expressive abilities of black authors. Jea’s 
interpolated text was presented as an argument on multiple fronts. Even Hammon’s and 
Gronniosaw’s narratives served a necessary purpose for abolitionist communities, helping to 
develop and sustain sentimental feeling for their subjects. In effect, they sacrificed 
demonstrations of authorial ability in order to develop an interracial and trans-national 
community of feeling. Even so, they avoid the usual pitfalls of sentimental texts. As Carey 
writes, “sentimental heroes have to be established more quickly and with greater economy of 
language. For this reason, tears, sighs, and other indicators of sensibility appear more frequently” 
(73). The prose in these texts elicit feeling not by tugging upon the audience’s heartstrings, but 
by insisting that the events they depict are true. 
Jea insists that readers, black or white, confront the reality of historical circumstance in 
two ways: economic and typological. Baucom strongly emphasizes the ledger book and 
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insurance accounting as narrative modes, perhaps the most important modes of this period. Here, 
Jea communicates through these seemingly anti-sentimentalist tones. However, he goes one step 
further, projecting accounting narration through a typological frame in order to show how 
economic processes could be divinely ordered as they descend upon the bodies and souls of 
individuals in the market. Wimbush describes the way that Equiano presents “a text in which the 
figure of Equiano weaves himself into the social-cultural textures of Britain, strategically using 
the nation-defining texts as a wedge” (Wimbush 87). That is: Equiano uses both biblical and 
nationalistic typologies to narrate his own upward trajectory. The same might be said of Jea, who 
writes in the increasingly dominant modes of narration in the Atlantic—namely: the economic 
and the scriptural—to both situate himself within the Christian-capitalist Atlantic, and to force a 
wedge by which he can gain entry into the textual cultures of Atlantic society. Baucom, insisting 
that accounting logic produces the dominant generic modes of market capitalist history, writes 
that “while particular genres arise as the means of resolving, or at least coding, the concrete 
experiences and ideologies of their particular historical moments, as genres survive the moment 
of their fashioning, they survive by carrying within themselves, as a sort of ghostly aftereffect, 
the signature ideologies of their formative moments” (Baucom 19). With regard to Jea, this 
strikes the right chord, but it does not go far enough. By limiting his perspective to the economic 
logic and generic discourse of the day, Baucom does not account for the vitally important generic 
markers of Christian typology that also linger as “ghostly aftereffects” in narratives like Jea’s.  
Jea writes a multivocal text, one that is semi-novelistic in its personal recollections, 
infused with accounting logic in its focus on economic exchange, and explicitly typological in its 
many references to scripture and scriptural models. By blending these generic modes together, 
Jea composes an essential representative document for his age and allows later readers to see the 
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way Atlantic society was produced by the mixture of market, church, and a burgeoning sense of 
the individual’s place within the econo-spiritual cosmology of the period. 
 The choice of narrative voice is representative of authors like Jea’s desires to use their 
own expressive abilities both to communicate personal and social histories and to instantiate 
potential social networks going forward. Phillip E. Wegner writes that “if ideology creates the 
synchrony or place of a given social reality, then utopia marks its potential for diachrony or 
historical becoming” (18). Confronted with the imaginary utopia of nations that, in law and 
ideology, reject them, writers like Jea use language to assert a separate form of inclusion. 
Wegner insists that “Utopia becomes ‘useful’ as a literary form precisely to the degree that it 
enables its audiences to think through…various scales of personal, cultural, and epochal 
transition” (31). The communities that these writers embrace operate through a trans-national 
culture that is held together only by the maritime marketplace, and which thrives along routes of 
trade and exchange. Moreover, they are figured as specifically Christian, so writing in a mode 
that is simultaneously financial and typological allows writers like Jea to insert themselves into a 
semi-utopian cosmology that is highly ordered and expansively inclusive. 
Jea actively rejects national identification as he cultivates and embraces a universal 
Christian community that exists in the Atlantic and which operates providentially, to position and 
reward the elect. Throughout his life, he continues to preach and occasionally finds himself 
called upon to fight as an impressed soldier, only to refuse due to his commitment to nonviolence 
and his resistance to nationalism. He writes, “I was not an American, but that I was a poor black 
African, a preacher of the gospel” (90). Jea more forcefully asserts his non-national status when 
he insists that he comes from “Old Callabar.” Nevertheless, his identity remains syncretic. He is 
an “African” but also a preacher of a gospel written in a language he cannot read unless 
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illuminated by divine light. Furthermore, he only uses his anglicized name and uses the same 
convention for his parents, despite the fact that their experiences with European cultures were 
limited and violent. His text argues that his knowledge of mobility, whether impressed or 
embraced, his belief in interventionist providential spirituality, and his experiences with captivity 
and violence have helped him to develop a community consciousness that is not national, but 
mobile, affiliated with all of the unfree Africans among whom he labors on ships and in ports, 
despite their denominational differences. 
Moreover, Jea’s self-identification reflects the synchrony of Atlantic culture, rather than 
its binarism. His presentation of himself as an “African” suggests that the term acts as it did for 
Smith, as a kind of placeholder for the diverse subset of cultural interactions that have produced 
his mobile Atlantic community and identity. In this way, Jea represents Lisa Lowe’s view of 
“intimacy” much more than he fits in with the “Jamaica” versus “Family” distinction that Hall 
defines. “African” as a term for identity blurs and blends distinctive cultural differences as it 
produces a new broader identity that allows Africa, the Americas, and even England to reside 
within one body. On the other hand, this identity is also more easily marginalized from white, 
Anglophonic “home” states like England or, increasingly, North America. So Jea expresses the 
ambivalent nature of self-identification in the Atlantic. The alternative communities that writers 
like Jea describe suggest both resistant and inviting counter-publics, and the nationalist, racial, 
and ideological ostracism that necessitated their creation. His “African” identification expresses 
both the interrelation of diverse cultural currents and the concerted efforts to evade, obscure, or 
sideline the existence of those same currents of identity and community. Perhaps most notable in 
a text like Jea’s is its sense that life in the mobile maritime Atlantic pivots around experiences of 
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captivity and violence that, nevertheless, help individuals to found and to maintain alternative 
communities that espouse Christian beliefs and that thrive on Atlantic trade.  
Jea strives for a delicate balance, embracing providence, along with a syncretic Atlantic 
identity, but denying the providential nature of slavery. He was not the first maritime Atlantic 
writer to attempt to thread this argumentative needle. For example, Ottobah Cugoano’s 1787 
Narrative of the Enslavement...also explicitly rejects the notion that slavery, an innately sinful 
and lawless practice, could in any way be redeemed, even as it acts as a vehicle by which 
individuals find Christianity. He calls slavery in every way “not natural and innocent” despite the 
fact that it, ultimately, brings him to Christian acceptance (51). He explains that “Sovereign 
goodness may eventually visit some men even in a state of slavery, but their slavery is not the 
cause of that event and benignity” (23). Frequently he refers to slavers as “pirates” or “European 
Pirates” (62). Nevertheless, his experiences with the violence and displacement of Atlantic trade 
help him to find and embrace Christian community when he fully assumes his role within the 
Atlantic market.  
Throughout his literary and political career, Cugoano remained engaged with the 
argumentative work of promoting antislavery ideals and of dismantling the framework of 
providential capitalism that posited slavery as a social, economic, and spiritual ideal. For 
example, in Thoughts and Sentiments, what Wheelock calls Cugoano’s true “major text,” 
Cugoano actually addresses the Zong massacre in his critique of Atlantic slavery as blatant proof 
of just how debased a spiritual condition slavery has brought to western civilization (Wheelock 
26). Moreover, in that text, Cugoano “wanted to point out the extent to which the Atlantic 
plantation complex was perverting the historical evolution of politics and religion in what was 
ostensibly an ‘advanced Christian era’ in the Atlantic” (Wheelock 27). Cugoano is explicitly 
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aware that Atlantic exchange has yoked Christianity to capital. As a result, he is also pointedly 
aware that Christianity has become tied to the primary business of the Atlantic—namely: slavery. 
With this in mind, Cugoano joined writers like Granville Sharp who believed that “Britain’s 
imperial expansion of chattel slavery augured apocalypse” (28). Wheelock explains that 
Cugoano’s argument rests upon a careful refutation of logical and scriptural defenses of slavery 
as well as upon a broader and much more destabilizing notion of Atlantic cultural rot. Wheelock 
explains that Cugoano was engaged with “undercutting an anchoring premise in modern 
historical self-understanding: that the march of history forward into modernity evinced progress” 
(47). Cugoano, engaged with the same political movements as his contemporary Equiano, is 
frank in his assessment of the political, moral, and theological position of nations engaged in 
Atlantic maritime exchange. Their view of progress is not only wrong, but entirely reversed. An 
ostensibly Christian society, Atlantic Britain had become debased, savage, bloodthirsty, and 
immoral in its pursuit of profits.  
All of this makes it all the more intriguing that, like Equiano, Cugoano would call, in 
both Narrative of the Enslavement… and Thoughts and Sentiments, for a system of paternal, 
colonial investment and uplift. Wheelock likewise recognizes the complexity of Cugoano’s 
position. He writes “Cugoano has already shown how religious instruction can be turned into the 
cultural handmaiden of imperial hegemony. Ironically, his proposal appears to extend the logic 
of cultural and economic paternalism” (57). However, readers can understand Cugoano’s 
reconciliation of these two seemingly irreconcilable positions by recalling that he frames 
Narrative of the Enslavement…around his own autobiographical experience. Like Equiano, he 
uses his own relative success as proof of the potentially uplifting powers of providence, capital, 
and providential capitalism, but only if used correctly.   
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Cugoano retains the sense that Atlantic life resembles captivity and unfreedom, and 
rejects the notion that this experience is a necessary trial that might ultimately reward him, but he 
also plainly uses these experiences as the material with which to create a community, and with 
which to develop a political identity in debates over slavery. Cugoano relied on the same 
networks of antislavery publication, as did Equiano, to disseminate his texts. He shares with 
Equiano a desire to craft community out of an experience of personal displacement and mobility 
but diverges greatly from Equiano in tone and tenor regarding his antislavery critiques. Where 
Equiano used his autobiography as an example of the “ethical education and development” that 
Lowe describes, Cugoano opts for a direct antislavery appeal. Vincent Carretta calls Cugoano’s 
narrative “the most overt African-British challenge to the slave trade and slavery ever published” 
(Carretta 11). In so doing, Carretta interestingly asserts an “African-British” identity that 
Cugoano does not articulate for himself in his narrative. Nonetheless, from his position as a 
liminal figure within the “African-British” Atlantic, Cugoano develops a vocal presence in 
antislavery circles.  
To a much greater extent than writers like Gronniosaw, or even Hammon, Cugoano 
offers the reader a visceral experience of being torn from peaceful Africa, rather than simply 
presenting the event in brief. As he does so, he confronts the complex expressive and interpretive 
challenge of representing the experience of commodification, arguing against it, and striving not 
to succumb to its logic. He describes, for example, having “heard the groans and cries...the 
rattling of chains” (124). The narrative also includes long digressive accounts of Atlantic history, 
including a fairly clear and thorough discussion of South America and its colonization as well as 
a history of the Royal African Company (79; 94). In this way, Cugoano links the historical to the 
personal, insistently reminding readers that Atlantic trade, politics, and history rely upon the 
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abuse and captivity of bodies like his own. In response, Cugoano does not shy away from 
wishing divine, even violent retribution on enslavers who “are those cooks and men that would 
be roasted and saddled, it certainly would be no unpleasant sight to see them well roasted, 
saddled and bridled too” (16). Even as he does so, however, Cugoano tacitly admits the way that 
the logic of the market undergirds all moral questions and debates in the Atlantic. It is true that 
Cugoano pushes hard on the logic that slavery constitutes man-stealing and argues that it is 
“opposite to every precept and injunction of the Divine Law” (Cugoano 4). Yet, although he 
argues against seeing men as property, his argument against man-stealing rests upon seeing men 
as things over which to debate questions of possession and ownership (114). His argument that 
“as reason must tell every man, that he himself is of more value than his property” is, therefore, 
ambivalent. A man is more valuable than property but, like property, can be valued (54). A man 
is a person, but also a thing to be owned. A free man, then, is a thing that can own itself. Yet 
what is perhaps most interesting about Cugoano is how he finds his way out of this logical bind: 
through the production and dissemination of text. 
The communities that writers like Hammon, Jea, Cugoano, and Equiano formed around 
the written word were real, mutually beneficial, and politically active. Like Jea, Cugoano 
addresses the personal experience of these kinds of economic communities by focusing on the 
cohesive power of literacy. Wimbush, for example, notes that “Cugoano and Equiano were 
known to have collaborated on letter writing and other projects, challenging slavery, the slave 
trade, and the general humiliation of Africans; working with resettlement projects; and 
encouraging commerce with Africans. It is speculated that Equiano assisted Cugoano with the 
writing of his manifesto” (Wimbush 203). This suggests a close-knit and collaborative 
community centered on textual self-expression, which allowed black writers to turn their 
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experiences with violence, maritime mobility, commodification, and Christian conversion into 
the productive means by which to assert their own power in Atlantic culture and in the Atlantic 
market. In this way, divinity operates in both the maritime laboring market and in the publishing 
market to reward the elect, even as it communicates to its special favorites through sacred texts. 
John Marrant, the Captive Prophet 
Mobile Atlantic maritime narratives like Jea’s and Cugoano’s recognize the violence, 
displacement, and mobility of Atlantic life, as well as the opportunity to turn traumatic 
experiences into providential Christian vocational messages. In so doing, they acknowledge the 
complex and ambivalent experience of Atlantic culture that, for better or worse, undergirds so 
much mobile Atlantic writing. These narratives run the gamut from the primarily quotidian 
account of the disappointing realities of mobile Atlantic life produced by Venture Smith, to the 
ostensibly freeing experiences of life at the frontiers of empire in Briton Hammon’s narrative. 
They include the frank assertion of the spiritually and economically liberating potential of life 
within a slave economy in Ukawsaw Gronniosaw’s autobiography, and the typology of self in 
John Jea’s multivalent text, as well as Ottobah Cugoano’s assertive autobiographical case against 
slavery. If these narratives present a fractious and contested view of life in mobile Atlantic 
society, they still share certain important ideological, social, and philosophical fixations. 
Namely: they all present individuals grappling with their desires for community within an 
Atlantic society that seeks to marginalize them. Moreover, whether they take the fact for granted 
or examine it closely, they all present Atlantic society as a circulatory system of exchanged ideas 
and goods, held together by the tightly entwined directives of providential Christianity and 
market capitalism. In so doing, these authors enshrine certain markers as important tropes for the 
maritime slavery or emancipated black Atlantic narrative. Conversion, a process with both 
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economic and spiritual dimensions, remains productive and necessary in the Atlantic market 
society. Expressive communicative power and literacy are important tools for the cultivation and 
presentation of individual identity. Christianity and exchange offer important opportunities to 
create communities, even within an increasingly nationalistic Atlantic space that would 
otherwise minimize or marginalize emancipated or unfree mobile laboring classes. 
 All of these trends occur as an extreme form of self-liberation through self-expression in 
John Marrant’s A Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings with John Marrant, A Black 
published in 1785. Marrant offers a number of instances of Christian faith operating, at times 
mysteriously, to create community, to forge a public founded on shared religious faith and 
mercantile enterprise. At the same time, his marginal status focuses the reader’s attention upon 
the generative potential of frontier spaces, and upon the power of community instantiation that 
occurs at the fugitive periphery to return to society’s core. Moreover, Marrant’s expressive 
abilities, evidently supernatural in nature, help him to develop an individual identity in text, and 
to extend the reach of providential Christianity wedded to labor, commodity identification, and 
market exchange.  
Marrant’s narrative blends many of the generic trends addressed in other texts, and 
amplifies them, presenting a life defined by captivity, transactional exchange, and 
marginalization as a supernatural experience of transcendence through captivity. A freeborn New 
Yorker who moves to Georgia with his family, Marrant soon discovers his talent for playing the 
French horn and a penchant for trouble. His sister first informs him that the former might be his 
means of making a living and escaping the effects of the later. She tells him, “You have now no 
need of a trade.” In fact, Marrant’s journey will see him discovering both piety and vocation, and 
discovering the constitutive nature of both as a route to salvation. One day, intending to disrupt a 
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worship service with his horn, Marrant is suddenly overcome with God’s power. He recalls, “I 
was struck to the ground and lay both speechless and senseless near a half an hour.” Revived by 
the preacher who remarks “JESUS CHRIST has got thee at last,” he falls sick and seems 
threatened by the preacher’s repeated prayers, until the prayers revive him and open his eyes to 
Christian vocation. Marrant then becomes an aggressively devout proselytizer. Finding his own 
family insufficiently pious, he sets out. In the wilderness, he seems to wish for death as a release 
from the body. He writes, “I prayed to the Lord upon the ground that he would command the 
wild beasts to devour me.” Instead, God fills him with powers, described, at times, as a 
preternatural connection with nature. He writes, for example “I got across the tree without my 
feet or hands touching the ground…I bit [grass] off like a horse, and prayed the Lord to bless it 
to me” (16). All of these transformations are abrupt, violent, and total. He transforms from 
playful mischief-maker to devout evangelical to semi-transcendental Christian with equal 
abruptness. He becomes nearly bestial in his renewed connection to the wilderness, guided and 
protected by God. His conversions are complete transformations of identity, as he sheds his 
youthfulness, his secularism, even, apparently, his humanity, on his way toward accepting 
divinity. These conversions are significant for, as in Equiano or Hammon, they mark a state of 
flux as powerfully open to the equivalent logic of divine exchange. All of these figures survive 
and even thrive because they remain in states of mobile conversion. This suggests the way these 
authors have looked to their own experiences with disruptive mobility as a source of power and 
freedom, when linked to both capitalism and a sense of Christian election.  
There are multiple interlocking symbols at work within this strange, meandering text but, 
for the moment, let us consider the horn to which Marrant attaches so much importance. It is a 
disruptive thing, but also the thing that invites God’s grace to enter with stunning force into 
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Marrant’s life. Perhaps most intriguingly, it is a thing. Elizabeth Maddock Dillon thoroughly 
examines both Marrant’s narrative and the importance of the horn within it, first noting that “The 
French horn is an object that we are unlikely to readily place in the hands of the eighteenth-
century black youths of our historical imagination. But precisely the thingly, material quality of 
the French horn…and its striking presence at the center of the scene lends a certain allure and 
potency to the conversion narrative” (319). The “thingly quality” to which Maddock Dillon 
refers ought to remind readers of the “thingly quality” of Atlantic commodities in general, and to 
remind them that both the horn and the man are productions of a circulating Atlantic culture that 
connects France to the Caribbean to North America. As Maddock Dillon points out, “a French 
horn would seemingly bear no relation to the implicitly African horn (the abeng, for instance) 
blown to signal slave rebellion or to communicate among slaves. The French horn, as we have 
seen, is understood as a European, rather than an African horn, and one that is sounded in the 
performance of European orchestral, dance, and military music (333)”. Marrant’s knowledge of 
how to play the horn, then, is revelatory on two fronts. First, it suggests the intersecting cultures 
of music, communication, and knowledge that have conspired to teach him the skill to use the 
“orchestral” instrument, rather than the banned African horn. This is, in fact, a point that 
Maddock Dillon examines in detail. However, perhaps more interestingly, is the implicit route 
that the two figures—the man and the horn—have taken to meet one another in the church. They, 
or their direct ancestors, have both traveled routes established and sustained by the Atlantic 
marketplace, in order to bring together the under-classes of the Atlantic—Marrant is not a slave, 
but is asked or required to perform for a higher racial and class order—and the cultural products 
of Europe, to create a new and syncretic communion that literally takes place in a religious 
setting. 
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Moreover, the horn and its role as a public instrument suggest Marrant’s navigation of 
public communities. Marrant’s is a text in which communication remains a persistent problem. 
For example, he goes to the church meeting intending to play music but, instead, emits a noisy 
“halloo,” the same church service initially seems unintelligible and then expresses deep spiritual 
truths, and when he returns home after his many wanderings, only his sister recognizes and can 
communicate with him. The moment the horn sounds, a conversion takes place within Marrant 
that initiates his shift from one community to another. Maddock Dillon writes, “one can clearly 
see Marrant’s own movement from an aesthetic and political community in which the sounds 
issuing from [Reverend] Whitefield’s mouth are mere noise…to a community in which the same 
sounds are deeply meaningful and serve as the central organizing language of the community” 
(322). Marrant’s use of his seemingly out-of-place “thingly” object allows, or even forces, his 
entry into a wider world of communication with other Christians. He becomes a valuable 
commodity who uses another valuable commodity to instantiate Christian community. 
It is precisely the oddity of this moment that allows community to spring up, that permits 
very different worlds to begin to communicate and interact. Maddock Dillon, for example, 
argues that “the possibility of equality is mobilized in moments of dissensus—moments when 
the limitations and exclusions of existing framings of the public sphere are rendered visible 
rather than naturalized under the guise of the self-evident, under the guise of the sensible” (325). 
Marrant’s seemingly senseless, discordant use of the horn reveals the barriers of race, class, and 
communication that separate him from the Christian community that his text presents as his 
ultimate goal. In rendering these barriers visible, Marrant begins to dismantle them. This, in fact, 
is a recurrent motif in the narrative: Marrant does something that seems quite strange and, in so 
doing, makes visible the difficulty of inter-community relation and conversion. When he does, he 
   Green 184 
 
is able to pass from one stage of his life to another, along his journey toward free salvation. 
Maddock Dillon notes this when she writes, “What Marrant seems to be particularly skilled at is 
creating a sense of community (an assemblage) in locations where sense itself does not initially 
seem to be shared between Marrant and those around him….we might say, then, that Marrant has 
a marked ability to make publics around him by means of performance” (336-7). Readers should 
not forget the nature of those publics. They are communities built upon the intersections of 
otherwise disparate communities, moments of communication across the breach of 
miscommunication, and always instantiated by a Christianity premised upon Marrant’s own 
mobility and his status as a commodified subject capable of inhering and transposing value and 
expression. He is, like the horn, a seemingly out-of-place thing around which a Christian 
community forms, and a direct production of the Atlantic market’s most powerful forces of 
mobility and exchange. 
He is also, of course, a person and, as such, develops identity and, in fact, material and 
even literary community from these events. As Maddock Dillon reminds readers, Marrant’s 
ability to create community was used “such that it became ‘common sense’ for an evangelizing 
Christian network to publish his narrative” (338). Marrant’s focus on the need for conversion 
experiences to empower and to liberate is an important element of eighteenth-century religious 
texts, in which conversion is the most fundamental spiritual experience for the individual and for 
the community at large. It is not enough to be a Christian; one must convert one’s self into a 
Christian and replay the experience as much as possible to reaffirm faith. This focuses on the act 
of becoming, rather than upon being and argues that a state of constant flux should be embraced 
and guided in positive directions, rather than resisted in favor of a false stasis. In particular, 
conversion was an important element of the antislavery text. Vincent Carretta points out, for 
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example, that “the emphasis on religion in the narratives of eighteenth-century Black authors was 
the long-standing belief that conversion to Christianity merited emancipation from slavery, a 
belief so strong that it led to colonial statutes denying its validity” (8). Narratives like Marrant’s 
attest to this belief, but they also attest to the way mobile, Atlantic Christianity could help 
displaced black authors to produce identities out of displacement and transformation.  
When Marrant meets an “Indian Hunter” and, later, becomes captive of the Cherokee 
nation, his faith in a Lord his captors cannot see changes from an external force that works upon 
him, to a power he can use to convert others and to instantiate community. After gesturing 
toward the tortures he should face as a captive of the Cherokee, Marrant describes how his 
prayers in English, translated into Cherokee and accompanied by the “talking book,” convert his 
would-be executioner, the daughter of the King and, ultimately, the King himself. He writes, 
“The Lord appeared most lovely and glorious; the king himself was awakened and the others set 
at liberty. A great change took place among the people; the king’s house became God’s house” 
(27). He then visits a number of other affiliated tribes, while under the protection of his Cherokee 
friends. In these interactions, Marrant’s captivity narrative has transformed into a jeremiadic 
narrative. His forced captivity in the wilderness becomes an opportunity to bring Christianity to 
the uninformed and to learn and embrace a vocation as a preacher. If his first abrupt conversion 
marked him as specially elect, his captivity has truly been the vehicle by which he receives his 
vocation. 
It is only right to call his proselytizing a vocation, for it is, at root, a form of profitable 
labor. Certainly it is his calling as an evident providential favorite of God, but it is also the 
transactional work of Marrant’s life. He offers Christian catechism in exchange for protection, 
mobility, and a certain degree of freedom, even within his captivity. The narrative of Christian 
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liberation becomes quite literal in this narrative in which Marrant’s captivity becomes an 
opportunity to transform the wilderness and to “civilize” a non-Christian population. As Cedrick 
May points out, “Marrant engaged in the spread of a Christianity tailored to the specific social 
and political needs of Africans and African Americans living throughout the Atlantic world” and 
especially in the Nova Scotian settlement he would later work to make prosperous (64). 
Nevertheless, as May concedes, Marrant was ambivalently positioned within Atlantic Calvinism. 
May writes that on the one hand “Marrant, like [Johnathan] Edwards and [George] Whitefield, 
emphasized the Pauline tenet of irresistible grace and the subordination of the human will to 
divine sovereignty” (65). This “gained him entrance into one of the major theological discussions 
of the time and gained him the patronage he needed to be a major missionary voice between 
England, Nova Scotia, and Boston.” On the other hand, “Marrant also advanced some new 
theological ideas dangerous to established authority. Marrant’s ideas were egalitarian in 
nature…[he] preached that the New Testament was the sole authority…he also advanced 
extemporaneous or ‘inspired’ preaching and prayer as indicators of one’s development as a 
Christian and of a true connection with God” (65). All in all, Marrant’s Christianity gives him 
occasion to turn his captivity not only into a narrative experience of survival, but also into a kind 
of hegemonic jeremiad, bringing the values of Atlantic Christianity into the frontier and bringing 
the benighted into Christian fellowship.  
Yet the experience also transforms his Christianity, so that it becomes a kind of syncretic 
cultural production. When he returns home after months away, he returns to a family who does 
not recognize him, for his “dress was purely in the Indian stile.” He acts with his neighbors as a 
prophet, “a wild man...come out of the woods to be a witness for God and to reprove our 
ingratitude and stupefaction.”  He is only recognized by his youngest, and, therefore, most 
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innocent, sister. Christian catechism began Marrant’s transformation, but his experience with the 
wider, more syncretic world among the non-Christian people who also populate the Atlantic has 
made him into the prophet who can bring the word of God back to society. In this way, Marrant 
partly conforms to the dichotomous distinction between the colonial “Jamaica” and the home-
state “England”—or, in this case, North America—of Hall’s description. Marrant explores the 
peripheral frontiers of empire, in order to bring its lessons back home. However, even as he does 
so, his text reaffirms the inescapable contamination that occurs as a result of his own mobility. 
The links between center and periphery keep them in contact, so Marrant’s exposure to the 
frontier marks him as both a peripheral “wild man” and a prophetic voice returning to society’s 
core. Even in his journey back to the center, he brings his wildness with him. This process is 
repeated throughout the maritime Atlantic, so that individuals and communities are, at once, 
marginalized, estranged, or made wild, and necessarily bound to the home or core that claims 
distance from them.  
As a sailor Marrant similarly discovers that he must accommodate himself to the 
syncretic and unsettling mobility of maritime life. When he does, he fully realizes his potential as 
a “prophet” who can fuse Christian, capitalist, and colonialist practices in one person. He 
remains reunited with his family “till the commencement of the American troubles.” At this 
point his narrative becomes more anecdotal and he finds himself “pressed on board the Scorpion 
sloop of war.” During this time, Marrant seems to backslide, although he does not dwell on the 
experience except to note his recommitment and deliverance from danger. He writes, “I 
continued in his majesty's service six years and eleven months; and with shame confess that a 
lamentable stupor crept over all my spiritual vivacity, life and vigor; I got cold and dead.” 
However, the violent powers of God again use the natural world to demonstrate divinity to 
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Marrant. He recalls, “We were overtaken by a violent storm; I was washed overboard, and 
thrown on again; dashed into the sea a second time, and tossed upon deck again.  I now fastened 
a rope round my middle, as a security against being thrown into the sea again; but, alas!  Forgot 
to fasten it to any part of the ship; being carried away the third time by the fury of the waves, 
when in the sea, I found the rope both useless and an encumbrance.” He continues, “I was in the 
sea the third time about eight minutes, and the sharks came round me in great numbers, one of an 
enormous size that could easily have taken me into his mouth at once, passed and rubbed against 
my side. I their cried more earnestly to the Lord than I had done for sometime; and he who heard 
Jonah's prayer, did not shut out mine, for I was thrown aboard again; these were the means the 
Lord used to revive me, and I began now to set out afresh” (38).  He closes these recollections 
with an invocation that ties together all of the strands of providential capitalist maritime life: “I 
have now only to entreat the earnest prayers of all my kind Christian friends, that I may be 
carried safe there; kept humble, made faithful, and successful” (38). Humility, faith, and 
success—for Marrant, these are all signs of grace and of the community that his providential 
election has helped to instantiate and that he hopes to maintain. 
Marrant’s text remains interested in creating publics, communities of affiliation in which 
persons, especially persons of color, could exercise their communal bonds with other Christians, 
as opposed to a national community that explicitly rejected them. This is a point also raised by 
Alexander Byrd, who notes that “Christianity offered a space not dissimilar to the one that 
prevailed ruing the course of the American war...Christianity in the Maritimes was also a place 
where blacks could exercise their liberty under terms increasingly denied them across the region 
at large” (175). Marrant imagines a Christianity that bonds black subjects and indigenous people 
and actually helps them to share values and connection to the natural world. He relies upon 
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tropes of the talking book, even a sounding horn and upon the power of conversion to create 
society, but he is notably creating a nonwhite counter-public through Christianity that might run 
parallel to the white mainstream that rejects him. In fact, he ends his narrative by travelling to 
Novia Scotia in order to join and to help establish a literal counter-public on the ostensible 
frontiers of the British Empire. 
The Kingdom on Earth: The Dream of Home and Colonial Disappointment 
It bears remark that, in a number of these narratives, particularly in those of Marrant and 
Equiano, colonial schemes, like the one in Nova Scotia, intended for loyalist black refugees from 
the American Revolution, and the one in Sierra Leone, intended for the displaced black poor, 
loom large, allowing these writers to imagine a potential refuge even within spaces of liminal 
exile. If “Jamaica was for sex,” Sierra Leone and Nova Scotia were, in the British imagination, 
for dislocation. Indeed, the very name asserts the peripheral status of Nova Scotia to the British 
Empire by linking it to Britain’s own internalized colonial territory to the north. Nevertheless, 
Marrant and Equiano both saw in it a potential alternative to the white national societies that 
rejected people of color in more explicit legal terms. The difficulties of Nova Scotia’s free black 
refugee colonies admit the unofficial or official rejection by the home state. At the same time, the 
important space that such a colony occupies in the minds of mobile emancipated Atlantic writers, 
like Marrant and Equiano, asserts its ideological significance as a site of potential refuge and 
community. 
Britain officially declared legal emancipation in 1834 but the run-up to freedom hardly 
assured the extension of citizenship rights to former slaves. With this in mind, Novia Scotia and 
Sierra Leone functioned as a means of extending national influence by simultaneously offering 
freedom to the emancipated and rejecting black claims to political inclusion. Byrd describes the 
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way that, for British antislavery groups “organizing a black settlement at Sierra Leone was, 
among other things, an attempt to strike at the Atlantic slave trade by demonstrating that free 
labor might produce much—even if not all—of what was asked of slave labor in the Americas” 
(4). Nevertheless, “black settlers across the Maritimes [in British Canada] were continually 
denied the privileges due loyalists and the rights of free subjects…the more that circumstances in 
the Maritimes made it clear that black settlers were neither loyalists nor free subjects, at least not 
in the manner of their white counterparts, the more black society seemed to crystallize in 
defiance of such facts” (170). So the British black settlements carried the ambivalence of the sea 
to shore: they were spaces of both freedom and unfreedom, inclusion and marginalization. Nova 
Scotia and Sierra Leone fulfilled the desires of unsettled black populations for a Christian, 
politically-recognized, and economically participatory kingdom on earth, but also permitted the 
empire to maintain the hierarchies of race, periphery, and citizenship that were so important to 
the function and development of Atlantic societies. 
These colonial opportunities remained ambivalent concepts in the minds and lived-
realities of displaced individuals and maritime communities in the Atlantic. Marrant, for 
example, makes his late-in-life pilgrimage to Novia Scotia for reasons both providential and 
practical.xviii He writes, “I used to exercise my gifts on a Monday evening in prayer and 
exhortation, and was approved of, and ordained at Bath.  Her Ladyship having seen the letter 
from my brother in Nova Scotia, thought Providence called me there:  To which place I am now 
bound, and expect to sail in few days” (127). He looks forward to a Christian community that 
becomes universal and overcomes all manner of nationalist or racial boundaries. He hopes that, 
“Indian tribes may stretch out their hands to God; that the black nations may be made white in 
the blood of the Lamb...the kingdoms of the world are become the kingdoms of our God, and of 
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his Christ” (127). Throughout this narrative, providence has served to deliver the specially 
selected individual, even as that individual, and his message, have become the centers around 
which universalist and syncretic cultures cohere. This cultural instantiation would have been 
impossible without both Marrant’s captivity experience and his vocational experience in the 
mercantile Atlantic, but it is also a necessary response to the social exclusion he experienced as a 
marginalized figure in Atlantic society.  
Furthermore, Marrant’s optimism is belied by the harsh realities that await him in Nova 
Scotia. Lauren Benton describes the potential and problems inherent to this colony as frontier-
space when she discusses the way “sovereignty in empire formed as multiple agents positioned 
themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers, and as polities and populations 
negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule.” 
She writes, “multiple anomalous legal spaces in European empires developed not merely in 
opposition to imperial centers but also in response to shifting interimperial relations and cross-
imperial comparisons, forming in the process part of a broader geographically uneven regulatory 
web, or another source of international law” (Benton 280). We might consider Nova Scotia or 
Sierra Leonne as similarly contested and contestable legal spaces within but at the borders of 
empire. These spaces allowed the empire to extend itself, even as it subordinated the very 
communities it used to assert its legal claims to territory. What David Kazanjian describes as the 
“colonizing trick” of using subjects, rather than citizens, to plant the seeds of colonial expansion 
is on full display here. Moreover, this “trick” conflates legal, political, economic, and spiritual 
identifications, so that the subjects relegated to spaces like Nova Scotia find themselves absorbed 
into a socio-political culture that is both economic and religious, even as they are rendered 
subordinate, objectified, or commodified. 
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Reading through these texts, Atlantic historians, critics of the black Atlantic, and readers 
of the texts that mobilized and remained mobile within the black Atlantic can see the hopes and 
disappointment of colonization play out as the drama of empire and frontier in miniature. 
Equiano helps plan and petitions to join a colonial expedition to Sierra Leone in order to extend 
both Christianity and capitalism as well as to plant a body of British colonial subjects on the 
African settlement. At the same time, despite Equiano’s optimism, the difficulty of this project is 
clearly evident. Equiano for example, makes a point of narrating the untamed savagery of one of 
these would-be colonial communities during a visit to Nova Scotia in 1758. He writes, "One 
thing remarkable I saw this day:—A lieutenant of the Princess Amelia, who, as well as my 
master, superintended the landing, was giving the word of command, and while his mouth was 
open a musquet ball went through it, and passed out at his cheek. I had that day in my hand the 
scalp of an Indian king, who was killed in the engagement: the scalp had been taken off by an 
Highlander. I saw this king's ornaments too, which were very curious, and made of feathers" 
(47). Any doubts about the nature of British colonial resettlement there should be put to rest with 
this in mind: Nova Scotia was, indeed, a frontier. The "highlander" and the native retain their 
wildness, their violent savagery in this wilderness. Nevertheless, in 1785, John Marrant expects 
to find in the North American frontier a space open to conversion and, like Equiano's plans for 
the Sierra Leone colony, a land and people receptive to the advancing powers of both the church 
and the market. He writes of his hopes "that the black nations may be made white in the blood of 
the Lamb; that vast multitudes of hard tongue, and of a strange speech, may learn the language of 
Canaan, and sing the song of Moses, and of the Lamb; and, anticipating the glorious prospect, 
may we all with servant hearts, and willing tongues, sing hallelujah; the kingdoms of the world 
are become the kingdoms of our God, and of his Christ.  Amen and Amen” (Marrant 127). Both 
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authors present their respective colonial projects as opportunities for a displaced population of 
former slaves to bring to stable land what they’d found only at sea: inclusion through cooperative 
labor, class affiliation, and the breakdown of racial barriers through Christian fellowship. 
However, the catastrophic failure of these settlements comes close to vindicating Smith’s 
disappointed perspective of his so-called liberty. The dream of social inclusion devolves into the 
reality of continued national exclusion. 
All of this is to say that the history of alternative maritime community-creation is not an 
entirely happy one. It is also evidence of the same processes of social exclusion that necessitated 
the cultivation of alternative spaces within and around the Atlantic in the first place. The union 
of mobile capital to mobile Christianity certainly helped some of these writers to achieve 
community but, for others, it only exacerbated and doubled the exclusion experienced by so 
many. Just as such figures found themselves brought into both the market and the empire, they 
also found themselves subordinated in terms that forced them to consider the potential 
devaluation of their political, economic, and even spiritual identities. 
Conclusion 
The experience of sailors and individuals like Smith, Hammon, Cugoano, Jea, 
Gronniosaw, and Marrant is, ultimately, emblematic of the ambivalent nature of life in the 
Atlantic market. Especially for these writers, who traverse the corridors of Atlantic trade while 
navigating the uncertain routes of freedom, captivity, fellowship, and alienation, a syncretic and 
sometimes universalist identity was crucially important. It allowed them to assert agency as 
laborers, and to instantiate communities, even as they served societies that often wanted to reject 
or ignore them. It allowed them to use their experiences of disruption, mobility and exchange to 
develop syncretic Atlantic, rather than strictly national, identities. Moreover, it allowed them to 
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use these experiences as the material with which to craft their own stories, and to use those 
stories to assert their presence in the politics, and the market, of the eighteenth and nineteenth-
century Atlantic world.  
However, this productive and often inclusive counter-public was also, in large part, a 
forced remove from other supposedly mainstream Atlantic societies. If, as Hall suggests, national 
cultures increasingly viewed “Jamaica” and “England” as distinct and distant spaces, this 
binarism created an enormous class of displaced people and cultures. This dualistic view of 
Atlantic life both obscured and admitted the links between the interior and the periphery. As a 
result, the individuals and communities that traversed the geographical and ideological space 
between the ostensible core of Atlantic society and its supposed margins were forced to create or 
to embrace identities that could exist within a society that largely sought to deny their existence. 
Baucom’s contention that Liverpool was the capitol of Atlantic society applies not only because 
slavery was so central to the economies and ideological formations of Atlantic societies, but also 
because its very nature as a space through which passed commodities marked by the diverse 
people who carried them is so emblematic of Atlantic cultural formation.  
Such a space tacitly admitted that the increasingly nationalist conception of “home” could 
not exist without the active participation of the mobile Atlantic communities that nationalities 
sought to deny. The displaced, the marginally free, or the mobile laboring classes, therefore, 
embraced an identity that was partly forced upon them and, in the process, came to embody the 
currents of Atlantic life more profoundly than writers or politicians cared to admit. For so many 
people, Atlantic society resembled the churning constellation of the Atlantic market, with its 
many counter-publics and alternative communities, much more than it resembled any stable 
definition of “home” or its othered opposite.  
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Places like Nova Scotia or Sierra Leone, therefore, serve as both literal and imaginary 
instantiations of this peripheral nature. Both enforced and embraced, these alternative 
communities are emblematic of the parallel alternative society that so many of these writers 
imagined for themselves and of the political and ideological rejection that attended such a 
fantasy. They served as the conceptual kingdom of freedom, Christianity, and free market 
participation that the providential market promised and, at the same time, demonstrated the way 
the providential market could facilitate the marginalization of whole communities, and use the 
language of individual liberty, election, and advancement, to create hierarchies of conditional 
freedom, and subordinate market agency.  
Even so, sometimes more hesitant to embrace the colonialist nature of providential 
capitalism than Equiano, all of these authors demonstrate the way that a providential capitalist 
frame could help individuals to understand the moral and practical cosmology of the world they 
inhabited, even or perhaps especially if that providential capitalist ideology made their lives 
difficult, disrupted, and constantly mobile. Woodard writes, “Through their lives and 
experiences, Gronniosaw and Cugoano forced the spotlight on the contradictions between certain 
Christian doctrines and their embodiment in social practice in the eighteenth century,” and this is 
true of all similar maritime slavery narratives (56). At times, they assert and project the nature of 
mobile communities of laborers and, especially, laboring Christians that, far more than 
nationalism, could hold together classes and collective identities in the fractious market of the 
Atlantic. At times, they suggest the way that narratives of mobility and captivity could help 
authors to assert the primacy of nationalist, racial, or otherwise hegemonic projects. Moreover, 
these accounts are not outliers. Indeed, this fractured view of Atlantic society was, in some ways, 
the model upon which Atlantic nations were premised. Eve Taylor Bannet, for example, points 
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out that “Jeffersonians sought to persuade the small farmers of America that their free and 
independent way of life was compatible with republican government by speaking of the new 
republic as a collection of small, independent farms—and why the more firmly the new Republic 
established its grip on its wayward population, the more paeans to republican Liberty were sung” 
(86). Similarly, Martha Schoolman notes “The growing field of hemispheric American studies is 
often predicated on the assumption that the hemispheric frame is perforce more radical, 
multiracial, and multilingual than the regional or the national, but such assumptions do not 
sufficiently account for the conservative aspects of British West Indian Emancipation” 
(Schoolman 5). Even so, sometimes despite their authors’ intentions, these texts suggest that life 
in the maritime Atlantic market was personally, racially, philosophically, and spiritually perilous. 
If Equiano was looking at the lighthouse, these writers looked to the rocky shoals beneath, and 
found new ways to navigate, to collaborate, and to survive in the treacherous waters of the 
Atlantic. 
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Chapter 3 
A Driver Over You: Piracy, Abuse, and National Vulnerability in the Atlantic
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Reading narratives of mobile, maritime negotiations of freedom and captivity, it is 
impossible to ignore their racial emphasis. Whether mobile black Atlantic authors attempt to 
integrate themselves into white society, resist white abuse, or create alternatives to Eurocentric 
hegemony, they were all bound to project personal and cultural identities against the seemingly 
monolithic totem of whiteness in the Atlantic. Yet, when readers encounter narratives from white 
authors that share similar preoccupations with mobility, transaction, captivity, and the 
development of identity, they discover that that whiteness was hardly static. In fact, authors of 
frontier captivity narratives, Barbary captivity narratives, and even white maritime free-labor 
trade and travel narratives all observed the ways whiteness and freedom, like blackness and 
unfreedom, could shift, depending upon circumstances within the Atlantic cultural economy. 
Black Atlantic authors had to come to terms with their own forced mobility, and with the 
symbolic meaning forced upon their flesh. Although the mechanisms of confrontation were 
different, white Atlantic maritime authors also had to confront the significance of their own 
mobility and the meaning of their symbolically fraught racial and national status. As they did, 
they discovered that the protective shield of white supremacy and national affiliation could be 
unreliable or even deceptive. They also revealed that the white body was a site of transaction and 
equivalence, and that white skin could also hold an exchangeable commodity value in the 
marketplace. 
Writers like Ottobah Cugoano and Venture Smith used a focus on the body’s symbolic 
meaning to turn Equiano’s optimistic vision of an Atlantic market, which allows individuals to 
encounter and freely embrace the will of God, into a philosophically complex vision of 
commodity misidentification. In so doing, they demonstrated a particular and prevalent fear of 
the power of the shipping trade to turn human beings into commodities. Given that black and 
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white sailors shared space in the Atlantic trading market and, as a result, shared in so many of its 
ordinary, abusive, transcendent practices, this was a fear that crossed boundaries of race. Like the 
black narrator of Briton Hammon’s Narrative of the Uncommon Sufferings…, the white narrators 
of Royall Tyler’s The Algerine Captive and Richard Henry Dana’s Two Years Before the Mast, 
for example, struggle to maintain their humanity as the degree to which they are embedded in the 
Atlantic market becomes increasingly, disturbingly clear.  
In fact, anxiety over the personal nature of commodification and subjugation became 
especially fraught for white American writers of the period leading out of the revolutionary era 
and through the expansive Jacksonian period. Writers like Richard Henry Dana drew upon the 
experiences of captivity, commodification, and wage slavery to recognize the elements of 
unfreedom contained within the liberationist promises of providential capitalism in the Atlantic 
market. Particularly in light of Barbary captivity, maritime impressment, and abusive labor 
practices at sea, such writers recognized that the same proximity to commodities that could 
restore the humanity, identity, and spiritual complexity that slavery sought to deny the unfree, 
could also take those same gifts away from individuals whose only claim to secure humanity was 
the tenuous logic of white supremacy.  
Black freedom—and its implied opposite, white bondage—presented a vexing problem 
for the white subject. As Saidiya Hartman asks “if race formerly determined who was ‘man’ and 
who was chattel, whose property rights were protected or recognized and who was property, 
which consequently had the effect of making race itself a kind of property…then how did 
emancipation affect the status of race” (Hartman 119). This is as pressing an issue for white 
authors who traverse the same trade routes as their enslaved counterparts as it would be for a 
white middle class contending with the reality of nationwide emancipation a generation later. For 
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writers like Royall Tyler and Richard Henry Dana, for instance, the possibility that whiteness 
was not a reliable guarantor of freedom destabilized their cultures’ operative notions of racial, 
class, spiritual, and national affiliation in the Atlantic. Moreover, the “property rights” to which 
Hartman refers are premised upon the authority of a national, economic, racial, and philosophical 
order. She argues that their disruption constituted an assault on the very notion of nineteenth-
century manhood. Barbary captivity narratives and free-labor maritime narratives demonstrate 
that, at least as early as the eighteenth century, writers were concerned with the destabilizing 
meaning of events that could untangle the knot of nationalism, racial difference, Christianity and 
claims to property upon which so much weight was placed in the Atlantic marketplace. 
In the face of abusive maritime labor practices, in the wake of ascendant black figures 
like Equiano, who challenged rigid strictures of racial, economic, and spiritual hierarchies, and in 
light of ongoing Barbary piracy and British impressment, whiteness was at risk of becoming an 
empty signifier, a text with no meaning. Lisa Lowe notes that “the seas were an open, uncharted, 
and yet undetermined domain for mercantile expansion and imperial experiments beyond the 
nation-state” (Lowe 43). She goes on to observe that “an older economic logic based on colonial 
conquest and slavery coexisted with a newer economic rationality that included the desire for 
maritime superiority and the command of…goods and peoples” (76). The new “domain” that 
Lowe describes is important in two respects: first, it represents the transformation of Atlantic 
economy away from landed property-holding and toward exchange-oriented commodity 
capitalism; second, it suggests the increasing national importance of binding together notions of 
racial hierarchy, geographic frontier, presumed Christian affiliation, and capitalist commodity 
exchange. In this “uncharted” space, all of these ideas were open to renegotiation. As a result, 
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authors attempted to reaffirm the sanctity of racial, national, economic, and spiritual cohesion, or 
ruminated upon the implications of disruptions to that cohesion. 
In fact, predating the Barbary captivity genre, frontier captivity narratives also used 
stories of peril to probe the limits of national, racial, and ideological hegemony. Hester Blum 
observes that “part of the appeal of the Indian and European versions of the captivity narrative 
was the format’s standard positioning of a white, Christian captive subject against the threat of a 
usually darker-skinned, presumed ‘savage’ or ‘heathenish’ people, whether Native American, 
Arabic, or African. The juxtaposition called attention to national differences and presented the 
white victims as dependent on Christian providence for their protection” (57). This is to say that 
frontier captivity narratives and, by extension, Barbary captivity narratives, functioned to 
reaffirm normative values in the face of challenge. In so doing, such narratives also reaffirmed 
the tight interconnectedness of nationalism, racialism, capitalism, and Christianity for North 
American Atlantic writers, readers, politicians, and citizens.  
It is important to recognize the links between frontier captivity narratives, Barbary 
captivity narratives, and later maritime trade and travel narratives because, in some cases, their 
serial indebted connections are overt and explicit. In other cases, however, what persist are 
generic conventions, philosophical concerns, nationalistic stakes, and racial constructions that 
evolve from one literary period to another. Just as Barbary captivity narratives drew upon 
traditions established in the frontier captivity genre, later maritime free-labor trade and travel 
narratives, like Dana’s, drew upon traditions prevalent in Barbary captivity narratives, like 
Tyler’s, in order to articulate a white, nationalist identity, against a threatening loss of self, and to 
assert a Yankee American heritage by showing it under attack. Moreover, it is important to 
acknowledge the literariness of these generic inheritances. In Barbary captivity narratives and 
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maritime trade and travel narratives, authors use fiction, typology, autobiography, and 
philosophical observation to deal with some of the most pressing and vexing concerns of the 
post-revolutionary and Jacksonian periods, within and around the Atlantic, but with particular 
gravity for North America and the United States. 
Attacks upon the American state from multiple fronts, in the form of Barbary piracy and 
British impressment, also indicated the entwined nature of American nationalism, racial 
construction, and religious affiliation. Hester Blum offers a succinct history of America’s 
political and military responses to these dual perils leading to the 1798 creation of the navy, the 
Tripolitan War of 1805 and the War of 1812 (48). As she does, she implicitly outlines an 
emergent narrative of an American state under potential assault on multiple fronts. Blum notes 
that “British impressment was equated with Barbary captivity in the writings of many sailors, 
and its dangers inspired sailors to suggest mechanisms for response to their fellow tars” (67). At 
the same time, America’s response to these dual affronts helped to characterize and mobilize 
American national identification in letters as much as in policy. Blum observes, “The success of 
the navy in restoring Autonomy to American ships in the Atlantic has often been cited as a 
crucial moment for the nation, when the United States could independently protect the integrity 
of its military and mercantile subjects. Yet mariners nevertheless remarked frequently (and with 
resignation) upon the tenuous nature of political and economic claims to sovereignty in the 
Atlantic world” (52). As they did, readers of maritime captivity narratives might note that the 
racial inversion and religious temptation that their protagonists encounter use personal narrative 
experiences to put pressure on the sanctity and security of an American racial and religious 
identity. As a result, the palpable desire of these authors to assert or to reestablish normative 
modes of national identification, founded around religious, racial, economic, and political 
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affiliation, read both as evidence of an emergent national identity and as evidence of that identity 
under assault. 
Crucially, these issues were mirrored in the development of the Barbary piracy literary 
genre, which tracked these political changes and responded in terms both instructive and 
expressive. Blum argues that Barbary piracy narratives served a primarily utilitarian purpose, 
aimed at a seafaring audience as instructive texts. Blum writes, “The value of sailors as national 
subjects was a problem for a young nation with neither the hardware for a naval defense against 
piracy nor the financial reserves to ransom its captive nationals.” America simply could not 
protect its sailors, its citizens, or itself from the possibility of capture and captivity. Blum 
continues, “captive seamen consistently located the value of their writings not just in the 
affective appeals of the texts to nationalism or humanism but chiefly in their utility to fellow 
laboring mariners. Federal-era Barbary narratives…were explicitly addressed to a reading 
community of fellow seamen” (46-7). The stakes of this literary movement were, therefore, very 
real.  
However, Barbary captivity narratives, like the frontier narratives before them, also 
served a sentimental purpose, inspiring sympathy, horror, anger, or even resolve amongst a 
reading public that took pleasure in the experience of a normative cultural self, contrasted 
victoriously against threats from the outside. At the same time, the frank reality of the situation 
was that, as Blum rightly observes, American claims to victory over these threats would have 
been unfounded, if not laughable. Thus, sailors used the networks of publication and 
dissemination that traversed the Atlantic in order to warn other sailors or to instruct them about 
how to behave in the very possible event that they might be captured and enslaved at the same 
time that Barbary captivity narratives found a robust audience on land. In either case, whether in 
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their sentimental or instructional capacities, Barbary piracy narratives evoke the national 
anxieties of their creation. America as both a geographic and an imaginary space was under 
assault at sea, and these texts worked hard to reassert the normative values of American national 
ideology, including the nation’s blend of Christian and capitalist value systems. 
More often than not, the hopes of authors of Barbary captivity narratives and, later, 
maritime trade and travel narratives, to assert national, class, religious, or racial solidarity were 
thwarted by a market that revealed its divine and all-encompassing powers. The authors of such 
texts long for, fear, and confront the reality that their bodies and souls must be sacrificed at the 
altar of providential capitalism, just as countless others have done before them and just as all 
persons, slave or free, must, in the end, do as well. Barbary piracy, coupled with the specter of 
British impressment, presented an existential threat to the American state as a claimant to 
position and power in the Atlantic. The combined forces of non-white, non-Christian pirates, and 
economic and nationalist competitors threatened the primary pillars of American national 
identity, namely: its expansive capitalism, its providential Christianity, and its liberty rhetoric. 
America, as an Atlantic power, found its mobile Atlantic citizens prey to attack, British 
impressment, and Barbary slavery. If these experiences did not promise death, they did promise 
some degree of unfreedom. If the American sailor could be killed or made a slave, then so too 
could the American state. 
Both Barbary piracy and free-laboring maritime trade and travel narratives, therefore, 
simultaneously articulated national hegemony and raised pressing questions about the sanctity 
and meaning of American identity, within a nationally and economically competitive Atlantic, 
that threatened to undermine the value of Americanness altogether. Much like an earlier 
generation of authors of Barbary captivity narratives, Dana, for example, will insist in 1840 that 
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his white, northern, American identity is an identity worth preserving against threats to its 
durability. However, he experiences reversals that challenge his status as racially superior or 
legally and philosophically free. Dana’s account ends on an ambivalent note, suggesting that his 
efforts to maintain the racial, nationalist, and class hierarchies of Atlantic society might fail in 
the face of the maritime trade’s aggressive, transgressive mobility. Such texts serve as reminders 
that even beyond the threat of Barbary piracy or Atlantic impressment, in the ostensibly secure 
maritime marketplace, freedom was less guaranteed than promised. Such texts also reaffirm the 
necessity of personal sacrifice for social cohesion and development, and enshrine the body as a 
site of Atlantic social reconciliation. These elements combine to make captive, fugitive, black or 
white sailors into Christ-like fetish objects, whose suffering, labor, loss of freedom, and even 
death permitted providential Christian principles to bind with capitalist directives for the sake of 
a seemingly disinterested market cosmology. 
At the same time, the similarity between chattel slavery, Barbary slavery, and free-labor 
maritime wage slavery amplified the market-oriented elements of captivity, and underscored the 
extent to which ostensibly free individuals were subject to the same logic of captivity, control, 
and possession as their unfree counterparts. As Blum notes, “the ultimate use of the Barbary 
slave was for ransom, redemption, or other economic exchange. Barbary captives served as a 
marker or commodity in this exchange and had corresponding value within the system” (57). Just 
like chattel slaves, Barbary slaves were used very much as a form of currency. Their bodies 
maintained use value as laborers of one kind or another but, more to the point, they housed 
exchangeable value. They could be traded on the open market for other individuals or even for 
other commodity goods. With all of this in mind, Barbary captivity narratives expressed 
anxieties that the market might strip individuals of their unique status as white, Christian, 
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nationalist subjects, and transform them into pure commodities. The same could be said of the 
maritime merchant sailor, who could, at any time, find himself under the lash of a dictatorial 
captain, made to labor for little or even no pay, or traded or killed for the sake of primarily 
economic concerns. 
Even if the captive white body could act as the site in which Christian virtue and 
capitalist know-how come together to create ideal virtuous, and frequently nationalist figures, 
this logic could also produce considerable anxiety. These narratives, spanning centuries, attest to 
the ease with which whiteness could go from a mark of privilege to a mark of exchangeable 
commodity value, or even the ease with which freedom could be exchanged for slavery. The 
white body, bolstered by white supremacist narratives that link white skin, claims to participation 
in the social economy, and designations of divine favor, becomes an unreliable indicator of 
status. In the face of captivity, capture, enslavement, and draconian labor practices, white skin 
takes on uncertain commodity status.  
That uncertainty revealed fissures and destabilizations in the emergent hierarchies of 
power in the Atlantic. Mary Nyquist observes the intersecting hierarchies of imagined and real 
power structures between state, monarchy, and family when she observes that "patriarchal 
absolutism has a special affinity with analogical argumentation" (162). Essentially, throughout 
history, the monarchy acted as a stand-in for divinity, and that relationship was replicated within 
the family. However, with the emergence of capitalism, new relationships of hierarchal power 
and control took root, including that of freedom and slavery and employer and employee 
(163). Similarly, conceptions of power in the Atlantic take on a decidedly economic slant when, 
as Nyquist observes "paradoxical inversion of the master/servant relation...derives from the tenet 
that the people are the 'principal' and the ruler the 'agent' in the contractual relation established by 
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the institution of government" (172). Post-capitalist power arrangements created a more mutually 
dependent relationship between rulers and ruled, investors and invested, commodities and 
owners. Barbary piracy, maritime impressment, and dictatorial maritime labor practices could 
make these arrangements of power into fraught, competitive experiences that challenged the 
sanctity of national, spiritual, ideological, and racial hegemony. 
At sea, free white bodies were mobilized and used as working commodities within the 
same labor market as enslaved black bodies. Although nominally protected from abuse, death, 
and dislocation by the safeguards of whiteness and nationality, white sailors and white captives 
also died and were disappeared in the same waters as the enslaved. If the scale of mistreatment 
and exploitation of white Atlantic denizens was dwarfed by that of their enslaved black 
counterparts, white sailors and captives could still see in the experience of unfreedom a grim 
reminder of the brittle promise of their own freedom. In the Atlantic maritime market, bodies of 
all races and classes became the communal sites of sacrifice around which Atlantic societies 
came together. The labor of the unseen, the passion of the working-classes, the spaces haunted 
by those who died to create and maintain society and economy—these became symbolic and 
sacred elements of social cohesion. Thus, at sea, the logic of conquest and submission crossed 
racial lines through acts of economic transaction, whereby the labor and even the lives of sailors 
both free and unfree were exchanged for the liberty, freedom, and class mobility that Atlantic 
societies promised to the elect. 
Barbary Piracy and the National and Racial Imaginary 
Barbary slavery narratives became increasingly popular throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries to ambivalent effect, both projecting white supremacist hegemony into the 
Atlantic and problematizing the distinction between black and white captivity. In his introduction 
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to White Slaves, African Masters Paul Baepler notes, “For nineteenth-century readers in the 
United States, the plight of the captive in Africa appeared to transpose the traditional roles of 
black and white bodies” (Baepler 27). However “while the Barbary captivity narrative might 
seem to mirror a slave narrative, the situations of white and black slaves differed…the captive 
used the situation to indirectly justify slavery in the United States or altogether denounce 
Africans as ‘barbarous’” (29). The production of these texts, therefore, served to advance the 
projects of imperialism and colonialism, even as they frequently exposed notions of racial, 
religious, and national superiority to critical scrutiny. The transposition that Baepler observes 
completely upends the normative codes that the nation worked hard to produce and to cultivate. 
On the other hand, the restoration of those codes in fiction promised their instantiation or 
affirmation in the world.  
Such narratives have a long history in Atlantic literature, linking early frontier captivity 
narratives to antebellum white slavery texts through common generic and ideological 
preoccupations that persist over time. Increase Mather, for example, was instrumental in the 
publication and dissemination of Mary Rowlandson’s captivity narrative, and it set a template for 
other such texts, which used the experience of captivity to differentiate national and racial 
characteristics and hierarchies. In fact, Rowlandson’s account became increasingly popular and 
important as white reading audiences faced the ongoing and escalating specter of white captivity 
and white slavery in the Atlantic. Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse, for example, 
note that “by the end of the eighteenth century, almost thirty editions of Rowlandson’s account 
had appeared, most in the last thirty years of the century” (204). Blum’s reading of Barbary 
captivity narratives applies to Rowlandson’s account as well. Both narratives serve dual 
functions as informative, instructional texts for people living at the frontiers of the nation, and as 
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sensational, sentimentalist texts for people who wished to cringe at, delight in, or even live 
vicariously through the captive’s experience.  
Moreover, like the Barbary captivity narratives that would evolve from the frontier 
captivity genre, narratives like Rowlandson’s served to define national and racial norms against 
their nationalist competitors.  Eve Tavor Bannet, for instance, argues that the publication and 
dissemination of captivity texts served this pointed political purpose. She writes, “when Mather 
had Rowlandson’s captivity narrative published in London…he was indirectly communicating to 
his friends and supporters in England the answer that the King could expect from those steadfast 
Puritans in New England, who acknowledged the sovereignty of God but not that of a human 
king” (63). Here then is an early example of an endemic American democratic genre, asserting 
the coinstantiation of providence, liberty, and, in Rowlandson’s resistance to her own 
commodified transactional enslavement, free capitalist exchange, while rejecting old norms of 
Royalist authority. Similarly, Armstrong and Tennenhouse point out that “the exemplary captive 
existed for the early eighteenth-century reader as a kind of epistolary heroine, whose ability to 
read and write…distinguished her from her Indian captors…literacy also distinguished the 
English individual from men and women of European birth. The French—and during the 
revolutionary period, the English—posed a threat to the [Americanized] English character.” 
They continue: “The temptations of religious conversion, in the first case, and of treason, in the 
second, could sever the individual’s connection to home and community just as permanently as 
going native” (204). This suggests that the captivity narrative served to differentiate the 
“civilized” and white against the “savage” other and then, later, also served to differentiate a 
nationalized American identity from European competitors. 
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When Increase Mather’s son, Cotton Mather, turned his attention to Barbary captivity, he 
similarly used the genre to draw the borders of his community, as well as to promote notions of 
covenanted white, elect society, against both “barbarity” and temptations to apostasy. In 1703, he 
presented a sermon whose very title communicated his intention to use the experience of Barbary 
captivity for educational and typological purposes: The Glory of Goodness. The Goodness of 
God, Celebrated; in Remarkable Instances and Improvements thereof: And more particularly in 
the REDEMPTION remarkably obtained for the English Captives, Which have been languishing 
under the Tragical, and the Terrible, and the most Barbarous Cruelties of BARBARY. The 
History of what the Goodness of God, has done for the Captives, lately delivered out of Barbary. 
Mather notes with some relief that “none of these our Friends proved Apostates, from our Holy 
Religion, when they were under so many Temptations to Apostasy” (64). If readers may be 
permitted to draw generational comparisons, then they should see “apostasy” as the rejection of 
the same Americanist values espoused by the elder Mather. Liberty, Christianity, and resistance 
to enslaved commodification all become divine and ordinary virtues in this reading, further 
strengthening the ties between national independence, providence, and capitalist free-agency.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, The Glory of Goodness also uses the specter of white slavery to 
advance notions of divine retribution to those who would reject these normative values and 
salvation for those who would uphold them. Mather writes, “We…acknowledge that you have 
Deserved all your Sufferings, from the Hands of a Righteous God, before whom you must indeed 
say, Lord, Thou hast punished us far less than our Iniquities have deserved. It is a Surprizing 
Mercy of God, that has rescued you from the Horrible Pit” (68). Slavery is the pit, conversion 
too, but Christian piety and suffering are the way to prove and to accept election, and the means 
by which to reassert racial and community supremacy even as individuals find themselves held 
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captive by and traded within the mobile Atlantic market of bodies. For Mather, Barbary piracy is 
a formative experience, a trial to prove the elect, white, and socially covenanted character of 
Christian captives abroad. 
Even nearly a century later, the struggle to maintain Christian faith and the victory over 
temptations to apostasy are common enough features of the Barbary captivity narrative that they 
make up a considerable portion of Royall Tyler’s 1797 narrative, The Algerine Captive as well. 
There, just as in Mather’s account, captivity and potential conversion allow the author to use 
trials and temptations to prove the moral superiority of white Christian slaves. In both Tyler’s 
and Mather’s texts, white slavery serves an instructive function: to use white slavery and 
conversion to Islam as an allegory for ordinary daily temptations to sin, and the victorious piety 
of white slaves as a model for how Christians ought to conduct themselves day-to-day.  
These texts also make note of the transactional nature of captivity as an allegory for the 
spiritual circumstances of Atlantic life. Describing the drama of escape, Mather insists “Tis 
Prayer, ‘tis prayer, that has done it all” (67). Yet, at the same time, he admits that “a Touch from 
Heaven upon the Heart of a Devil Incarnate [intervened] compelling him to deal more truly than 
he use to do…The Difficulty of Gathering the Ransome was at lasts got over” (66). Mather is 
careful to insist that it is God who has made the ransom easier to procure, and careful also to 
insist upon the power of prayer, but it is clear that this is a scene of transaction, and one that 
unites distant cultures through what is, ultimately, trade. If, elsewhere, the connection between 
providential Christianity and capitalist exchange remained coded and implicit, here it becomes 
explicit. Providence is transactional, an economic operation, an expression of the divine in 
economic events. Moreover, as for Rowlandson, and, indeed, for black maritime Atlantic writers 
like Equiano, an unfree body acts as the currency of exchange for two distinct national and racial 
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cultures, and the logic of exchange capital uses the routes of unfree mobility to bind those 
cultures together through commerce. 
However, ruminations upon the exchange value of captive bodies, whatever their race, 
were never simple and could serve as the material by which to make arguments both for and 
against slavery. Baepler, for example, demonstrates how white authors frequently invoked white 
slavery to comment on slavery as it was practiced in the West Indies and America, as well as to 
defend the practice in comparison to other forms of slavery. On the other hand, white writers 
sometimes used the existence of white slavery to point out the hypocrisy of slavery in general, as 
did early Abolitionists like Thomas Sewall in 1700’s The Selling of Joseph (Baepler 30). In any 
case “readers in the United States, the plight of the captive in Africa appeared to transpose the 
traditional roles of black and white bodies” (27). This could serve multiple purposes. In fact, it 
could potentially serve multiple purposes at once. By generating sentimental sympathy, white 
writers could argue against the sadism of American chattel slavery, argue for the relative merits 
of American slavery against supposedly worse forms of white slavery, or simply use the 
distinction between freedom and unfreedom to generate ideas about democratic liberty. 
Although Barbary captivity narratives could serve these many purposes, they tended to 
privilege favorable comparisons between American norms against Atlantic competitors. Baepler 
writes, “while the Barbary captivity narrative might seem to mirror a slave narrative, the 
situations of white and black slaves differed, just as the ability of the narrators varied...Most 
often, the captive used the situation to indirectly justify slavery in the United States or altogether 
denounce Africans as ‘barbarous’” (29). In many ways then, the production of these texts served 
to forward the projects of imperialism and national supremacy inasmuch as narrative can be used 
as a form of “subjugation” or “domination” (32).  
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Even so, such texts also admit the ongoing centrality of the West Indian slave cultures 
that America and England sought to deny. Sean X. Goudie writes, “We must consider the West 
Indies as intertwined with, and a formative presence in, the New Republic’s national character, 
as well as the New Republic’s literary history” (Goudie 35). Equally crucial to the development 
of a normative national identity were political, racial, religious, economic, and literary codes. 
Thus, the presence and persistence of Barbary captivity narratives suggests the important role 
that literature, whether intended for instruction or for sentimentalist consumption, played in the 
construction of nation. On the other hand, because these narratives are so assertively Atlantic and 
mobile in nature, their surface nationalism cannot disguise the central importance of slavery and 
captive labor to the growth and continuity of Atlantic societies.   
It is, therefore, impossible to separate the literary elements of these texts from the 
political circumstances surrounding their creation. John Foss’ exemplary model of the genre 
from 1798 coincides, as Baepler notes, with President Thomas Jefferson’s establishment of the 
federal navy and his attempt to deal directly with the problem of Barbary piracy (Baepler 71). 
The narrative also asserts its intention to use the experience of white, Christian captivity to draw 
the borders of whiteness, Christianity, and even national difference. The author notes that “the 
tears of sympathy will flow” when readers witness “the most extreme cruelties” heaped upon 
“Christian captives” by Muslim pirates who “are taught by the Religion of Mahomet (if that can 
be called a Religion which leads men to the commission of such horrid and bloody deeds) to 
persecute all its opposers” (73). Similarly, an extraordinarily popular account of Algerian slavery 
by Maria Martin, which was published twelve times between 1807 and 1818, emphasizes both 
graphic violence and potential sexual assignations as it asserts the power of the nation acting in 
the market to transform an experience of captivity into one of liberation and transcendence. 
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Baepler is careful to note that the narrative probably draws heavily upon a “fictionalized tale,” 
entitled The Captivity and Sufferings of Mrs. Mary Velnet, Who was Seven Years a Slave in 
Tripoli, three of which she was confined in a dungeon, loaded with irons, and four times put to 
the most cruel tortures ever invented by man (Baepler 147). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
sensational nature of its source material, Martin’s account emphasizes the brutalizing tropes of 
both frontier and Barbary captivity narratives in order to satisfy the audience’s interest in 
adventure, violence, and sexuality. Even so, the text ultimately resolves with a gesture that 
reasserts the primacy of the nation, and of white “civilization,” against the excesses of Martin’s 
Barbary captors. The author observes, “my liberty had been purchased by my country…I often 
stopped in the streets, stared around me, doubted my own existence, and bit my finger, in order 
to convince myself that I was really awake and alive” (157). Slavery endured, the captive 
rescued, and community restored, this final flourish gives life both to the transactional 
“purchase” necessary to produce freedom, and to the “country” that stands triumphantly in 
contrast to Algerian captivity. 
In fact, white captivity narratives could, somewhat counterintuitively, use the experience 
of the reversal of hierarchies of captivity and freedom as the means by which to construct and 
defend racial and community borders even amid the most destabilizing events of Atlantic history. 
They could insert white perspectives into an Atlantic history that privileged the experience of 
unfreedom. For example, Marcus Rainsford’s 1805 An Historical Account of the Black Empire of 
Hayti, relies upon tropes of white captivity and potential white slavery, in order to re-center the 
assertive black Caribbean revolutionary history around a white body and a white perspective. 
According to Paul Youngquist and Grégory Pierro, Rainsford’s text was long considered an 
authoritative account of the Haitian Revolution by an Anglo writer. However, its real value lies 
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in the way it forcibly, even awkwardly inserts the author, himself, into the narrative of black 
Atlantic history. It is true that Rainsford was captured and held as a spy only to be freed by 
Toussant L’Overture, but the text maintains a reflexive desire to turn history into a personal 
narrative of white captivity, in order to make sense of nonwhite political and historical events. 
Rainsford’s description of his own captivity and release by L’Overture privileges his white, 
Anglocentric perspective, maintaining the centrality of captivity to the Atlantic experience, but 
transforming it into an experience of white witnessing and white liberation. He writes “Even in 
this situation he could not resist the opportunity which his prison, or rather, cage, afforded him” 
(233). Indeed, for Rainsford, captivity is an opportunity to place himself at the center of a history 
of black rebellion, in which he plays only a very minor role. Moreover, it allows his white body 
to appropriate the experience of captivity much more familiar to the comparatively unfree black 
figures in his midst. This has as much to do with establishing unique links of sentimental 
sympathy as it does with asserting supremacy. For, although Rainsford’s experience does allow 
him to sympathize with the goals and even the methods of the revolutionaries, it also asserts his 
own supremacy, self-mastery, and even national superiority, amid the destabilizing experience of 
captivity. Stripped of his freedom, Rainsford remains calm, appreciative, enlightened, and 
virtuous. He is ultimately rewarded with freedom and even gratitude by the Haitian 
Revolutionaries.  
By translating the Haitian struggle for independence into a personal struggle for liberty 
and transcendence, Rainsford also asserts his authorial privilege to order events and to 
characterize history. Toussaint L’Overture, for example, is largely presented as what Youngquist 
and Pierro describe as “white man in blackface” (xlv). By this they mean that Toussaint is 
presented as both exemplary and extraordinary, an embodiment of the Enlightenment values that 
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the English ostensibly held over the French, and an example of a black figure “civilized” by 
those same values. Similarly, while Rainsford describes the various methods of torture used by 
both sides, his sympathetic identification with the Haitian Revolutionaries allows him to assert 
British national superiority over the tyrannical French (93). He likewise sees a “benevolent 
Female of Colour” as a figure of personal and national Enlightenment liberation, drawing the 
individuals and groups involved in the Haitian struggle into a larger assertion of the superiority 
of Eurocentric Enlightenment values (147). He also presents Toussaint as generally heroic and 
offers causes for the revolution that rest upon “that spirit of revolt which only sleeps in the 
enslaved African” (77).   
Furthermore, Rainsford’s insistence upon the importance of his own white Enlightenment 
gaze extends beyond the written word to include extra-textual features, like visual representation. 
Rainsford, for example, uses the interplay between illustration and text both to reassert his 
evaluative and determinative gaze and to render the realities of the Haitian Revolution as a 
drama of Enlightenment values struggling to win out over both African and, importantly, French 
barbarity. He is credited with the original drawings upon which the engravings in the text are 
based, and uses them in tandem with his written observations to witness and to characterize 
events (xlii). This Anglophonic white man, therefore, uses his power to order and to narrate 
events in order to repurpose the Haitian struggle for independence as an account of his own 
heroic victory in the larger Atlantic drama of mastery, captivity, and freedom. 
 However, although the project of narrating and disseminating narratives of white slavery 
was intimately tied to notions of whiteness and racial hierarchy, it could also destabilize the 
exclusive status of whiteness to nationalist identity. Robert Adams’ 1816 text, for example is an 
Algerian captivity narrative told from the perspective of an African American to a white 
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amanuensis. Adams works to develop a national self, in contrast to the cultures through which he 
passes, including Timbuktu and Algeria, and aligns himself most clearly with white Europeans, 
while also providing a witness account to the intersection of international and local politics with 
the lived experience of African slavery. The narrative subsumes its racial representations beneath 
a nationalist and Occidentalist perspective, but still observes the intersections of slavery, 
economic exchange, and suffering, as they play out upon the body. Throughout, the author 
observes the tenuousness of racial and nationalist identification, suggesting the porosity of racial 
and national borders in an Atlantic world. 
Such texts were common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and suggest the 
reading public’s appetite for narratives that explicitly dealt with the destabilizing experiences of 
Atlantic captivity, mobility and relative freedom. As Duncan Faherty and Ed White point out, the 
anonymously authored 1801 narrative, Humanity in Algiers: or, the Story of Azem, was produced 
locally and attests to the circulatory familial and communal subscription practices of a particular 
denominational Abolitionist group near the intersection of Vermont, New York, and 
Massachusetts. It is clear from subscription records that the text was passed along among friends 
and family members as both a novelistic account, and as a text to be read typologically, as an 
experience of unfreedom as Christian suffering. Moreover, it maintains a transactional logic that 
allows it to combine Christian virtues with exchange-oriented capitalist interactions. Faherty and 
White’s recognition of the transmission of such a text also draws attention to the continued 
popularity of Barbary captivity narratives, even for reading communities that were unlikely to 
face the maritime threat. This couples with Blum’s insight into the “instructional” nature of 
Barbary captivity narratives to demonstrate that such texts had appeal that went beyond the 
purely pragmatic. Moreover, it suggests that events that took place within the competitive space 
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of the Atlantic found their way, through the dissemination of narrative, to the communities that 
encircled the Atlantic. What happened at sea did not stay at sea and even landed New England 
communities were deeply interested and involved in the events of maritime Atlantic competition. 
Humanity in Algiers is a remarkably sensitive text, interested in developing, as it says, the 
“humanity” of its characters, but also invested in developing and investigating a moral system 
that encompasses both interventionist divinity and exchange economics. The narrator offers the 
text as a “memorial of [his] gratitude.” but readers might also see it as an effort to erect a 
scaffold of supernaturally ordered capitalist humanism, even as it dismantles the image of the 
African other as totalizing stock character (28). Told in a frame narrative by a white slave 
survivor of the Dauphin, captured in 1785, the narrator recounts his experiences as a slave. When 
he rescues a gentleman friend of his masters from a startled horse he is, in return, offered 
freedom. As the man and the gentleman travel to seek the necessary legal proof of that freedom, 
the gentleman tells the story of Azem, a now wealthy merchant who was given, as a boy, to a 
family suffering through debt and privation. After his master’s death, Azem is contracted to work 
for each brother for a year before being freed. Their mother initially resists but has a prophetic 
dream which ultimately convinces her to accede. After he rescues the young bride of his new 
master from rape, he is offered his freedom and a stipend. Later, he meets a young slave woman 
bemoaning the lustfulness of her vile master and petitions for her release. When this is denied, he 
decides to leave to seek his fortune. Returning, he finds the woman has been freed because her 
master has had something of a near death-vision and repented. Azem even discovers that the 
woman is his long-lost sister. He then returns to the metropolis and sets up as a trader, becoming 
quite wealthy in the process. The narrative ends, however, when his wife, sister, mother, and 
child are killed by a plague and, brought low by the emotional blow, he prepares his finances. 
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After his death, a certain amount of his fortune is used to free a slave every year. Throughout all 
of these reversals, the narrative maintains a consistent transactional logic: freedom is offered in 
exchange for good actions, and as a reward for virtuous service. Prophetic dreams signal these 
transactions and suggest their divine ordination. All the while, the suffering slave wends his way 
through society as the figure around which families and societies constitute themselves. If this 
narrative conflates Azem’s experiences with those of the white narrator, it does so in such a way 
as to assert the universality of prophetic spirituality and market exchange as the means by which 
divinity communicates with and orders human affairs. 
Royall Tyler and the American Family 
Perhaps the most famous example of the Barbary piracy genre, Royall Tyler’s 1797 
narrative, The Algerine Captive, also uses the enslaved white body as the site of reconciliation 
between Christian virtues and capitalist directives. The narrative follows a relatively disengaged 
young man as he searches for a place in American society, finds himself involved in the Atlantic 
slave trade, gets captured and brought into Algerian captivity, and eventually returns home with 
a newfound sense of nationalist purpose. The text makes its connections to a particular American 
historical memory clear in the narrator’s early encounters with and familial connections to John 
Winthrop, Anne Hutchinson, and Roger Williams (12-13). In so doing, the author foregrounds 
the function of the Barbary captivity narrative as a text with nationalist implications for white 
authors and audiences. Joel Wendland calls the novel “among the first original North American 
novels with major anti-Muslim and anti-Arab themes…because its author saw it as a self-
conscious effort to promote and develop a U.S. national culture in literary form and because his 
work had enormous influence on subsequent U.S. Writers” (162). Indeed, just as Adams asserted 
national affiliation through the transactions of his body around the Atlantic, and just as Foss and 
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Martin asserted white, nationalist superiority in the face of Barbary cruelties, Tyler uses his 
protagonist’s experience with captivity to assert the centrality of Yankee North American 
identity to Atlantic history. As his body traverses the Atlantic, faces threats of violence and 
temptation, and, ultimately, overcomes all of the adversities represented by the slave experience, 
Tyler’s protagonist, Updike Underhill, becomes a symbol for the supremacy of white Yankee 
identity in a mobile and heterogeneous Atlantic. However, as Underhill travels throughout his 
orientalized Atlantic, he also sees his body rendered into a commodity in ways that both uphold 
claims of American national supremacy and undermine claims to national, racial, or religious 
inviolability. 
The journey that the narrator undertakes at once attests to the complex interactions of 
different spiritual traditions in slavery and insists upon the salvific powers of providential 
Christianity. For instance, in Algiers, the protagonist meets a “Mullah” who offers him freedom 
in exchange for conversion. After a series of lengthy and generous discourses, the narrator rejects 
Islam, remarking “Abashed by his assurance, and almost confounded by his sophistry, I resumed 
my slave’s attire, and sought safety in my former servitude” (142). Tyler’s dramatization of the 
transactional and liberationist potential of conversion here is not entirely fictitious. For example, 
drawing upon sixteenth-century thinker, Jean Bodin, Mary Nyquist notes that "Turkish 
servitude...does not regard as slaves the Christian youths taken by the Turks for tribute because 
they are incorporated into the Turkish royal family" (Nyquist 183). Because Barbary piracy 
offers to incorporate white slaves into an Islamic community, it challenges the primacy and 
cohesion of the empire from which the slaves came or, in Tyler's case, of the American state 
from which he derives. It is not only slavery that threatens the sanctity of the national home, but 
also the possibility of incorporation. Elizabeth Fenton, for example, notes that the invitation to 
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conversion for freedom accepted first by an “apostate” Englishman who Underhill meets in 
captivity, and later extended to Underhill, himself, “is the path to all kinds of liberty.” This, she 
says “is an appealing notion, perhaps, but by placing it in the mouth of a convert to Islam, Tyler 
was inviting his eighteenth-century audience to receive it critically. Having made an informed 
decision, the Englishman also has abandoned that which, within the context of the novel, he 
should have held most dear” (71). Fenton’s critique is important especially because it notes the 
potent mixture of nationalism, racial difference, and religious affiliation that “the Englishman” 
has abandoned. Religious conversion, then, is an act of rejection of all of the racial, national, and 
religious tenets that Tyler intends to reaffirm and, in so doing, to bind together.  
The liberty that tempts Underhill is a liberty premised not only upon conversion, but also 
upon an invitation into full participation in the Algerine economy. The Englishman is free to 
hold a job and to hold property but, to earn it, he must reject the religious, national and, 
implicitly, the economic claims of his homeland, and announce the supremacy of Algerine 
claims to the same. In contrast, although he makes himself useful to his captors, Underhill resists 
completely and freely embracing a role as a full participant in the Algerine economy. Because he 
holds to his American values, he remains a captive commodity. At the same time, liberty, 
Americanness, Christianity, and, implicitly, free capitalist exchange, are all one in this reading, 
and to abandon any one pillar is to abandon them all. And so, when Underhill resists conversion 
to Islam, he upholds the inviolability of Christianity, nationalism, and capitalist ethos all at once.  
However, by asserting mastery in contrast to the specter of captivity and submission, the 
text implicitly admits the centrality of unfreedom in the Atlantic. For example, when the author 
becomes a surgeon aboard a slave ship, ironically named Freedom, he is shocked to be 
confronted by the material reality of the trade in which he has become directly, although, he 
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insists, accidentally, implicated. He remarks, “To hear these men converse upon the purchase of 
human beings, with the same indifference, and nearly in the same language, as if they were 
contracting for so many head of cattle or swine, shocked me exceedingly” (99). Once he is 
captured and made a slave in Algeria, the text’s tone shifts dramatically. The light picaresque 
that marked the early chapters falls away, and the author’s suffering becomes pronounced, as 
does his recognition that the commodification of bodies has profound mental and spiritual 
consequences.  
As a slave, he undergoes his own humiliating examination and market experience, 
becoming the commodity that once filled him with so much pity and condescension (121). After 
seeing a slave killed for attempting to escape, he declares “I now found that I was indeed a 
slave” (149). He remarks that slaves find “it deeply engraven upon their memories, that when 
men are once reduced to slavery, they can never resolve, much more achieve, anything that is 
manly, virtuous, or great!” (150). However, it is this act of complete physical, spiritual, and 
mental debasement that will serve as the means of his eventual redemption. A “slave” then refers 
only to a state of moral and social death, from which a new man must be reborn. Mary Nyquist 
also notes that slavery is often figured as "social murder or death" as well as the loss of the self 
as property (Nyquist 186). The apostate Englishman is, therefore, something of an undead figure 
in the text, one who has succumbed to the “social murder” of slavery and given up his claim to 
himself as property, in order to be reborn as one who has rejected all of the normative values that 
gave him life. In order to maintain his sanctity as an American, Underhill must experience these 
challenges but overcome them, even at the cost of his own life. This text, as Nyquist suggests, 
presents slavery as a matter of consent to subjugation and commodification. In order to resist, the 
narrator must embrace his Christianity, navigate the market in Algiers, and endure the 
   Green 223 
 
humiliations reaped upon his body. To escape “social murder,” Underhill must accept Christian 
trial and the possibility of a pure and virtuous death, rather than an apostate and compromised 
life. 
More pronounced even than its meditations upon the necessity of maintaining nationality 
in the face of temptation, the text is fascinated by the relative and shifting meaning of 
unfreedom. The narrator, for example, foreshadows his own real slavery by comparing his work 
on his father’s farm to chattel slavery (26). He likewise describes his brief period as a teacher as 
being a master “enslaved” to his students’ whims and bad behavior (33). Such moments prepare 
readers for the reversal that will cast all of his lengthy discussions of racial difference into a new 
light. After his slavery experience, he returns to America a very different man, embracing the 
nation and vowing to commit himself fully to citizenship and sociality. He announces “I now 
mean to unite myself to some amiable woman, to pursue my practice as a physician, which I 
hope will be attended with…success…to contribute cheerfully to the support of our excellent 
government…and thus secure to myself the enviable character of an useful physician, a good 
father, and worthy federal citizen” (240).  In short, Underhill declares his intention to 
reconstitute the American national family in miniature within his own household. The paternal 
order of divine Christian authority will be reinstated, the borders of race will be reaffirmed, and 
the Atlantic social polity will return as a democratic, though undeniably patriarchal, family. 
That mastery was essential for Tyler’s conception of not only a national political culture, 
but also a national literary culture, erected upon a foundation of racial, social, and philosophical 
superiority. Wendland, for example, notes that “Tyler’s caricatures are created as a racist gesture 
meant to degrade the cultural work of his contemporaries—poet Phillis Wheatley, scientist 
Benjamin Banneker, or AME Church founders Absalom Jones and Richard Allen—and to 
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silence the calls for freedom and equality by antislavery and equality activists such as Equiano, 
Lemuel Haynes, and Prince Hall” (184). All of these figures stand in implicit contrast to 
Underhill’s own polymath education before slavery, his evident utility during slavery, and his 
successful reintegration after slavery. Moreover, his narrative, whether playful, mournful, 
fearful, or nationalistic always serves as evidence of his own authorial mastery. 
However, the reconstruction of the American literary and political family can only come 
after its destruction and, even as the text looks forward to its eventual happy ending, it reveals 
the fissures in the power structures of white, Christian, national authority. In particular, the text 
uses moments of relative domestic security to anticipate the racial, national, and religious 
upheavals that are to follow. For example, Underhill, during his brief time as a schoolmaster, 
compares his apparent drudgery to slavery. The comparison has an interesting historical 
background. In fact, Mary Nyquist observes that, for seventeenth-century philosopher, Richard 
Overton, the schoolmaster had a strict, binding obligation to his students (174). Underhill uses 
this experience of compulsion to prepare readers for the experiences that will follow, even if the 
tonal shift necessary for one experience to anticipate the other seems dramatic or even awkward. 
Nevertheless, whether believable or no, Tyler uses an implicit comparison between Underhill’s 
labor-servitude and later slavery, and implicit chattel slavery in order to reify the racial order at 
the heart of the novel. Wendland argues that, in this moment, Tyler “implies a racial difference 
between whites and Blacks that makes the lack of economic security seem as brutal for the white 
as violence and punishment is for the African” (182). Underhill’s immersion into classical 
literature anticipates an argument for the ostensible superiority of white slaves to black chattel 
slaves not unfamiliar to readers of, for example, Thomas Jefferson. In the same way, his 
successful resistance to the yoke suggests his moral and racial superiority over even the chattel 
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slaves for whom he expresses sympathy. This comparison between white wage slavery and black 
chattel slavery implies a fixed system of racial superiority, even within the context of unfreedom. 
However, if readers follow the logic of the moment as a literary foreshadowing gesture, the 
narrative follows the protagonist from imagined allegorical slavery, through real slavery, and to a 
new democratic freedom instantiated by his nationalist and real family. The father replaces the 
king who replaces God, but Tyler unites the masterful father with Christian philosophy and 
nationalist ideology in order to create a new form of mastery rooted in American democratic 
polity in the home. The narrator’s suffering has been a necessary trial, and, on the other side, lies 
a newly reconstituted national family. 
Underhill’s personal experience with white slavery also illuminates the degree to which 
the devaluation of whiteness was linked to competitive nationalism. When the British navy 
withdrew their protection of American ships after the American Revolution, Britain explicitly 
exposed American vessels and, by proxy, the American state, to predation by Barbary pirates. At 
the same time, Britain implicitly rejected America from the league of European, white, and 
collaborative capitalist powers. America became a nation at collective risk of losing its claims to 
all the benefits of Eurocentric, Anglophonic, racial superiority, as individual Americans were 
placed at personal risk of having their bodies commodified in the unfree labor market. 
In particular, impressment put the question of American whiteness and claims to liberty 
to the test. If, after the American Revolution, the British could lift their protection from 
American ships and impress American sailors, they could essentially transform America into a 
space as open to European plunder, captivity, and commodification as the colonial Caribbean or 
West Africa. Without a working claim to equality and supremacy in the Atlantic, the United 
States itself might become a peripheral nation, a frontier space, both part of Atlantic society, and 
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subordinated to greater Atlantic powers. All of independent North America might transform into 
a space like colonial Nova Scotia or Sierra Leone, included in the commerce and politics of the 
Atlantic, but relegated to the margins as a space reserved for the subjects of more powerful 
European actors 
With this in mind, the creation of the American navy takes on particular racial, 
hierarchical, and even philosophical importance. The Naval Act of 1794 reestablished the United 
States’ standing navy only after years of ongoing attacks on American commercial vessels by 
Barbary pirates, only after the Haitian Revolution, and only after years in which America was at 
risk of being cut off from Atlantic maritime trade. The reestablishment of the armed navy was an 
effort to protect the sanctity of the nation as a space with geographical access to the Atlantic, as a 
partner in Atlantic trade, and as an ideal of the inviolate national body, on equal standing with 
other Atlantic powers.  In the same way, Tyler’s reestablishment of the American family after 
the crisis of Barbary piracy affirms the sanctity of American identity against threats both real and 
imagined. 
Tyler's novel therefore functions as a particular kind of horror novel with the white 
American as victim. In it, all of the signifiers of racial, spiritual, class, or national sanctity prove 
violable. American citizenship and heritage is meaningless, religious affiliation is open to debate 
and conversion, liberty can be foreclosed and, perhaps most unsettling of all for the hierarchies 
of power in the Atlantic, whiteness offers no protection at all against the loss of the very 
privileges it was designed to guard. In fact, if anything, all of these ostensible signs of power 
only make Tyler's narrator more appealing as a target for predation. The very codes and 
signifiers in which Underhill has draped himself—his liberty, his national heritage, his free 
laborism, his whiteness—become sources of weakness instead of strength.  
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The novel systematically inverts and recontextualizes all of the hierarchical signs of 
national power at the very moment when the nation was anxiously and busily engaged with 
erecting and supporting those same signs. America as a state was attempting to exert power both 
in the Atlantic and southward and westward at the very same time that it was becoming 
increasingly obvious that the nation was vulnerable and, potentially, subordinate to other powers. 
The American state was premised upon the erection of expansive capitalist business practices, 
exclusive class and racial caste systems, and a presumed divine favoritism. Yet, in practice, 
America was a nation unable to protect its citizens in the Atlantic, much less project international 
power there. So Tyler's novel is not simply about one individual's struggle to resist enslavement, 
but rather about a national identity under assault, struggling to reassert itself.  
Nevertheless, as Underhill becomes a valuable laborer and, eventually, a doctor during 
his enslavement, the text permits moments of critical comparison and, as a result, memorializes 
the heterogeneity of the Atlantic slave market. For example, although he traffics in some general 
antisemitism, Tyler also finds a Jewish benefactor, who tells him “I owe you my life. I owe you 
money, which you cannot oblige me to pay. You think a Jew will always deceive in money 
matters: you are mistaken” (234). That the text remains somewhat ambivalent on this point is of 
a piece with its general tone, at once open to the people and experiences the narrator encounters, 
and also deeply invested in the stereotypes with which this openness is at odds. In something of a 
reversal of the routes of the slave trade, the narrator discovers a diverse religious and ethnic 
Atlantic, encompassing the American South, Algiers, Medina, Giza, and Jerusalem. He holds to 
his Americanness, his Christianity, and his American-Atlantic capitalism, but he approaches the 
diversity he encounters without hostility.  
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This is both demonstrative of the diversity of the Atlantic market and, perhaps, a 
calculated display of American capacity for international compassion. If the frontier or captivity 
narrative is meant to elicit sentimental feeling in its readership, either for ostensibly superior 
whites or for similarly enslaved Africans, Tyler’s novel functions to elicit national 
sentimentalism. Sarah Sillin, for example, notes that the name of Updike Underhill’s second 
ship, The Sympathy “invites us to recognize that sentiment carries Underhill into a series of 
fraught cross-cultural encounters…these scenes suggest that the protagonist cannot resist 
expressing sympathy for foreign peoples” (101). However, Sillin argues that that sympathy is 
meant to work in both directions. By demonstrating his own capacity for sympathy, Underhill 
invites international readers to feel sympathy for a besieged American subject. Sillin writes, “By 
developing themes of rootlessness, slavery, and captivity, Tyler’s novel dramatizes pervasive 
concerns over the potential dissolution of domestic bonds and the destabilizing effects of foreign 
relations, which preoccupied Americans in the decades following the Revolutionary War. To 
address these anxieties over the United States and its role in the global sphere, writers and 
political leaders alike turned to eighteenth-century theories of sentiment” (102). Along with its 
elements of picaresque and its adherence to the generic conventions of the Barbary captivity 
narrative, the novel is, therefore, a sentimental fiction. However, it is not a sentimental novel 
fixated upon the plight of any one individual, or even of a frontier population under assault, but 
of an entire nation. The American state, engaged in uneasy relations with foreign powers, must 
demonstrate, to the literary world and to the world at large, its capacity for feeling, in order to 
elicit feeling, camaraderie, and solidarity around shared tenets of racial superiority, providential 
Christianity, and the right to national sanctity. 
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It is with this in mind that Tyler’s novel's conclusion takes on such nationalist gravity, as 
Underhill embraces Yankee American identity with a vigor that admits the heightened stakes of 
his choice. The family that he elects to form when he returns to the United States reconstitutes all 
of the hierarchical systems that were under assault for the protagonist and for the nation he 
represents: patriarchy, white citizenship, liberty-rhetoric, Yankee heritage, and Christian 
fellowship. Tyler used much of his novel to cast doubt about the power of these very signifiers to 
protect individuals in the Atlantic or to ensure the equality, supremacy, or validity of the nation. 
The creation of an American family at the conclusion of the novel diffuses these anxieties, but 
does not fully dispel them. Although Wendland insists that “the social conflict of Native 
American genocide on the frontier, the class rebellions, and the presence of hundreds of 
thousands of African slaves are erased or silenced in this fictional social harmony of readers,” 
the reader leaves the novel with the sense that the narrator and the author are clinging to codes of 
power and order precisely because they suspect that they are under siege (Wendland 170).  
The extension of a national maritime presence was premised upon the very same 
hierarchical codes of economy, spirituality, race, and class that ordered the national family and 
polity on land. To undermine those codes, or to demonstrate their violability in the Atlantic, is to 
suggest the potential that they are innately unfounded, imperiled, or even inverted. The whiteness 
and Yankee heritage so necessary for nationalist identification in Tyler’s novel, the involvement 
in Atlantic mercantile economy, even the generic conventions of novelistic picaresque, all 
become points of assault. The foundation upon which the edifice of state is erected, the codes in 
which the state is most invested, all become the fodder for that assault, and the rhetorical, 
generic, philosophical, and economic ideologies that undergird expansive American identity 
reveal their weaknesses. If all of these measures of national identity could be undermined, then 
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their meaning might be reversed utterly, so that American claims to superiority were not only 
misleading and unfounded but also demonstrative of American cultural inferiority. 
This anxiety is by no means confined to narratives of captivity or Barbary enslavement. 
In fact, it becomes considerably more pronounced in commercial maritime texts, which note the 
anxiety produced when the ostensibly free body becomes the site of convergence for the 
providential and syncretic Christian philosophies, and capitalist ideologies that flourish along 
Atlantic trade routes. As white free-laborers and authors saw the many ways in which white 
bodies could come to occupy the position of the unfree—through Barbary capture, through 
captivity, and, increasingly, through wage slavery—they came to see the ways in which they too 
could become the commodified captives used to instantiate capitalist and Christian convergence 
in the Atlantic market society. They increasingly recognized that their relatively unfree laboring 
identity was necessary for the instantiation of modern Atlantic society. 
The Atlantic’s mobile seafaring populations constituted both its periphery and its core. 
Ships brought culture from place to place, mixing, and producing the features of a universal 
syncretic religious, economic, and philosophical society that united Philadelphia, Le Pac, Benin, 
and Liverpool. They were the essential base of the Atlantic mobile economy, the foundation 
upon which Atlantic communities constructed themselves. Though fluid and shifting, the 
cultures developed aboard Atlantic ships also served a universalizing and unifying function for 
Atlantic societies, connecting diverse centers through market routes. Those maritime cultures 
were composed of human beings in relative and shifting positions of freedom or unfreedom. So 
often made invisible to the Atlantic societies that they linked through labor and trade, they 
suffered, worked, and even died so that the market could thrive. Their bodies, therefore, became 
the focal points of the convergence of providential Christian and market-oriented capitalist 
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ideologies. Even Olaudah Equiano, as a “particular favourite” of heaven, presented a text in 
which his body incarnated providential capitalism by accruing value that was simultaneously 
economic and spiritual. Narratives of unfreedom only further underscored this reality. Captives 
like Updike Underhill and the protagonist of Humanity in Algiers were all essential but, in their 
captivity, largely invisible parts of a broad Atlantic economy that traded in souls and bodies at 
the same time. As the unfree elements of supposed free-laborism became clearer throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the nature of this captivity, invisibility, and erasure would, 
likewise, become more pronounced. 
Richard Henry Dana and the Yankee Gaze 
If Tyler presented an emergent American state in need of a robust maritime presence to 
protect its geographical and ideological borders, later texts, like Richard Henry Dana’s 1840 
autobiographical account, Two Years Before the Mast, presented the extension of that presence 
into uncertain international markets and philosophical cultures. Edward Sugden notes that Dana 
“shows how, as the United States increasingly realized its early expansionist energies while also 
becoming dependent on a complex globalized economy, these same cultural forces placed 
considerable pressure on the notion that there could be a shared way of reckoning time across the 
nation and then further into the unsettled borderlands of the continent, through other foreign 
countries, and into the rest of the world” (88). Sugden identifies the central motivating structure 
of the narrative, as well as its tense and unsettled core: it is at once expansionist and aware of the 
vulnerability that that expansion entails. As a result, the novel demonstrates the fact that even 
supposedly free labor could, like the captive experience, reveal the anxieties of a culture 
attempting to assert racial, philosophical, and national hegemony as normative and dominant. 
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Two Years Before the Mast is a quintessential antebellum seafaring adventure and travel 
narrative that both exemplifies the genre’s most recognizable characteristics and suggests the 
anxieties that haunt Romantic accounts of the oceanic market. Daniel Walker Howe argues that 
“for all the political liberty that American institutions and ideology promised to adult white men, 
in practical terms most lives were disciplined and limited by the economic necessities of a harsh 
environment and the cultural constraints of a small community. Instead of ‘freedom’ from 
demands, it might be more accurate to think of the American husbandman as possessing 
‘agency,’ that is, the ability to act purposefully in the service of goals” (40). As he travels along 
the trade routes of maritime exchange, Dana brings with him this American sense of agency 
without freedom. Dana’s protagonist certainly maintains his own “agency,” particularly as a 
writer, who gives narrative order to the events of his time at sea. However, whether he maintains 
“freedom” is open to question, even by the author, himself.  
Following the exploits of an educated gentleman who goes to sea to cure or to escape a 
case of bad eyesight that prematurely ended an academic career, the text claims to be a 
straightforward account of Dana’s adventures at sea, filled with descriptions of seafaring life and 
observations of what he saw. This includes the usual sailor’s life events, along with an extended 
sojourn in Mexican California and the Sandwich Islands. As a result, the text adheres largely to 
its audience’s demands for light adventure and for descriptions of exotic locales and peoples. It 
also contains no small degree of colonialist salesmanship, encouraging Atlantic American 
readers to support and pursue exploration and repopulation of Spanish and unclaimed lands to 
the south and west. Nevertheless, despite its seemingly straightforward travel-narrative structure, 
the text offers moments of uncanny interrelation of commodity capital, syncretic spirituality, and 
providential Christian philosophy. 
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Dana’s overt gestures toward nationalism also underscore the problem inherent to 
binding ideals of nationhood to notions of race and freedom. Just as was the case for Tyler, 
Dana’s loss of personal freedom within a strict hierarchy aboard the merchant vessels on which 
he shipped implicates his country in a potential loss of white racial identification. Dana’s sailor 
uses his structuring gaze to present himself as the embodiment of American values and American 
hegemony, but, when crewmembers are “made” into slaves by a dictatorial captain, a troubling 
possibility appears: the prototypical American might be unfree, indeed, might be increasingly 
unfree. If Tyler’s loss of freedom implied the loss of the special value of his whiteness and, 
further, suggested the loss of his nation’s claims to international racial identification, Dana’s loss 
of freedom suggests that the extension of America’s borders might, in fact, make its people less 
free. In so doing, the terms of racial superiority upon which the nation was implicitly and 
explicitly founded might break down, causing the American state to become a racialized, 
subjugated, and subordinate one.  
In order to hold these anxieties at bay, Dana’s protagonist constantly projects an 
imperialist gaze, even as his body experiences humiliating subjugation. For example, Dana 
presents the west coast as a “barren waste,” on its own terms but particularly in comparison to 
the New England of his birth. Edward Sugden argues that Dana’s experience in California gives 
the national past meaning through imagined “simultaneity” (Sugden 84). Home goes on, Dana 
imagines, while he, at the periphery, witnesses its opposite. So periphery helps to construct and 
give meaning to home. Nevertheless, like Ian Baucom, Sugden rejects the romantic “temporal 
turn in nineteenth century American literary studies,” presenting it less as a generic and 
philosophical awakening to a broader world and more as the development of a national 
imaginary within the context of capitalist colonialism. The news that Dana receives from home 
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suggests an ongoing connection between home and the periphery as well as the creeping 
extension of a national presence westward (Sugden 85-7).xix In short, when Dana considers the 
alternative national public in California, he imagines it always in relation to a New England, an 
American state that exists simultaneously and is always ready either to conquer or be conquered 
by its competitors. 
The simultaneous perspective allows the observer to draw categorical comparisons 
between societies and, implicitly, to consider where the home state resides in the hierarchy of 
capitalist nations. As the United States became part of a globalized economy, its citizens, in 
Sugden’s words, both “reveled in” connections to the greater world and became “obsessed with 
the demarcation of boundaries, the setting of limits, and, increasingly, the securing of their 
borders” (90).  In the globalized world that Richard Henry Dana chronicles a generation after 
Tyler, Sugden notes that British openness to Pacific trade threatened to devalue American 
Atlantic trade, again threatening to turn America into a subordinate or inferior power in the 
greater cosmology of capitalist exchange (Sugden 90). Writers like Dana and Tyler, therefore, 
both hope to procure an established status for the national imaginary and remain anxious about 
the position of the American state relative to the rest of the world. 
To be clear, American primacy was not assured on the California coast that Dana 
explores. For example, Mexican inspection was required of any ship hoping to do business in 
California. Nor was American protestant Christianity to be assumed. In California, for instance, 
Protestants were required to convert to Catholicism in order to hold property. Sailors could not 
even count upon the extension of a common language in the west, so Dana’s ability to speak 
Spanish made him a valuable go-between when the Pilgrim made its way to the alien coast 
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(Amestoy 27-8). All of this suggests that the tenets of Yankee nationalism that Dana brings with 
him to California are, if not under assault, then at least open to dubious inspection. 
What Dana’s novel does, therefore, is to couple whiteness with nationality, while naming 
other societies, including Spanish colonial societies, aboriginal societies, and even the syncretic 
non-Eurocentric societies Dana encounters while aboard the Pilgrim, as all essentially alien, non-
white, excluded. At the same time, he reveals the anxiety behind attempts to erect edifices of 
national affiliation around codes of race, class, capital, and Christianity, by demonstrating the 
brittleness of those same codes. Whiteness could be taken away, nationality could become a 
marker of subordination, class hierarchies could allow the individual to tumble, rather than to 
rise, and religious affiliation could become contaminated and blended.  
The unspoken anxiety at work in the narrative is over whether the nation will conquer 
new lands and shores, or whether it will overextend and weaken. Indeed, would it, like the 
waning Spanish colonial powers, find itself diminished and even racially suspect? When Dana 
observes "Spanish" colonial lands, the diminished imperial status of Spain looms in his mind. So 
too does the implicit racial and religious alienation of Spanish citizens so important to later 
nineteenth century American-Spanish contests for dominance. Would America prove capable of 
conquering these Spanish lands to the west and south? Or would America fail and, in so doing, 
become increasingly marginalized, spiritually impure, and even racially suspect? When Dana’s 
captain threatens to make Dana and the other sailors into slaves, to conduct a grim racial 
transformation over their bodies, the narrative therefore personalizes and embodies larger fears 
about the meaning of American identity in the Atlantic. Exposed to attack, attempting to extend 
geographically and to exert Atlantic influence, the nation is like the hardworking Jack Tar 
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around whom the novel is centered: industrious, plucky, casting his gaze over new shores, but 
also under potential assault. 
Dana and the Making of a Slave 
Thus, the white author makes special note of the way that the same system that offered 
Equiano escape from racial determinism might rob white sailors of the special status conferred 
upon them by racist logic. During a scene in which a sailor is flogged for misbehavior, the 
draconian captain metes out discipline that degrades the sailor’s body both directly and 
symbolically, stripping it of both its flesh and its talismanic whiteness. Dana narrates the 
exchange: “‘I'm no negro slave,’ said Sam. ‘Then I'll make you one,’ said the captain.” The 
sadistic captain relishes the physical and racial mastery he performs in the two-fold punishment. 
Giddily, he announces “‘You see your condition! You see where I've got you all, and you know 
what to expect’—‘You've been mistaken in me—you didn't know what I was! Now you know 
what I am!’—‘I'll make you toe the mark, every soul of you, or I'll flog you all, fore and aft, 
from the boy, up!’—‘You've got a driver over you! Yes, a slave-driver—a negro-driver! I'll see 
who'll tell me he isn't a negro slave!’” (47). Such declarations inform the crew and Dana’s 
readers of the proximity and similarity of the sailor’s life to that of a slave. They also indicate the 
constructed and conferrable nature of slavery as a position of powerlessness and punishment. 
The disempowered sailor or laborer is always in danger of being converted to a lower racialized 
caste. The victim even cries out for the help of Jesus Christ, but the captain answers that he has 
taken the place of the savior, a brutal inversion of the hierarchies of Christology within the 
Atlantic market.  
The mental subjugation that Dana depicts advances the notion, also present in The 
Algerine Captive, of slavery as a question of will and consent. Saidiya Hartman notes that the 
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“repressive problematic of consent frames everyday practices in terms of mutual obligation and 
reciprocity between owners and the enslaved. Thus it stages the agency of the enslaved as a form 
of willed self-immolation in that what is ‘consented’ to is a state of subjugation of the most 
extreme order” (Hartman 53). In some sense, Dana’s narrative self desires this “willed” 
enslavement, because he desires the instantiation of national, patriarchal, and cultural authority. 
However, this matter of consent does not function as an apologia for slavery. It does not suggest 
that the enslaved are innately inferior. Rather, by staging dramas of subjection in white bodies, 
authors like Dana suggest that all individuals in the Atlantic marketplace, black or white, slave or 
free, might desire or consent to subjugation. Dana willingly invites the humiliations of life 
aboard the Pilgrim, just as Tyler’s narrator discovers that true slavery is the slavery of the mind. 
Both suggest that the market is divinely ordered around the logic of submission and mastery and 
that all individuals are subject to this commodifying “self-immolation.” Hartman wonders 
whether “the only difference between freedom and slavery [was] to be ascertained in the choice 
to labor dutifully,” and these texts suggest a similar view of freedom (Hartman 141). Freedom, 
then, is a state of willed personal and spiritual submission to commodification as well as to 
violence and labor. In short, there is no freedom, only submission and mastery cloaked in 
different manifestations. 
With this in mind, free labor takes on more complex philosophical significance. In an 
Atlantic world in which, returning to Hartman, “emancipation instituted indebtedness,” work 
itself was a demonstration of both belonging and ascension, a performance of the concept of 
freedom through the experience of indebted labor (Hartman 131). Labor communicated the fact 
that the laborer belonged to the divine and social lenders of liberty, and that the laborer was 
willing to repay that social and divine debt through work. Work was a form of penitent 
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acknowledgement that freedom too entailed responsibilities to society and to the god that ordered 
the universe around the logic of exchange (Hartman 135-6). Furthermore, the equality and 
sociality Dana presents revolve around communal suffering and subjugation. The studious but 
remote Dana gives himself to the community of fellow sailors, in order to embark upon an 
economic adventure that, he hopes, will also inculcate his own personal growth. But, in order to 
do so, he must also give up his freedom, autonomy, and body to accept the subjugation enforced 
by corporal punishment, as the cost of inclusion in a market-driven community. He becomes a 
member of the elect society of fellow seamen when he accepts his status as a relative slave. 
This is representative of an Atlantic world in which there are more slaves than masters, 
more unfree bodies in circulation than free ones. As Susan Buck-Morss argues, the Hegelian 
dialectic of mastery and slavery, so central to conceptions of culture and self in the slaveholding 
Atlantic societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, developed in response to actual 
slavery. Liberty evolved as a concept in response to its opposite. With this in mind, Dana’s 
“willed” submission to mastery is also evidence of his desire to uphold the normative 
foundations of mastery and power upon which his society was formed. Dana plays out the literal 
drama of slavery in order to uphold, as Buck-Morss suggests, the ideal of liberty.  
However, if Equiano and other emancipated Atlantic writers used their proximity to the 
unfree to present God as the ultimate and benign owner, texts like Dana’s emphasize what 
possession truly means: powerlessness, subjugation, and uncertainty. Marcus Rediker and Peter 
Linebaugh note that “paradoxically, the worst sites of oppression and terror offered opportunity 
for collaboration.” For example, the prison “was something of a leveler, where the radical 
protestant, the sturdy rogue, the redundant craftsman, the Catholic recusant, the wild Irishman, 
the communist, and the cutpurse met on roughly equal terms” (60). If we accept this view, then 
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we might also accept that what Dana describes is where the myth of the American dream, liberty, 
and democracy, begins: not as a mighty ideal, but in the harsh levelling realities of the ship; not 
with a divine light, but with a punitive lash. 
Class Desire and Invisible Sailors 
Perhaps it is natural, then, that the text, in some respects fetishizes the common man. The 
narrative, like Tyler’s, revolves around an educated young man of relative means choosing or 
being forced to choose to give up his class privilege to become a laborer among a mass of other 
laborers. Jason Berger argues that the relationship between reader, author, and sailor-figure 
became a common triptych in antebellum literature because authors increasingly wanted to 
explore the kind of labor-oriented authenticity that the sailor represented. He writes, “The 
literary marketplace’s anxiety about the issue of authenticity is, in part, a symptom of 
foundational fantasies about class and labor experience…the position of the common sailor 
becomes a fantasmatic locus of enjoyment” (26). However, Dana’s efforts to transcend to new 
heights of spiritual or personal understanding by sinking downward in the hierarchy of labor and 
command are largely circumscribed. He learns only that he is less powerful than the market, that 
there will always be another person with more potential claim upon his body and soul than he 
has. All he seems to gain is the knowledge that his privileged racial or class status is a mere 
mask, obscuring the reality of his servitude and subjugation to the market, to the buyers in the 
market, and to the inchoate god who operates through the market. If he gains and communicates 
any “authentic” knowledge of maritime life, it is of the undeniable authenticity of violent 
subjugation in the Atlantic. 
Dana himself was a man who engaged with a promiscuous but ambivalent sort of class 
mobility. A member of Boston's Brahmain sect, he spurned Harvard for a life laboring at sea, and 
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returned home to practice law. He had, therefore, the privilege of experiencing class as a 
malleable thing. By leaving home, Dana gains a new perspective on the place and society he has 
just left, and can see it anew. He goes to the periphery to better judge the nature of “home.” In 
fact, Bryce Conrad calls this “objectification of self” the “obsessive concern” of the narrative 
(292). Moreover, Conrad notes that this alienated perspective allows Dana to consider himself 
better too (295). In California, for example, the self is, mutable and uncertain.  As Conrad 
observes “Dana’s speakers picture the visible self as an object changed into unfamiliar forms by 
experience” (304). In Conrad’s telling, this objectification is all a part of reasserting racial, 
personal, national, and ideological norms. Conrad notes that Nathaniel Philbrick describes 
Dana’s text as a captivity narrative in which “the virtue of heroism of the captive depends upon 
his unshakable allegiance to his original identity (Conrad 302).” If Dana’s narrative is a captivity 
narrative, Conrad argues, it is only because Dana is essentially a captive of his own home, forced 
to remain there in order to maintain a sense of self (Conrad 310). However, that Dana questions 
his own identity is of a piece with the logic of the text as captivity narrative: the text raises the 
specter of a transformed identity so that the protagonist can more forcefully assert the normative 
self. The protagonist is presented with a drama in which he hopes, essentially, to convert back 
into the person he has always been. 
However, Dana traversed an odd trajectory from Boston Brahmin society to laboring 
seaman and back, and his time at sea, along with the vocal antislavery and anti-despotic 
advocacy that he developed as a result of his time at sea, made his return relatively constrained. 
He returned home and used the successful publication of Two Years Before the Mast to help 
establish himself as a New England lawyer, but never fully made his way back into the upper 
echelons of New England society. Dana's vigorous antislavery advocacy and legal career attest to 
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his understanding that what was legally permitted in the hierarchies of power, both in the 
American state and aboard American ships, was not necessarily just (Amestoy 5). And so, 
ashore, Dana developed a strong reputation as an advocate on behalf of abused sailors and 
escaped slaves, if not always a successful one. In fact, Jeffrey L. Amestoy notes that Dana drew 
upon his reputation as a sailor and a lawyer to write publicly against despotic captains who found 
their way before juries (96). Dana also wrote freely against the often violent hierarchies aboard 
American ships in publications like the American Jurist (Amestoy 57). Dana’s open opposition 
to slavery was at odds with the generally hierarchical feelings espoused by others in Boston 
society, who frequently looked down on both black Americans seeking freedom and the 
Abolitionists who agitated on their behalf (Amestoy 148).  
In fact, Dana returned home from his time at sea in many respects more the embodiment 
of the Atlantic class outsider than he, perhaps, expected. In his narrative, he rebels against the 
strictures of Harvard and, aboard the Pilgrim, is demeaned as a landsman going to sea as a kind 
of tourist. These are not unfounded critiques. However, they also ironically allow Dana to 
experience and represent the experience of marginalization that life amid Atlantic commerce 
could inculcate. The sailor was at once a part of society and marginalized away from society. 
Jack Tar embodied the tension that Sugden identified in American culture at large: 
simultaneously expansive and vulnerable. Perhaps appropriately, when he returned home, Dana 
remained at once a member of New England society and an outsider to his Brahmain heritage. 
He, for example, brought many aspects of the sailor’s life home with him, even writing freely 
about his visits to America’s urban brothels and other ostensible dens of vice frequented by 
sailors, and permitting his wife, Sarah, to read about his exploits (Amestoy 85). This suggests 
that Dana brought home the ambivalence evinced by sailors who perceived themselves as bound 
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within a complex moral web of providence and superstition. In fact, Dana’s perspective on the 
nature of providence even made its way into his legal practice. Amestoy, for example, notes that, 
like many Abolitionists, Dana believed that God would provide “a faithful juror” to help decide 
cases in favor of freedom (Amestoy 165).  Dana’s time among the laboring classes awakened his 
Atlantic maritime syncretic beliefs and his class consciousness, even as it marked him as an 
outsider on land. 
In the moment in which his captain threatens to "make" a slave, Dana, perhaps, 
anticipates the anxiety that his desired class mobility could produce. Though Dana enjoys the 
freedom to traverse class boundaries, his return may not be absolute. Others may not even be that 
lucky. The unfortunate sailors on the receiving end of the Captain's outburst convert to a lower 
class, lower even than the oft-abused Jack Tar, and even to a lower racial order. Despite Dana's 
personal class journey, his text demonstrates that the polity of the ship, and, by extension, the 
polity of the American state, was one in which freedom could be taken away and might not ever 
be returned. 
Dana experiences an uneasy transition to home, perhaps, because the sailor class for 
which he felt such an affinity was one that Boston society would just as well have ignored, even 
as it benefitted directly from maritime trade. Howe explains that “New England Yankees made 
themselves one of the world’s great seafaring peoples…seaport Americans earned livings not 
only as merchant sailors but also as fishermen, whalers, and shipwrights” (Howe 47). 
Nevertheless, the Atlantic, as well as the Pacific coast, that Dana describes is populated by 
people who largely remain invisible to the societies that depend upon their labor. He explains, 
“Death is at all times solemn, but never so much so as at sea. A man dies on shore; his body 
remains with his friends, and ‘the mourners go about the streets;’ but when a man falls overboard 
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at sea and is lost, there is a suddenness in the event, and a difficulty in realizing it, which give to 
it an air of awful mystery” (19). These sailors’ lives are defined by the lines traced between 
places, by brief encounters ashore, and by long periods of isolation, during which all that seems 
to remain of them is their laboring value and commodified identity. And so they seem to exist 
only as ghosts, entities that persist on the margins of Atlantic society, even as they vitally 
empower its centers of trade, commerce, and culture.  
Moreover, Dana’s direct embeddedness in this market forces him to confront the degree 
to which sailors were asked to make personal sacrifices in the name of sustaining the market. 
While reflecting upon the death of George Somerby in “Twenty-Four Years After,” the 
conclusion that appeared in every edition of Two Years Before the Mast published after 1869,xx 
he writes, “There he lay, not over nineteen years of age, ruined by every vice a sailor's life 
absorbs” (179). The sailor’s body “absorbs” the vice and sin of a society that depends upon his 
labor to survive, and disperses it in death. Somerby is sacrificed, then, not only in the service of 
the market, but also in the service of the spiritual community of the Atlantic. He dies so that the 
market can thrive, and also so that the market’s many souls may be cleansed. 
This sense of being forgotten, rendered invisible, or even damned invites readers to 
reinterpret the Atlantic as what Avery Gordon might term a haunted space, suffused with and 
empowered by crews and ships, unfree bodies that are never seen, powerful absences that 
announce themselves only by their effects in the tangible world. Gordon writes, “The ghostly 
haunt is a form of social figuration that treats as a major problem the reduction of individuals ‘to 
a mere sequence of instantaneous experience which leave no trace or rather whose trace is hated 
as irrational and ‘overtaken’’” (20). Readers should keep this “ghostly” haunting in mind both as 
they consider the ocean over which Dana sails, saturated with the unseen dead, and as Dana’s 
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fellow crewmen encounter the privations and cruel social structures of life aboard ship. The 
sailor’s passion, his trial under the lash, serves as a reminder of the many sacrifices sailors had to 
make in order for the maritime trade to function. They willingly or unwillingly took on the 
punishments and powerlessness necessary for other individuals—the captain, the company’s 
owners, even the consumers in distant ports—to experience freedom in the market and in the 
culture of the Atlantic. For example, in a chapter entitled, “Loss of a Man—Superstition,” the 
ship’s cook laments, in response to the death of crewmember, George Ballmer, “‘To work hard, 
live hard, die hard, and go to hell after all, would be hard indeed!’" (20). These sailors have a 
sense that their unfreedom may be necessary for others to claim freedom, their labor necessary 
for others to enjoy leisure, and their damnation necessary for others to secure election.  
This is a fact borne out by the economic realities of the landed slave system the sailor’s 
replicate at sea. Edward E. Baptist, for example, points out that “Enslavers used measurement to 
calibrate torture in order to force cotton pickers to figure out how to increase their own 
productivity and thus push through the picking bottleneck.” Troublingly, these enslavers were 
successful.  Baptist writes, “After the Civil War, when many cotton planters would pay pickers 
by the pound at the end of a day’s work, free labor motivated by a wage did not produce the 
same amount of cotton per hour of picking as slave labor had…this system confounds our 
expectations, because, like abolitionists, we want to believe that the free labor system is not only 
more moral than systems of coercion, but more efficient” (130). Dana seems cognizant of this 
grim reality and to transpose the coercive “torture” that Baptist describes into the lives and onto 
the bodies of his sailors. This form of coercion was not incidental to the economies of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but essential to them.  
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Pinned between freedom and bondage, between vice and virtue, the sailors in Dana’s 
account also demonstrate the peculiar legal and moral ambivalence of the sea. Lauren Benton 
writes that “by its very nature, the ocean has seemed to demand the mutual recognition of legal 
norms derived from natural law or other law standing outside the control of polities. At the same 
time, the historical weakness of such legal regimes has given the oceans an enduring association 
with lawlessness” (Benton 105). Benton describes the sea as a place that both demands and 
evades legal conquest. Dana’s text demonstrates the moral and spiritual elements of this evasion. 
Rightly so, for, if the cultures of the Atlantic are brought together by the logic of a universal 
moral system of righteous capital, codified in law, and expressed through legal contracts, all of 
which are backed by divine intent, then the economic and legal uncertainties of maritime trade 
reflect deeper moral and spiritual uncertainties as well.  
If Equiano believed that a life of constant conversion offered an ironic stability, a sense 
that, because he was always changing he was always ascending, Dana’s narrative shows readers 
the particular superstition and fear of doom that arises in a life of uncertainty and 
rootlessness. He writes, “A sailor's life is at best, but a mixture of a little good with much evil, 
and a little pleasure with much pain. The beautiful is linked with the revolting, the sublime with 
the commonplace, and the solemn with the ludicrous” (122). This is not to say that no moral 
code could take hold in the Atlantic. In fact, as Benton notes, “the high seas….came to be 
understood as a peculiar legal region in which multiple powers exerted influence but not control” 
(Benton 110). With this in mind, the directives of the Atlantic market served a unifying purpose. 
The logic of profit and loss, equivalent exchange, and circular mobility maintained stability in an 
Atlantic governed by multiple legal systems. When sailors or writers ascribed supernatural or 
   Green 246 
 
providential significance to that economic order, they asserted a universal divinity that crafted 
order out of the chaotic networks of trade, law, and cultural exchange in the Atlantic.   
Dana uses the hardships of seafaring life and, particularly, the death of fellow 
crewmembers to examine the superstitious and darkly religious nature of sailors’ belief systems 
within a mobile life in the Atlantic. The sailors with whom he travels share a semi-contradictory 
conviction that they are hell-bound for their lives of sin and vice, even as they suffer through 
difficulty in expectation of heavenly reward. For example, Dana describes one fellow sailor who, 
“after leaving home… had spent nearly twenty years, sailing upon all sorts of voyages, generally 
out of the ports of New York and Boston. Twenty years of vice!” (90). In moments like this, 
Dana’s seemingly dry description of exploration and adventure reveals his internalization of a 
widespread sense that the sea is a space of depravity and perilous moral instability. To be in 
contact with the oceanic trade markets is to put one’s very soul in jeopardy, for the market seems 
to infect all who touch it.  
This openness to the perils and possibilities of new markets and new lands remains 
fraught in the text, and rightly so, for the moral and providential nature of newly opened national 
spaces posed a serious question for nineteenth-century writers, politicians, and philosophical 
thinkers, alike. Joseph Fichtelberg, for example, notes that “speculation, in all senses of the 
word—stockjobbing, risk taking, unproductive labor—seemed to be the antithesis of…rational 
order. Not only was speculation driven by the passions; it was also the preserve of the wealthy 
and unscrupulous and thus, of the old, despised, aristocratic order.” On the other hand, he writes, 
“Providentially, the Louisiana Purchase made the past unnecessary by opening up vast new tracts 
to common enterprise. Combined with the land bounties distributed to Revolutionary veterans, 
such opportunities amounted to a wholesale endorsement of democratic individualism and the 
   Green 247 
 
modest prosperity now open to all (188). What this suggests is a widespread belief in the 
providential properties of expansion into newly acquired lands, matched with a healthy suspicion 
of “speculation.” Though Dana makes his journey to the west by sea, rather than by land, he 
remains uncertain about whether his venture is providential or merely acquisitive.  
Moreover, this uncertainty was more pronounced, as Fichtelberg notes, because, after the 
acquisition of French Louisiana, American farmers and explorers found themselves in 
competition with the waning Spanish (191). Hoping for stability, such individuals attempted to 
stake a claim to the west in whatever way they could. Elsewhere, Fichtelberg notes, “fortune 
seekers, in the race for security, denounced speculators in one breath and amassed land in 
another. Poor farmers sought compensatory power in magic, and anxious property holders found 
comfort in speculation and rumor” (198). This mix of magical thinking, geographic expansion, 
and ambivalent attitudes toward the acquisitive nature of land possession demonstrated anxieties 
that were heightened by the expansive nationalist context that dominated the early nineteenth 
century, and became increasingly politically contentious as the century wore on. These concerns 
also blend many of Dana’s own generic preoccupations: nationalist expansion or debasement, 
acquisition or failure, conventional Christian or syncretic spiritualism all become elements of an 
ongoing and contentious public debate about the nature of westward national expeditions. And 
so, throughout his narrative, Dana wonders whether the journey is either nationally and 
spiritually healthy, or overly profit-driven, and, therefore, contemptible. 
These concerns were tied to the questions of power and submission that energize so much 
of Dana’s narrative. Fichtelberg writes, “On the nation’s borderlands, questions of sovereignty 
were inescapable, and the need for paternal sanctions intensified” (198). Individual farmers, 
explorers, and citizens at the frontier of the American state sought legal claims to land, desired 
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the aegis of official national sovereignty, and craved the order that “paternal sanctions” might 
provide. The desire for national order at the frontier evolves, in Fichtelberg’s telling, into a desire 
for paternal mastery over the land, its people, and its culture. These same desires play out in their 
most brutal form aboard the Pilgrim, in which the desire for paternal control becomes a tense 
interplay between both sides of what Foucault calls the “pleasure of power” or what Hartman 
describes as “willed” enslavement.xxi To some extent, Dana and the other crewmembers take 
pleasure and comfort in submitting to the domineering will of a leader as they travel to lands 
with uncertain claims. In so doing, however, they unleash the dictatorial powers of a captain who 
wields his power at the end of a lash. As a result, Dana’s wish for command becomes, like his 
implicit wish for nationalist expansion, an ambivalent desire. Though he may wish for national 
expansion and national mastery, he remains unsure of whether that expansion and mastery is 
benign or malign. Moreover, he remains cognizant of the fact that, as he sails the corridors of 
Atlantic trade and brings the ideologies of the east to the west, he embodies all of these 
contradictions and, good or ill, brings them with him. 
In response, Dana communicates his sense of his own embodiment of ambivalent desires 
and values, and his own role in spreading the ideology of paternal control and expansion, as a 
kind of frontier contamination. Dana uses the language of contagion to consider the embodied 
moral effects of the Atlantic market and its itinerant sailors. He writes, “It has been said, that the 
greatest curse to each of the South Sea Islands, was the first man who discovered it” (122). Dana 
recognizes the catastrophic nature of European incursion into the Caribbean, the Americas and 
even the Pacific in commercial, moral, and biological terms. He continues, “Every one who 
knows anything of the history of our commerce in those parts, knows…that the white men, with 
their vices, have brought in diseases before unknown to the islanders, and which are now 
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sweeping off the native population of the Sandwich Islands, at the rate of one fortieth of the 
entire population annually” (122). His language belies his belief in the material effects of vice 
and capitalist expansion. Here the market itself becomes a body, of which the sailors are 
essential but contaminating parts. This body is inextricably intertwined with and subject to the 
moral superstructure of providential capitalism.  
The Body Auction 
Dana’s narrative also demonstrates the way sailors used their own bodies, and the bodies 
of the dead, as ritualistic and fetishistic repositories for the synthesis of the universal providential 
capitalist culture that kept nationalist Atlantic projects afloat, if still ambivalent and syncretic. 
This conflation becomes especially stark in the funeral rites of the crew. In a scene that becomes 
a common feature of other maritime texts, the funeral of George Ballmer includes an auction of 
his now reliquary possessions.
xxiii
xxii Dana explains: “It is either a law or a universal custom, 
established for convenience, that the captain should immediately hold an auction of [the dead 
man’s] things, in which they are bid off by the sailors, and the sums which they give are 
deducted from their wages at the end of the voyage.”  This serves a practical as well as a 
symbolic purpose. Dana writes, “In this way the trouble and risk of keeping his things through 
the voyage are avoided, and the clothes are usually sold for more than they would be worth on 
shore” (21). It is difficult not to interpret this scene as emblematic of the commodification of the 
sailors aboard the ship, and the spiritual significance of commodification. In life, Ballmer’s body 
contained both his value as a laborer and his potential value in the future. He was an individual, 
but also a potentially tradeable commodity in the marketplace. In death, his direct value 
collapses, leaving only his abstracted, potential market value to be dispersed in the form of his 
personal effects. Clothes and trinkets contain the Ballmer that could have been, the money he 
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could have made, and the value he could have brought to another ship or to another journey. In 
short, they are haunted by his absent market value. The other sailors seem to recognize the 
sacredness of this conversion, from man to thing and from thing to the container for a soul now 
lost, for they pay extravagant sums for small items, in part as a form of reimbursement to 
Ballmer’s family ashore, and, in part, out of solemn and religious respect. 
Moreover, this funeral scene suggests the sailors’ awareness of their potential to be 
erased by the commodifying logic of their trade, as well as their desire to resist that erasure. 
Hester Blum writes that “for most sailors, death at sea represented a putative erasure from 
terrestrial and human memory” (162). In fact, Blum explains that sailors took solace in the small 
reliquary markers placed throughout the islands of the Pacific to memorialize the dead who 
otherwise had no memorial (166). If sailors and their labor were rendered invisible by society, 
their death and “erasure” foreclosed the possibility of their return to and disruption of the society 
that thrived off of their work, sacrifice, and even death. 
Nevertheless, Dana’s description of the dead auction demonstrates the degree to which 
sailors used market logic to make up for the absence of the normative burial amenities, including 
church and family plot, that would have been offered to the dead at home.  The sea itself is the 
burial plot for countless sailors, lost to but remembered by the maritime economy they served. 
Similarly, relative to Melville's White-Jacket, Jason Berger notes that the ship's log's notation, 
"D.D" for "Discharged, Dead," suggests "an odd turn of phrase hatched by some seasick 
accountant." He writes, "It seems to speak to the fact that the Neversink [the ship at the center of 
White-Jacket] produces reproducible, replaceable laboring bodies and functional actions out of 
the masses of living men. On the other hand, this bizarre need to discharge the dead may bespeak 
an attempt (unconscious or otherwise) to occlude the excesses that the system garners from 
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sailors' bodies and actions" (Berger 223). The body auction, and the sailor-author's recording of 
the event, therefore also function as both material and expressive forms of resistance against 
textual erasure.  
These economically-derived religious practices served the essential function of providing 
the same qualities of order to sailors that burial practices on land provided to communities of the 
faithful. Blum continues, “seamen’s desire for…’closure’…is derived from the material 
conditions of maritime labor, in which stowage, confinement and restraint—of men and of 
things—are fundamental practices. When death at sea can only exist as a metaphor (represented 
by the figures of a locker, a cave, or a grotto), rather than as a material practice that they can 
perform, sailors discover a breach in their understanding of the poetics and practices of maritime 
life” (177). Into this “breach,” sailors poured a unique philosophy of economic supernaturalism. 
Blum writes, “Sailors’ faithful attention to objects therefore becomes a conceptual tool for 
translating into materialist terms the absence caused by death: that is, the objects, labor practices, 
and shipboard exchanges that comprise the true targets of death’s effect” (179). More than this, 
however, the sailors’ relics allowed them to fold the simultaneously productive and obliterative 
forces that dominated their lives—the market and the sea itself—into a comprehensible and 
comprehensive belief system. They used the commodities left behind after a sailor’s death as 
material substitutions in the dematerialized world of Atlantic maritime economy and as physical 
monuments for the burial at sea, which, otherwise, offered no memorial. 
Even so, Dana’s prose permits a twinge of discomfort with the swiftness and superstitious 
nature of such practices, suggesting that the frequency with which sailors’ bodies were reduced 
to or exchanged for other commodities remained a troubling feature of Atlantic maritime life. He 
writes, “We had no sooner got the ship before the wind, than his chest was brought up upon the 
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forecastle, and the sale began. The jackets and trowsers in which we had seen him dressed but a 
few days before, were exposed and bid off while the life was hardly out of his body, and his 
chest was taken aft and used as a store-chest, so that there was nothing left which could be called 
his” (20). Continuing, he notes the taboo that follows haunted objects: “Sailors have an 
unwillingness to wear a dead man's clothes during the same voyage, and they seldom do so 
unless they are in absolute want” (20). Gordon reminds readers that “ghosts are never innocent: 
the unhallowed dead of the modern project drag in the pathos of their loss and the violence of the 
force that made them” (Gordon 22). Appropriately then, the sailors recognize that something 
both commonplace and, in some way, unnatural has occurred in the transfer of man to tangible 
commodity good. Though the process is appropriately ritualized as part of the ecclesiastical 
practices of providential capitalism, it still reminds the other sailors of the ease with which they 
might also be converted into post-human commodities, and the degree to which their lives could 
be exchanged, even in death, for an equivalent value of commodity goods.xxiv 
Especially in these funeral scenes, Dana demonstrates the way Christian tradition 
intersects with animist, heterodox, and superstitious belief systems, which have all come into 
contact in the Atlantic Market. The form of religion practiced aboard the ship appropriately bears 
all the signs of the mobile heterogeneity that produced Atlantic cultures. Dana, for example, 
writes of a conversation he has with the cook, in which he finds that he “was full of the 
superstitions once more common among seamen, and which the recent death had waked up in his 
mind” (21). As Christine Leigh Heyrman recognizes, supernaturalism spread throughout the 
Atlantic and North America to such an extent that preachers “actively dismissed beliefs in 
witchcraft and magic as ‘superstition’” later in the nineteenth century, in a way they hadn’t in the 
eighteenth (Heyrman 73). So the cook’s beliefs have a rich history, even if they are not exactly 
   Green 253 
 
orthodox. Moreover, they will, as Heyrman notes, continue to have effects at sea and on land as 
the ideologies and heterodox philosophies of the Atlantic marketplace increasingly influence 
societies around the Atlantic.  
In this moment, Dana illustrates the prevalence, even across racial boundaries, of belief 
systems that were deeply engrained in both the free and unfree cultures of Atlantic maritime 
exchange. Echoing Equiano, the cook believes in providential design that frames supernatural 
events as productions of divine intelligence. He goes on to tell Dana “stories of dreams, and the 
unusual behavior of men before death” (21). He even suggests the way that providential events in 
nature might intersect with the nationally competitive elements of Atlantic trade. Dana writes 
that the cook “had heard of ships, too, beating up the gulf of Finland against a head wind, and 
having a ship heave in sight astern, overhaul and pass them, with as fair a wind as could blow, 
and all studding-sails out” (21). Taken together with the auction of the dead crewman’s goods, a 
practice that invests personal effects with monetary and sentimental value, while also using them 
as fetish tributes to the dead, readers see the maritime belief system come into focus. Colin 
Dayan similarly recognizes the way that fetish objects in the syncretic Atlantic take on profound 
social significance and demonstrate the ability to empower the unquiet dead, along with the 
social processes that attended their life. The constantly shifting Christian, animist, superstitious, 
and racial formulations that Dana observes are all held together by the economic system that 
maintains these sailors in its grasp, and by the proximity sailors share to the commodities they 
invest with the same providential value that suffuses their own bodies. 
Nevertheless, Dana turns away from superstitious readings of these events, insisting upon 
a rational interpretation and Enlightenment objectivity to keep philosophical problems to the 
margins of the narrative. In his concluding chapter, he actively resists romantic notions of sea-
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life, writing, “There is a witchery in the sea, its songs and stories…I have known a young man 
with such a passion for the sea, that the very creaking of a block stirred up his imagination so 
that he could hardly keep his feet on dry ground.” Nevertheless, he continues, “This fine drapery 
falls off, and he learns that it is but work and hardship, after all. This is the true light in which a 
sailor's life is to be viewed; and if in our books, and anniversary speeches, we would leave out 
much that is said about ‘blue water,’ ‘blue jackets,’ ‘open hearts,’ ‘seeing God's hand on the 
deep,’ and so forth,” (Concluding Chapter). Still, though Dana might maintain that his text and 
his experiences adhere to Enlightenment norms and orthodoxies, his text reveals the anxious and 
unsettled nature of a mobile life lived at sea. Embedded within the commodity exchange market, 
he is forced to confront the meaning of his own body as a commodity with importance as a 
symbolic repository for market exchange value and spiritual significance. At the same time, he 
must consider his position, as well, as an invisible and suffering laborer, whose harsh life is 
necessary for the sustenance of the Atlantic market community. 
The Pilgrim and Capitalist Colonialism 
Notably, Dana’s first ship is named the Pilgrim, strengthening his adventure’s narrative, 
historiographical, and ideological connections to an earlier touchstone of North American 
providential capitalism. If his ship’s journey may be called a pilgrimage, or if it represents an 
extension of the puritan pilgrimage, it is a pilgrimage that explicitly conflates religious and 
commercial pursuits. Sacvan Bercovitch is careful to remind readers that “Puritan society was 
not middle class” even though it “established the central tenets of what was to become…our 
‘dominant culture’” (xiii). The relative universality of that cultural dominance is open to debate, 
but it is clear that the trade, exploration, and colonialism that Dana describes, helped to spread 
American hegemony and to present as normative its tenets of providential Christianity bound to 
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expansive market capitalism. This marriage served to instantiate, justify, and codify claims to 
new lands, and new markets. Daniel Walker Howe notes that Americans “needed frequently to 
glance back over their shoulders, toward the ocean that continued to bring them goods, additional 
people and new ideas. Atlantic crossing times and costs would both fall steadily over the next 
thirty-five years and for the rest of the century, integrating commodity markets, even on the 
North American frontier, in an early example of what our own era calls ‘globalization’” (Howe 
48). Dana’s voyage is, therefore, tied to the “civilizing” forces of capitalism and Christianity that 
connected a mobile economic venture to an imaginary and expansive Atlantic, uniting the people 
it bound together as members of the church of capital. 
As evidenced by Dana’s conflation of Spanish lands with “Christian lands,” Christian 
hegemony was intimately tied to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ evolving nationalist 
projects. Entering Mexican waters, he remarks, “We felt as though we had got into a Christian 
(which in the sailor's vocabulary means civilized) country” (35). Although he earlier admitted 
that the spread of colonialism would decimate the pre-capitalist, non-Christian cultures 
throughout the Americas, Dana here uses Christianity as a stand-in for colonial modernity. Dana 
offers a vision of Atlantic capitalist Christianity suppressing non-capitalist, non-Christian 
cultures throughout the Americas and “uplifting” the population. This is not far off from 
Equiano’s plans for a virtuous providential Capitalism spreading the fruits of modernity to 
Africa. Taken together, the authors present a consistent picture of providential capitalism as the 
ideology that empowers both capital and Christianity to spread as colonizing ventures. Both 
authors use this colonialist perspective to imagine a universal Atlantic ideology and system of 
trade and value exchange that sustains itself and uplifts the diverse populations of the world. 
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Nevertheless, by remaining ambivalent about the nature of that hegemony, texts like Dana’s 
present the possibility of an implicit rebuke to even their own nationalist frontierism. 
This push and pull between Atlantic universalism and nationalist particularity was 
especially important in the revolutionary to antebellum periods. Sean X. Goudie, for example, 
writes that “Hamilton proposes the strategic expansion of commerce…for Hamilton, the model 
U.S. empire flows south and east: his notion of empire is not bent on continental expansion and 
conquest, but on the command of the hemisphere’s tradeways” (Goudie 88). Similarly, Goudie 
notes that John Adams’ letter to U.S. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Robert Livingston, “makes 
transparent what Franklin’s paracolonial posture mutes: that the ‘commerce’ of the West India 
Islands’ is the most vital component part of the entire ‘American system of commerce’” (62). 
Moreover, Goudie observes that “If Franklin frequently engages in acts of paracolonial negation 
in his writings, anxious to repress the potentially deleterious social and cultural effects of 
commercial excess on the emergent national character, Hamilton not only sustains U.S. 
paracolonialism in the West Indies as an affirmation of the United States’ special mission to 
spread liberal and republican values in the hemisphere; he also strives to build a U.S. commercial 
empire there” (63). Goudie, therefore, reasserts the tense rhetorical and philosophical back-and-
forth that American Revolutionary patriots held over the question of national expansion, based 
upon slavery.  Even as Dana extends an American identity abroad, he carries with him this 
unsettled national inheritance. It is never fully clear whether the extension of American 
nationalism is good or bad, virtuous or wicked, ennobling or infectious. 
In practical terms, religion served a key role in the advancement of Atlantic nationalism 
and hegemony, a historical fact to which Dana’s ship’s name and journey also implicitly harken. 
Vincent L. Wimbush notes that “even as ‘religion’ became more restricted and less pervasive in 
   Green 257 
 
traditional or superficial terms, it became more powerful in terms of providing, for example, the 
ideological and discursive framework for the modern nations” (Wimbush 50). As was the case 
for frontier and Barbary captive narratives, religion served a key role in differentiating national 
identities as well as in distinguishing between “civilized” and “savage,” as Eurocentric and North 
American powers attempted to extend their influence around the Atlantic. When Dana insists, “I 
never knew but one sailor who doubted its being the inspired word of God,” he generally 
subsumes the fact that that “word of God” appears decoupled from specific religious 
denominations, suggesting the syncretic religious practices that were so prevalent at sea, even as 
he offers a Christian American nationalist framing (Concluding Chapter 25). Dana, therefore, 
treads a fine line. On one hand, he dramatizes his own mobility among different religious 
traditions within a unifying Atlantic marketplace, and, in the process, elaborates the porous 
barriers between civilization and barbarity or between one national identity and another. On the 
other, he ties Christian development to the larger project of nationalist demarcation and capitalist 
and political expansion.  
As a result, Dana also implicates the mordant hope that his fellow sailors hold out for 
divine intervention into their extraordinarily difficult lives in the processes of personal, social, 
and moral definition that preoccupied the nation. This too is a result of historical circumstance. 
Bercovitch, for example, notes that “The Yankee Jeremiahs…shift[ed] the focus of figural 
authority. In effect, they incorporated Bible history into the American experience—they 
substituted a regional for a biblical past, consecrated the American present as a movement from 
promise to fulfillment, and translated fulfillment from its meaning within the closed system of 
sacred history into a metaphor for limitless secular improvement” (Bercovitch 94-5). In response, 
the Yankee Dana suggests a system of personal reform that, as for so many other writers, 
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combines moral development with literacy, labor, and Christian virtue. He writes, “A sailor 
never becomes interested in religion, without immediately learning to read, if he did not know 
how before; and regular habits, forehandedness (if I may use the word) in worldly affairs, and 
hours reclaimed from indolence and vice, which follow in the wake of the converted man, make 
it sure that he will instruct himself in the knowledge necessary and suitable to his calling.” Dana 
here yokes personal moral development to vocational improvement and expects reading to 
initiate a necessary conversion. He reiterates, arguing that, “The religious change is the great 
object. If this is secured, there is no fear but that knowledge of things of the world will come in 
fast enough” (Concluding Chapter 24). Sailors, he suggests, will learn to understand text. In so 
doing, they will convert into more virtuous members of a Christian laboring polity. Their virtue 
will then make them into better laborers and their labor will make them better Christians, so that 
the capitalist enterprise of shipping, exploration, and trade will become a self-sustaining vehicle 
for spreading Atlantic capitalist and Christian hegemony abroad. 
Conclusion 
If Dana’s vision of colonial expansion uses the market and Christianity as twin 
mechanisms for the spread of rational modernization and Yankee-rooted capitalism, it could not 
have functioned without the help of the literary marketplace. Howe notes that “New England 
Yankees made themselves one of the world’s great seafaring peoples; they had already traveled 
around Cape Horn and across the Pacific to open the China trade. They had a remarkable amount 
in common with the Dutch—another seagoing, predominantly Calvinist people who combined 
agriculture with commerce, practiced religious toleration, and had no compunction about 
subjugating native populations” (Howe 47). However, it was the dissemination of texts that 
reproduced the American Yankee archetype for transatlantic audiences. For example, Eve Tavor 
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Bannet notes that “American printers recognized and re-imported…narrative elements from 
captivity narratives which their forbears had earlier exported to Britain, as well as arguments 
from antislavery discourses which their forbears had shared with Britons, both of which had 
become topical again in America during the 1790s” (Bannet 60) In fact, In addition to his early 
positive reception, Dana’s literary output established important personal connections to other 
writers, including Herman Melville, who described his experience of reading Two Years Before 
the Mast as feeling “wedded” to Dana (Amestoy 161). Thus, Dana doesn’t merely bring an 
American colonial perspective to the maritime travel genre, but also uses the genre to extend the 
Yankee heritage and to assert its primacy as the root of American hegemonic power.  
It is clear that, as Jason Berger argues, Barbary piracy narratives were just as often 
instructional as they were sentimental, while antebellum seafaring literature was both concerned 
with presenting the fantasy of an authentic vision of the sailing life and preoccupied by the 
problems inherent to nationalist expansion. Berger writes, “Earlier narratives by sailors held 
captive by Barbary States such as Algiers and Tripoli were often written to provide specialized 
and serviceable information for other seamen. Sea narratives produced in the antebellum era, 
however, not only circulated within a maritime laboring and reading community, but also were 
progressively addressed to a larger domestic readership” (Berger 27). However, Berger’s own 
recognition of the commodity identification in maritime novels, his examination of the literary 
market’s desire for “authenticity,” and his analysis of the processes by which the Atlantic market 
allegorized laborers and even worked to “occlude the excess” persons at the heart of Atlantic 
commerce, all suggest a broader view. Barbary captivity narratives and maritime free-labor 
travel narratives appear to have served both sentimentalist and instructive purposes for the 
reading public. Authenticity, therefore, is a deceptive lynchpin around which to posit a change in 
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literary goals. The authenticity of experience in Barbary captivity narratives was intended to 
elicit the sympathies of white readers even as it was intended to warn sailors about the possible 
dangers of the Atlantic maritime trade. Meanwhile the supposed authenticity of later maritime 
narratives was meant to lend believability to fantasies of labor that bound sex, class, race, and 
nationalism into one ostensibly prototypical figure. 
Dana as narrator, for example, maintains distance and difference from the rest of the 
crew, undercutting his autobiographical claims by transforming the other crewmembers into 
objects for analysis and, frequently, into figures for allegorical ruminations on philosophy, 
capitalist ideology, and nationalist identity. According to Berger, Lacan reads Hegel’s master-
slave dialectic to present the master as the dominant capitalist and the slave as the figure 
dispossessed by capitalism (Berger 40). However, both figures are essentially united in Hegel’s 
ongoing struggle for primacy, so both are constitutive elements of capitalist interplay in the 
market. Dana reads his experiences through a similar lens, observing both mastery and 
submission at sea as the dual elemental experiences of Atlantic life. 
The Atlantic was a space of potentially productive mobility, but also a space of 
potentially destructive conversion. Nevertheless, the special status of nation or of race could be 
undermined just as easily and as neatly as it could be reaffirmed in text, as well as in the 
embodied experiences of travelers and laborers in the Atlantic market. These narratives 
demonstrate that life in the mobile Atlantic marketplace could be dehumanizing, as well as 
transcendent.  They suggest that the possibilities presented by mobile Atlantic life could swiftly 
transform into anxieties about the self, and about cultural identities that had profound 
philosophical implications. More than anything, these texts admit the centrality of the captive, 
yet mobile body, whether enslaved or nominally free, to the function and practical reality of 
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maritime Atlantic life, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As writers absorbed 
these captive experiences, they began to see greater reasons for philosophical and personal 
anxiety. Just as one person could find transcendence and mastery through the movement of their 
literal body in the Atlantic, and the movement of their representative and valued body through 
the market, any other person could find domination, violence, and submission as they traveled 
the same routes over the same churning waters. 
Disrupting the racial and national identities that writers attempted to articulate and assert 
in the letters and politics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, life at sea demonstrated the 
tenuous logic of ideological, national, or racial superiority. At any moment, any person involved 
in the economy of the Atlantic could transform or convert, could gain or lose status. Just as the 
enslaved black laborer could trade upon his commodity value to achieve higher status, the free 
white laboring man could, at any moment, find himself transported into Barbary captivity, or 
meet a captain who wished to “make” him a slave. Given the tremendous importance of race for 
the production and demarcation of Atlantic culture, this instability presented intense 
philosophical challenges. What did it mean for the soul of a white person, if the white body 
could be captured and enslaved, subjected to abuse, or used as a laboring commodity? In the face 
of these many forms of subjugation, white writers attempted to assert racial, cultural, and 
national difference. They insisted that even their captivity and abuse communicated their 
elevated status. Yet, lurking behind these assertions of power is a tacit acknowledgement of the 
insecurity of racial superiority. In particular, texts like Tyler’s and Dana’s demonstrate that, even 
as white writers privileged their own evaluative gaze and their own national identification, they 
struggled to contend with the fact that their personhood was constantly threatened by the 
ineluctable moral logic of the Atlantic. In such a space, neither race nor nationality could protect 
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the individual from the inescapable reality of commodification. Even as they insisted that the 
privileged status of their bodies suggested the privileged status of their souls, the providential 
capitalist marketplace demonstrated that they were laborers in an economy much larger than they 
could comprehend, and things to be traded in a market they could hardly claim to master. 
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Chapter 4 
Combustible Man: Consumption, Cannibals, and Commodity Horror at Sea
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Questions of commodification, exchange, and even spiritual value were very real issues 
affecting the lives of the people most intimately associated with Atlantic trade. These issues 
arose amid the realities of impressment, Barbary captivity, and wage slavery. Moreover, the 
providential capitalist nature of mainstream accounts of maritime trade and travel allowed 
readers to explore the philosophical implications of these issues as they related to national 
expansion and antislavery politics alike. The persistent concern with commodification, 
displacement, community, and exchange in maritime texts offers evidence for the swelling 
anxiety over the value and status of the individual caught in a market-driven moral, cultural, and 
financial economy. What maritime slavery narratives, like Olaudah Equiano’s or Ukawsaw 
Gronniosaw’s, or Barbary captivity narratives, like Royall Tyler’s, and later maritime sailor’s 
trade and travel narratives, like Richard Henry Dana’s, also reveal is the centrality of the body to 
Atlantic providential capitalist discourse. The body—sacrificed, enslaved, consumed, converted, 
absent—is the site where capitalist exchange logic and providential Christian logic cohere, for 
good or ill. Anxieties over commodification, racial evaluation, and even the tense push and pull 
between mastery and submission were registered as embodied, corporeal experiences of loss, 
sacrifice, and passion. Abstract concepts of commodification and consumer logic became fraught 
and potent questions about the value and meaning of the body in the Atlantic marketplace. 
In many respects, this anxiety is tied explicitly to the question of race. Given the 
overwhelming symbolic and ideological importance of white and black bodies in the 
construction of Atlantic societies, this should come as no surprise. In the white supremacist 
Atlantic, the white body was all that ensured liberty, salvation, and even election. But that 
whiteness could be undermined by unequal labor relations, unfair contracts, and the confounding 
reverses that attended mobility along the routes of Atlantic commerce. Whiteness served, in the 
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white supremacist Atlantic, as a catchall symbol, an assertive sign of superiority into which 
intangible values could be poured, in order to justify hierarchies of power. Vincent L. Wimbush, 
for instance, observes that white writers, politicians, and thinkers posited “something 
mysterious…variously referred to as beauty, sentiment, or sensibility, imagination or reason” to 
justify white superiority (Wimbush 59). However, maritime texts like Richard Henry Dana’s, or 
those of Edgar Allan Poe and Herman Melville, refocus critical attention upon the material in 
which these values are housed. Although these texts dwell upon the significance of whiteness 
and white flesh, they do so in such a way that reveals its violability and, as a result, suggest the 
potential diminution of whiteness as a stable epistemological sign of power. This is, perhaps, 
why Toni Morrison argues that Poe was the most important writer of his age regarding “the 
concept of African Americanism” (Morrison 33). She describes his “figurations of impenetrable 
whiteness that surface...whenever an Africanist presence is engaged” and calls Pym an 
experience of “haunting” of whiteness by a sense of otherness and by unstated blackness (33). 
All of this is to say that Poe’s investigations into the epistemological value of whiteness are 
really investigations into the hierarchies of power, natural, supernatural, invented, and innate, 
that structure his moral universe and are supposedly housed in white skin.  
But the question of the body in the Atlantic market went beyond a question of racial 
significance. Indeed, the sacrifice of bodies became a progressively central trope in Atlantic 
fiction as the revolutionary age gave way to a more ideologically hegemonic and nationalist 
period, and to the increasingly industrial Jacksonian age, which was, itself, marked and 
empowered by the wholesale disappearance and violent destruction of people and communities. 
The ideology of individual free-laborism collided with the reality of demeaning labor conditions, 
so that the value of labor, and the value of the bodies that could perform that labor, remained in 
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question. This uncertainty led writers to consider the possible spiritual ramifications of bodily 
commodification. Was the body the receptacle of a valuable immortal soul? Was that soul the 
product of labor relations and remote contracts? Was the sacrifice of the individual necessary for 
the instantiation of community? These were practical questions for the sailors, free and unfree, 
who found their bodies mobilized and exchanged within the Atlantic market.  
They were also perplexing philosophical questions in an age of expansive maritime 
markets and ongoing exploratory capitalist exchange. For example, Mary Nyquist observes the 
persistence of the biblical story of Jephtha, who, for the sake of military victory, vows to 
sacrifice his own daughter, in European discourse over the social function of personal sacrifice. 
Responding to George Buchanan’s 1554 Iepthes sive votum, she remarks that “when voluntary, 
sacrifice of life for the common good may unite the best in scriptural and Greco-Roman 
traditions” (93). She also notes that “[Bartolome] Las Casas argues that, when performed for the 
welfare of the entire state, the reverent sacrifice of fellow humans should not be judged as 
unnatural or unreasonable” (122). Nevertheless, the actual drama of human sacrifice came to 
signify the barbarism of colonized New World peoples in the European imagination. Nyquist 
writes, “Often regarded as a by-product of human sacrifice, anthropophagy—the Greek term for 
what Euro-colonialism, following Columbus’s lead, calls ‘cannibalism’—did not occur only 
outside European Christendom, however. For Protestantism, debates about the Eucharist 
provided an opportunity to stage a righteous revulsion against anthropophagy as a barbarous 
feature of Roman Catholic worship” (94). This dual attitude toward sacrifice, of both longing and 
revulsion, was vital to Atlantic providential capitalist literature. Poe and Herman Melville, for 
example, both toy with these dual interpretations, presenting sacrifice as, at once, sacred and 
profane, barbaric and necessary for the continuation of civilization. Increasingly, such authors 
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pursued the possibility that the market that was premised upon divine order could demand bodily 
sacrifice even as it produced profits that individuals might never see. 
Edgar Allan Poe and Arthur Gordon Pym’s Pointless Adventure 
Edgar Allan Poe’s 1838 novel, The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket, 
contorts the traditional maritime adventure romance into a covert meditation upon the 
dehumanizing effects of commerce, racial relativism, and commodification anxiety. It uses the 
motif of a sacrificial body to portray the effects of commodification and consumption as anxious 
reenactments of Christian sacrifice. In so doing, it raises vital questions about the moral shape of 
a universe that appears to be divine in conception, but chilly, economical, and even bloodthirsty 
in its dictates. Moreover, the novel raises pressing questions about the early nineteenth-century 
American drive toward expansion and colonialism, and the American nation’s attempts to assert 
its status as a world power through exploration. Johan Wijmark points out that “When Poe wrote 
Pym, the Antarctic really had become a source of mystery again, and many Americans hoped 
that it would be revealed as a new territory for economic expansion. Some went further and took 
reports of ice-free Antarctic waters as indications that exploration would uncover a region of 
temperate climate—or, as in the infamous theories of John Cleves Symmes, even reveal an 
opening into the interior earth” (85). This fantasy of colonial expansion “is written…reflecting a 
desire among Americans to reject their colonial history and have the Republic assume its rightful 
place in the international community of nations” (85). Thus, the disaster that befalls Pym and the 
crews of the ships with whom he sails suggests a dim view of what has become a national project 
of hegemony through exploration and community through exploratory labor. Moreover, the god 
of this novel demands blood sacrifice in submission to the ultimate logic of consumption, 
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conversion, exchange, and equivalence, that extends from the Atlantic outward, toward a global 
south and toward a global market of commodities, souls, and souls as commodities.   
Recent scholarship has attempted to situate Poe within the context of the racial and 
national politics of his age. Kevin J. Hayes, for example, helps to place Poe within a political, 
literary, and social climate that doubtless influenced his writing. Similarly, Jerome McGann and 
J. Gerald Kennedy have worked to recover Poe’s position as an emblematic antebellum 
American writer, despite his seeming “anti-nationalism” and mythical outsider status. On the 
other hand, Robert T. Tally Jr. suggests that Poe is best read as a satirist of antebellum literature 
and politics. If readers look back even further, David S. Reynolds both situates Poe within a 
literary and political climate, and productively reads the “subversive” elements of Poe’s 
literature. All of these readings are well-founded and important interventions into a long history 
of Poe scholarship that has largely read him in something of a vacuum, cordoned off from the 
racial and national politics of his age. It is important, however, to apply this contextualizing 
scholarship to issues related to a broader Atlantic culture, to see Poe’s interest in maritime fiction 
as evidence of an interest in the philosophical issues related to Atlantic capital commerce, and 
maritime philosophy and spirituality.  
Pym is a novel that challenges both readers and critics to find meaning in its seemingly 
dissolving mess of potential readings, but, within the context of providential capitalism, it opens 
itself up as a text concerned with documenting an economic universe that is, ultimately, ordered 
around the logic of commodification, transaction, and, in the end, consumption. In some ways, 
Pym and Herman Melville’s Redburn mirror one another as novels concerned with literal and 
authentic representations of maritime labor. Wayne Grady, for example, argues that “Poe’s novel 
anticipates Moby-Dick, and even The Grapes of Wrath, in the way in which it introduces long 
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passages of non-fiction as a way of not only creating and prolonging suspense, but also of 
injecting an atmosphere of verisimilitude into the fictional account” (342). Nevertheless, this 
verisimilitude is only ever in the service of destabilizing the reader’s reliance upon textual 
authority and narrative reality.  
As a result, other critical discussions surrounding Poe’s novel have centered upon its 
epistemological challenges, its racial formulations, and its structural and symbolic 
inconsistencies. For example, Darryl Jones discusses the “polar imaginary” that Poe employs to 
such intriguing, but indeterminate, effect. David Ray Vance mines the providential elements of 
the novel in order to assess the unsettled nature of the castaway text. Other scholars have focused 
upon elements of racial hybridity in the novel. This focus on Pym’s structural and symbolic 
challenges is no recent innovation in Poe studies. For instance, in 1978, Barton Levi St. Armand 
discussed the symbolic significance of Poe’s treatment of cannibalism in the novel, concluding 
that each ghastly sacrificial event in the novel represents a transcendent “ritual” of personal 
ascension for Pym. Tying these two modes of reading together, readers might see Pym as the 
representational product of both mid-nineteenth century scientific discussions, and the generic 
elasticity of the author’s most allegorically daunting works.  
Paramount among the novel’s preoccupations is its curiosity and worry over the meaning 
of racial codes and their possible disruption. Indeed, Katherine Montwieler and Mark E. Boren 
point out, for example, that in their partnered escape from the murderous natives of the island, 
Pym explicitly figures the racially ambiguous Dirk Peters as white (Poe 188). Race, argue 
Montwieler and Boren, is “connected to violence, sexuality, and hybridity” in the text and, as 
such, implicitly comments upon the conditions of chattel slavery with which Poe’s readers would 
have been familiar. As such, “Poe shows us that violence is universally human, if often 
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racialized, and Pym anxiously suggests that disaster looms on the horizon” (Montwieler; Boren 
14-15). Poe’s racial configurations, therefore, are even more ambiguous than they seem. They 
are at once of a piece with the racist hierarchism of antebellum America and disruptive of those 
same hierarchies, convinced of looming American racial hybridity and fearful of the violence 
that will erupt from the impossibility of interracial integration. This instability seems to pull the 
text apart and, indeed, the text closes on a note of such baffling ambiguity as to suggest that the 
author has simply given up on resolving its many inconsistencies. However, the racial 
formulations of the text are comprehensible within a system of supernatural market economy: 
race is, like any other commodifiable value, something to be traded, exchanged, balanced, and 
desired. It too adheres to the logic of violent rising, falling, and give-and-take that orders the 
text’s other concerns. 
The conferrability and reversibility of race extend to the novel’s curiosity about the 
sanctity of human personhood altogether. For example, Dominic Mastroianni recognizes that 
many readings of Pym have focused on its elements of racial hybridity and transformation, but 
extends his critique to “study how conceptions of social life can change when the boundaries 
between human and animal are taken not to be stable or inviolable, but rather volatile and readily 
crossable” (185). Although Mastroianni is careful to note that his definition of “hospitality” as a 
system of exchange does not overturn Poe’s racist caricatures or hierarchical thinking,  the 
volatility it presents also suggests Pym’s post-human transformation into commodity and, in 
particular, into a consumable commodity—into food for the market and for other individuals. For 
Mastroianni, what maintains Pym’s humanity, even in the face of his potential loss of human-
ness is his adherence to “hospitality,” the codes of conduct that dictate and negotiate social 
interactions among people. Of course, hospitality is, in part, one more facet of the western 
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colonial ethos of “civilizing” other cultures through demonstrations of virtuous behavior. This 
may be so, but it is important to recognize that that hospitality arises from a system of behavior 
ordered around the logic of economic consumption. Mastroianni, for example, recognizes that 
the moment in which a gull drops a hunk of human flesh aboard Pym’s raft as he and his fellow 
survivors starve is “a form of hospitality [that] is consistent with the chapter’s larger redefinition 
of hospitality as an unmasterable form of response” (192).  That responsive “unmasterable” force 
might well be defined as the surrounding, perhaps transcendentally universal, reality of 
consumption and sacrifice. “Hospitality” in Pym is just one element of social life within the all-
consuming market. 
 Moving away from the human experiences in the text and toward its unsettling but 
significant depictions of natural environments, Peter Taylor reads the novel’s closing gesture 
toward a supernatural but unreadable language written in stone, along with the repeated but 
never deciphered native refrain, “Tekeli-li” as moments of pure typology. He likens both the 
writing and the speech of the natives to the Book of Daniel “the only apocalyptic text in the 
Hebrew Bible [which] is read not as actual history but rather for its symbols and signs that 
enable the interpretation of ‘current’ history.” Taylor notes that, like the evidently supernatural 
writing that Pym discovers in the stones of the island, “in Daniel the mysterious inscription, 
written by disembodied hand, confounds every diviner” (18). On the other hand, Shaindy Rudoff 
insists that these codes are implicit attempts to uncover the root of racial hierarchism in Poe’s 
time. She writes, “In Pym, the codes themselves become Poe’s focus, his point of entry into a 
discussion of racial politics, religious texts, and the ideology of slavery. The text’s philological 
play re-enacts, and is in conversation with, the debate about whether slavery was a natural, 
divinely ordained institution or a purely human social construct” (Rudoff 63). In either case, 
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Readers should consider the possibility of typological meaning in two respects. Firstly, it 
suggests that, within the world of the novel, events are dictated by a divine but obscure hand. 
Secondly, it suggests that the novel, itself, is a typological text, one to be read symbolically and 
interpreted relative to current events—including, for Poe’s readers, slavery, the possibility of 
war, and scientific revolutions.  The indecipherable stones are not meant to be deciphered, but to 
be seen as representative of a world beyond understanding, yet deeply involved in the daily 
experiences of individuals. If the novel presents market-exchange logic as active and formative 
in the world, it also presents it as divine, supernatural, and typological.  
At the same time, the novel stages encounters that challenge readers to consider the 
meaning of the transition from pre-capitalist social interaction to capitalist exchange. Central to 
this transition is a shift from pre capitalist gift-giving to capitalist exchange is the text. As 
Hildegard Hoeller notes "the memory of a gift is not the same as the transcription of one. Once 
written down, the amount is fixed...the transcription of the gift inevitably records a specific 
debt—not a bond between people but a precise debt" (167-8). Similarly, Hoeller argues that in 
Typee, "Melville stages the conflict between gift economies and market economic thinking that 
is at the center of many colonial encounters. How can one comprehend one through the lens of 
the other?" (144) Readers might ask the same question of the encounter that occurs in Pym. Does 
the violence that erupts at the conclusion of the novel allegorically relate the violent overthrow 
of pre-capitalist gift culture by capitalist exchange and debt? Regarding Typee, Hoeller observes 
that "what escapes Tommo is that, in response to the gifts bestowed upon him, he is expected to 
become a Typee since gift economies function by drawing clear distinctions between brother and 
other" (150). If readers apply this logic to Pym, it is possible to read the moment of failed gift-
giving between an American merchant ship and a native culture that Poe describes as a mutual 
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rejection of relational modes. Too-Wit's people offer a gift, which the sailors reject in favor of an 
economic exchange. The villagers, in turn, reject the imposition of capitalist economy and 
ideology. In that mutual rejection, the seeds of violence are planted. The cannibalistic horror that 
breaks out between the villagers and the sailors appears as the natural endpoint of a conflict over 
the logic of gift-giving. Holler explains that "gift economies bind tribal members through the 
bond of obligation." Again, regarding Typee, she goes on to note that "since he cannot see what 
other value he brings to the table, cannibalism over and over appears to him as the final gesture 
of self-interest and exploitation...that may make sense of the mysterious generosity he 
encounters" (151-2). Pym literalizes this experience. In this novel, the sailors really do have 
nothing to offer but themselves, and so they become the consumable gifts given in exchange with 
the villagers. Readers might consider this the embodied experience of a shift from gift culture to 
debt culture. 
However, even as recording of debt—the recording of significant absence—signals the 
violence that attends capitalist acculturation, Poe, like Melville, uses sea-burial and the recording 
of sea-burial as an important substitution for proper memorialization, a form of writing that uses 
the logic of debt and value loss to ironically resist personal erasure. Hester Blum writes “while 
the coffin must be symbolically and materially unattainable in factual sea narratives, in these rare 
(yet canonical) fictional examples in sea literature, it can serve as the container for physical and 
spiritual salvation…Pym’s buried locker and Queequeg’s coffin become placeholders for the 
absent narratives of dead sailors” (183). By parodizing the maritime narrative, Poe emphasizes 
the way the genre frequently uses its own texts to memorialize the absent dead. “Ultimately,” 
writes Blum, “the sailor’s desire for bodily enclosure can only be realized in this textual form” 
(184). At the same time, Blum argues that, in the novel’s frustrated and clipped ending, “this loss 
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of narrative, neither author nor text materially remaining, is the theoretical component of the lack 
of a record of burial…so often lamented in sea narratives” (190). Ian Baucom has made similar 
claims about the allegorizing function of the ledger book and its ability to record loss. Again, 
readers should not ignore the way that this privileging of text elevates the allegorical logic of the 
market, the substitution of words and figures for bodies and graves, to spiritual heights. The text 
itself, as well as the genre it both represents and upends, serves the memorializing function that 
is otherwise unavailable to the dead at sea. 
With all of this said, the novel’s interest in indecipherable codes, inscribed values, and 
potentially divine organization also arise from Poe’s immersion in the scientific questions of his 
day. The novel’s implications of a polar region reigned over by a divine or supernatural entity, 
for example, evidently represent an ancient desire to combine rationalism and supernaturalism by 
literally reaching beyond the limits of human navigation and understanding. Daryl Jones argues 
that, even for ancient Greek thinkers, a land beyond the polar limits of the world “acts as a limit-
point of human speech and understanding beyond which is only silence and whiteness and 
consequently as a space with the potential to open up vistas of numinous terror” (51). He 
continues to note “the specifically American resonances of hollow earth theory,” by observing 
“their origins in the work of Cotton Mather, who, in The Christian Philosopher (1721), repeats 
[Edmund] Halley’s [1692] theories almost verbatim” (56). In fact, explorer, Cleves Symmes 
applied to the Senate to fund an expedition to prove the existence of what Jones calls “Symmes 
holes” in 1818, an endeavor that, though failed, would, Jones argues, have been present in the 
minds of Poe’s readers (60). This quest has always, therefore, been both scientific and mythic, 
representing a desire to rationally explore the realms of the phantasmagoric and philosophical. 
Jones even calls “the quest for the Pole…a desire to return to a prelapsarian state, the discovery 
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of a lost Eden before (or outside of) time” (63). However, in Poe’s hands that Edenic world 
contains and, perhaps, even emanates from the logic of capitalist consumption. All of the 
consumer sacrifices of the novel lead the main characters toward the divine space beyond the 
novel’s and the world’s termination.  
All of these critical readings pursue the alluring enticements of the novel’s dense and 
resistant symbolisms and structural peculiarities. Readers should draw upon all of these sources 
for a better understanding of this difficult novel, but they ought to go a step further: the novel is 
not interesting merely for its epistemological innovations, its structural problems, or its symbolic 
density. It is interesting because of the way that all of these elements allow Poe to repackage a 
capitalist enterprise as a supernatural problem. Wayne Grady insists that “cannibalism existed for 
[Poe] beyond the limits of horror” (344). However, Poe’s selective decisions about what to 
depict and what not to depict appear to be part of a rather more manipulative game he plays with 
his audience. By denying representations of cannibalism, he entices his readers into desiring 
cannibalism. He extends his authorial hand beyond the pages of his own novel to draw us into 
the system of consumption that orders the text. 
The tale is deeply ironic but in no ways more so than in its overall inversion of the 
adventure narrative. The novel’s seafaring events are initiated not by the titular Pym’s 
demonstrations of maritime prowess, for example, but by his failure, along with that of his friend 
Augustus Barnard, to avoid a literal collision with the maritime economy, in the form of a 
whaling vessel. Pym’s later stowaway passage aboard that whaler, the Grampus, turns into an 
extended chronicle of potential live-burial, rather than an opportunity for the young man to 
acquaint himself with the crew, their adventurous goals, or to their transcendental relation to the 
sea. Poe even refuses to narrate a mutiny that occurs during Pym’s interment. Then, after a 
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shipwreck, Pym, mutineer Dirk Peters, and Augustus all find themselves adrift and forced to 
resort to cannibalism. Pym and Peters are rescued a short time later by the Jane Guy, rendering 
the death and cannibalistic consumption of a crewman at best superfluous. Finally, the crew of 
the new ship lands upon what, at first, seems a verdant island refuge that reveals itself to be 
populated by cunning and bloodthirsty villagers who, rather than succumb to the superior 
technological strengths of the white crew, manage to outwit and murder them. These plot events 
reveal the extent to which Poe appears to be in constant conversation with the narrative forms he 
subverts.xxv However, adventures are accidental in Poe’s narrative, exciting events take place off 
the page, and main characters are dispatched frequently and in such a manner as to render their 
deaths unnecessary. All of the tropes of white superiority and exploratory conquest dissolve into 
utter disaster.  
This makes for an interesting, if sometimes frustrating, text, but it also serves to reverse 
the moral assumptions of prior maritime adventure narratives. Accounts such as Richard Henry 
Dana’s, or even Olaudah Equiano’s, assume that maritime expansion, driven by the needs and 
desires of capitalism, is also an essentially civilizing and blessed venture. When these authors 
narrate or imagine personal victories, or the potential future triumphs of expansive nationalist or 
capitalist projects, they assume God’s favor and divine election, grace demonstrated in economic 
terms. In contrast, Poe’s narrative posits a reverse course: such ventures demonstrate, if 
anything, divine disfavor, although, again, the economic nature of these events suggests that God 
communicates that disfavor through market forces. As David S. Reynolds notes, Poe’s narrative 
also functions as both an exercise in and inversion of mid-nineteenth century reform literature, 
which offered to “lift the veil,” on society’s sins.xxvi  Poe uses testimony to critique the ostensibly 
righteous and rational nature of modern life, but goes a step beyond reform literature by insisting 
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that, beneath the veil of propriety, rationality, and divine orderliness, is an entirely inverted 
moral, racial, scientific, and psychological system. Behind the veil of Poe’s supposedly virtuous 
capitalist and enlightened society is not a clear moral system of divine favor and wrath, but a 
mirror universe, still ordered around capitalist principles, but with the elect and the damned, the 
successful and the failed, reversed. Ignore national entreaties to expand through trade and 
exploration, Poe seems to say, ignore too any moral system that blankets capitalism in simple 
and clarifying pieties, for these are misleading distractions from the course upon which all sail 
toward hell. At the center of this moral system lies a corpse, a commodified and consumed body, 
destroyed for nothing but the advance of a market that never particularly cared for it in life. 
Even as the novel engages with an evidently national desire to discover and subdue a 
global south, a space both strange and ripe for exploitation, Poe suggests the folly of such a 
project. As Pym’s journey takes him to the absolute southern extremity, he projects an American 
capitalist colonialist perspective, moving directly from Nantucket, through the Caribbean, and to 
a South Pole that, beyond the ice, reveals an apparent tropical paradise. The south is a space of 
exotic encounters, unformed civilization, and cultural and personal flux. These are familiar 
extensions of the colonialist ethos to the global Atlantic south.xxvii Jennifer Rae Greeson, for 
example, argues that the Northern American psyche was constructed, in part, against visions of a 
colonial American south, and against a broader Caribbean and global southern other (44). 
However, this adventure is not a glorious one. The presumed “savages” of the story have 
cunning intellects and comprehend an occult belief system that, the endnote material suggests, 
truly does structure the world. In contrast, the ostensibly “civilized” white North Americans 
descend into savagery and cannibalism in short order. The Christian god that ought to protect the 
protagonists instead seems to present them with only endless and even tragic ironies. Moreover, 
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Poe’s characters discover the ineluctability of their own commodification, even as they attempt 
to master the Atlantic marketplace. In short, Poe’s novel suggests that the extension of 
providential capitalism southward is neither a victory nor a foregone conclusion.  
Nevertheless, Poe recognizes the importance of the Atlantic itself as a space of 
imaginative conquest and expansion. He was not alone. As David Dowling observes, by 1838, 
“the zeitgeist was seething with romantic dreams of sea adventure” (35). Dowling notes that Poe 
“took only two transatlantic voyages in his lifetime, both as a boy” and, as a result “sorely lacked 
the degree of firsthand maritime experience that established the credibility of Richard Henry 
Dana and Herman Melville…Poe relied instead on popular and intellectual culture as the primary 
source material for his sea narratives” (32). Nevertheless, Dowling argues that Poe “construed 
[the sea] as one of the many antebellum creative renderings of the virgin territory inherent in the 
concept of Manifest Destiny” (33). True, the sea is an important, Romantic expanse for Poe, but 
he never loses sight of the fact that it functions very much as a space of trade. Maritime stories 
were profitable to the writer of fiction, but maritime trade was even more profitable to the nation 
at large. As Melville would a decade later, Poe blends the Romantic with the financial, 
presenting the sea as the space where economy achieves spiritual significance. However, because 
Pym remains strange, uneasy, and almost perversely unresolved, Poe darkens the hues of his 
Romantic-economic adventure.  Here too he draws upon the trends of the literary market. In 
1821, for example, Owen Chase published his Narrative of the Most Extraordinary and 
Distressing Shipwreck of the Whale-Ship Essex, an account of a disaster at sea that would also go 
on to inspire Melville’s Moby-Dick. In that narrative, Chase openly admits to cannibalism borne 
of necessity and, in so doing, raises doubts about the conditions necessary for survival that both 
Poe and Melville exploit for philosophical ends. The sea raises important questions about the 
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value and nature of the soul, as well as the goals and righteousness of the nation, but the answers 
it provides may not offer comfort. 
The sacrifice endemic to Pym’s capitalist misadventures is essential to Poe’s critique of 
the ideological underpinnings of providential capitalism in his age. In Capital, Marx recognizes 
that the social conditions of capitalism were commonly narrated as if they were divinely ordered. 
In reality, however, the division of buyers and those with “nothing to sell but their own skins” 
was determined by conquest and violence (Marx 874-5). This material and theatrical conquest 
relies on analogical reasoning that the thing isn’t the self but its embodied relational networks—
the body becomes an analogue of value and exchange both real and, in the commodity exchange 
market of the Atlantic, symbolic (136). For example, as Eric Sundquist points out, the 1839 
ruling in favor of the Amistad slaves did not assert a general right to claim revolutionary self-
possession, but, instead, reaffirmed the commodity status of persons, specifically based upon the 
fact that the slaves had been illegally purchased and sold in the first place (Sundquist 177). 
Sundquist suggests that “this also reveals the linguistic and conceptual tautology at the heart of 
slavery—what is a thing and what is a person? What is and what is not? Only violence could 
truly break through this circular dialectic” (182). Poe asks the same questions but, in the context 
of ostensibly free white labor, lets their unsettling conclusions extend beyond the barriers of race 
and freedom. The transactional logic that determined the humanity and liberty of slaves did the 
same for the supposedly free white sailors in Poe’s novel. Moreover, his narrative suggests the 
possibility that the extension of national identity actually required the sacrifice and unfreedom of 
both black and white persons. 
Nearing the end of the novel, Pym evinces some satisfaction in having had a hand in 
furthering the aim of exploration, but admits that the cost of doing so is the bloody destruction of 
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an entire crew. Urging his captain to push farther south, toward what, ultimately, will prove the 
ship and its crew’s demise, Pym retrospectively insists “I must still be allowed to feel some 
degree of gratification at having been instrumental…in opening to the eye of science one of the 
most intensely exciting secrets which has ever engrossed its attention.”  Nevertheless, he admits 
that he “cannot but lament the most unfortunate and bloody events which immediately arose 
from my advice” (111). In this case, the “eye of science” also sees with the eye of capitalism, for 
the crew’s actions are entirely mercenary as they explore the societies they discover in their 
approach to the South Pole.  Just as the lives lost in the expedition are traded in for scientific 
advancement, so too are they implicitly exchanged in order to open new markets, to access new 
commodities, and even, in Pym’s case, to achieve spiritual and philosophical epiphany. If Pym 
here suggests that human lives have a value that should be spent if the ends are worthy enough, 
the novel supports his assertion time and again even as it undermines his paeans to nationalist, 
divine, or even rational order. Readers might here be reminded of Ian Baucom’s presentation of 
insurance logic and writing as generic and ideological forms that permit the market to profit even 
through loss. The loss of friends, the massacre of the crew, the deaths of the native villagers Pym 
encounters are all the necessary sacrifices made for the aim of a nationalist and colonialist 
adventure that portends to divine and economic ordination, but which reveals itself as pointless, 
tragic, and empty. 
The Capitalist Urge and Self-Destruction 
Naturally, therefore, Pym’s search for understanding in a morally obscure universe 
manifests in an obsession with documenting material commodity amounts and figures. For 
example, he engages in lengthy discussions and explanations of the bouche de mer or biche de 
mer, the sea-cucumber, to be found in the Antarctic island community his ship discovers. Pym 
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writes “a description of the nature of this important article of commerce, and the method of 
preparing it, may prove of some interest to my readers” (123). In fact, it is difficult to imagine 
readers, expecting Poe’s characteristic psychological horrors, to find anything of interest in the 
description that follows. However, Poe here is engaging in the tropes of the exploration 
narrative, a genre defined by its descriptions, which, it must be noted, serve to entice potential 
investors, explorers, or business partners, for future expeditions. Additionally, the biche de mer 
is a living commodity, a live thing with market value and even value as currency between the 
white sailors and the native villagers. Yet, in Poe’s story, the pursuit of the biche de mer allows 
the native villagers to tempt the crew of the Jane Guy into the archipelago and onto the island 
where, eventually, they’ll be slaughtered (121). The capitalist motive for exploration is, 
therefore, exposed as self-destructive. In its obsessive pursuit of profitable commodities, the 
capitalist urge blinds individuals to the perils to which they expose themselves. 
Poe underlines the destructiveness of this attitude even further by putting it into conflict 
with the aims and ethos of an evidently pre-capitalist society.xxviii After the wreck of the 
Grampus, Pym and Peters travel south and discover a series of islands, later revealed to be 
named Tsalal and ruled by the duplicitous Too-wit. During their first encounters with the natives 
of Tsalal, Pym describes the way the Jane Guy’s crew “endeavoured to ascertain if they had 
among them any articles which might be turned to account in the way of traffic, but found great 
difficulty in being comprehended” (115). Michael Taussig points out that Native peoples didn’t 
view white Europeans as ‘God’ but as potential gods who could be both good and evil (Taussig 
190). In premarket societies, exchanges were presented as reciprocal gift exchange, not simply 
economic transactions. The real evil of capitalist conquering spirits is, Taussig suggests, in 
rupturing the reciprocity of social and natural relations (197). As Hoeller might have anticipated, 
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a pre-capitalist culture of reciprocity clashes with a culture of acquisition, instantiating an 
inevitable violent cultural collision.  
At the same time, villagers see an animate spirit in the inanimate ship and can implicitly 
imagine an animate man made into an inanimate thing. In the same way, the sailors see trinkets 
and sea cucumbers and imagine commodity exchanges. The white explorers are utterly distracted 
by their valuative mode of assessment, whereas the villagers attempt to discover the spirit or 
intelligence that animates the visitors’ arrival.xxix If Poe here describes a discovery event, the 
moment in which a pre-capitalist society first encounters capitalist rituals and ideology, he also 
describes the birth of commodity fetishism. The text parallels the villagers’ evident 
miscomprehension of the ship, with the sailors’ over-valuation of the biche-de-mer. Colin Dayan 
notes that commodity fetishism insists upon the over-determination of a thing with social, and 
even supernatural significance (Haiti, History and the Gods). The body, the relic, the coin all 
function with the logic of the thing possessing and containing spirits of social interaction and 
even divine intervention. In this case, both sides of the transaction see the other in possession of 
a potentially valuable fetish object: the ship and the biche de mer, respectively. Pym and the 
explorers see live things and imagine commodities; Too-wit and the villagers see a commodity 
and imagines a live thing. Moreover, Too-wit does so because he imagines the living ship’s 
suffering. Even in reverse, the logic of commodification uses the suffering and sacrifice of a 
body as the pivotal moment in which its status as living being or commodity thing oscillates. 
However, this may also be a case of the pre-capitalist society playing to and subverting 
the capitalist crew’s condescending colonialist expectations. When the ship’s cook leaves a gash 
in the deck of the ship Too-wit, appears “pushing the cook on one side…commenced a half 
whine, half howl, strongly indicative of sympathy in what he considered the sufferings of the 
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schooner, patting and smoothing the gash with his hand, and washing it from a bucket of 
seawater which stood by” (114). Taussig points out that the introduction of capital to the 
indigenous world introduced both the iconography of mastery in nature and messianic struggles 
for resistance (Taussig 183). Too-wit here essentially performs the logic of commodification in 
reverse in order to satisfy the American sailors’ expectations of messianic reception. The sailors 
expect the pre-capitalist natives to view them with appropriate awe and miscomprehension, so 
Too-wit evinces awe and performs submission, in order to gain his own advantage.  
Though Too-wit’s performance adheres to the logic of providential capitalist 
commodification practices, it also alienates these practices, in part because it plays them in 
reverse, and, in part, because the performance is false. Pym notes that, “This was a degree of 
ignorance for which we were not prepared, and for my part, I could not help thinking some of it 
affected” (114).  In this, at least, Pym is correct. Too-wit’s followers will commence to burn the 
ship, after murdering the majority of the crew, belying their understanding of the ship’s 
functional, but inanimate status (134). Too-wit appears to understand that the capitalist crew of 
the Jane Guy believes in a reality to which he is not subject. The crew is bound by the logic of 
commodification, by an essentially animistic belief in the allegorical equivalence between living 
and non-living things. Because Too-wit evidently understands this belief, but does not truly share 
it, he can perform it as a deadly form of play. This recalls Sianne Ngai’s discussion of 
“animatedness” as a form of performance that demonstrates social structures by performing them 
and animating them. Too-wit gives life through his exaggerated performance of commodity 
misidentification, to Atlantic capital’s ideology of all-encompassing commodification. He does 
so in light of the fact that, all along, the crew has treated ships and the commodities they carry as 
repositories of value, spirit, memory, and have treated the men who crew these ships as 
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potentially consumable commodities. In fact, by this point in the novel, Poe has been building a 
case for commodity misidentification, both through Pym and the other crew-members’ 
metonymic relation to things, and through Pym’s ongoing anxiety about cannibalism, the 
ultimate act of commodification.  
Commodity Misidentification in the Storeroom 
Early on, Pym begins the process of dehumanizing commodification, by transforming his 
own body into literal and figurative commodity cargo. Pym’s friend, Augustus Barnard, helps 
him to stow aboard the whaler, Grampus, by packing him among the other commodities to be 
shipped. Pym describes “the ends of the box [that] could be removed at pleasure” and announces 
that he “proceeded immediately to take possession of [his] little apartment, and this with feelings 
of higher satisfaction, I am sure, than any monarch ever experienced upon entering a new 
palace” (15). It does not take long for the dehumanizing aspects of Pym’s predicament to reveal 
themselves. After passing out, he wakes “strangely confused in mind” and notes that his “limbs 
were greatly cramped, and [he] was forced to relieve them by standing between the crates.” Then 
he announces that “feeling an almost ravenous appetite, I bethought myself of the cold 
mutton…what was my astonishment in discovering it to be in a state of absolute putrefaction” 
(16). Poe’s language here is careful and considered: Pym says he “bethought myself of the cold 
mutton,” ostensibly thinking of a necessary repast, but also potentially conflating himself with 
the mutton. In the context of the page, this makes sense: bit by bit, Pym loses his humanity and 
sees his body, mind, and soul transformed into commodities among other commodities. His legs 
have ceased to function, his mind is giving way, and his language begins to dissolve the 
distinction between himself and a hunk of stowed meat. The container for foodstuffs thus comes 
to resemble a tomb, and Pym’s live burial comes to resemble the process by which meat is cured, 
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stowed, and shipped for consumption. If he is to be reborn from this tomb, it will be as a body 
subject to the logic of consumption and commodification. 
Poe’s treatment of Pym’s conversion into a commodity emphasizes the fact that 
commodification is an embodied experience of transactional logic, one in which a person loses 
selfhood, humanity, or life itself, so that others might survive. Pym’s fear of consumption 
initially and powerfully manifests in his interactions with Tiger, his faithful Newfoundland dog, 
who, starving, transforms from a friend into a potential murderer. At first, Pym is delighted that 
Augustus has stowed the dog in the ship to keep him company. However, as days pass with no 
escape from the hold, Pym discovers that “the sausages were entirely consumed; of the ham 
nothing remained but a small piece of the skin; and all the biscuit, except a few fragments of one, 
had been eaten by Tiger.” When Tiger begins to look for other sources of nourishment, Pym 
discovers that he is the only meat available. He recalls, “As I rubbed, he ran his nose against my 
hand with a slight snarl; but I was too greatly excited at the time to pay much attention to the 
circumstance… Presently I became aware of a singular hissing sound close at my ears, and 
discovered it to proceed from Tiger, who was panting and wheezing in a state of the greatest 
apparent excitement, his eyeballs flashing fiercely through the gloom…his behavior inspired me 
with so great a degree of fear, that I became fully aroused. He was now lying close by the door of 
the box, snarling fearfully, although in a kind of undertone, and grinding his teeth as if strongly 
convulsed” (26). Pym, trapped in a box, is nothing more than a self-conscious piece of meat at 
this point, having traded places with the hams and sausages already consumed. His fear is 
natural. Given his proximity to commodities, he has come to view himself as a commodity. 
When others come to view him in the same way, he is subject to the same fate that awaits all 
commodities: consumption. 
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This fear remains potent throughout the text, as characters are forced to consider, or even 
to carry out cannibalism upon one another. Moreover, the persistence of this fear suggests the 
essential logic of the market-oriented universe. In the moral cosmology Pym inhabits, a body 
contains value that can be transposed into an equivalent body of another kind. A person can, 
potentially, be traded in for an equivalently priced amount of grain or alcohol or meat. 
Furthermore, one must consume in order to avoid being consumed. One must lose for another to 
gain. One life must be spent to purchase another's survival. The market has transformed 
friendship and companionship into simply benign distractions from the reality of deadly 
competitive advantage that exists in the market-oriented Atlantic world. 
The Cannibal Urge 
On the other side of Pym's fear of being consumed lies his latent desire for consumption. 
For example, while Pym and his fellow survivors are adrift and starving aboard the storm-
ravaged Grampus, a bird flies overhead, carrying the disembodied head of a sailor from another 
passing ship, this one decimated by plague. Pym writes, “The horrid morsel dropped at length 
with a sullen splash immediately at the feet of Parker. May God forgive me, but now, for the first 
time, there flashed through my mind a thought, a thought which I will not mention, and I felt 
myself making a step toward the ensanguined spot. I looked upward, and the eyes of Augustus 
met my own with a degree of intense and eager meaning which immediately brought me to my 
senses. I sprang forward quickly, and, with a deep shudder, threw the frightful thing into the sea” 
(70). Both Pym’s fears and his desires are mingled in this scene. He aches to consume but 
shudders at what succumbing to the urge would reveal: that the universe is ordered only around 
the logic of consumption and exchange, and that everyone is designated as either the consumer 
or the consumed. Pym implicitly fears being made into a product like the meat with which he 
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shares metonymic proximity in both space and text, and desires, as a survivor of the capitalist 
market system, to consume others. 
In Pym readers see a character obsessed with the puzzle of consumption, the relentless 
need to consume or to be consumed, as well as an author and an amanuensis who present an 
ostensible history for public consumption, reiterating the experience of bodily sacrifice as an 
instance of communion among a public readership. This is a persistent feature of Poe’s writing. 
Writing in 1992, for example, Alexander Hammond pointed out the recurrence of tropes of 
consumption in Poe’s texts. In “The Gold-Bug” and “Bon-Bon,” characters “convert foodstuff 
into meals sold to and eaten by customers… [or the character] offers to convert his soul into a 
‘stew’ to be sold to the devil. At the middle of each of these relationships, the exchangeable 
commodity…can be metaphorically substituted one for another, as can the more mysterious 
conversion and consumption processes at the extremes” (162). Hammond specifically links this 
to the act of writing, saying that “because the exchange of that commodity is economic, writing 
for the marketplace thus becomes both a kind of Faustian bargain with those who would buy and 
control the author’s work and a commerce with the cannibals who ‘dine’ on it” (163). 
Consumption is the central terror of the text, but also its most productive element. People 
consume one another, so that they might survive, readers consume the novel so that they might 
learn its secrets, and Pym learns to consume, in order to transcend the boundaries of perceived 
moral logic, and to comprehend the divine but amoral economic logic that undergirds reality. 
For a time, other, less troubling commodities keep Pym from succumbing to his desire, 
but even these commodities reinforce the divinely-ordered religious overtones of Pym’s 
suffering and need to consume. When the surviving men discover a barrel while diving beneath 
the waterlogged decks, they literally survive off of wine and blood, taking satisfaction and 
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communion at the same time and conflating the consumer urge with Christian sacrament (73). 
All the necessary elements of a communion are present but the sacrificial body, and, as long as 
Pym resists the requirement for such a sacrifice, his salvation will be provisional at best. Though 
the wine may seem to save Pym’s life, it provides no nutrition, and even invites the kind of 
madness Pym experienced after days locked in the coffin-like hold of the Grampus. He 
maintains, “I had for some time past, dwelt upon the prospect of our being reduced to this last 
horrible extremity, and had secretly made up my mind to suffer death in any shape or under any 
circumstances rather than resort to such a course. Nor was this resolution in any degree 
weakened by the present intensity of hunger under which I laboured” (78). Readers know that 
this is but a temporary and deceptive repast, a commodity that merely distracts Pym from his 
essential need to act according to the logic of the market, to eat or to be eaten.  
When Pym does finally succumb to the necessity for consumption, he at once loses his 
sense of what it is to be human and gains a greater sense of what it is to be a survivor in the 
capitalist marketplace. He converts into his first terrifying vision of the embodiment of consumer 
hunger let loose and transformed into a kind of madness, and becomes the consumer monster 
first embodied by his beloved dog, Tiger. He recalls, “At this moment all the fierceness of the 
tiger possessed my bosom, and I felt toward my poor fellow-creature, Parker, the most intense, 
the most diabolical hatred” (81). People are, the scene argues, little more than hungry animals, 
friendly when fed but ready to pounce upon one another for nourishment, protection, or survival. 
We will kill to eat, to survive, and to consume. 
If Pym wishes to survive, he must face the sacrifices that underpin survival in a capitalist 
moral universe. He recalls, “I recovered from my swoon in time to behold the consummation of 
the tragedy in the death of him who had been chiefly instrumental in bringing it about. He made 
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no resistance whatever, and was stabbed in the back by Peters, when he fell instantly dead.” 
Almost perversely, Poe has his narrator faint, but recover in time to witness the violence that will 
be his salvation. Pym sadly admits to his readers that he did what, for so much of the novel, he 
has longed to do. He writes, “I must not dwell upon the fearful repast which immediately ensued. 
Such things may be imagined, but words have no power to impress the mind with the exquisite 
horror of their reality” (81). Perhaps not, although Pym will violate this promise not to describe 
the event in just a moment. However, if the moral order of the Atlantic revolves around the logic 
of consumption, then this act is its most sacred rite. Pym’s “fearful repast,” is a necessary and 
even holy sacrifice in the providential capitalist Atlantic.  
Pym performs this tense drama of desire and revulsion, by focusing on its central 
character’s struggles with how and whether to narrate scenes of consumption. Pym insists that he 
will not betray his own secrets, even as he satisfies our desires, our hunger, for the grim details. 
He writes, “Let it suffice to say that, having in some measure appeased the raging thirst which 
consumed us by the blood of the victim, and having by common consent taken off the hands, 
feet, and head, throwing them together with the entrails, into the sea, we devoured the rest of the 
body, piecemeal, during the four ever memorable days of the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, 
and twentieth of the month” (81). Poe knows that, from the first stirrings of potential 
cannibalism, the reader has expected and longed for this moment. Finally, we see Pym succumb 
to the logic of consumption and in such a way so that we too can share in that consumption.  
Poe goes a step beyond simply acknowledging the co-instantiation of commodity 
relations and consumption, to tease and implicate his readers in the brutal logic of commodity 
consumption. He shows us what happens to the blood, the entrails, the hands and feet of the 
victim, so that, as readers, we can devour them along with Pym, but also so that we might share 
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in a kind of communion with the survivors of the wrecked Grampus. The communal Christian 
sacrifice entwines with the calculating logic of market equivalence and exchange: one dead body 
for three live ones. Writing in 1992, Carol Peirce and Alexander G. Rose III also recognize the 
religious overtones of this blasphemous meal. They write, “The passing of the ship leads straight 
to the bloody cannibal feast, almost a parody of the Eucharist, the sacred ritual of the Grail 
mysteries. Pym shrinks in horror but presides over the lots and ultimately participates” (67). A 
grim echo of the sacrament of Holy Communion draws together the small and stranded society 
around the parcels of flesh that have both ceased to be human, transforming into meat no 
different from the ham and mutton of the storeroom, and taken on overwhelming spiritual 
significance, converting into the fetish objects that give the men no less than life.  
However, just as Poe asserts the sacred status of the cannibalistic urge toward 
consumption, he undermines its claims to logic or necessity. Ironically, the stranded party is 
saved almost a moment later by another “large ham and a bottle of Madeira wine” that they 
discover below deck (82). The act of cannibalism was unnecessary except as a means to 
perpetuate consumer logic; the sacrifice was made to a god who cares little for the men or, if it 
does care, toys with them in the most perverse way possible. Consumption then is an act carried 
out for its own sake. Moreover, the rediscovery of wine and ham as lifesaving commodities 
allows the text to double back on itself, to reveal the way cannibalism, consumption, 
commodification, and communion have functioned as the primary values of providential 
capitalism all along. 
Pym faces a greater spiritual crisis when his friend, Augustus, dies, presenting the 
challenge of whether to continue to obey the law of consumption, to treat his friend as the 
commodity he always was, and survive, or to resist the inescapable grasp of consumer demands. 
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He writes, “We now saw clearly that Augustus could not be saved; that he was evidently dying. 
We could do nothing to relieve his sufferings, which appeared to be great. About twelve o'clock 
he expired in strong convulsions, and without having spoken for several hours. His death filled 
us with the most gloomy forebodings, and had so great an effect upon our spirits that we sat 
motionless by the corpse during the whole day, and never addressed each other except in a 
whisper” (88). When Augustus begins to decay, just like the ham in the Grampus hold, it is as if 
nature itself is taunting the men for their decision not to obey its cannibalistic logic. The text 
presents the men with an enticing opportunity to eat a friend who resembles more and more a 
piece of meat and less and less a person. The longer they resist, the longer they strain against the 
essential values of the moral and natural universe they inhabit. 
Nevertheless, although they do resist—or claim to—the market still succeeds in the end. 
Throwing Augustus’ body overboard only invites other operatives in the market to profit from 
their refusal. Poe completes the drama of Augustus’ non-burial, writing, “It was not until some 
time after dark that we took courage to get up and throw the body overboard. It was then 
loathsome beyond expression, and so far, decayed that, as Peters attempted to lift it, an entire leg 
came off in his grasp. As the mass of putrefaction slipped over the vessel's side into the water, 
the glare of phosphoric light with which it was surrounded plainly discovered to us seven or 
eight large sharks, the clashing of whose horrible teeth, as their prey was torn to pieces among 
them, might have been heard at the distance of a mile. We shrunk within ourselves in the 
extremity of horror at the sound” (88). This entire scene has been orchestrated to make its 
conclusions inescapable. The market will ensure that someone, somewhere, will profit, even 
from death. Moreover, nature seems to obey the consumer logic of the market. The world itself 
shares the logic of the cannibal or the monster. 
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The moral tension of such a text carries enormous weight in an Atlantic world that 
depends so greatly upon the suffering and sacrifice of laborers to function. As a result, the 
reader’s position is of central importance: can we identify with the consumer or the consumed? 
Saidiya Hartman, for example, notes that scenes of black suffering ask us to participate as 
“witnesses...or…voyeurs” presented with the chance to sympathize or self-reflect (3). Poe, in 
contrast, doesn’t ask readers to consider the suffering of sacrificed characters, but to consider the 
choices made by those who sacrifice them. The novel puts the reader in the position of the 
consumer and criticizes characters for resisting the overwhelming logic of consumption. People 
die and must be consumed, the novel argues. The important thing is the moral choice to consume 
or to resist, to obey the consumer logic of the moral universe we inhabit or to turn away from its 
imperatives. 
As the cannibal horror continues in the novel, it does so in such a way as to critique 
Pym’s polite pretenses for masking the essential nature of the moral and economic universe in 
which he lives.xxx The leader of Tsalal, Too-wit, invites the sailors of the Jane Guy to a feast, 
where they are offered mysterious, but disgusting, meat. Pym speculates that it belongs to “the 
slim-legged hogs” that he’d earlier seen, but the text makes it clear that it may well be the body 
of some unfortunate man. Pym describes the way their dinner “was handed into the tent over the 
heads of the attendants, and consisted of the palpitating entrails of a species of unknown animal, 
probably one of the slim-legged hogs which we had observed in our approach to the village.” 
Although Pym tells readers that they are “probably” only consuming a pig, Poe invites readers to 
see the potential horror that lurks just beneath the surface of polite ritual. He continues: “Seeing 
us at a loss how to proceed, he began, by way of setting us an example, to devour yard after yard 
of the enticing food, until we could positively stand it no longer, and evinced such manifest 
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symptoms of rebellion of stomach as inspired his majesty with a degree of astonishment only 
inferior to that brought about by the looking-glasses” (121). Poe creates a scenario that, though 
coded and filtered through the protagonist’s orientalizing gaze, still forces readers to consider the 
fact that the bloody exchange and consumer market presents the same actions under the pretense 
of civility.  
Moreover, as Mastroianni explains, the hospitality on display is the very thing that marks 
the participants as human. If, however, that hospitality is rooted in a cannibalistic exchange, then 
it follows that cannibalism, the consumption of one individual by another, is the most natural 
“human” behavior in the market-driven universe. When Pym returns to the topic to chastise the 
evidently duplicitous natives, he writes “we should have been the most suspicious of human 
beings had we entertained a single thought of perfidy on the part of a people who treated us so 
well. A very short while sufficed to prove that this apparent kindness of disposition was only the 
result of a deeply laid plan for our destruction, and that the islanders for whom we entertained 
such inordinate feelings of esteem, were among the most barbarous, subtle, and bloodthirsty 
wretches that ever contaminated the face of the globe” (123). However, Poe is more critical than 
Pym and offers readers the chance to see his implicit critique. If the natives’ civility masked their 
bloodthirsty nature, then what did the cannibalistic sailors’ civility mask? 
Commodification and Racial Reversal 
This act of masking also implies the deceptive nature of race in the novel and in an 
Atlantic in which white bodies could be impressed into labor or, in this case, reduced to the 
savagery they pretend to have transcended. Indeed, Pym’s body, forced into the cramped 
confines of the ship, surrounded by other goods, each with an equivalent market price, undergoes 
a racially and geographically inverted middle passage. By evoking white slavery and Barbary 
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piracy, and by recontextualizing the slave experience within the white body of Pym, Poe offers 
his white readers an opportunity to investigate Rudoff’s questions about the natural ordination of 
racial hierarchy or to consider the frightening possibility against which Poe’s readers hold the 
shield of white supremacy. In a market in which human beings can be shipped and traded, only 
the false logic of an invented racial caste system protects white bodies from the same fate. Pym’s 
commodity conversions are so complete that he loses or exchanges his racial identity, suggesting 
that, if whiteness does possess a high market value, it could be converted or lost through trade. 
With this in mind, readers might examine all of the subsequent horrors that Pym experiences as 
the results of his conversion from free white man into a body that can be stripped of its protective 
whiteness, enslaved, commodified, and consumed.  
Pym’s racially inverted middle passage is of a piece with the novel’s anxiety over racial 
transformation or over the unreliability of racial codes. Recall that Pym rightly suspects Too-wit 
of performing ignorance in order to mollify his race-blinded white victims. Moreover, the 
constant refrain of the villagers, “Tekili-Li,” is a terrified response to whiteness that goes hand-
in-hand with the text’s overall treatment of whiteness as something frightful, rather than 
transcendent.  This ambivalent treatment of whiteness conforms to the concluding chapters’ 
over-determination of racial signifiers. The natives of Tsalal, for example are described as being 
so black as even to have black teeth (150). Pym’s fellow survivor of the sinking of the Grampus, 
Dirk Peters, is also described through the racializing gaze of Arthur Gordon Pym, amateur 
phrenologist: “Peters himself was one of the most ferocious-looking men I ever beheld. He was 
short in stature, not more than four feet eight inches high, but his limbs were of Herculean 
mould. His hands, especially, were so enormously thick and broad as hardly to retain a human 
shape. His arms, as well as legs, were bowed in the most singular manner, and appeared to 
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possess no flexibility whatever. His head was equally deformed, being of immense size, with an 
indentation on the crown (like that on the head of most negroes), and entirely bald” (30). Yet, as 
Montwieler and Boren, in their discussion of hybridity, are aware, the racial cues are all 
misleading: the “natural ferocity of [Peters’] countenance” conceals Pym’s friend and ally; the 
ignorant savage played so expertly by Too-wit is really a cunning strategist; the white creatures 
and the white haze Peters, Pym, and Nunu, the villager they capture, all enter at the end of the 
novel, inspires terror, instead of connoting the apex of racial symbols.  
All of this suggests anxiety about racial miscommunication, and further suggests a fear of 
racial relativism. Whiteness might be bad or evil instead of good, just as blackness might be a 
sign of intelligence instead of ignorance. Within the novel, whiteness and blackness are equally 
untrustworthy and unreliable empty signifiers. None of these racial categories are fixed or 
permanent, because the logic of exchange and equivalence reigns over all. Race isn’t 
symbolically fixed if, in the mobile market of the Atlantic, individuals can climb up or fall down 
its treacherous ladder. John C. Havard sees Pym as “a hoaxical satire of racist epistemologies” 
that reveals that Poe “undoubtedly believed in the inferiority of those of African descent” even as 
it both plays into and challenges the beliefs of the readers of The Southern Literary Messenger 
(Havard 107). Havard contends that “Poe satirizes his readers’ tendency to misunderstand race 
due to their reliance on similarly racist epistemological apparatuses” (108). Moreover, the 
savagery to which the white characters descend further undermines epistemes of race and racial 
hierarchy. Finally, Harvard argues that the final image of the text, of the looming white figure, 
represents Pym’s own racialist fantasy of triumphal whiteness, even as it functions to confuse 
readers on the issue of race because “whiteness here leads to the utter absence of meaning” 
(116). However, if we limit our interpretation of the novel to its racial formulations and even 
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dislocations, we miss the important philosophical challenge it poses for its audience. The 
question of race in Poe’s age is, as Rudoff notes, a question of the essential value of individual 
personhood. To upend racial epistemology, therefore, is to upend the primary mechanism by 
which antebellum society not only constructs hierarchies of class and status, but also those of 
spiritual election. By placing his characters in an environment ordered around the logic of the 
market value of human flesh, Poe forces his readers to confront their fantasies of white mastery, 
and to grapple with the question of whether their souls have value only in relation to the color of 
their skin. If Poe challenges the readers of The Southern Literary Messenger to question the 
meaning and value of race, he asks them to scrutinize their very souls by the logic of the 
marketplace, even as he snatches away the codex of white supremacy upon which they depend 
for meaning.  
If race becomes permeable in this novel, or at least open to symbolic reversal, so too does 
the logic of mastery and submission that undergirds nineteenth-century notions of a racial caste 
system. Poe dramatizes this uneasy potential, by presenting Pym as a character who at once fears 
and longs for both mastery and submission. In discussing Poe’s presentation of women, Colin 
Dayan points out “that the enslaved want to be mastered, for they love—and this is the crucial 
word for Poe—to serve, to be subservient” (242). This applies in this text as well, for Pym 
willfully, even gleefully submits to his burial, commodification, and submission in the bowels of 
the Grampus, then spends the rest of the novel caught in a tense back-and-forth between his 
desire to consume and to be consumed. Dayan also argues that in Poe’s “tales about 
women…possession, multiple hauntings, and identity dissolutions suspend gender difference as a 
component of identity” (244). The same might be said about Poe’s treatment of race in Pym. 
Regarding Poe’s willingness to turn nineteenth century tropes of white female beauty into 
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visions of white “pallor” and dread, Dayan notes that Poe “makes whiteness as negative and 
opaque what Jefferson had described in Notes on the State of Virginia as an ‘immoveable veil of 
black.’…Poe plays with the possibility of one thing passing into another and vice versa—the 
convertibility so much a part of his project” (250).  The central character of Pym remains in 
circulation in the Atlantic market, and so his racial status remains suspended, with the potential 
to settle into the role of mastery or submission, and frequently oscillating between both. 
Moreover, his whiteness might instantiate the hierarchies of white supremacy, or might upend 
them altogether. 
 This “convertibility” becomes pronounced in the novel, as seemingly docile pets 
and natives become threatening figures of submissive entities asserting their claims to mastery. 
Dayan, for example, notes that the loving submission of the pet turns into the monster seeking 
mastery, reflecting Poe’s ambivalent views of mastery and slavery. Dayan writes that “the rare 
and special love between slave and master, man and wife, based on the law of property, becomes 
the medium by which perfect submission becomes equivalent to a pure but perverse love. A 
slave, a piece of property, a black pet…effects an excess of devotion.” Yet this devotion, in its 
excess, in its sacrificial love, can quickly reverse and transform into the urge to consume. 
Regarding “The Black Cat,” Dayan writes that Poe “demonstrates…how destructive is the 
illusion of mastery…as the pet of perfect docility turns into “a brute beast” (252). So too might 
the slave or the servant turn into the master or the monster driven by the consumptive urge. 
Pym’s anxiety represents not only his fear of dehumanization and consumption, but also 
his concern over the dangerous game of trading and production upon which the entire Atlantic 
market depends. Pym’s enclosure within the bowels of the Grampus is doubly frightful as a 
result of the dangerous products with which he, knowingly or unknowingly, shares space. 
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Tobacco, flammable alcohol, dried grains—these are some of the most important products of 
Atlantic trade, and each has the potential to explode and destroy the very ship that carries them. 
Pym notes how carefully commodities must be packed by reminding readers of the case of the 
Firefly. He tells us that in 1825, “the force of the movement [of commodities] bursting open the 
main hatchway…the vessel went down like a shot. This happened within hail of a small sloop 
from Madeira, which picked up one of the crew (the only person saved)” (44). Pym himself is a 
form of unstable cargo at this point, potentially unsettling the shipped commodities as he moves 
about in the hold. The Firefly anecdote suggests that the market itself is unstable and may, at any 
moment, erupt into a calamity that would engulf the Atlantic world by engulfing the trade upon 
which it depends. Pym’s body becomes the repository not only for the Atlantic market’s 
commodifying logic, but also for its fears of disruption and collapse.  
Given his trip’s evocative references to the middle passage and to racial inversion, Pym’s 
body also becomes the repository for fears of revolutionary racial upheaval. If valuable 
commodities like tobacco, alcohol, and grain could combust, could not the most valuable 
commodity of all? Fear of a slave rebellion also motivates the novel’s conclusion, in which the 
black villagers of Tsalal outsmart and murder the white explorers en masse. If the logic of 
commodification is all-encompassing, it is also unstable and threatens free white people with the 
possibility that they might change places with unfree black people within the market cosmology. 
In this novel, the exchange must be violent, because all of the transactions in the novel are. The 
dead bodies of the white sailors become the sacrifices upon which the black natives can assert 
their superiority, liberty, and agency in a market-oriented universe. 
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Providence Written in Stones 
In what way, though, do the moral, cultural, and personal crises narrated in Pym’s 
account constitute concern over providential capitalism in particular? For one thing, these are 
moral issues, anxious investigations into the impact that transactional human encounters might 
have upon one's soul. For another, they reveal the unsettling reality that God offers no answers to 
moral questions and cannot be counted upon for deliverance. The text offers only ambiguous 
explanations for revelation and denies a comprehensible basis for commerce and commercial 
adventurism—both might be rational, supernatural or simply the products of disease or 
drunkenness. In any event, messages from outside of the confusing web of commodification and 
consumption utterly resist interpretation. For example, Pym, interred in the heart of the Grampus 
receives a dispatch from Augustus that says only “blood,” to which he responds, “how trebly full 
of import did [the word] now appear—how chilly and heavily…did its vague syllables fall, amid 
the deep gloom of my prison, into the innermost recesses of my soul!” (25). The message carries 
the weight of spiritual significance and may, in fact, offer the key to Pym’s survival. Yet it is 
incomprehensible. Receiving messages of this kind, the soul merely shrinks from horror in this 
novel; it never exults in grace.  
This shrinking is appropriate, given nature’s chilly reception of entreaties to the divine. 
For example, as the Grampus crashes and sinks, Augustus exclaims “It is all over with us, and 
may God have mercy upon our souls!" (61). God shows no evident mercy, and will not, 
throughout the text. Instead, what divine intelligence there is will present the tantalizing 
possibility of deliverance, but never its manifest reality. A moment after the former exclamation, 
Pym and Augustus fall to their knees. They look to God and ask “his aid in the many dangers 
which beset us” (67). Then, as if in answer, they see an approaching vessel and think themselves 
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rescued. Pym exults, “we poured out our whole souls in shouts and thanksgiving to God for the 
complete, unexpected, and glorious deliverance that was so palpably at hand” (68). But the ship 
is—comically, tragically, horrifically—captained by a literal skeleton crew. All hands are dead 
from a mysterious plague. God’s message is like that of Augustus to Pym: blood, with no 
rational or supernatural context. The novel contains only death, with no promise of deliverance.  
Nevertheless, the final scene of the novel brings Pym to an evident place of judgment that 
frames the text as retrospectively providential, and suggests that a divine hand has been 
orchestrating events all along. Careening ever southward, Pym’s final journal entry reads “there 
arose in our pathway a shrouded human figure, very far larger in its proportions than any dweller 
among men. And the hue of the skin of the figure was of the perfect whiteness of the snow” 
(151). If this is a divine figure, it is one that elicits fear from the Tsalal villagers, including the 
captured Nunu, who dies of fright at their approach (150). It is never clear whether this is, 
indeed, God, but it is clearly a superhuman entity and appears to have orchestrated the events 
that drew Pym to its feet. As such, the reader should prepare for a judgment to be rendered over 
the decisions and transactions that have brought Pym to this fatal moment. All of Pym’s 
documented sins have been sins of a transactional nature, trading other lives for his own, or 
blasphemously replaying the communion to survive. The ending of the novel, therefore, leaves 
readers with an important question: has it all been worth it? Has Pym purchased revelation at the 
cost of his friends, his home, his identity, and his preconceived moral boundaries? If so, does he 
inhabit a universe in which such a trade is proper and justified? Were his sins actually just the 
natural and, therefore, virtuous performances of his vocation as a consumer in the market? This 
final judgment will determine whether the sacrificed bodies that Pym has left in his wake have 
helped him to convert into a soul ready to be received by a divine entity that has orchestrated his 
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economic and literal journeys. Or it will reveal him as unsuited to existence within a moral 
cosmology that uses economic transactions to offer individuals their only opportunities to make 
moral choices. That he survives to tell the tale, perhaps, offers the answer. 
Moreover, these events have been telegraphed from the start of the novel, reinforcing the 
novel’s late gestures toward providential predestination. Pym admits in only the second chapter 
that his “visions were of shipwreck and famine of death or captivity among barbarian hordes; of 
a lifetime dragged out in sorrow and tears, upon some gray and desolate rock, in an ocean 
unapproachable and unknown” (11). If these visions are not explicitly coded as providential, they 
still contain the entire novel in miniature. At least in this respect, the novel implies predestination 
and supernatural revelation.  
More compelling is the possibility that events in the novel spring from a divine intellect 
that has communicated through written language but, again, in such a way as to remain 
incomprehensible to the central characters. Pym, for example, notes the shape and location of the 
system of caves in which he and Dirk Peters seek shelter from the attacking villagers (138). 
Later, the editor and publisher of his narrative reads them as an alphabet, potentially spelling “To 
be Shady…to be white…the region of the south” in a number of different world dialects (154). 
This then is the language of the secret but universal religious culture that unites faiths and far-
flung societies. The editor’s interpretation tantalizingly suggests that all of the events of the tale 
may have been composed by an active and divine authorial hand and that that hand links all of 
Ethiopian, Arabic, and Egyptian cultures to Pym’s experiences. If Peter Taylor is correct and the 
novel should be read typologically in light of the Book of Daniel, then, even if the messages 
remain unreadable, they suggest the union of spiritual cultures in the Atlantic, as well as the 
divine order of the novel’s narrative events. The will and message of God presage the text, 
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having already been etched into the stones of the island for Pym, acting as a prophet, to discover 
and disseminate. Moreover, Pym only found his way to this prophetic position as a result of the 
economic underpinning of the adventure at the start of the novel.  So, once more, the divine 
communicates with the ordinary world of men like Pym primarily through the market. The 
market, the one that launched the Grampus, the Jane Guy, and Arthur Gordon Pym into the 
Atlantic, has proven a vehicle for the discovery of a divine universal language and an evidently 
interventionist deity.  
Even so, if God is the intelligence designing Pym’s universe and journey, then the novel 
suggests that people like Pym are but God’s commodity playthings to move about, exchange, and 
evaluate. This then inverts the logic employed by writers like Equiano. Belonging to God offers 
no reassurance, peace, or security, save the security of knowing that an individual is little more 
than a commodified object in a universe that resembles the market.xxxi Barton L. St. Armand 
similarly observed this element of the novel and called the nature of transformation in Pym 
“sacred and profane” (60). He notes that the series of interlocking rituals of consumption and 
transformation in the novel, “are all allegories of the larger, higher, and more inclusive ritual of 
transcendence, rungs on a ladder by which the ultimate state of all-in-one and one-in-all is 
reached” (61). Poe maintains the revelatory and providential generic conventions of this moment 
by reframing predestination as a secular but supernatural form of prophecy, and by re-forging the 
covenant tablets as the cliff-side dwellings of a civilization of bloodthirsty killers. Text maintains 
its covenant-oriented taboo status, with the ability to assert truth as well as to make events occur, 
but with no security that the outcomes will offer the individual transcendence, rather than 
obliteration. These concerns would continue to influence writers into the antebellum period. In 
particular, the philosophical implications of maritime free labor as a form of social sacrifice 
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would become particularly acute, especially in novels by writers like Herman Melville, who use 
the Atlantic market as a space in which to stage dramas of sacrifice, conversion, communion, and 
exchange. 
Herman Melville Tries to Sell a Book 
Maritime novels, like Dana’s and Equiano’s, offer a jeremiadic sense of victorious 
exploration and expansion, a narrative of personal conversion from naiveté to special knowledge 
and expertise, as well as an assertion of the virtuous character of seafaring labor as vocation. 
Herman Melville knew these conventions and constructed his 1849 novel, Redburn: His First 
Voyage, as a narrative that adhered closely to expectations of the maritime exploration genre. 
The novel’s parallels to Dana’s are unmistakable, down to specific plot elements, attesting to the 
degree to which Melville was writing within an established medium. Indeed, readers might be 
tempted to take the novel’s conventionality for granted as they search for Melville’s novelistic 
innovations or subversions. However, the relative predictability of a text like Redburn is the very 
thing that distinguishes it as evidence of a larger cultural victory for providential capitalism and a 
broader, more prevalent concern with issues of commodification that appears in maritime 
narratives.  
Redburn, along with its follow-up, White Jacket, is something of an accidentally pivotal 
novel for Melville. It largely abandons the sometimes wild and wandering exoticism of 
Melville’s early Pacific-set novels and evades the extravagantly symbolic and imaginative leaps 
of his later novels. Redburn is also a deliberate response to the failure of Melville’s previous 
novel, Mardi, a highly symbolic and much less mainstream early attempt at extended allegory. 
Nevertheless, as an attempt at writing an orthodox maritime adventure narrative, Redburn is a 
failure. Its plot is both circular and digressive, its characters either thinly drawn or caught in 
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endless games of manipulation and control, and its themes both covertly and overtly pessimistic. 
Where Redburn succeeds is as a complex meditation upon the personal effects of a market-
dictated life, which focuses attention upon the uncanny aspects of human-commodity relations in 
the Atlantic. Indeed, Brian Yothers points out that Melville “dismissed White-Jacket and 
Redburn as books written to order” that nevertheless maintain “his profound ethical interest,” in 
questions of poverty, charity, and the innate violence of social interaction (Yothers 73).  In its 
awkward attempts to satisfy as a mainstream maritime adventure account, the novel uncovers 
fears of commodity misidentification that lay at the heart of maritime fiction.  
Redburn is not unique because it discusses the relation of men to their labor—the same is 
true of most of Melville’s fiction. Rather, it is unique because it is so focused upon the maritime 
commodity market, so fixated upon the way that an individual’s relation to that market could 
initiate processes of personal commodification, and so interested in the sacrifices necessary for 
the production of the Atlantic economy. Benjamin S. West argues that Redburn presents 
Melville’s most potent criticism of capitalism as a system of labor and as a structure for Atlantic 
society. He writes, “Redburn makes it clear that Melville views capitalism as an alienating force, 
a hindrance to the American Dream, and a cause of social injustice throughout the Western 
world” (West 165). West also argues that the book reveals Melville’s opinion that capitalism 
“forces some individuals to live so that others might profit” (179). Though Bartleby the 
Scrivener is probably his most thorough indictment of American capitalism, and The Paradise of 
Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids probably his most direct attack on the system’s abusive 
practices, Redburn most clearly articulates the centrality of abuse, consumption and 
commodification in the Atlantic maritime marketplace in particular. In an earlier critique, Neal 
Tolchin agrees, writing that Redburn is Melville’s “most damning case against commercial 
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values” (Tolchin 168). Indeed, the novel’s cynical bildungsroman sees Wellingborough Redburn 
grow only through degradation and exploitation aboard his ship, The Highlander, poverty in 
Liverpool, and humiliation upon his return to the United States.  
Many scholars have taken up Melville as a writer interested in the problems of capital 
and labor, or even as a figure of resistance to capital’s demands.  For example, Melville’s 
narratives suggest Theodor Adorno’s formative examinations of human and social embodiments 
of ideals of capitalist labor. Similarly, in an early but representative 1945 reading of Melville, 
R.E. Watters read Melville’s Typee as a novel primarily concerned with examining “sociality” as 
an experience of social indebtedness. More recently, Cesare Casarino reads Moby-Dick as a 
series of class performances and depictions. Scholars like Hester Blum have, likewise, 
investigated Melville’s evident protest against capital relations, particularly in texts like Bartleby 
the Scrivener. Related to this focus upon Melville’s examination of class relations is the question 
of the relative authenticity of his depictions of classed subjects. Authenticity and believability 
were primary concerns among maritime authors. Moreover, as Jason Berger points out, because 
they were presented as autobiography, both slave and sailor’s narratives required authenticity. 
This suggests not only their generic resemblance, but also their experiential similarity (Berger 
31). Both slave authors and sailor authors wanted to produce experiences for their readers that 
would instruct, elicit sympathy, instantiate community, and allow past experiences to take on 
productive life in the market. They could only do so if readers believed texts to be authentic. 
However, a marked shift appears to have occurred among scholars of Melville and his 
literature. Where earlier critics, and some recent critics, have focused primarily upon Melville’s 
ties to labor-relations and even upon the way his representation of labor might reflect his interest 
in antebellum antislavery politics, more and more recent scholarship has taken up Melville’s 
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work for its aesthetic experimentation and for its psychological insights. John Paul Wenke 
examines Melville’s metaphysical interests through his aesthetic recreations of philosophical 
issues. Paul McCarthy, on the other hand, has attempted a thorough examination of the role of 
“madness” across Melville’s work. Clare Spark studies the political culture surrounding 
Melville’s texts through the lens of censorship and Enlightenment debates. This is not to say that 
the Melville’s religious interests have been left aside. Brian Yothers, for example, attempts to 
reconcile Melville’s many contradictory religious allusions by examining the diverse religious 
cultures of Melville’s America. If these many interpretations can be unified and linked to 
critiques that focus primarily upon Melville’s interest in labor relations, it is through the lens of 
providential capitalism. Melville assesses a society that sees capital as providentially divine and 
providence as a form of capital relation. As a result, his psychological, aesthetic, and political 
experiments fall into place alongside his more overt labor concerns. 
Poe and, increasingly over his career, Melville, both appear to challenge the need for 
authenticity in literature, producing texts that claim autobiography, even as they practice fiction. 
Nevertheless, critics like Walter Bezanson assert that Melville mined his real experience for his 
sailor narratives. This is true, but Melville uses his authority as a former sailor to threaten the 
barrier between fiction and autobiography. Writing in 1991, Jonathan L. Hall noted that Redburn 
“is the closest Melville had ever come—or ever would come—to obeying the formal conventions 
of the mid-nineteenth-century novel” (259). Although Hall recognizes that this adherence is, at 
best, circumscribed by Melville’s characteristic allegory, he still reads the novel through the lens 
of nineteenth-century bildungsroman. Nevertheless, he too sees the violence upon which this 
development of self rests. He writes, “Redburn attacks the shipboard system of identity, with its 
insistent erasure of personal history, its attempt to base personal identity on the mere 
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contingency of the present moment of the present cruise. He attempts to reverse this denial of the 
past, to re-assert more traditional norms which emphasize the continuity of the self and the 
validity of familial definition.” However, hall continues, “the more he tries to contact the past 
and to establish a connection between the accounts of those who came before and what he finds 
in his present experience, the more he encounters not reassuring continuity but disorienting gaps” 
(261). This is correct and, to see the material reality of this “erasure,” readers need only look to 
Redburn’s father’s useless travel guide, the protagonist’s link to his familial past, to the past of 
his laboring community, and to the geographic past of Liverpool. Hall locates Redburn’s 
resistance to this obliteration of self in his construction of a narrative identity, one that can 
adhere to novelistic expectation and can observe and control the meaning of events. However, 
within the context of providential capitalism, this erasure is even more comprehensible if no less 
destabilizing. Time and experience are, themselves, subject to the same exchange logic as all of 
the other individuals, events, and belief systems in the novel. The past does not proceed into the 
present, but is exchanged for the present. The past then loses value and becomes excess, like the 
rags that the rag-pickers pick, like the books that no longer communicate, like the individuals 
lost at home or to the sea. The past is spent, erased as the present accumulates value. Redburn’s 
true personal development, then, comes when he transitions from resisting this erasure to 
accepting it as part of the exchange process of the divine marketplace. He comes to accept that 
the only things that persist are those that maintain exchangeable or usable value.  
Nevertheless, it is impossible to divorce Melville’s critiques of capital from his critiques 
of Jacksonian America. In 1985, Michael Rogin argued convincingly for the questioning 
approach to capitalism that runs throughout many of Melville’s novels as well as for the links 
between Melville’s autobiography and his “subversive” representation of labor. Indeed, these 
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elements of Melville’s evident discomfort with capital link early Melville scholars like Watters 
to more recent scholarship that has attempted to situate Melville’s capital critiques within a 
personal, political, and historical context. Numerous critics have remarked, for example, upon 
the economic circumstances of Melville's own life, circumstances which first drove him to sea, 
then drove him to work at the New York Customs Office when he could not support his family 
on a writer's income. Hildegard Hoeller notes the way these facts made their way into Melville's 
fictions when she observes how, in his first novel, Typee, "Melville defines Typee as the 
antithesis of the depression-plagued capitalist America he knew. The very fact that there is no 
money in Typee—the root of all evil, as Melville calls it—gets rid of all the phenomena of a 
depressed money economy that Melville lists and knew first hand." The novel is, therefore, "an 
ironic panic fiction" (148). Readers might read that “panic” as rooted in economic uncertainty, 
personal economic failure, or broader national or philosophical ambivalence.  
Similarly, Melville’s fears of the Jacksonian period’s violently expanding nationalism, 
economic destabilization, and avaricious personal individualism, broaden his economic concerns 
to include fears of Jacksonian personal and social moral values. For example, amid her thorough 
1993 explanation of the elements of Redburn that mark it as a novel about the protagonist’s inner 
and social growth, Joyce A. Rowe noted that Redburn’s personal development is at odds with the 
Jacksonian period’s emphasis on individualism as a mode of normative manhood. Rowe writes, 
“If growth signifies moral development…Melville suggests that the demands of economic and 
social survival produce a deepening self-division and deficit in that emotional center from which 
genuine moral action derives. In his capacity for sympathy with others, especially with his 
tormentor Jackson, Redburn develops as a moral being. Yet the deeper levels of inner growth are 
blocked by the exigencies of the individualism he must live by” (56-7).  She continues, “In 
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Captain Riga…Redburn is introduced to the realities of a commercial world that humiliates his 
patrician expectations” (60). Essentially, Melville writes a nineteenth-century bildungsroman 
that remains circumscribed and even deformed by the social and economic mandates of 
Jacksonian America. More overtly, the villainous Jackson “connects the demagogic and brutal 
characteristics of the late president with the nightmare fears of the era to which his name serves 
as rubric—the anarchy, violence and corruption that an individualistic, socially fluid age fears it 
will unleash” (64). The villain’s name and Melville’s critique are hardly subtle: he fears that 
Jacksonian individualism, yoked to competitive market economy, will produce a society of 
sharkish exploitation and violent struggles for power. 
Yet, Melville’s investigations into the subject of labor, capital, philosophy, and politics, 
are always personalized, playing out upon the bodies of the men involved in these democratic 
and capitalist projects. With this in mind, the same-sex relations among the crew and characters 
of Redburn also suggest a kind of hospitable reciprocity that readers might consider a tacit 
rebuke to the Jacksonian threat. For David Greven, this aspect of the novel makes it into 
something of “a Russian-doll series of embedded allegories.” This is to say that “its depiction of 
the hellishness of shipboard life allegorizes the hellishness of gender conformity; in turn, the 
disruptive potentiality of gender nonconformity illuminates the perils and possibilities of sexual 
nonconformity.” By the same token, “the novel’s critique of antebellum era racism allegorizes 
Melville’s critique of compulsory gender roles and evocation of an alternately threatening and 
playful same-sex desire” (2). The novel’s moments of same-sex desire are most closely paired 
with its explicit ekphrastic critiques of slavery when Redburn travels to Liverpool sees a statue 
that calls to mind the European slave markets, and meets his friend and evident object of desire, 
Harry Bolton. Greven’s argument rests upon this apposition, suggesting that the possible 
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disruption of compulsory heterosexuality instantiated by life among the mobile denizens of the 
maritime Atlantic also portends the possible disruption of racial codes and hierarchies by the 
same mobile population. This reading extends the interpretation of Redburn as a novel of 
personal development, to present it also as one of potential national reckoning with race through 
gender. What readers should not miss in this critique is the element of reciprocal exchange. 
Homosocial and homosexual relations arise in the novel through reciprocity so, if such 
relationships are to portend racial reconfiguration or even the disruption of racial hierarchies, 
readers must see those possibilities as equally arising from the experience of reciprocity. 
Gendered, sexual, national, and racial freedom erupts in the novel because exchange, organized 
around the logic of market equivalence, makes it possible. The binding reciprocity of these 
relationships returns to Hoeller's contention of the gift economy that Melville observes in Typee. 
The gift-giving that Tommo experiences in that novel creates a social expectation that he will 
become a member of Typee society. It creates a building desire to possess Tommo (Hoeller 154). 
The same could be said of Redburn who, increasingly, feels the pull of a society that wants to 
possess him to the point of potentially consuming him.  
It is difficult to negotiate these interlocking allegories because they remain so ambiguous 
in Melville’s writing. Douglas Ivison, for example, argues that even Melville’s critiques extend 
from the same colonizing gaze and carry the same colonialist assumptions that they attempt to 
dismantle. Regarding Typee, He writes, “Typee works to negotiate this potential contradiction 
through a subversive misprision of one of the central literary genres of colonialist discourse, the 
travel story. However, although Melville’s book does provide a powerful critique of European 
behavior in the South Seas in particular, and of European civilization in general, it must be 
recognized that Typee ultimately seems to work toward the reification of the consciousness of the 
   Green 311 
 
imperial subject through its internalization of colonialist discourse” (115). Redburn potentially 
suffers from the same problem, critiquing slavery by overturning normative codes of sexuality, 
interracial labor relations, and even religious affiliation, but doing so through the authorial gaze 
of a normative colonial subject. Again, however, these knots of meaning and contradiction are at 
least partially resolved when the text is viewed through the lens of providential capitalism. 
Melville’s narrator does not merely observe and engage with both the norms and disruptions of 
Atlantic hierarchies of gender, nationalism, religion, and race. Rather, he views these hierarchies 
as negotiable and exchangeable elements in a grander transcendental cosmology of divine 
economy.  
Even Redburn’s own empowered colonialist perspective is implicitly a valuable 
commodity that might be exchanged or lost or devalued, much like Redburn’s once-precious 
travel book that loses all value over time. Regarding The Confidence Man, Hildegard Hoeller 
notes that the novel “stages the impossibility of narrative in a world where human bonds are 
replaced by deals and contracts, where trust has disappeared, and where the gift is almost 
(im)possible” (147). She continues "in a capitalist world of strangers, rather than in the tribal 
non-monetary world of the Typees, gifts become (im)possible and—Melville concludes—so do 
narratives" (158). Redburn sees a character learn this lesson in the harshest way possible, 
entering the maritime trade expecting mutual exchange to be the basis of friendship, but 
discovering the disappointing realities of capitalist acquisition and commodification instead. The 
novel’s highly organized structure allows this transformation to occur for Redburn, for the reader 
and, ultimately, for Melville, who would move on to less narratively cohesive, and more piercing 
critiques of capital, as his career continued. 
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Moreover, the novel presents moments of resistance in order to trace the borders of the 
society they challenge. Jason Berger, for example, describes sailors’ resistance to incursions into 
their spaces of pleasure in White-Jacket as moments of insurgence against the tight hierarchal 
control of the ship. This may be so and, indeed, in White-Jacket, sailors resist their captain’s 
attempts to curb their pleasure to the point of rebellion. However, in Redburn, pleasure is not an 
experience that exists outside of maritime hierarchies of power, but resides squarely within its 
logic and control. Redburn and Harry Bolton enjoy themselves in Liverpool, but do so at their 
own expense and for the sake of a greater economy. Moreover, their time in Liverpool is 
explicitly shaded by the city’s position within the economy of slavery, a point that Ian Baucom 
emphasizes when he calls Liverpool the “capitol” of the slaveholding Atlantic, and that Melville 
underscores with references to the presence of slaves and reminders of the slave economy all 
around his protagonist (Baucom 3). Redburn, furthermore, imagines the pleasure of sexual 
assignation, but imagines it in such a way that it conforms to consumer logic. Perhaps because 
the novel is less concerned with critiquing the specifics of oft-draconian Naval command, it 
broadens its view to demonstrate the way that pleasure—even self-negating pleasure—can be 
contained within a system that still operates via the logic of consumption, leading, ultimately, to 
the total consumption of the individual within the marketplace. As with Poe, readers would be 
wise not only to see all of these critical approaches as parts of a dialogue concerning Melville’s 
interests and investigations, but also to see them as the material with which the author forces a 
capital critique to transcend its economic frame and to become a personal and philosophical 
issue. Homosociality, democracy, labor, commodification, and philosophy are all important 
elements of Melville’s investigation into the spiritual event of his age. Namely: capitalist labor.  
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More often than not, Melville presents that experience as one of personal and social 
sacrifice. Nyquist notes that early Christian colonialists, including Las Casas, looked to classical 
texts and the Biblical Jephthah's model of self-sacrifice against the specter of forced slave 
sacrifice. She writes "in appealing to Euripides's emphasis on his heroine's voluntary self-
sacrifice, [historian George Buchanan] reinforces his culture's condemnation of the ritual 
sacrifice of children, prisoners of war, or slaves, none of whom have a say in the matter" she 
notes that scholars underscored the "voluntary character" of sacrifice while criticizing "the 
barbarism of customary, involuntary human sacrifice" (121-2). Essentially, for a sacrifice to be 
considered within the bounds of Christology, even capitalist Christology, it had to be voluntary. 
The laboring and suffering sailors aboard Poe's and Melville's ships are liminally situated 
between voluntary and involuntary sacrifice. They serve to put themselves in perilous situations 
and sometimes choose to sacrifice themselves for the sake of their crew, but, just as often, their 
initial choice is taken as acquiescence to the social need for sacrifice, and their death, voluntary 
or not, can be deemed sacred and necessary, within the logic of providential capitalism.  
Moreover, the primary sacrificial events of the novel occur as willed acts of 
commodification. Berger argues that White-Jacket’s white jacket “might act as a fetish-object for 
the narrator, allowing him to partition himself off from the logic of the ship’s space” (Berger 
Floating 209). No such “partition” exists for Redburn, who bears witness to individuals who, 
though they share space with commodities, do not use them as fetish repositories for social 
interaction or signification. Instead, they sacrifice themselves to become the fetish commodities 
through which interact the distant forces of Atlantic market capitalism. 
Nevertheless, the novel never forgets the personally obliterative nature of the 
commodification sacrifice, even if that sacrifice helps to establish or maintain community or the 
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market. Redburn consistently offers the possibility of escape in the Atlantic market, only to 
foreclose that possibility when the market reveals its true consumptive nature. This marks it as an 
important step in Melville’s evolving interest in the possibilities for freedom and free agency 
within or outside of capitalism. Even Melville’s earliest and seemingly least political novels, 
Typee and Omoo, suggest an open yearning to use the routes of maritime trade to escape the 
strictures of a capitalist, western, white or “civilized” culture, and to embrace a more 
heterogeneous, culturally syncretic freedom. Mardi similarly experiments with a series of 
competing ideologies and tries in vain to strike upon the best way by which to live one’s life. 
Redburn, by contrast, is a clear-eyed and ornately detailed catalogue of the suffering wrought by 
Atlantic market capitalism. It was certainly not the last time Melville would critique maritime 
hierarchies of power. For example, in White-Jacket, he openly questions the rigid structures of 
authority that turn Atlantic Naval life into an experience of submission to mastery. The sailors of 
that novel are given orders they do not understand, experience harsh conditions and disrespectful 
treatment, and are flogged viciously for insubordination. Moby-Dick, of course, presents 
Melville’s grandest drama of out-of-control mastery and disastrous submission. In The 
Confidence-Man, Melville considers the possibility of socialist philanthropy as a cure for 
capitalism’s broader problems, but concludes, “With mankind it would never do” (57). Redburn 
appears to be a novel-length examination of the reasons why it “would never do.” The market is 
organized around the logic of pure consumption. Philanthropy, the giving of self to another, is 
just one more example of this consumptive logic, less charity than wolfish commodity ingestion.  
Redburn is unique in that it places these questions of mastery in the Atlantic maritime shipping 
corridor, suggesting that even the business relations of Atlantic capitalism resemble the 
   Green 315 
 
hierarchies of power so familiar to the punitive Navy of White-Jacket or the Shakespearean 
fiefdom of Moby-Dick. 
Many of the same points about commodity misidentification, the uncanny personification 
of taboo objects and, especially, God’s relative interest in individual humans and level of 
intervention in the physical world could be made about Melville’s other novels—including, of 
course, Moby-Dick. Billy-Budd is even more explicitly concerned with the social compulsion 
toward human sacrifice than is Redburn. However, Redburn exports these anxieties onto 
commodities, asserting not only the communal and spiritual necessity of commodification and 
labor as sacrifice, but also the economic underpinning of the sacrificial urge as it exists in the 
maritime exchange market. As a result, Redburn is the work in which Melville most acutely 
advances the notion that providential capitalist ideals have infiltrated and subsumed daily life 
within a market-oriented Atlantic world. Even as he details the specifics of maritime trade, he 
employs tropes of prophecy, conversion, and social election to emphasize the dehumanization of 
a capital-driven universe. In Redburn, prophecy only promises destruction, election is 
meaningless or damned, equivalence guarantees dehumanization, and text can reveal nothing 
trustworthy. Moreover, the sailor’s body and soul are always perched in a precarious position 
between nearly free and nearly enslaved. That body endures hardships, and even seemingly 
supernatural destruction, so that the market can run smoothly. If Billy-Budd uses the sailor as a 
Christ figure, dying to maintain the social hierarchies of his ship, Redburn uses the sailor for the 
sake of maintaining the social order of a broader Atlantic world. In this novel, the sailor’s body 
is destroyed, consumed, or lost, so that the market-oriented society’s urge toward consumption 
and exchange can be preserved.  
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Melville’s view of maritime communities bowing to the logic of consumption also 
suggests the power of debt to structure the Atlantic world, and to create a system of mutual 
possession and mastery. This focus upon debt as a mode of social relation has long interested 
Melville scholars. In 1943, for example, R.E. Watters argued that Melville’s view of debt 
coincides with this representation of Atlantic society as a system of personal and social 
consumption. Regarding Typee, he writes that Melville believes “that man is born, lives and dies 
in constant debt to the social community of his fellows…[Melville] repeatedly portrayed the 
distortion of the individual and the destruction of the group which follow upon voluntary 
repudiation or involuntary neglect of that debt” (33-34). Although Watters insists that “Typee 
society displayed communal life nearly at its best,” he stops short of dealing with the fact that 
Tommo, a thinly veiled facsimile of Melville, himself, flees the peaceful valley of the Typee 
because he fears their cannibalistic consumptive urge as well (Watters 34). Watters wrote from 
the perspective of a generation of scholars who largely read Melville as an author who sought to 
champion the authentic experience of the working sailor. However, what this reading leaves out 
is instructive: the logic of consumption and market cannibalism follows the author wherever he 
goes. Though Tommo runs, he cannot run forever. This inescapability is Redburn’s central 
drama. 
Certainly the degree to which the Atlantic market abuses and exploits Redburn 
demonstrates Melville’s perception of capitalism’s disorienting, and unsettling powers. For 
example, Benjamin S. West writes that, “Redburn and his family may have once been considered 
genteel, but with capitalistic ideology increasingly taking over Western social practices, his lack 
of wealth keeps him from gaining any kind of class prestige…his gentlemanly upbringing, is of 
no value” (174). However, Melville recognizes the ambivalent nature of capitalism as well, and 
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even his critiques acknowledge the system’s potential to liberate as well as to obliterate. In the 
“Knights and Squires” chapter of Moby-Dick, for example, Ishmael proclaims, “this august 
dignity I treat of, is not the dignity of kings and robes, but that abounding dignity which has no 
robed investiture. Thou shalt see it shining in the arm that wields a pick or drives a spike; that 
democratic dignity which, on all hands, radiates without end from God; Himself!” (103). If 
Atlantic capitalism victimizes Redburn, it also helps America to define itself as a space where 
capitalist principles allow individuals to rise and fall, rather than an English or European 
aristocratic social hierarchy.  Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh point to Francis Bacon as 
originating a theory of capitalism as divine and genocide as a moral good for the benefit of the 
Christian capitalist state (2). What Melville’s treatment reveals, therefore, is not that capitalism is 
innately good or bad, but that even its ostensibly socially progressive elements contain threats to 
the individual, and vice versa. Social good and social evil remain inextricably bound, two sides 
of the moral ledger book of the Atlantic. 
Utopianism, Wage Slavery, and Life in the Atlantic 
Melville’s leery view of contract arises from the rocky evolution of the relationship 
between slavery, contracted labor, and utopian free labor, from the revolutionary period, through 
the Jacksonian era, and toward the Civil War. In the revolutionary period, both free labor and 
slavery were used to articulate philosophical notions of liberty and emergent American 
nationalism. In the Jacksonian period, free labor became an ideal of personal individualism 
empowered by repressive slavery, violence, and debt speculation. That tension would result at 
mid-century in the violent collision between the ideals of liberty and the reality of bondage in the 
American Civil War. Melville explores the breadth of this tense push and pull between freedom 
and unfreedom by looking back to American founding, surveying his contemporary American 
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milieu and looking forward to the American violence to come. Ian McGuire suggests that the 
language of Captain Ahab, for example, is clearly meant to evoke the President Andrew 
Jackson’s elevation of individualist labor, as well as John Calhoun’s warnings against wage 
slavery. At the same time, Melville responds to the development of unions promising to protect 
laborers against the worst competitive excesses of the market. Similarly, he writes in the context 
of a period of social activism that resulted in, for example, Fourierism and other forms of utopian 
socialism. Such groups believed, as the preeminent historian of American labor movements, 
Philip S. Foner, writes, “in a new social order which would abolish all types of slavery and 
oppression by restoring to the people control over the productive forces” (170). By and large, 
these projects, including, famously, Emerson, Hawthorne, and Margaret Fuller’s experimental 
Brook Farm, collapsed into utter failure.  
Foner’s description of Brook Farm as a potentially “new social order” is interesting, 
given the existence of the laboring communities that Melville describes. Moreover, arriving in 
the wake of the Second World War, Foner’s history suggests the longstanding scholarly interest 
in pockets of utopian thinking, which linked eighteenth to nineteenth to twentieth century labor 
projects, but which, until recently, has neglected to recognize the importance of mobile maritime 
laboring societies to the evolution of labor ideology. As Melville could attest, as either a sailor or 
an author, the economy and culture of Atlantic maritime trade functioned all along as a system 
emblematic of both the promises and problems of such movements. Both marginalized from and 
essential to the survival of Atlantic societies, maritime laboring cultures contained pockets of 
utopian idealism alongside the brutal imposition of capitalist enterprise and control. The 
maritime trade about which Melville wrote was, as Rediker and Linebaugh note, an enormous 
system. They estimate that “20 to 25 percent of the adult male inhabitants of Boston, New York, 
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and Philadelphia worked in the maritime sector—trade or fishing—throughout the eighteenth 
century” (62). Mobility was essential to this system, and to individual survival within this 
system. Rediker and Linebaugh argue that “Desertion was not so much a trade as a trademark of 
a footloose maritime proletariat” hoping to avoid impressment, capture, the law or, in some 
cases, land (105). Indeed, some sailors, recognizing their exploitation, removed themselves from 
the logic of wage-earning and striving, choosing to live primarily at sea. (146)  Rediker and 
Linebaugh also note that sailors demonstrated many means of resistance and cooperation. As a 
result of labor specialization, work-stoppages were common. Indeed, “strike” is a term that 
comes from the maritime work stoppage involving the “striking” of sails (97). Although courts 
were unlikely to “‘liberate’ sailors from their ships” seamen also resorted to courts, struck, 
deserted or called for violence against captains (140). Rediker and Linebaugh even present 
pirates as a “pre-capitalist” riposte to the intensely hierarchal and exploitative capitalism of the 
merchant ship (264). However, in the face of the all-consuming logic of commodification that 
Melville’s novel posits, all of these forms of resistance can only resolve into failure, 
dehumanization, and the transformation of laborers into labor commodities. 
Redburn’s central preoccupation is with the philosophical issues raised by commodity 
fetishization and misidentification. In Redburn, Melville seeks to make the processes of 
commodification and commodity fetishism both personal and alien again, to demonstrate the 
way that they elevate the thing over the person and conflate the thing with the person. Michael 
Taussig attempts, from an anthropological and sociological point of view, to make sense of a 
similar experience, when he notes the fact that the things people living within industrial capitalist 
societies see as natural appear strange or evil to those who live outside the society’s borders. He 
suggests that capitalist societies encourage individuals to see market-based cultural formations 
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and practices as non-historical, as innate and naturalized, but that societies that later encounter 
capitalism see it as unnatural and, perhaps, even supernatural (Taussig 3). Commodities, he 
reminds readers, are both inert things and animate entities in such societies, with spirit and 
godlike life-force (5). He describes commodity fetishism as the process “whereby products of the 
interrelations of persons are no longer seen as such, but as things that stand over, control, and in 
some vital sense even may produce people” (Taussig 5). Commodity fetishism grants the 
commodity thing an animate presence with the potential to relate socially with human beings, 
especially as human lives are increasingly given an equivalent status in the market. Redburn, in 
some respects, is an extended meditation upon the experience of commodity fetishism being 
applied to the maritime laborer, his body, his class, and his soul. More than this, Redburn 
suggests that the individual body or soul must be annihilated in an act of obliterative 
commodification to satisfy the demands of the market.  
As a result, the novel traces a purely downward trajectory for its protagonist, even as his 
journey across the Atlantic is recursive. Redburn’s textual life begins with failure and proceeds 
to destabilize, fracture, and diminish as he becomes ever more directly involved with the market 
practices that have dictated his fate all along. The same economic circumstances that drove 
Richard Henry Dana to sea likewise initiate Redburn’s adventure of downward economic and 
personal conversion, but the narrative that follows shares little of Dana’s nationalist optimism. 
Wellingborough Redburn goes to sea as an educated but naïve young man in search of adventure 
and masculinity, but he is also driven there by the calamitous effects of price instability on his 
family, which ruined his father (Melville 54). Thinking it will help him, and evading the 
traumatic memory in the back of his mind, Redburn pretends to a certain laboring aristocracy as 
the son of a “wealthy merchant” (59).  However, he later admits that it hurts him to “think of 
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those delightful days, before my father became a bankrupt, and died, and we removed from the 
city” (82). This same price instability dictates the terms of his launch to sea. He explains, “I had 
not procured a ticket, and Going to the captain’s office to pay my passage and get one, was 
horror-struck to find, that the price of passage had been suddenly raised that day, owing to the 
other boats not running” (54). Thus, even in these early chapters of the novel, Melville has 
embedded his narrator in an economic world in which families are ruined, fathers emasculated, 
and economic agreements voided, all because of a market that appears not to be controlled by 
human actors. 
Signing On: Embodying Contract Instability aboard the Highlander and in the Flesh 
Moreover, the novel undermines the use of contracts as mutually obligatory promissory 
covenants, insisting, instead, that they only assert and conscribe an individual’s market value. 
They are imposed upon the individual, not entered into freely. As a result, they are exposed to 
manipulation or outright dismissal by untrustworthy captains and owners, even as they bind 
laborers to a subordinate subject status. Redburn is, for example, cheated from the very start, 
though the naïve young man fails to see this reality, distracted as he is by friendly surfaces. As 
Redburn signs his contract to ship out, for example, the captain tells him that the company 
sometimes pays a portion of a sailor’s salary in advance but “in this case, as the boy has rich 
relations, there will be no need of that.” It is only in retrospect that Redburn admits “Poor people 
make a very poor business of it when they try to seem rich” (60). Essentially, Redburn expects 
contracts to bind and to create social cohesion. He expects to sign a book that will guarantee his 
inclusion among the market elect. Instead, he is punished for his credulity. Equiano saw the 
contracts he entered into as covenants-by-proxy that required the advocacy of a righteous man 
but that were still divinely binding. Melville, writing about a character whose travels disembark 
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from the same ports that were so important to Equiano’s seafaring life sees contract as the basis 
for a viciously unstable anti-community, in which responsibility has transformed into 
competitive deceit.     
 In this situation, contracts develop a kind of sacred talismanic power to delimit the 
borders of an individual’s free agency, to dictate a sailor’s destiny and, most of all, to reveal a 
laborer’s equivalent commodity value. Melville’s view of contracts as both omnipresent and 
unreliable is not, therefore, contradictory. Rather, it seems that Melville responds to the reality 
that, as contracts become more widespread among nineteenth-century Atlantic maritime cultures, 
laborers find themselves mastered by both the interpreters of contract documents, and by the 
documents themselves.xxxii The text dictates how much a sailor is worth in relation to the 
commodities the sailor stewards and, in so doing, reveals the otherwise obscure equivalence 
between person and thing. That the captain and ship-owners in Redburn violate the pact of 
laborer and boss underscores the fact of the central character’s commodification and 
embeddedness in the open market. Redburn himself has very little control over the exchange of 
his body, labor, and value, and relies upon the validity of a contract, which he doesn’t understand 
and which, it turns out, only functions to name and assert his commodity value.  
In fact, the money Redburn does not receive reveals the pure commodity relation hiding 
behind covenant rhetoric. The seaman’s signature is not an agreement to mutual responsibility 
and the contract is not a promissory note of social inclusion and protection. Rather, the signature 
is a sign of acquiescence to the god of market forces. According to Marcus Rediker, the typical 
sailor of the time lived according to the whims of what Sir William Petty called “Political 
Arithmetic” (12).xxxiii The sailor signs, and agrees to permit his labor to be traded promiscuously 
in the arithmetic market, and to transform his own body into a mere repository for valuable labor. 
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The contract attests to the fact that the sailor has become a kind of Marxian commodity, the thing 
through which buyers and sellers interact.  
For sailors like Redburn, contract fails to provide the reliable haven of community it 
promises. If Melville doesn’t deny the omnipresent reality of contract-oriented social constructs, 
he does deny their supposed sanctifying or stabilizing effects. Indeed, not only does Redburn fail 
to receive adequate compensation for his labor for Captain Riga, but he even incurs debts, 
leaving Redburn’s friend, Harry Bolton, with no recourse but to exclaim “this is the reward of 
my long and faithful services!” (399). “This,” of course, refers to nothing, the only guaranteed 
reward in any contract, according to Melville. The contracts the sailors sign are failed attempts to 
establish security amid the forceful mobility of the labor market. The rest of the crew console 
themselves by offering the captain a rude scatological rebuke, and Redburn muses “they are here 
and then they are there; ever shifting themselves, they shift among the shifting: and like rootless 
sea-weed, are tossed to and fro” (402). The crew’s frustrations respond not only to Captain Riga 
then, but also to the system that empowers Riga and all the other captains to “shift” sailors 
endlessly, to use them as renewable commodity labor resources.  
Knowing that they may all have signed covenants that might be subverted by the 
malevolent masters of the ship and the market, the sailors in Melville’s novel therefore craft their 
own covenants in their own bodies. In so doing, they reassert the centrality of the body to 
providential capitalism. Abused, unable to trust in the binding power of contracts, and constantly 
reminded of their subject status, the sailors aboard the Highlander cling to the only thing they 
can trust: their own bodies. Yet, even as they reconstitute the earliest logic of covenant 
ideology—that the text might stand in for a divine agreement first instantiated by Christ’s human 
sacrifice—the sailors tacitly confirm their own commodity transformations.  
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Melville makes the point clearly when he describes his fellow sailors’ tattoos. Redburn 
tells readers, “I saw a sailor stretched out, stark and stiff, with the sleeve of his frock rolled up, 
and showing his name and date of birth tattooed upon his arm. It was a sight full of suggestions; 
he seemed his own head-stone” (251). A moment later, Melville writes, “I was told that standing 
rewards are offered for the recovery of persons falling into the docks; so much, if restored to life, 
and a less amount if irrecoverably drowned.” He then describes the market for these marked 
bodies, writing “I observed them principally early in the morning, when they issued from their 
dens, on the same principle that the rag-rakers and rubbish-pickers in the streets, sally out…there 
seems to be no calamity overtaking man, that cannot be rendered merchantable” (251). This is a 
useful description of both covenant ideology and commodity conversion as it becomes a bodily 
experience. Typee’s Tommo resisted the tattooing that would mark him as a full member of the 
Typee tribe, seeing it as submitting to social imprisonment. Here, Redburn both longs for the 
sign of community, and recognizes it as a mark of dehumanizing commodification. Typee, 
however, does not contradict Melville’s reading of tattooing in Redburn. Rather, both texts 
demonstrate the author’s ongoing interest in the efforts of individuals to claim possession of their 
own bodies, as well as in their inevitable failure to do so. Given that value rests upon possible 
resale, one might read the act of tattooing as an attempt by the sailors to escape the market’s 
grasp. It is. But it is also an implicit admission of the seemingly limitless reach of the market into 
personal and social lives. The sailor’s flesh becomes a text affirming his humanity, even as, in 
death, it becomes a purely symbolic currency, representative both of a life that once was but is 
no more, and of that life’s specific commodity value. 
Melville follows the logic of the signature as a sign of community inclusion into the 
marketplace where it has proliferated beyond the bounds of the church to include the fractious 
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mobile society of the maritime market as well as pockets of resistance to the market’s demands. 
If these tattoos implicitly resemble the signatures the sailors signed when they contracted as 
laborers aboard ship, they also function as a form of resistance. Michael Taussig, for example 
suggests that the devil contract is the exchange that ends all exchanges and thus violates social 
ethics because it removes the individual soul from the market (Taussig 118). The tattoos are 
emblems of a pledge the sailors make to an alternative moral order from the mainstream. They 
represent a pledge to assert self-possession in the face of a market that loudly asserts proprietary 
claims. However, the collection of bodies by the “rag-pickers” implies the market’s 
inescapability, even in death. And so, the binarism of good and evil, or even of life and death, 
has ceased to have meaning in the Atlantic market and has been replaced by an accounting 
divinity that uses both profit and loss for its own extension and expansion.xxxiv  Even the sailors’ 
attempts to resist or to escape can be granted a market value. Good and evil, life and death are 
but opposite sides of a divine ledger book, in which God organizes individual commodities.  
On the Whiteness of Redburn and the Specter of Slavery 
Just as Poe presented a central character surrounded by signs of his own racial instability, 
Melville’s Redburn consistently confronts the many ways in which whiteness can be 
commodified or rendered meaningless in the Atlantic market. He exclaims, “Miserable dog’s life 
is this of the sea! Commanded like a slave, and set to work like an ass! Vulgar and brutal men 
lording it over me, as if I were an African in Alabama” (119). Redburn’s unpaid labor establishes 
the degree to which he loses his privileged racial status through a more direct relation with the 
market’s inner processes. As Rediker notes, when ships could not find enough free and willing 
labor, they resorted to impressment, forcing imprisoned, indigent, itinerant, or merely unlucky 
men to serve (289).xxxv Doing so meant subjecting these men’s bodies to the same perils and 
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punishments as those experienced by the enslaved laborers who shared space on the ship.xxxvi 
Redburn’s body is, thus, potentially open to claim or in danger of disposal; his labor is 
potentially taken for free or by force. When Redburn is denied his contracted money exchange, 
he realizes, along with the reader, the extent to which “free” labor could resemble slavery and the 
degree to which whiteness served as a mere distraction from universal commodification. Where 
white supremacists see whiteness as an escape from commodification, this novel posits 
whiteness as just another value to be commodified or to be lost in the market.  
Perhaps more than any of his other novels, Melville’s Redburn critiques the pockets of 
utopian liberty contained within the free-laborism of the sea. Sacvan Bercovitch observes that 
Thoreau’s Walden “embodies the myth of American laissez-faire individualism…the lessons it 
teaches echo those of the celebrated Homo Economicus of the mid-nineteenth century America” 
(Bercovitch 187-8). But Melville’s laboring protagonists are always circumspect in their 
approach to “free” labor that resembles unfree labor more than his contemporaries might like to 
admit. Ishmael, for example, went whaling, at least in part, due to a suicidal urge.  
Redburn’s presentation of labor as an experience of sacrifice for the social order also 
demonstrates something of a generational pivot-point around which has turned an important 
element of Melville scholarship: whether the novel is a paean to free-laborism or a critique of the 
unfree elements hidden within free-labor ideology. Bercovitch, for example, looks to older critics 
like C.L.R. James, who observed that in Redburn, Melville “launches into a long defense of 
sailors as a class of workers. They carry around the globe missionaries, ambassadors, opera-
singers, armies, merchants. The business of the world depends upon them; if they were suddenly 
to emigrate to the navies of the moon everything on earth would stop except its revolution on its 
axis and the orators in the American Congress” (James 78). However, Wellingborough 
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Redburn’s degradation and embarrassment stem from his utopian belief in the brotherhood of the 
working class. His experience, therefore, reflects a reality that Lisa Lowe more recently asserts 
when she says that “‘free trade’ policies lifted mercantilist barriers and broke up the company 
monopoly, yet in effect, they provided the means to secure a tight military hold” (Lowe 79). So 
Redburn, in the end, is both: a narrative that, as older scholars contended, praised maritime 
laborers and drew authenticity from the experience of maritime free-laborism, and, as later 
scholars would more fully recognize, a critical invective against the abusive practices that 
evidently empowered maritime economies. 
In essence, the kind of labor that Redburn investigates permitted Atlantic national powers 
to extend the logic of mastery and command, which structured slavery, into a “free” market even 
though free labor could never be totally free. Rediker argues that the merchant ship was, like the 
slave or naval ship, organized in an intensely hierarchal fashion and owners and captains often 
worked to exploit their laborers, limit their rations, find cause to abuse or even murder them, or 
abandon them to cut costs and to exert control (Rediker 84). This brutal system of control even 
included the worst forms of personal violence. Rediker even notes that “Murder was clearly a 
part of the social relations of work at sea” (219). Redburn exposes the lie beneath the utopian 
notion of free labor, demonstrating all of the ways that the laboring classes could be taken 
advantage of and sacrificed for the benefit of the capitalist elite. 
Coupled with the text’s undermining of Redburn’s expectations of the power of 
whiteness, the specter of chattel slavery hangs over the entirety of the Highlander’s journey. 
Redburn notes, for example, the appearance of “a little brig from the Coast of Guinea…the ideal 
of a slaver…her decks in a state of most piratical disorder” (245). The cynical but well-traveled 
sailor, Jackson, even plays upon this context with disturbing relish, in order to taunt the non-
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working passengers of the Highlander, by spreading a rumor “that Riga purposed taking them to 
Barbary, and selling them all for slaves” (344). Later, Redburn laments that Captain Riga 
“was…actually turning a poor lad adrift without a copper, after he had been slaving aboard his 
ship for more than four mortal months” (399). Even Redburn’s transcendental contemplations 
are inflected with visions of the violence and death that attend slavery, such as when he passes a 
carnival and imagines “jet black Nubian slaves [who] flight themselves on poles; stand on their 
heads; and downward vanish” (334). Thinking about the “delirium” caused by his difficult work 
amidst dramatic nature, Redburn recalls “the feeling of mastering the rebellious canvas, and 
tying it down like a slave to the spar” (175). Slavery is an endemic part of this world and an 
innate element of nature. Sailors are, therefore, always in danger of losing their special status as 
free whites. The novel suggests that they may, in fact, have always been living under the 
delusion that whiteness and freedom were, in any way, distinguishable from blackness and 
unfreedom, in a labor society governed by market value and equivalency. 
Moreover, the ship’s journey towards its destination, Liverpool, draws Redburn ever 
closer to the trade, which remains the true lifeblood of the Atlantic market. As a result, readers 
should hardly be surprised by the moment when Redburn beholds a statue celebrating Nelson’s 
“principal victories,” and sees the “swarthy limbs and manacles” that recall “four African slaves 
in the market-place” (222). Redburn recognizes the same violent social, economic, and 
ideological elements that would invite Ian Baucom to describe Liverpool as the “capitol” of 
Atlantic modernity. Redburn’s exposure to the abusive practices of the market, as well as his 
own experiences of commodification, have revealed the blood of the slave upon which all of the 
Atlantic market sails. He cannot look at nationalist victory or maritime power without seeing the 
loss and powerlessness that have been necessary for Atlantic society to develop. In Liverpool, he 
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is struck by “the absence of negroes; who in the large towns in the ‘free states’ of America, 
almost always form a considerable portion of the destitute” (277). Melville’s use of scare quotes 
gives away his dim, circumscribed view of what freedom means in a slaveholding society: there 
can be no such thing as freedom, only degrees of slavery. When Melville goes on to note that “to 
be a born American citizen seems a guarantee against pauperism,” readers should understand that 
he means to implicate the hypocrisy of white supremacist ideology in myths of democratic 
American exceptionalism (277). In this sentence “guarantee” is a vastly less significant word 
than “seems,” for whiteness is only a seeming appearance of freedom, beneath which lies 
potential impressment, capture, or slavery. For Melville, a nationalism founded upon white 
supremacy is a nationalism founded upon a lie.  
Redburn’s Cannibal Desire 
Consumption and suggestions of cannibalism in the novel further emphasize the violence 
at the heart of a society that purports to civilization even as it practices slavery’s barbarism, and 
reframe the novel’s project of using the body to instantiate all of the processes of the providential 
capitalist market. Recalling Hartman’s contention that submission and slavery are “a form of 
willed self-immolation” as well as Montwieler and Boren’s description of the connections 
between race, “violence, sexuality, and hybridity,” Melville, at first playfully and then more 
frightfully, restages the communion ritual of consumption of Christ’s body as the ghastly ritual 
of cannibalism at sea, but still allows the event to function as a tool to create social communion 
(Hartman 53).xxxvii
xxxviii
 At one point, when Redburn transforms a sexual fantasy into one of 
cannibalistic ingestion, he uses a blasphemous version of sacramental consumption to create a 
communal relation.  Melville writes, “There they sat—the charmers, I mean—eating these 
buttered muffins in plain sight. I wished I was a buttered muffin myself” (292). The sacrament 
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by which Christ allowed himself to become a thing to be consumed and, through this act, to 
instantiate a community, replays as a dark comedy in which the individual becomes a thing 
around which a society—here a society playfully engaged in group sex—may be formed.  
This concept takes on a much darker aspect later in the novel, when the passengers 
aboard the Highlander begin to suffer from starvation and disease, and their deprivation becomes 
a form of communal suffering, debasement, and then cohesion. Redburn explains that the dying 
passengers “made inroads upon the pig-pen in the boat, and carried off a promising young shoat: 
him they devoured raw, not venturing to make an incognito of his carcass; they prowled about 
the cook's caboose, till he threatened them with a ladle of scalding water…they beset the sailors, 
like beggars in the streets, craving a mouthful in the name of the Church” (371). Melville’s 
emphatic italicization of “him,” along with his intentional failure to clearly indicate what 
“mouthful” the starving masses seek, allows the reader to potentially confuse the consumption of 
livestock with the consumption of persons. There is no textual difference between goods and 
people when it comes to the needs of a market of the starving. Moreover, this episode of 
starvation, blood sacrifice, and consumption serves as a moment of social unity, albeit one that 
inspires horror at the same time that it initiates social communal action. 
Given the way that Melville and Redburn have subtly drawn readers’ attentions to the 
similarities between merchant and slave vessels, readers would be remiss not to think of similar 
scenes aboard the slave ships that navigate the same seas.xxxix This becomes especially fraught 
when disease breaks out among the emigrant passengers, and death follows in due course. The 
crew begins pitching bodies over the side of the ship, prompting Redburn to remark “the 
bottomless profound of the sea, over which we were sailing, concealed nothing more frightful” 
(376). Yet these are not the only dead bodies “concealed” beneath the waves. They follow 
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countless scores of bodies, free and unfree, that have become the unfortunate but necessary 
sacrifices of the Atlantic trade.  Ian Baucom, for instance, recognizes the importance of such 
bodies when he examines the case of the Zong massacre, in which sick slaves were thrown 
overboard, so that the crew could maintain their profits through insurance claims. Baucom 
presents this scene as the emblematic event of modernity, in which “the slaves were…treated not 
only as a type of commodity but as a type of interest-bearing money...commodities for sale and 
as the reserve deposits of a loosely organized decentered but vast trans-Atlantic banking system” 
(Baucom 61). Noting the way the insurance claim asserts the slaves’ value, even in their 
disappearance, he writes, “in a money culture or an insurance culture value survives its objects” 
(95). The bodies of the slaves were used as “promissory notes, bills of exchange...embodied, 
material existence but to their speculative, recoverable loss value” (139). Here the bodies of sick 
passengers serve a similar function. They have already paid for passage, so their absent bodies 
become secondary, in the pure logic of exchange, to their disembodied market value. The bodies 
become, essentially, unnecessary, and the “value survives its objects.”  
That this grisly scene plays out with white bodies asserts the degree to which the flimsy 
protective status of white skin became a source of real anxiety for nineteenth-century white 
laborers, authors, and readers. It also telegraphs the novel’s overall interest in the classed 
dimensions of social sacrifice. The market economy of maritime trade sees no difference in skin 
color, reducing laborers to slaves and reducing people to livestock. In Melville’s comprehensive 
vision, Atlantic life is one of chattel slave conditions, in which everyone is potentially 
exploitable, and potentially consumable. However, these moments of consumption, obliteration, 
or sacrifice are all done in the service of a hierarchical economy that positions laborers, slaves, 
and chattel together as a group open to the exploitation. Whether aboard the Zong or the 
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Highlander, the violent sacrifice and even death of slaves or laborers is necessary for the survival 
of the Atlantic communities linked through trade and exchange. 
Such scenes, coupled with those in which the crew, and even the emigrant passengers 
find themselves the targets of hierarchal control and punishment, pivot from Melville’s depiction 
of a grim kind of communion to a totalizing vision of suffering and slavery as passion. In this 
way, Melville returns Christian metaphysics to their bodily ritualistic materialism. He also 
implicates polite society in the violence of the slave trade, by enshrining the slave as the 
sacrificial body around which Atlantic society revolves. Taussig suggests that, in Christian 
societies, Jesus is the fetishization of good, just as the Devil is the fetishization and embodiment 
of social relations of evil (Taussig 180). By this logic, the sailor might be considered the fetish 
object Melville uses to embody Atlantic labor. Each sailor experiences his own and a community 
passion, and each is potentially consumed in a sexualized or frightful play upon Christ’s 
sacrificial offering of self to community. The Kingdom of Heaven with a sacrificial Christ at its 
center becomes the market of the Atlantic with the sacrificial sailor at its heart. Implicitly too, the 
kingdom of modern Atlantic society has, at its center, a sacrificial enslaved body 
For this brutal but inclusive vision of the Atlantic market society to function, free persons 
must recognize their interchangeability with the unfree. Persons must become commodities so 
that they might equally be acted upon by the deity who inhabits the marketplace. Elect souls 
must recognize that election is possession, inclusion in a totalizing market that binds everyone 
through common and painful commodification. Money, according to Marx, acts as “all other 
commodities divested of their shape—the product of universal alienation—the commodity 
disappears when it becomes money” (Marx 205). However, the slave body both acts as money 
and retains direct use value. The flesh has an equivalent symbolic value and direct laboring 
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value. Melville posits that sailor is the slave, and civilian might be as well. As such, every living 
person similarly functions as both currency and commodity at the same time. Every body is a 
fetish object inhabited by use and exchange potential. Here readers can make a theoretical leap to 
read Christian metaphysics through the lens of industrial capital. If human beings are bodily 
containers for souls who act in the material world, they are also functional laboring commodities, 
haunted by a metaphysical and allegorical market value (Marx 205). These readings overlap, 
revealing the way that providential Christian logic and abstract capitalist exchange logic function 
in tandem, each influencing and shedding light upon the other. 
Furthermore, the punishments meted out aboard the Highlander touch both crew and 
passengers alike, demonstrating the market’s ability to combine laborers with pilgrims for 
survival, so that community coheres around bodily sacrifice (376). The Highlander, carries a 
mixed crew, including merchant laborers, and immigrants and their families who have signed 
different contracts. If “signers” might function as a catchall for the diversely-contracted 
population on the ships, so too might “sufferers,” given that, as Redburn explains, “Captain Riga, 
issued another ukase, and to this effect: Whatsoever emigrant is found guilty of stealing, the 
same shall be tied into the rigging and flogged” (371). This reading builds upon the logic of 
covenant to argue that election means something other than a promise of divine protection. It is 
also a promise of bodily suffering. Yet that suffering is necessary in two respects: first, it keeps 
the ship running and, as a result, satisfies the demands of the market; second, it permits a society 
to combine in a mutual experience of mutual trial. The individual body becomes the site of a 
communal ritual of inclusion and, potentially, collective transcendence. 
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The Combustible Man and Commodity Misidentification 
Redburn trades upon this interpolation and transference from person to thing, and the 
haunting of thing by a spiritual essence, as the central thematic concern of the text. For example, 
at one point, the text syntactically reinterprets Redburn’s discussion of himself as a jack of all 
trades as a revelation of his literal and figurative status as a tool. Redburn recalls how “often 
furnished with a club-hammer, they swung me over the bows in a bowline, to pound the rust off 
the anchor” (183). The man wields the tool, and swings it, but the crew wields the man, and 
swings him. Metonymically, Redburn and his hammer have become one and the same. Similarly, 
Redburn remarks upon the sailors’ function in the world economy by comparing them to the 
wheels of a coach. He writes “they go and come round the globe; they are the true importers, and 
exporters of spices and silks; of fruits and wines and marbles; they carry missionaries, 
ambassadors, opera-singers, armies, merchants, tourists, scholars to their destination: they are a 
bridge of boats across the Atlantic; they are the primum mobile of all commerce” (204). Amidst 
his reverent description of the centrality of Atlantic trade in the modern world, Redburn loses the 
clarity of his pronouns, letting “they” conflate the sailor with the ship. The confusion is telling, 
drawing the reader’s attention to the way that human bodies take on the attributes of the tools 
with which they work, and the way that objects take on the spirit of the people who use them. 
Elsewhere, Melville notes that this proximal and metonymic commodity relation 
becomes a form of personal identification with commodities. Redburn describes, for example, 
being conflated with his outfit and writes “sometimes they used to call me ‘Boots’, and 
sometimes ‘Buttons’, on account of the ornaments on my pantaloons and shooting-jacket” (128). 
Such moments are presented to readers uncritically, encouraging Redburn’s transcendental sense 
of spiritual life adhering in nature to give life to objects, his providential belief in the sanctity of 
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work to transform humans into tools, and the crew’s uncanny belief in the spirit-life of things to 
become a paean to the importance of the working class. However, the text reveals an anxious and 
high-stakes consideration of the philosophical effects of these instances of commodity 
misidentification.  
Most famously, Melville uses alcohol, an enormously important commodity in the 
Atlantic market, to develop the anxiety produced by commodity identification to its most 
shocking extreme. First, Max, a friendly face aboard the ship, is referred to as a “combustible 
man” partly for his coloring and partly for his drink-encouraged unpredictability (134). The 
moniker anticipates and prepares readers for the moment’s shocking sequel. A drunken Miguel 
Saveda, impressed while unconscious and taken aboard to fill the ranks of the crew, 
spontaneously combusts (326). “To the silent horror of all,” Redburn recalls, “two threads of 
greenish fire, like a forked tongue, darted out between the lips; and in a moment, the cadaverous 
face was crawled over by a swarm of worm-like flames.” Redburn goes on to describe the way 
“the eyes were open and fixed; the mouth was curled like a scroll, and every lean feature firm as 
in life; while the whole face, now wound in curls of soft blue flame, wore an aspect of grim 
defiance, and eternal death.” Finally, the Mate shouts down to the barracks, asking “where’s that 
d—d Miguel?” (326). In this moment, the anxious uncanny of commodity identification, which 
has, heretofore, lain dormant beneath the surface of the text, breaks out and reveals that it has 
been present all along. In this moment too, the novel’s preoccupation with the bodily effects of 
spiritual and material commodification becomes shockingly literal.  
This is the most potent reminder, in a text full of such reminders, that the impressed and 
commodified body instantiates the processes of spiritual and commercial conversion, even as it 
functions as the site of community cohesion, and binds the judgments of the divine to the tools of 
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the commodity market. The Mate’s punctuating question seems to frame the entire scene as a 
hellish punishment. In this, it responds to an earlier moment in which a man “must have 
suddenly waked up…raging mad with delirium tremens…rushed on deck, and, so, in a fit of 
frenzy, put an end to himself” (99). Likewise, Redburn remarks “I almost thought the burning 
body was a premonition of the hell of the Calvinists and that Miguel’s earthly end was a foretaste 
of his eternal condemnation” (327). Alcohol-induced immolation is a potent and symbolically 
rich tool of punishment for the sin of excessive drunkenness. However, alcohol is also a central 
commodity around which the Atlantic economy turns. So the bodies damned by alcohol are, like 
the sick bodies thrown overboard, redolent of the human sacrifices necessary for the Atlantic 
world to persist and to prosper. The man and the commodity become intertwined in a circuit by 
which two of the Atlantic world’s most valuable and profitable goods—rum and human bodies, 
spirits and spirits—become equivalent, but do so within a spiritual framework in which the logic 
of damnation still pertains. Saveda consumes a commodity in such great quantities that it 
consumes him.  
At the same time, just as Saveda’s soul is lost to its hellish fate, his combustion presents a 
question of profit and loss for the ship, reminding readers that death is no escape from the logic 
of the market, and that the absent body also has value. Jackson, for example, thinks that “the man 
had been actually dead when brought on board the ship; and that knowingly, and merely for the 
sake of the month’s advance, paid into his hand upon the strength of the bill he presented, the 
body-snatching crimp had knowingly shipped a corpse on board of the Highlander, under the 
pretense of its being a live body in a drunken trance” (327).  Whose interpretation, Redburn’s or 
Jackson’s, is correct? By the logic of the text, and of providential capitalism, both men have 
rightly read the situation: Saveda’s is a lost soul, a profit made, and both at once. 
   Green 337 
 
The relation of humanity to divinity has curdled in this text, so that God either dislikes or 
disregards humans as the gears of the market turn on and on. Redburn explicitly invokes 
providence only once when he receives the interventionist protection necessary to return safely 
from his first attempt at slushing down the top-mast of the ship. He writes, “It was no easy 
job…I contrived to place my bucket in the ‘top’; and then, trusting to Providence, swung myself 
up after it” (76).xl Melville here situates providence in a scene of labor, in which his protagonist 
requests the kind of special protection upon which a providential capitalist writer like Equiano 
depended, but in a context that will only reward the company for which Redburn risks his life. 
This is also a scene of degradation, in which Redburn is forced to do the most humiliating and 
dangerous task, and his rescue only offers him the opportunity to continue to perform demeaning 
functions on the ship and in the market. If there is a providential god, it evidently requires 
debased sailing “boys,” rather than specially elect souls. Elsewhere Redburn’s invocations to the 
divine take the form of mordant jokes and blasphemy, suggesting Melville’s at-best cynical view 
of the conflation of God with the market. When Redburn exclaims, “And as for the ginger-pop, 
why, that ginger-pop was divine!” a simple platitude becomes a subtle critique of the market’s 
ability to profane the divine by way of intimate collusion (393). The exclamation rises to the 
level of parody, taking direct aim at a belief system that sells God as a consumer product and 
sells humanity promiscuously in the market. 
Furthermore, the novel emphasizes a leery view of divine intervention and human 
knowledge by undermining sacred texts, the traditional means of knowing the mind of God. In 
particular, Redburn’s father’s guidebook, a precious family relic from his time in Liverpool, 
directs Redburn toward sites that no longer exist. Melville uses the failure of the book to 
highlight the endless churn of capital as it destroys itself to make itself new again. In the swift 
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currents of Atlantic capital, old signposts and landmarks are washed away with startling 
swiftness. Melville also uses the failure of the guidebook to put the final nail in the paternal 
coffin, revealing Redburn’s father as failed businessman, failed author, and failed father. Finally, 
the book suggests the disinterest of the market god. There is no paternal figure to communicate 
Redburn’s path to him, even if the hand of God intervenes in the market itself. Redburn’s choices 
are made for him by captains, by con-men, by fellow sailors, and by the universe that constantly 
offers him reminders of his own embeddedness in the market, an embeddedness that will 
continue even beyond his death. Unlike in Equiano’s narrative or that of so many authors 
brought to epiphanic grace through a talking book, this universe offers books that talk but lie or 
do not talk at all.  
A Universally Unresponsive God 
Nevertheless, Melville describes a universal but universally alienating spiritual culture to 
which he has been exposed as Redburn travels within the Atlantic maritime market. This culture 
is market-driven and oriented around exchange, mobility, and conversion. Furthermore, Melville 
notices the way that the maritime market incubates heterogeneity. At one point, Redburn focuses 
upon a peculiar scene of syncretic religious practice in the docks of Liverpool, describing the 
“Floating Chapel…the hull of an old-sloop-of war, which had been converted into a mariner’s 
Church” (246). Melville here telegraphs a universal religion of laborers. Redburn, watching 
groups of sailors, dreamily intones “whenever, in my Sunday strolls, I caught sight of one of 
these congregations [of sailors], I always made a point of joining it; and would find myself 
surrounded by a motley crowd of seamen from all quarters of the globe, and women, and 
lumpers, and dock laborers of all sorts” (247). Redburn immerses himself in the miscellaneous 
community of people drawn together by Atlantic trade and sees divinity in this kind of 
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communal association through labor. He writes “Frequently the clergyman would be standing 
upon an old cask, arrayed in full canonicals, as a divine of the Church of England. Never have I 
heard religious discourses better adapted to an audience of men” (247).xli Redburn revels in this 
universality and Melville takes it as an opportunity to note the unifying potential of the market, 
although whether that union is good or bad, he does not disclose. 
While Redburn does not discover any specific religion at sea, he does discover a kind of 
spiritual humanism that draws together the men and women who work the ships and docks that 
link Atlantic trade. In fact, the universal possibilities of maritime spirituality are a recurrent 
feature in Melville’s fiction. Brian Yothers, for example, notes that “Melville’s career from 
Typee (1846) to Moby-Dick (1851) is marked by an intensifying and broadening concern with the 
varieties of religious difference from nearly every portion of the planet” (Yothers 51). This 
includes spiritual practices that do not fit into the traditional categories of Christian practices. 
Redburn observes, for example, “a fortune-teller, an old negro woman by the name of De Squak, 
whose house was much frequented by sailors” (144).
xliii
xlii He also learns to understand the sailor’s 
propensity for superstition when, for example, the Highlander passes a ship with the dead crew 
still lashed in place (161).  Likewise, the bunk in which Saveda died becomes taboo, although 
it is not clear whether out of fear of contamination or out of fear of haunting. Redburn tells 
readers that “an iron pot of red coals was placed in the bunk, and in it two handfuls of coffee 
were roasted. This done, the bunk was nailed up, and was never opened again during the 
voyage…after the event, no one sailor but Jackson would stay alone in the forecastle…he froze 
my blood, and made my soul stand still” (328). These are the signs of a syncretic religious 
culture, borrowing folk beliefs from the various peripheries of the Atlantic, and mixing them in 
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the ships that move port to port, so that they reappear, in blended fashion, in the centers of trade 
that make a kind of cobbled-together universal system.  
Commerce likewise collapses national boundaries, as Redburn finds himself conducting 
American business in an English setting that is truly cosmopolitan (196). Marcus Rediker 
sketches the contours of this community at sea that existed far beyond nationality, and was 
primarily composed of merchant sailors.  The typical sailor of Rediker’s history, Jack Tar, was 
“in many ways a marked man,” an individual with features and habits so unique as to designate 
him a member of a mobile polity, rather than that of any one nation or creed (12). He dressed 
differently, spoke differently, even walked differently from others in the world on shore. Rediker 
notes that sailors’ common experiences of abuse could also create community, despite the best 
efforts of bosses and masters. Slave traders, for example attempted to disrupt community among 
slaves: “in order to prevent mutinies by slaves, merchant captains drew their cargoes from 
scattered locations and different linguistic groups” (Rediker 48). Similarly, writers like Equiano, 
Briton Hammon, and John Jea demonstrated the way that ports and ships could offer 
opportunities for the creation and curation of counter publics. Enslaved maritime writer, Briton 
Hammon jumped from ship to ship in search of relative liberty, while the preacher-author, Jon 
Jea used religious affiliation to generate community among the laborers who lived along the 
mobile trade-routes of the Atlantic. Here, Melville similarly demonstrates the way the maritime 
port functions as a democratic international and religious space, where commerce dictates all that 
goes on and creates communities of fellowship through labor and exchange.  
In Redburn, the market also functions to bring together diverse faith traditions in the 
service of smoothly-running capitalism. For example, Melville describes the docks as “a small 
archipelago, an epitome of the world, where all the nations of Christendom, and even those of 
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Heathendom, are represented. For, in itself, each ship is an island, a floating colony of the tribe 
to which it belongs” (234).  Yothers argues that “A recurring motif throughout Melville’s career 
is his representation of internecine strife among Christian denominations” (53). However, the 
“archipelago” of merchant ships reconciles not only Christian sects, but also a multitude of 
diverse worldwide faiths, all brought together through the influence of Atlantic trade. What 
makes Redburn unique among Melville’s fictions is its assertion of the democratizing influence 
of market exchange. If, in his earliest novels, Melville “registers [a] tense religious environment 
when he writes in Typee and Omoo about a series of conflicts among Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries and Pacific Islanders,” here that tension dissolves into the universality of 
providential Atlantic capital (Yothers 53). Moreover, when Melville returns to the question of a 
universal church and universal moral directives in Moby-Dick, he presents a scene in which 
democratic utopias dissolve as the crew embraces Ahab’s charismatic tyranny. Different faiths 
are not brought together, but swiftly abandoned in favor of the cult of personality surrounding 
Ahab. In contrast, Redburn presents a market that allows and even thrives on difference, because 
difference allows it to spread along all of the trade routes of the world. Redburn expresses awe at 
the power of commerce to encourage sailors to exchange nationalism and religious 
denomination, and to accept entry into the elect community of sailors that maintains diversity 
even in its universality.  
As a result, Redburn still sees through the lens of the providential capitalist jeremiad, 
imagining the horizons of possible universal humanism extending forever toward the horizon. He 
writes “The other world beyond this…was longed for by the devout before Columbus’ time, was 
found in the new; and the deep-sea-lead, that first struck these soundings, brought up the soil of 
Earth’s Paradise. Not a Paradise then, or now; but to be made so, at God’s good pleasure…The 
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seed is sown, and the harvest must come, and the harvest must come.” Adhering to the 
nationalist tenor so familiar to such jeremiads, he continues: “then shall the curse of Babel be 
revoked, a new Pentecost come, and the language they shall speak shall be the language of 
Britain. Frenchmen, and Danes, and Scots; and the dwellers on the shores of the Mediterranean, 
and in the regions round about; Italians, and Indians, and Moors; there shall appear unto them 
cloven tongues as of fire” (239). All of this sounds relatively familiar to the jeremiadic form and 
it is important to recall that the New World paradise Redburn imagines was founded, developed, 
and will bear fruit, all because of the purported divinity of capitalist progress.  
By using the Christian imagery of passion and communion, Melville can recast labor, 
loss, and sacrifice as a kind of communal interrelation of diverse Atlantic cultures and vice versa: 
the market interactions between Atlantic cultures become sacred moments of exchange and 
communal intimacy. This reading sees Melville’s curiosity about supernaturalism and investment 
in capitalism not as parallel interests, but as one comprehensive vision of the Atlantic as a space 
both capitalist and supernatural. Both generically and philosophically, this reading also expands 
upon something that Lisa Lowe uncovers with regard to the instantiation of community in 
oceanic discourse. Lowe sees trade as the means by which Europe, North America, Africa, and 
Asia not only interacted but also developed conceptions of freedom, labor, and market exchange. 
She describes the way that trade instantiated “modern liberalism” by which she means “the 
branches of European political philosophy that include the narration of political emancipation 
through citizenship in the state, the promise of economic freedom in the development of wage 
labor and exchange markets, and the conferring of civilization to human persons educated in 
aesthetic and national culture—in each case unifying particularity, difference, or locality through 
universal concepts of reason and community” (Lowe 4). It is difficult to improve upon this 
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description of mercantile “free labor” and trade as productive cultural forces. Nevertheless, Lowe 
leaves out the important role that spiritual culture played in developing this universal “intimacy.” 
Melville’s scenes of communal suffering and communion reassert the centrality of a spiritual 
interpretive framework for the people living within this market system and for the societies that 
used trade as the means by which to cohere and absolve difference. 
Moreover, readers should not forget the classed elements of this communion. Redburn 
travels with and among the laboring classes that circulate the maritime Atlantic. As a result, his 
observations about power, submission, and even the reciprocity of homosociality are all 
contained within the class hierarchies that grow out of Atlantic commerce. If the sacrifices of 
maritime laborers allow broader Atlantic societies to develop and cohere, the event represents the 
sacrifice of one class for another. The communion that Redburn witnesses ultimately helps to 
instantiate a hierarchical society that subordinates and, if possible, frequently occludes the 
existence of laboring classes altogether. They are the invisible sacrifices that permit Atlantic 
societies to function.  
 Nevertheless, suffering and sacrificial bodies bring Melville’s characters together in 
moments of self-recognition and community instantiation. The heterogeneous crew of the ship, 
the American and European travelers aboard the ship, the African laborers and slaves who are 
present either literally or abstractly, in Redburn’s imagination, all come together around, for 
example, the disappeared body of Miguel Saveda, the sacrificial livestock, and the sick bodies 
thrown overboard. All meet under the threat of the same lash, a testament to the truth of Lowe’s 
contention that free labor was merely another name for the extension of practices of control and 
mastery. Melville presents these moments as both spiritually significant and market-driven. 
Doing so allows him to dramatize the intimate relations for which Lowe argues so incisively.  
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Melville’s metaphysics present the universalism born of international commerce and 
travel as the creation of a universal and divine kingdom. Crucially, his spiritual framework draws 
upon tropes of Christian sacrifice, rebirth, and communion, but remains open to syncretic 
interpretations of events and ritual practices. His is no strict or orthodox typology. In this too, the 
novel’s moments of spiritualism dramatize Lowe’s vision of intimate universality. Such 
moments are both truly intimate—scenes in which people touch, gather, suffer, labor, and 
commune together—and truly universal. Providential capitalism, therefore, the blending of 
Christian and capitalist values and epistemologies in the Atlantic, allows economic interactions 
to take on the significance they deserve as the means by which cultures meet and propagate. 
As a result, although the novel purports to be a generically direct bildungsroman, a text 
not unlike Dana’s, in which a young man’s maritime adventures allow the reading public at 
home to experience the expanding scope of national and international commerce, conquest, and 
collaboration, it remains suffused and even initiated by supernatural spiritual experiences. 
Redburn, for example, was called to his vocation by what he calls “vague prophetic” inclinations 
(48). Taken together with the references to the fortune-teller, Melville offers a vision of universal 
belief not dissimilar to Equiano’s. In both, events are prefigured in near-prophetic visions; in 
both, a fortune-telling character underscores the orchestration of human affairs as well as their 
legibility; in both, the market appears to be the medium through which the divine and ordinary 
interact. The difference then is in the trajectory: where Equiano is able to seize on his visions to 
navigate the moral and economic cosmology of the Atlantic world, Redburn’s visions only set 
him on a course for ruin. There could be no other way. For, if Equiano is the “particular 
favourite,” implicitly, someone else is not: someone like Wellingborough Redburn. The 
philosophy of the divine ledger-book thus transcends and unites both texts. One man’s gain is 
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necessarily predicated upon the other’s loss. Still, even in an accounting of loss, the market-spirit 
nexus of providential capitalism asserts its universality. If Redburn and Equiano participate in 
the same economic and spiritual system, along with their captains, masters, and fellow crewmen, 
then the market truly is a binding force. It yokes together individuals from all over the Atlantic 
world and places their mobile interactions at the center of a dense cultural net. 
Yet it would be much easier to take the novel’s ode to a universalizing market at face 
value if it did not end as it does: by returning to the scene of a sacrificial body but, now, with a 
nihilistic recognition that the sacrifice only serves to obliterate the individual for the sake of the 
market. The “tongues as of fire” Redburn invokes only remind readers of Saveda’s consumption 
and obliteration by commodity. Yothers argues for Jackson as an anticipatory figure of “all the 
worst possibilities of human nature” foreshadowing Ahab (Yothers 73). However, Jackson is as 
much a victim as he is a villain. Jackson, the consummate seaman, with no care for land, and no 
love for anyone in the crew, but with all the skill, knowledge, and commitment to vocation that, 
Redburn insists, will bring about a capital-fueled divine kingdom, falls to his death at sea. When 
he does, Redburn sadly recalls that the ship’s owners will not have to pay him. Foreshadowing 
Melville’s most famous examination of bodily sacrifice for social ends, Billy Budd, Redburn 
laments, “his death was their deliverance” (387). Melville’s conflation of the ship to a church, a 
conflation he literalizes and emphasizes to a much greater degree in Moby-Dick’s Father Mapple 
chapter, frames national, capitalist, and spiritual concerns as inextricably tied together. However, 
this moment reminds readers that this universal church ensures only the annihilation of 
individuals. The moment reminds readers that, although optimistic readings of providential 
capitalist events focus on the community that surrounds the sacrificial body, that body too has a 
perspective. The slave made invisible to the market that depends upon slavery, the indentured, 
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the sailor, the missing, and the dead, all who were sacrificed for the working of the market, had a 
humanity and personhood that the market absorbs and destroys in its efforts to distill the 
sacrificial person into a mere numeral in its arithmetic logic. 
The novel therefore demonstrates a harsh reality that underwrote Equiano’s fraught but, 
ultimately, successful journey toward transcendence: the successful navigation of the 
increasingly universal providential capitalist culture of the Atlantic required the destruction, 
disappearance, or suffering of individuals who could not attain the kind of upward trajectory that 
the system promised. By the midpoint of the novel, Redburn, for example, secures his own 
survival in the market by offering up the life of the con-man, Harry Bolton. Though their 
relationship is based, ostensibly, upon friendship, Redburn essentially purchases admission into a 
higher echelon of more experienced seamen at the price of his friend, offering a new sacrificial 
body in exchange for his own security (298). As the text and the Highlander’s journeys double-
back, Redburn makes his way toward becoming a man who understands and survives the 
economic structure that dictates the universe. However, as he does, Harry Bolton, who never 
learns to successfully navigate the maritime trade or its customs, dies at sea. Bolton then is yet 
another necessary sacrifice, another body and soul given to the merciless system of Atlantic 
trade, so that Redburn can survive.  
Harry Bolton also allows Melville to try out what would evolve into one of his favorite 
literary types: the con-man. This is an important figure in Melville’s work in two respects: he 
simultaneously reveals the instability and untrustworthiness of Atlantic society, and suggests a 
way to navigate it. Michael Rogin, for example, recognizes the philosophical and personal 
necessity of the con-man’s disposition relative to the Atlantic capitalism of Melville’s age. “On 
the one hand,” he writes, “marketplace motives threatened to swallow up politics, religion, and 
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family life. On the other hand, the marketplace itself required mutual confidence and was 
vulnerable to confidence games…to trust was to be gulled, to mistrust was to go mad. Sanity 
required a trust in appearances that placed one in the power of confidence men” (Rogin 240). 
Yet, in Redburn, even Bolton fails. No figure escapes from the novel truly unscathed, so, just as 
Ishmael’s escape from the disaster of the Pequod allows him to witness the catastrophic folly of 
Jacksonian democracy yoked to charismatic monomania, Redburn’s relative survival allows him 
to witness the totality of Atlantic capital’s rapacious obliterative appetite. It consumes every one 
and every thing. 
The bodies and souls of men like Jackson and, ultimately, Harry Bolton, serve as the fuel 
to sustain providential capitalist trade. The pauper women with their sick babies dying in 
Liverpool, and the rag-pickers among the dead are the system’s incorporated excess. The will of 
God plays out in the uncanny destruction of a body by transformation into commodity. 
Membership in the crew is the only significant register of election, yet, although his crew 
promises to look for Redburn on their return, in order to compensate him for his lost wages, they 
never do. All that remains for Redburn is the grim awareness of his meagre value in the market. 
The only covenants are the ledger book, which tells God or the captain of gains, losses, and debt, 
and the crew list, which secures only degradation, loss of identity, and commodification. 
Jackson, the ostensible villain of the story, actually offers an incisive critique of faith among 
merchant men. A fellow sailor insists “all sailors are saved; they have plenty of squalls here 
below, but fair weather aloft.” Jackson responds “And did you get that out of your silly Dream 
Book, you Greek? Don’t talk of heaven to me—it’s a lie—I know it—and they are all fools that 
believe in it…Avast! When some shark gulps you down his hatchway one of these days, you’ll 
find, that by dying, you’ll only go from one gale of wind to another; mind that, you Irish 
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cockney!” (162). The universe of the novel turns on universal consumption, by the divine, by 
other people, and, most of all, by the market.  
Conclusion 
When Melville uses the vicissitudes of the maritime market and the whims of a shiftless 
captain to investigate the interventionist nature of divinity, he maintains a sense of natural 
cosmological order, but presents it as obliterative and threatening. Similarly, Poe’s strange novel 
taps into a long history of fears about the protective nature of whiteness and the relative 
possibility of commodification and dehumanization. Both authors assert the centrality of the 
body as a site of sacrificial communion, and reproduce that communion as a violent cannibalistic 
event at the heart of a system of violent consumption. They also maintain an interest in the 
body’s significance as covenant, a suffering or disappearing center around which a community 
can form. 
As individuals in both of these narratives fail to elude the logic of commodification, 
consumption, and sacrifice, they tacitly assert the inescapability of the providential capitalist 
market’s universal reach. Lisa Lowe notes that, “while colonial power had employed ‘negative’ 
powers to seize, enslave, occupy, and destroy, a new mode of imperial sovereignty also 
expanded the ‘productive’ power to administer the life, health, labor, and mobility of colonized 
bodies. The productive powers of liberty were realized in the command of bodies that moved 
themselves” (102). The bodies in these texts, although nominally free, are dictated to by the 
market-oriented powers of Atlantic hegemony, and so they embody and reveal the underlying 
needs of that hegemony. Lowe notes that, for Marx, “slavery is situated as ‘precapitalist,’ rather 
than specifically embedded in colonial capitalism, or coterminous and interdependent with a 
spectrum of other labors. By positioning slavery as external or prior to capitalism, not integral to 
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it, the Marxist critique of capitalism is unable to grasp the complex combination of both waged 
and unwaged labor” (149). However, in history and in these texts, capitalism, slavery, and 
freedom are all mutually inclusive.  
The interrelation of national expansion, liberty ideology, and slavery continued to expand 
in the period from the American Revolution, through the Jacksonian age, and into the antebellum 
era. Recent historians like Edward E. Baptist and Walter Johnson have commented on this point 
as well. Baptist, for example, presents both the southern plantation culture and the expansion of 
America as an international power as parts of a modern commodity-oriented exchange market 
that depended upon slavery and slave-produced goods. He explains, “[Andrew Jackson’s] 
policies repeatedly gave the frontier’s entrepreneurial elite exactly what most of them wanted: 
more Indian lands, more territories to the west for slavery, free trade for cotton, and, finally, 
destruction of all limits on their ability to leverage enslaved people’s bodies as credit.” He also 
argues, “The majoritarian philosophy of the new Democratic Party would be fatally alloyed by 
its commitment to both slavery’s expansion and the unregulated, unstable economy that one-
eyed entrepreneurs desired” (Baptist 252). And so, expansion demanded disappearance, 
obligatory subservience, even death, whether in service to Jefferson’s dream of a spacious 
agrarian American landscape, or to the industrial and violently destabilizing Jacksonian age. 
These novels explore the central motivating hierarchies that bound both Jeffersonian and 
Jacksonian ideologies to an expanding Atlantic marketplace. Johnson similarly notes that the 
Jeffersonian dream of an individualist planter economy and the Jacksonian drive toward 
economic expansion were both empowered by an increasingly international market of slave 
commodities and slaves as commodities. He writes, “The United States of America entered the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century with a vast public domain…the question was finding the 
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best mechanism to turn that land into a reservoir for the cultivation of whiteness of the proper 
kind” (Johnson 5). Admittedly, “Jefferson’s vision of social order through expansion had at its 
heart a household-based notion of political economy. Rather than cities sprawling across the 
American landscape, bound together by invisible financial networks and all-too-visible factories, 
white households were to be the serially reproduced unites by which progress was measured” 
(3). However, the very notion of a “white household” was dependent upon the exploitation of the 
black laborer, so, even in Jefferson’s most utopian-agrarian dreams, liberty, labor, unfreedom, 
and commodity-capitalism remained tangled together in the knot of American political 
philosophy and ideology. This reality continued throughout the early parts of the nineteenth 
century so that “The Mississippi Valley remained connected to the Atlantic world by the currents 
of global commerce that could be channeled, but never fully contained by the boundaries of the 
Unite States” (28). Johnson continues: “Creditors pressed debtors to cover the money advanced 
against it along a chain of debt—a chain that joined even the most isolated rural planters and 
country stores to the factors of New Orleans, the merchants of New York, the brokers of 
Liverpool, and even the Bank of England…thus were the science of political economy, the 
practicalities of the cotton market, and the exigencies of racial domination entangled with one 
another—aspects of a single problem, call it slave-racial capitalism” (282). So it is with 
questions of individualism, national identity, and economy in these novels: liberty, nationalism, 
and racial purity are always shadowed by the expansive reach of unfreedom and commodity 
capital. Commodification is the central fact of life in the Atlantic and, despite assertions of white 
supremacy, special election, or even national inclusion, commodification touches everyone 
included among the laboring masses the novels describe. These texts employ commodification as 
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the crucial conversion events of the narrator’s lives. The narrators come of age in their texts only 
after being converted into and coming into contact with valuable things.  
Moreover, where a writer like Equiano saw this lack of human control as a sign of divine 
volition and a promise of divine organization, these writers present it as only human bafflement. 
Humans cannot comprehend the intelligence of whatever force wills their conversion or destiny. 
That force is, above all, the market itself, a force that mutely orders events, affects individual 
lives, and intervenes in personal and historical narratives in inexplicable, even miraculous ways, 
but does not care about humans any more than it does for rum, sugar, or other commodity goods.  
If these writers avoid mentioning the Christian God at length it is because it has been supplanted 
by the market itself. 
What matters most, perhaps, is the sense that Melville and Poe can examine these tropes, 
even as they amplify their supernatural elements, precisely because they have become tropes. 
What began as the particular ideological position of capital-minded Christians, or Christian-
minded capitalists, in and around the Atlantic, has migrated into popular letters, and become the 
expected generic matter of adventure fiction and exploration myth. Importantly, Melville and 
Poe use the genre’s metaphysics to cast a critical eye upon Atlantic capital exchange, especially 
upon its dehumanizing powers of commodification. 
Because there is no entity to present as benign, these writers reveal the terror of the 
potentially unelect: that God will stand in silence, that they are not special, and that they will not 
be spared. Or they go further, to present an even more subversive anxiety: that we are all elect 
only insofar as we embody market value. We are all equally things and we only interest the 
market, the new God, in our exchangeability for and among other equivalent commodities.  
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Chapter 5 
All is of Equal Value: Charles Brockden Brown’s Urban Gothic Captivity Narrative
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In the wake of revolutions taking place in North America, the Caribbean, and Europe, the 
Atlantic—a geographic space, a net of interlocking mobile societies, and a market of trade and 
travel—presented challenges to power hierarchies, national polities, and individual conceptions 
of community, the state, and even spirituality. Given the equivalent-exchange orientation of 
Atlantic capital, it was, perhaps, natural that these challenges should revolve around questions of 
value. What value did the individual or the community hold for the state? What value did one 
individual hold for the communities that traversed the Atlantic’s routes of exchange? What 
elements constituted value? Race? Nationality? Economic and social participation? Could value 
be transferred from one person to another? Indeed, if persons possessed value, could one person 
be exchanged for another? In Arthur Mervyn or Memoirs of the Year 1793 Charles Brockden 
Brown set out to interrogate these questions and all of their consequences. Brockden Brown 
critiques the complex intersections of race, politics, morality and commerce in the post-
revolutionary Atlantic metropole. He does not stop there. His ruminations on value and its 
meaning interrogate the nature of God and reality itself. Arthur Mervyn suggests that Atlantic 
commerce has brought into being a new god, one that is both disinterested and interventionist, 
simultaneously a phantom “ruling genius” and an activist judge. Moreover, the text itself models 
this form of divinity, offering a narrator who generates narrative reality around the logic of 
personal equivalent exchange, and situating the reader in the position of arbiter, whose job it is to 
determine the value of all that has come before and all that will come after. 
The novel, published in two parts—first in 1799, and then in 1800—follows the 
eponymous Mervyn’s involvement in an insurance and investment fraud scheme, his escape 
from that scheme, and his efforts to rescue a number of women and their inheritances from 
shame and waste, all set in the context of a Philadelphia debilitated by a Yellow fever epidemic. 
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Famously, the constant presence of the disease in the plot and setting of the novel evokes fears of 
contagion borne by ships travelling from port to port—especially from the slave plantations of 
the Caribbean—as well as fears of national moral rupture and, perhaps, spiritual degeneracy. 
And so the novel situates the city, and the characters that populate it within a mobile but 
intimately connected world of Atlantic economic, cultural, and moral exchange. These links 
underscore the fact that as the Atlantic’s constellated metropolitan centers of trade and culture 
like Philadelphia, took on new significance as sites of nationalistic identification, they advanced 
and were sustained by the same transnational ideals upon which the Atlantic market ran—ideals 
of virtuous capital, individual sacrifice, communal contract, and personal transaction. At the 
same time Atlantic metropoles reproduced experiences of mastery and submission defined by 
violence, personal commodification, commodity fetishization, and supernatural beliefs in the 
meaning and power of contracts and currency. 
Taking on all of these subjects, Brockden Brown critiques a transnational and national 
culture that is haunted by its foundational links to the Atlantic’s oceanic market of captivity, 
violence, and exploitation, and by market logic that, plague-like, infected the social relations of 
the increasingly urban metropoles of the Atlantic world. As Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro 
note, the novel comments on how to build a virtuous society from the individual up, from 
Mervyn, to his social circle, to his city, to his new nation (xvii). By the same light, the novel 
interrogates the breakdown of virtue on all of these same registers. In so doing, it explores both 
the theological and the national implications of the economic and ideological system of 
transaction at the heart of Atlantic exchange. The ostensibly heroic protagonist of this novel 
reveals the unstable contours of his nation’s claims to liberty, racial caste, spiritual protection, 
and even geography, as he finds himself deeply involved in schemes intended to expand personal 
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wealth that, in turn, ought to enlarge the hegemonic claims of the country, but that draw power 
from the broader Atlantic slave trade.  
Brockden Brown’s dramatization of the individual’s relationship to this broad and 
anxious market culture addresses an audience facing swift political, economic, and cultural 
changes that would not end with the year 1793. As Phillip E. Wegner points out “the antimodern 
reaction was…a significant component of late-nineteenth century U.S. culture” (75).  Evidently 
the “antimodern reaction” was significant for Brockden Brown’s post-revolutionary period as 
well. Indeed, Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath, and Stephen Shapiro note that the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798 were part of an Atlantic “anti-revolutionary” response that took place at 
the time of the novel’s production (xiii). Readers might consider this “anti-revolutionary” shift as 
an under-articulated desire to return to a moment before the disruptions of the revolutionary 
period. They might then consider the novel’s response to anti-revolutionary hypocrisy. It, at 
once, portrays and critiques a national figure’s evocations of liberty and fears of true universal 
liberation. 
In truth, Brockden Brown’s novel examines the North American metropolis from the 
perspective of an author whose metropolitan and nationalist experiences had been doggedly 
ambivalent. Julia Stern, for instance, argues that the Revolution and its “public 
convulsion…disrupts [Brockden Brown’s] childhood, violates the pacifistic principles of his 
Quaker upbringing, and deprives his family of a paternal presence” nevertheless produces the 
nation to which he pledged fealty by 1792 (183). She continues to examine “the attendant shift 
from spiritual to political innovation that occupies the city’s newcomers from the Quaker 
migration in the seventeenth century, to the Revolutionary War and establishment of a republican 
government in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, and finally to the post-revolutionary 
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climate of the 1790s, when French refugees from the Reign of Terror and the San Domingo 
Revolution pour into the city in great numbers” (188). And so, the production of modernity in 
this novel is always disturbing. It points the way toward a future ever more removed from the 
very principles that the new nation claims to uphold. 
The novel’s primary critique addresses society’s embrace of value as a register of social 
belonging, along with the logic of transaction that attends the application of market-oriented 
value to human lives. Describing Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, Wegner notes that “the 
text clears a narrative space in which will appear a different, and very modern, social formation: 
what, for want of a more precise term, has been described as the new ‘consumerism’ associated 
with an emerging segment of the American middle class” (78). Similarly, Sian Silyn Roberts 
writes that Arthur Mervyn “performs a series of revisions on Enlightenment models of the 
individual, sympathy, and contractualism in order to yield a citizen who can enter into 
contractual relations in a setting where disparate people of radically diverse backgrounds and 
interests—including the American Mervyn and the Portuguese-Jewish-British Acsha Fielding—
seek to unite as a social body” (308-9). She continues, “These assumptions turn both sympathy 
and the contract into exclusive forms of community” (308). Brockden Brown’s novel 
demonstrates that this concern with the nature of the emergent national community based upon 
consumerism goes back even further than Wegner observes, to the very founding of the nation, 
and that its economic concerns were always also personal social questions about the evaluative 
composition, direction, and moral parameters of intimacy and community.  Such concerns were 
integral to Enlightenment debates over the relationship of the individual to the public. Hannah 
Arendt, for example, noted as much when she wrote that “the development of the modern age 
and the rise of society, where the most private of all human activities, laboring, has become 
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public and been permitted to establish its own common realm, may make it doubtful whether the 
very existence of property as a privately held place within the world can withstand the relentless 
process of growing wealth” (112). Considering Arendt’s interest in Lockean alongside classical 
philosophy, readers should also consider the viability of the private person relative to the 
growing state. Brockden Brown’s novel, therefore, plays out and experiments with pressing 
ideological and philosophical issues at the center of the emergent post-revolutionary nation. 
The novel has long attracted critical attention for its critiques of both finance capital and 
the increasingly national societies that depend upon it, but readers should never lose sight of the 
moral and spiritual questions at the heart of these issues. Nevertheless, this critical element of the 
text has remained under-scrutinized for generations of Brockden Brown critics. For example, in 
an overarching review of early twentieth century criticism of Arthur Mervyn, Donald A. Ringe, 
noted that Brockden Brown “intends the commercial city, both before and during the plague, to 
assume symbolic import as the place of Mervyn’s adventures. The scenes of the plague, 
therefore, reinforce the concept of the corrupt city” (67). Ringe and his generation of Brockden 
Brown scholars offered a perceptive invitation to read the novel as a unique and uniquely 
probing urban gothic investigation of the rot at the heart of the would-be nation’s “commercial 
city,” but readers and critics must now go further, to see the novel’s exploration of the nature of 
social morality and even of reality itself. 
To demonstrate the potential for personal, social, and especially moral failure, Brockden 
Brown slyly underscores the subtext of the same urban gothic genre he helped to popularize so 
that, if readers are meant to identify with the novel’s imperiled victims and their champions, they 
are also complicit in the violence, transaction, and commodification involved in narrative 
episodes of captivity. Regarding this philosophically ruminative element of the text, Bruce 
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Burgett has noted the “slippage between two adjacent literary genres: the philosophic dialogue 
and the seduction narrative” (136). However, Brockden Brown does not merely blend these 
generic forms. Instead, he uses them to suggest that, in a nation founded upon and funded by 
unfreedom, a nation at the border of a grander Atlantic economy that uses captivity as a means to 
assert power, society might have more in common with the captors and villains of urban gothic 
literature, than with its victims and heroes. 
Brockden Brown also takes seriously the spiritual assumptions of urban gothic texts when 
he evokes the machinations of an ordering or retributive divine intelligence at work in the novel. 
He questions, for example, whether a “ruling genius had prepared [Mervyn’s] path” (45). At the 
same time, he suggests the possibility that the plague is a form of divine judgment over a fallen 
society. Thus, Arthur Mervyn’s active “slippage” between generic modes raises questions about 
personal, national, and universal morality that go far beyond critiques of “the commercial city.” 
If the marketplace is an expression of the nation’s moral character, Brockden Brown asks, then is 
morality or sociality a simple matter of market transaction? If divinity operates providentially 
and through market functions, does the Atlantic economy, and the nation’s position within it, 
suggest a disinterested god or the interventionist work of a coldly calculating but judgmental 
deity? 
Crucially, the novel opens these interpretations of divinity and reality to scrutiny by 
modeling them in textual style and structure. Brockden Brown’s aesthetic choices—his decision 
to use a shifting and innately untrustworthy narrator, for example—reveal themselves as 
commentary upon the nature of national literature, the nation he observes coming into being, 
and, perhaps, the divine natural universe. Ezra Tawil argues that “Brown used his fiction not 
only to provide instances of ‘American romance’ but also to guide readers’ reception of this new 
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mode along the way. By both enacting and simultaneously theorizing the distinctness of 
American literature, and doing so in explicit relation to contemporary theories of aesthetic 
experience, Brown’s novels in effect operated not only as critics, but ore radically as a kind of 
aesthetic theory by other means” (106). This reflexive commentary on the very genre Brockden 
Brown produces is important, but when linked to other criticisms that note the novel’s 
engagement with social critique, it becomes profound. The text itself provides a space in which 
to try out and to interrogate different social and spiritual modes of relation.  
All of this comes together as the novel nears its conclusion, when the text offers a 
seemingly off-handed epigraph, intended to close off a narrative that has, to that point, simmered 
with unresolved anxiety and has proven stubbornly irregular, circular, and difficult to trace. “All 
is of equal value,” writes Brockden Brown, as if to force the narrative to cease its rambling 
momentum and just end already (329). However, the phrase is significantly trickier than it, at 
first, appears, effectively communicating the novel’s most pressing themes and evidently holding 
the key to understanding all that has come before and all that the novel portends for the future. 
The phrase asserts the logic of equivalence that has functioned as the primary force for social 
contact in the novel. Throughout the novel, equivalence and transaction have initiated 
relationships, have proven binding forces, or have allowed individuals to exert autonomy over 
their own identities. The logic of value has also exposed the hierarchies of sex, class, and race 
that structure the Atlantic and its metropolitan ports. And so, the phrase insists that there is a 
hierarchy of value undergirding not only the logic of the novel, but also the logic of a life lived in 
the Atlantic world. All people, all lives, all stories have value. Some are more valuable than 
others. Some are equivalent. The transaction and exchange of each and all is the primary means 
by which society, the market, and even the society of souls in the novel enlarge themselves.  
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The phrase also bears scrutiny as a unique interpretation of the post-revolutionary 
nation’s definition of liberty. Like the founding documents of the nation that the novel’s 
Philadelphia represents, the phrase insists upon equality. At the same time, it insists that that 
equality is produced through value and evaluation. Thus, even as the nation and its rhetoric 
embrace liberty, they enshrine hierarchical evaluation as a primary element of the nation’s 
founding economic, philosophical, and theological ethos.  
Brockden Brown also permits the phrase to carry spiritual connotations, a point left out of 
many important critical readings of the novel and its author’s intentions. Shapiro, for example, 
offers as succinct and inarguable a reading of the actions and significance of “value” in this 
novel as one could hope for, but neglects Brockden Brown’s theological intentions.  He writes, 
“as value is brought in one floating vessel, the slave ships, it is transferred into another, the paper 
monetary instruments, which then become the currency for securing bourgeois 
marriages…Brown argues that the contradictions of mercantile accumulation in one sphere will 
float to reappear in another.” He continues, “Brown seems to insist that because the original 
moment of accumulation depends on violence on African bodies, this competitive force will be 
carried alongside the chain of exchanges manifested as acts of business fraud and forgery and the 
emotional deception in seduction” (283). It is difficult to dispute this reading, but Mervyn’s 
references to a “ruling genius” at work behind the scenes of all of these transactions imply that 
the transference Shapiro observes occurs within the sight, if not at the command of a divinity that 
the novel takes pains to trace, if not to comprehend. 
With this in mind, the phrase is also notable for its source: spoken from an omniscient 
authorial perspective in a text in which narrative control has shifted and exposed itself to doubt. 
Throughout the novel, the author both controls the narrative that describes Mervyn’s past, 
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present, and future, and models an interventionist and providential divinity at work in the world 
in which Mervyn lives. Brockden Brown achieves this, largely, by disrupting narrative stability. 
The narrator, or narrators, produce narratives but do not offer obvious keys to their 
interpretation. They produce questions and force readers to offer their own answers. Tawil 
observes that “even when events are clarified retrospectively in the novels’ 
resolutions…Brown’s novels neither fully dispel this narrative disorientation nor conclude with 
stable epistemological resolutions” (120). As a result, the text’s invocations of value and 
evaluation, and of a “ruling genius” implicate both the author and the reader as models for divine 
intervention into reality, on the one hand producing equivalent and potentially transactional 
narratives and identities, and, on the other, evaluating them.  
In Arthur Mervyn, equivalent exchange functions not only as a structuring element in the 
Atlantic economy, but also as the organizing principle of the natural universe. When the text 
skips over Mervyn’s happiness by casually informing readers that “all is of equal value” and 
therefore does not merit telling, it also asserts the reality-ordering nature of “value,” 
simultaneously narrative, moral, and market-driven. Mervyn’s happy ending is static; it has 
ceased to rise or fall. However, this represents only the final settlement of equivalent logic over 
the text and over Mervyn’s life story. All of Mervyn’s experiences have a value, but that value 
can be measured, transacted, or exchanged, all within the contours of a cosmology of time, social 
relations, experience, and commerce that resemble a self-contained marketplace. Moreover, in 
Mervyn’s final plan to remove to Europe and, after some time, to return to America a wealthier 
man, he traverses the routes of Atlantic trade that have carried the many troubled business 
dealings of the novel. Thus his experiences are bound, quite literally, within the Atlantic 
marketplace. Brockden Brown uses the un-narrated sequel to the novel to demonstrate Mervyn’s 
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complete convergence with a system that remains in place even as individuals traverse the 
Atlantic and exchange bodies, labor, time, experience, and value within the market.  
A Transactional Universe 
Although the novel explores the lived experience of transactional Atlantic life, an 
experience that often appears, as is right for an urban gothic narrative, deeply confusing, it also 
implies an ordered cosmological reality that sustains and intervenes in reality according to the 
market-oriented logic of equivalence. Readers must keep the novel’s symbolic conflation of 
infection, moral depravity, slave economy, and nationalism in mind as they approach critics like 
Carl Ostrowski, who argues that the novel should be read in light of the theory of “political 
economy,” a phrase that appeared in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and was first propounded 
by Sir James Steuart in his 1767 treatise, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy. 
Ostrowski explains that “a number of incidents in the novel can be read as Brown’s comment on 
the social costs of speculation, a financial practice that generated controversy and scandal in 
America during the 1790s” (4). The world of the novel comprises a “political economy,” a space 
in which the logic of the ledger book dictates political motives, personal actions, and social 
bonds. However, the novel also expends a great deal of energy in examining the personal and 
spiritual costs of life lived in such an environment, especially if the “political economy” of the 
Atlantic and the nation are tightly bound to sinful, deceptive, or dehumanizing market practices 
such as speculation, untoward debt-finance, and slavery. 
On this point, it is important to recall that the novel was hardly written in a vacuum. 
Indeed, Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath and, Stephen Shapiro note that “Brown infused his 
writing with the cultural politics of the early national period. And as scholars turn to focus on 
competing material and ideological productions in the 1790s, they have become increasingly 
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interested in the role of authority and authorial agency…. especially as identity construction 
becomes a metaphor for the body politic” (xvi). Given this scholarly interest, it is crucial to 
recognize that the text does not merely trace the evolution of American nationalism or capital. 
Rather it demonstrates that, even as capitalist wealth expands, even as Arthur Mervyn develops 
into a more stable personality, even as the nation becomes more assertive, and even as the 
language of liberty becomes ever more insistent, the Atlantic marketplace imperils and captures 
fortunes, the protagonist’s life devolves into an experience of captivity and dehumanized market 
value, the nation’s status as a subordinate Atlantic outpost becomes clear, and the failures and 
limits of liberty come into focus. 
In fact, Brockden Brown expresses potent doubts about the application and manipulation 
of capitalism in a time in which the proper use of capital was being challenged by abuse and 
fraud. Ostrowski explains, “the Yellow fever epidemic famously described in the novel might be 
seen as a judgment on economic liberalism, a vindictive invisible hand that punished the people 
of Philadelphia for their habits of conspicuous consumption” (4). Of course, these were old 
worries. Philip Barnard and Stephen Shapiro argue that commerce was suspect from premodern 
times through modern society, and, as a result, it became dominated by and linked to religious 
and ethnic minorities (xxiv). As the novel toys with racial hybridity, moral uncertainty, and 
ethically dubious commercial interactions, it will build upon these concerns. The text’s critiques 
are never wholly abstract: Ostrowski goes on to provide a thorough explanation of the process by 
which speculators in the 1790s essentially swindled Revolutionary veterans out of their due 
bonds. However, readers must not rush past the conflation of a debased economic culture and a 
debased social or moral culture. Brockden Brown writes from the critical perspective of one who 
sees the potential risks of Atlantic capitalist exchange firsthand and recognizes that they 
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undermine both the nation’s claims to economic stability and its claims to moral or even spiritual 
legitimacy. 
And so, even as the novel acknowledges the power of the market to amplify nationalist 
authority, it withholds examples of the market as a salvific force. It presents it, instead, as a 
vehicle for the enlargement of the Atlantic economic-social cosmology, at the cost of personal 
and national morality. At one point, for instance, Mervyn launches into an extended discourse on 
the debasing power of money in the context of the economic disappointment that ruined his 
family and initiated his journey toward the city and toward the Atlantic marketplace. He writes, 
“The want of money would be no obstacle to prodigality and waste. Credit would be resorted to 
as long as it would answer his demand. When that failed, he would once more be thrown into a 
prison; the same means to extricate him would have to be repeated, and money be thus put into 
the pockets of the most worthless of mankind, the agents of drunkenness and blasphemy, without 
any permanent advantage to my father, the principal object of my charity” (290). If this is, in 
some ways, an apologia for Mervyn’s family’s failures, it is also a broader critique of the 
inextricable trap set for individuals and nations in the market: to rise, one must borrow; to 
borrow one must incur debt; once indebted, it is nearly impossible to pay off debts and rise. 
The novel treats debt and ownership as, at once, foundational and threatening to the 
Republic, as well as to personal social relations and individual objectives. In fact, Ostrowski 
argues that the novel’s real thrust is the seduction of the title character away from “more 
productive pursuits” and toward debt speculation (7). This logic extends so that, Ostrowski 
observes, “one could say that Mervyn speculates in mentors, abandoning the promising but 
ultimately worthless Welbeck in favor of the more stable (but still modestly prosperous) Dr. 
Stevens. A similar exchange takes place during Mervyn’s search for a wife…the fortune that 
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Mervyn ends up with at the novel’s end…itself faintly bears the speculator’s taint” (12-13).  As 
the novel bears out, social relations in the post-revolutionary United States are structured via the 
same logic that structures all of Atlantic society: transaction and equivalent exchange. Thus, the 
personal journey of Mervyn toward debt-backed modes of personal relations reverberates 
through national culture founded upon the logic and mechanics of exchange and transactional 
value—in goods, in morals, and in flesh. 
Mervyn’s journey also takes him ever closer to the heart of the Atlantic economy: the 
slave trade. Despite its exotic distance, and despite the narrator’s attempts to encode references 
to it, the Philadelphia of the novel is a vital link in the Atlantic market of slaves and the products 
that they cultivate. In fact, the dependence of business speculators like Mervyn and his associate, 
the villainous con-man, Welbeck, upon wealth and commodities derived from the Caribbean 
attests to the fact that, as Ashli White has pointed out, at the time the novel is set, Le Cap, in San 
Domingue, was the most prosperous and populous city in the Americas, while Philadelphia was 
its dependent. Mervyn and Welbeck negotiate transatlantic business deals, which generally 
originate in the Caribbean, Mervyn and the doctor who becomes his benefactor battle against a 
Yellow fever epidemic, which originates in the Caribbean, and Mervyn works to negotiate the 
contracts that bind imperiled women to business and businessmen who originate in the 
Caribbean. Reading Mervyn’s repeated Caribbean business ventures, it is difficult not to 
conclude that the center of gravity for the novel is the same as it was for Atlantic culture in the 
1790’s—the Caribbean, rather than North Atlantic cities like Philadelphia. 
One effect of urban Philadelphia’s economic and cultural subordination to the Atlantic 
slave market is its necessary involvement in the allegorizing logic that allows the market to use 
human bodies as commodities. The text suggests the veracity of Ian Baucom’s claims of the 
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centrality of debt and insurance speculation to Atlantic society by representing the anxieties of 
commodification produced by such a system. Baucom’s discussion of the Zong massacre posits a 
number of important critiques of finance capital that Brockden Brown will take up in fiction.xliv 
The commodification of bodies, their possession and disposal, the links between economy and 
death, contract as a force that binds human lives to powerful masters, and even the recirculation 
of the dead through the insurance market are all elements in Brockden Brown’s novel. 
Welbeck’s misbegotten fortune is apparently “swallowed up” by investments in the slave trade. 
A letter reveals that a ship travelling from San Domingue to Philadelphia has crashed, incurring 
“the loss of his ship and cargo.” The “cargo” lost in transit indicates a loss of North American 
capital, and of African or Caribbean human souls. Mervyn’s narration both obscures the human 
reality of this cargo and reinforces the cold evaluative commodification of the slave trade when 
he recounts how “all was lost but one hundred and fifty dollars” (91). The human cargo lost in 
the ship is linguistically and conceptually transferred into dollars. Moreover, the dollars here 
named become an allegorical abstraction of the insurance logic that, in slavery, commodifies the 
entire person. 
This point becomes especially clear with regard to the insurance market that, in the novel, 
stands in for both slavery’s most dehumanizing abuses, and the means by which market 
equivalence and transaction include even the unpredictable changes in the natural world in their 
eternally comprehensive schema. Mervyn explains Welbeck’s plan, by which, “should the 
voyage be safely performed, the profits would double the original expense [but] should the ship 
be taken or wrecked, the insurers would have bound themselves to make ample, speedy, and 
certain indemnification.” He continues, “Loss from storms and enemies was to be precluded by 
insurance. Every hazard was to be enumerated, and the ship and cargo valued at the highest rate” 
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(77). However, this plan is violated when “Two French mulattoes [who] had, after much 
solicitation, and the most solemn promises to carry with them no articles which the laws of war 
decree to be contraband, obtained a passage” on their business partner, Thetford’s, ship. 
Ultimately “the vessel was captured and condemned, and this was a cause of forfeiture, which 
had not been provided against in the contract of insurance” (80). Regarding the importance of 
insurance to the world in which Arthur Mervyn is set, Baucom writes, “the Zong massacre is the 
emblematic event of modernity, in which “the slaves were thus treated not only as a type of 
commodity but as a type of interest-bearing money...commodities for sale and as the reserve 
deposits of a loosely organized decentered but vast trans-Atlantic banking system” (61). Baucom 
continues, noting the persistence of commodified individuals in a commodity-oriented society. 
He writes, “In a money culture or an insurance culture value survives its objects” (95). In such a 
culture, the bodies of the slaves were used as “promissory notes, bills of exchange... 
[embodying] material existence but [maintaining] their speculative, recoverable loss value” 
(139). Even the loss of the Caribbean “cargo” has a market value—if Mary Watson, the ship’s 
investor, or Thetford, or Welbeck has lost, presumably the insurance company has profited. As a 
result, both parties in the exchange reinforce the necessary commodified, dehumanized status of 
human cargo for the balance of capital exchange to be complete. Whether accounting a loss or a 
gain, the text is clear: “all is of equal value,” and transaction is the ordering logic of society. 
Indeed, transactional logic extends even beyond life and death. Debt-backed unfree 
persons are taken from their homes, transacted upon in an unfamiliar space, and ultimately lost to 
violence. They are also captured and destroyed by the logic of insurance-backed allegorization, 
market exchange, and mobility. With this in mind, readers might recognize Mervyn’s late 
consideration that his death might allow his money to do some good in the world as less a 
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suicidal fancy and more a plain recognition that the dead still have a value in a market that 
continues to produce profits, even where individual human lives are lost. Chad Luck argues that 
“anxieties about the ambiguous purview of ownership and about the ephemeral nature of 
property itself only grow more insistent as the nineteenth century gets under way. The rising 
influence of market culture…increasingly treats property not as an embodied phenomenon, not 
as a phenomenological relationship between persons and things, but as an abstract commodity, as 
a legal construct designed to facilitate easy movement and exchange.” Luck calls this the 
“virtualization” of property (81). However, in this novel, the increasing “virtualization” of 
property suggests the expanding “virtualization” of persons as well. As Brockden Brown sees 
America become increasingly market-oriented, he presents his readers with a character who sees 
other people as property and struggles against his own transactional commodification, only to 
discover that everything in law and in nature, embodied or disembodied, alive or dead, exists 
alike within the market. 
The novel also uses the transactional relations between men and women to replicate the 
links that were most important to Atlantic social construction; namely: those between slaves and 
their masters. This reveals the unsettling dark side of the Enlightenment liberationist rhetoric 
upon which the American state was founded. Mary Nyquist, for example, notes that the 
conception of freedom in the presence of unfreedom was a feature common to the discourse both 
of Greco-Roman societies, and to the modern states that looked to them as models for democratic 
polity. She writes, “Even when antityrannicism is being rejected, early moderns carry on the 
Greco-Roman practice of conceptualizing rule with reference to a distinction between household 
slavery and the state” (169). Looking to these classical sources, Nyquist begins to uncover the 
relation between mastery, slavery, and ownership that still adhere in modern contexts, writing, 
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“Polar opposition between servitude and freedom informs every move…in which oeconomize—a 
verb deriving from the oikos, or house-hold—applies to the nation” (173). Nyquist here notes the 
degree to which slaves were a part of the household and thus closely engaged in their masters’ 
lives. They were both household members and household items, both persons and things in close 
contact with free individuals and families. Although she does not explicitly spell out the 
connection, Nyquist’s classical sources also presage the turn that would come with capitalism. 
Readers should, therefore, update the intimate connection between master and slave that Nyquist 
describes to include the ways in which capitalism allowed the intimate relation between slave 
and free, owner and owned, to stay active, even in relationships in which captivity was less 
frankly obvious. Shapiro notes the dual significance of this intimacy in Arthur Mervyn, writing 
that the novel “shows how closely intimate relations in Philadelphia are built on the 
infrastructure of slavery and the Caribbean economy and thus under threat of being ‘undone’ by 
black rebellion” (Culture and Commerce 282). In the capitalist Atlantic, the commodity relations 
of individuals to their possessed captives burst forth from the confines of the home but 
maintained the intimacy of captive possession and the resilient logic of transaction.  
Mervyn claims to enter into the world of Atlantic business relations with little 
understanding of how it works or willingness to accommodate himself to its logic. However, in 
his efforts to present himself as blameless, he demonstrates the extent to which the equivalence-
generating operations of debt define his free movements, and personal and moral liberty. 
Crossing the bridge across the Schuylkill river on his journey toward the city, he realizes he has 
no money and notes “I had nothing to pay, and by returning I should only double my debt. Let it 
stand, said I, where it does. All that honour enjoins is to pay when I am able” (22). Yet the world 
does not run on the “honour” that Mervyn, as narrator, claims is his guiding principle, so he finds 
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himself unsheltered and unfed, trekking unhappily toward a future of abuse and disillusion. In 
fact, Mervyn’s narration subtly undermines its own pronouncements of “honour,” for it is 
“honour” itself that leads him to betray his own ethics and morals. He explains “I had an 
invincible aversion to the calling of a beggar, but I regarded with still more antipathy the 
vocation of a thief; to this alternative, however, I was now reduced. I must either steal or beg; 
unless, indeed, assistance could be procured under the notion of a loan” (37). In this world of 
social transaction, these are Mervyn’s options: beg, steal, or engage with the rituals of finance 
and debt.  
Here the novel articulates its moral sense of money-matters. Money could, potentially, be 
used for good, but it is also sinful, existing within a world that is, at best, amoral. And so, it 
turns, ever and always, to debasement. In fact, the web of debt and exchange runs the risk of 
actually converting good into social evil. Mervyn admits, for example, that, “Good intentions, 
unaided by knowledge, will, perhaps, produce more injury than benefit” (242). Moral intentions 
have nothing to do with it. Brockden Brown concedes as much when he states, “if cities are the 
chosen seats of misery and vice, they are likewise the soil of all the laudable and strenuous 
productions of mind” (221). Late in the novel, Mervyn too confesses that all of his actions have 
either come to ruin or furthered the harm he wishes to limit. He wonders, “Is every man, who 
leaves his cottage and the impressions of his infancy behind him, ushered into such a world of 
revolutions and perils?” (248). The novel’s answer is, evidently, yes.  
With this in mind, Mervyn wonders whether the divine does indeed care to pass judgment 
over the moral choices of individuals and societies. If it does, then it does so over a fallen world 
made crudely decadent because of its links to immoral elements in its economic system. Mervyn, 
for example confronts the uncle of Eliza Hadwin, a young woman whose family has been carried 
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off by the ongoing Yellow fever epidemic. Hadwin’s uncle hopes to use the legal language of 
Hadwin’s father’s will to exploit and take advantage of the young woman, and he shouts down 
Mervyn’s heroic entreaties, exclaiming, “‘God damn it! You then are the damned rascal.’” 
Mervyn goes on in an aside: “but permit me to repeat his speech without the oaths with which it 
was plentifully interlarded. Not three words were uttered without being garnished with a—"God 
damn it!" "damnation!" "I'll be damned to hell if"—and the like energetic expletives” (228). 
Hadwin continues, enhancing “each word by the epithets damnable and hellish; closed each 
sentence with— ‘and be curst to you!’” (229). Divine power resides in the minds of these 
characters, but only as something with the power to destroy, frustrate, or otherwise to condemn. 
Moreover, it does so in response to the same acts of economic transaction that have recurred 
throughout the novel. And so, the novel uses the insurance market to model a disinterested but 
still providential deity, and uses moments like this one to model a judgmental form of the same. 
In fact, this moment signals the simultaneous existence of both aspects of providential divinity.  
The man will be “damned to hell” because he stands on the wrong side of an equivalent 
transaction that takes place over Eliza Hadwin’s person. 
Feminine Peril, the Limits of Liberty, and Explosive Potentials. 
This event is hardly isolated, for, throughout the novel, Brockden Brown uses the 
imperiled white female body to expose the dangers posed by a broader market-oriented Atlantic 
to the nation founded upon and funded by unfreedom. As Paul Baepler has discussed, captivity 
narratives were alternately used throughout early American literary history to elicit interracial 
sympathy or to reinforce codes of racial difference. Brockden Brown toys with both of these 
generic effects as he situates transaction as the dominant experience of Atlantic life. In the 
presence of bodies that are literally held captive, literally transacted upon, literally open to 
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exploitation and commodification, Brockden Brown’s characters internalize fears that such 
might be the fate of supposedly free persons and bodies as well. In a world in which some people 
can be made into things, given value, bought and sold, all people should worry about the threat 
of valuation, possession, and sale.  
The novel’s interest in scenes in which individuals are literally stolen away, kept in 
bondage, and traded as valued things in an economy of possession and exchange appears to have 
been a persistent theme or generic reflex for Brockden Brown. For example, Stephen Shapiro 
argues that, in a similar vein, “at its heart, Edgar Huntly is a series of male captivity 
narratives…where the trope of physical duress within an alien culture operates as an intimate 
code of shared experience” (225-6). Arthur Mervyn is also a “male captivity narrative,” but one 
that uses debt, contract, financial speculation, and, in some cases, the literal possession of bodies 
as the mechanisms of captivity. In Arthur Mervyn, Brockden Brown goes a step further than he 
does in Edgar Huntly, suggesting that the nation might resemble not only the captive but also the 
captors, traders in human flesh as commodities on the open market. 
This aspect of Brockden Brown’s critique becomes clear in light of the fact that Arthur 
Mervyn is populated by characters who strive for liberation from literal and economic captivity, 
even as they are made complicit in the captivity of others. Clemenza Lodi, the first woman 
Mervyn attempts to rescue from financial and personal ruin, Eliza Hadwin, the second, and 
Acsha Fielding, the woman with whom he ultimately settles a mutually transactional intimate 
relation, are all women who are brought from home and confined to a distant and isolated space 
that they do not recognize. They are all threatened by violence and sexual assault, they all 
become the objects of financial transaction, and they all secure their freedom only through rescue 
efforts that carry transactional market costs. Other characters are held captive too—Welbeck to 
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his co-conspirators, and Mervyn to Welbeck—even to the point of literal forced transportation 
and captivity. However, characters like Welbeck and Mervyn also use debts and contracts as the 
technologies by which to capture or cheat others, as well as to transact for the freedom or 
possession of women. Welbeck swindles the businessmen, Thetford and Jamieson, through false 
checks, and does so with Mervyn’s assistance. Similarly, Welbeck entraps Clemenza Lodi, 
exploiting her sexually and economically, but he could not do so without Mervyn, even if 
Mervyn professes innocence. 
And so, if readers can identify with Mervyn as a victim, they must also identify with him 
as a potential victimizer. For example, Clemenza Lodi is bound to Welbeck through a shared 
history instantiated by a will that keeps her his subordinate, and through seemingly-false 
documents and bills that maintain their connection. Although he ultimately works to free Lodi 
from these binding contracts, Mervyn initially acts as Welbeck’s go-between, his accomplice in 
the project of female exploitation. As a result, both men use debt to control Lodi, even as they, 
themselves, are bound through debt to other distant business partners. Moreover, this system of 
captivity has material, palpable effects upon the captives with which it trades. In Eliza Hadwin’s 
case, the novel suggests the possibility of sexual exploitation as an outcome of debt, for example. 
This fate actually does befall Clemenza Lodi, who becomes pregnant with Welbeck’s 
illegitimate child. She becomes the unfortunate victim of, if not rape, then at least sexual 
exploitation that has been made possible by her contracted debt. These experiences of mutual 
exploitation and debt-financed violence make it difficult, if not impossible, for the primary 
characters to avoid tacit responsibility for the exploitation taking place in the urban Atlantic. 
Every character in the novel has some exposure to debt finance. As a result, each one of them has 
a role to play in a system that draws its power from commodification, transaction, and bondage.  
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With this in mind, the novel recognizes that, in Atlantic societies, individuals have 
distinct values according to the hierarchies of trade, class, gender, and race. Women have a 
different market and social value from Mervyn, himself, and so they possess less free 
exchangeability and must, therefore, be transacted upon or for. Although white men—especially 
Mervyn—do find themselves imperiled in the novel, they usually find their own way out. 
Moreover, they do so by asserting their transactional acumen. They embrace exchange-oriented 
logic and, through it, experience their own freedom.  Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds astutely gestures 
toward this fact when she notes the gendered elements of “virtue” in the novel. She observes that 
“the women of Arthur Mervyn are known by the property they keep, and as a result, loss of 
property threatens their reputation, creating a need for the benevolent interference of an Arthur 
Mervyn” (Private Property 70). She continues, “it is women’s virtue that is defined by the 
property they keep. Compared to Arthur’s economic freedom—his ability to suffer loss of 
inheritance and still prevail in a market economy within which he exchanges cash and 
benevolence for financial success—this property-defined virtue is rather confining” (90). 
However, if the novel and the society it depicts limit the degree of agency they lend to white 
female characters, they outright deny agency to the slaves who constitute essential elements of 
Mervyn’s Atlantic business.  
Thus, the embodied and hierarchical perils of the market come into particularly sharp 
focus when Mervyn recognizes the ongoing presence of unfree persons in post-revolutionary 
America, a nation proclaiming liberty with the specter of chattel slavery in its midst. Late in the 
novel, Mervyn takes a journey through the American South to Baltimore, in order to settle Eliza 
Hadwin’s contract dispute. As he does, the text implicitly mirrors the captivity and exchange of 
black and white female bodies. Mervyn describes, “A black girl who sat opposite, and whose 
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innocent and regular features wanted only a different hue to make them beautiful.” He continues, 
unconsciously revealing his own biases when he notes that “near it, in a rocking-chair, with a 
sleeping babe in her lap, sat a female figure in plain but neat and becoming attire.” The 
disturbing dehumanization contained in his use of the pronoun “it” does not mark Mervyn as a 
villain in the novel, but does belie his own participation in the dehumanizing slave trade that he 
claims to detest. He even notes his frightful effect on the girl when he writes that, “the black girl, 
having occasion to change her situation, in order to reach the ball which was thrown at her, 
unluckily caught a glance of my figure through the glass. In a tone of half surprise and half 
terror, she cried out, ‘Oh! See dare! A man!’" (276). Although sent on an errand of liberating one 
captive, Mervyn, for a moment, reveals his own role as a captor. He never describes the fetters 
that hold the girl, for there are none, only the implicit, unspoken logic of possession and 
enslavement, logic to which Mervyn succumbs when he dehumanizes her in his own mind and in 
his narration. Despite her play, the girl is as much a captive of the Atlantic economy as the 
woman Mervyn hopes to rescue, and more so, for she has no white man to come to her aid. 
Mervyn’s sojourn through the South demonstrates the intimacy of liberty and captivity, placing 
the allegorical captivity of white women and their rescue by ostensibly heroic figures in relief 
against the experience of truly enslaved black women who are just as much captive but who lack 
an Arthur Mervyn with the will to rescue them. 
Setting the scene in the American South also allows Brockden Brown to focus on the 
ideological and commercial links that connected the nation’s aspirational and ostensibly 
liberationist Yankee identity to its slaveholding and hierarchical partners around the Atlantic. As 
Walter Johnson points out, well into the nineteenth century, enslaved hands touched almost all of 
the commodity goods that flowed from the South and the West “for sale in the great metropolitan 
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markets of the Atlantic world: Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Havana, Marseilles, and, above 
all the others, Liverpool” (81). Because of Philadelphia’s centrality to the American economy 
and to the American national identity, and despite its stated religious and ethical refutation of 
chattel slavery, it could not escape its connection to the slave economy. Shapiro agrees, writing, 
“with Arthur Mervyn’s constant intersection of trade, slavery, domesticity, and violence, Brown 
suggests that no component of American society, even the Jeffersonian agrarian homestead or 
the interior space of Mervyn’s romantic imagination, can be insulated from the reverberations of 
Atlantic slavery’s accumulation by dispossession, since faraway commercial aggression will 
ultimately come home to roost” (Culture and Commerce 283). However, in this novel, those 
links not only “come home to roost” but also structure society itself. Jennifer Rae Greeson, for 
example, discusses the way the South functions as an internal other that brought the United 
States into existence even as it contradicted national ideals (1). Depicting the South, she says, 
allows writers to develop a national identity as a relationship of mastery over an internalized 
“other” (10). There may be some of this in Mervyn’s trip to Maryland. Yet his trip also reveals 
the dependent status of Yankee Philadelphia to slave business and finance culture. The center to 
which Mervyn is drawn is the slaveholding South, a space Mervyn views as alien, but which 
holds vastly more power in the formation and direction of the American state than he would care 
to admit. Similarly, Samuel Otter presents Philadelphia as “the city positioned near the border 
between South and North…the dividing line between slavery and freedom” (4). Brockden Brown 
explores this boundary status, but assertively presents that boundary as a point of connection 
rather than division between freedom and unfreedom. For this reason, Otter suggests that “it was 
a city of porous boundaries and unstable parts” (14). Held in a kind of death embrace with the 
self it pretends to reject, Yankee Philadelphia finds itself in the unique position of holding onto 
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what it claims to abhor, lest it perish. Mervyn’s liberating actions therefore perform, in 
miniature, his nation’s curtailed extension of liberation. Mervyn’s relative blindness to this 
reality only underscores Brockden Brown’s critique of racializing logic. 
That Mervyn negotiates the escape of the white Hadwin, but not that of the enslaved 
black girl both safely reestablishes his society’s racial hierarchies and admits his tacit 
participation in the slave trade. Mervyn’s failure to act on behalf of the enslaved girl in the scene 
demonstrates the limits of freedom in a transactional and slaveholding society. He presents 
himself as a liberator but he is also, in this case, complicit in the continued captivity of another 
human being. And so, even when Mervyn sees the bonds and shackles of others, he fails to see 
his own hand upon them. 
With this in mind, the text uses Mervyn’s own anti-romantic narration of the experience 
to cast a critical eye upon his intentions of liberationist heroism. Mervyn declares, “I will not 
describe my dreams. My proper task is to relate the truth. Neither shall I dwell upon the images 
suggested by the condition of the country through which I passed. I will confine myself to 
mentioning the transactions connected with the purpose of my journey” (275). The sentimental 
romanticism that he decries here functions to obscure the transactional logic that organizes and 
empowers the southern landscape through which he travels. This, in and of itself, exposes the 
cold transactional heart of a society too mannered to confess its own economic basis. Yet the 
narration contains a double critique, drawing the reader’s attention back to the fact that even 
Mervyn is absorbed by the logic of “transactions” that define both social interactions and 
economic exchanges.  Sean X. Goudie strikes a similar chord, recognizing that “Brown’s novel 
exposes in unflattering ways the classificatory mechanisms used by the budding empire to 
constitute the national character, to establish the boundaries between acceptable and 
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unacceptable terms of identity for the nation and national citizen, and to devise frameworks for 
belonging and removal” (Specie 64).  More to the point, after the Haitian revolution, “one did 
not have to be born in the South, or live in and around the southern plantation economy, to 
become racial in one’s thinking by the turn of the nineteenth century” (76). Indeed, Brockden 
Brown’s own opinions on the subject were complex. Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro, for 
example, note that, in correspondence, he demonstrated “militant critiques of slavery 
and…underlying prejudices concerning race and racial typology” (xxxiv). Rather than ignore or 
resolve these complexities, Brockden Brown brings them to the foreground through his 
protagonist. Although he claims heroic status, Mervyn’s words belie a mind shaped by and for 
the transactional economy of which slavery is such a key part. 
What the novel does not name—what it cannot name—is the most important Atlantic 
event of the 1790s, an event of which the audience would hardly need to be reminded. Namely: 
The Haitian revolution. It does not name the event, because its characters deeply fear its 
significance. However, the novel’s seeming-erasure of history lends the revolution even greater 
power as a fearful potential eventuality in both the minds of the central characters and in the 
mind of the reader. In fact, Philadelphia could not escape its connections to the Haitian 
revolution because, as Otter points out, white planters escaped Haiti and brought their slaves 
with them to Philadelphia (6). Indeed, Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro argue that it is this very 
event that permits Welbeck and Mervyn to act at all. They note that the Haitian revolution 
disrupted established systems of ownership and trade, making profits and goods ripe for the 
taking by figures such as these (xxxiii). Goudie similarly argues for the novel’s attempts to 
explore these connections by stating that “Brown’s accomplishment…is significant: by limning 
the contours of U.S.—West Indian relations, he dares us to come face-to-face with disturbing 
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affiliations between U.S. and West Indian creole characters and cultures at the turn of the 
nineteenth century” (83). It is worthwhile to take this reading even further: the contagion that 
spreads in the novel from the West Indies to Philadelphia and from character to character, could 
suggest the possible spread of revolutionary abolitionist rebellion from the Caribbean to the 
industrial cities of North America—a deeply frightening possibility for the highly leveraged 
businessmen of Brockden Brown’s Philadelphia. Goudie likewise notes that the novel’s 
“narrative creole complex reveals that mastery and control of the United States nation-space, let 
alone the hemispheric waterways, has been replaced at the turn of the century by chaos and 
instability” (Creole America 198). Even worse, if that chaos could spread, then so too could a 
Haitian-style revolution.  
Brockden Brown therefore allows his white female characters to revolt in ways that 
would be much more narratively and culturally disruptive for black figures. W. M. Verhoeven 
notes that “Notoriously, Brown’s idiosyncratic tales of the irrational beyond appear, on the one 
hand, to be geared toward promoting or sustaining an ideological status quo in the young 
Republic, while on the other offering a sustained strategy of representation…which seems to 
betray a resistance against the dominant ideology” (8). Verhoeven continues “if novels like 
Wieland, Edgar Huntly, and Ormond are ‘radical,’ they are so in the first place…because of their 
predominantly skeptical stance toward [Enlightenment principles of] self-determination, justice, 
truth, and providence” (24).  At least in this case, this interpretation is astute. Eliza Hadwin’s 
negotiated liberation both upholds and upends the “status quo” of possession and transaction in 
the Atlantic. However, it also actively invites readers to critique that status quo by letting 
Mervyn, an unreliable and, in the end, morally ambivalent figure, reassert it. So Brockden 
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Brown’s skepticism toward the Enlightenment furthers the tense balance between upholding and 
critiquing republican values. 
Given the prominence of contracts as sites of transactional authority in Arthur Mervyn, it 
makes sense that Brockden Brown also presents the rupture or failure of contracts as potential 
sites of rebellion. Eliza Hadwin, for example, finds herself beholden to her corrupt benefactor by 
contract of her father’s will. Following Mervyn’s advice, she destroys the will in order to avoid 
its execution and to decide her own fate. As she does, she announces, “‘Then I am free.’ Saying 
this, with a sudden motion, she tore in several pieces the will, which, during this dialogue, she 
had held in her hand, and threw the fragments into the fire” (216). Eliza’s destruction of her 
father’s will essentially displaces the possible revolutionary energy that seems to be creeping 
north from the Caribbean and reconstitutes it in the drama of a white female debt captive 
realizing liberation.xlv As Otter points out, abolition remained a contentious subject in 
Philadelphia, so much so that by 1838 anti-abolitionist mobs were rioting violently against 
abolitionist groups (7). And so, one unfree woman does what countless unfree men and women 
cannot: she destroys the compact that holds her in bondage and marks her as another’s property. 
Sacred Vows, Sacred Transactions 
As Eliza Hadwin’s case demonstrates, transactional market logic traveled from the broad 
Atlantic market to the space of the home itself. This reflects both a transnational and a domestic 
trend, by which cultural contact was instantiated through transaction and, in so many cases, 
exploitation. The economy established the transnational “intimacy” that Lisa Lowe would 
identify as uniting disparate cultures across great distances, through trade and cultural exchange. 
It also established codes of political, social, and personal discourse in communities and homes 
throughout the Atlantic. Uniting Nyquist’s examination of household intimacy and Lowe’s 
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description of intimacy in terms of cultural encounter, Brockden Brown presents the intimacy of 
slaves to their masters as a human relation disfigured by larger economic forces—the household 
shaped by the culture beyond its front door. The logic of value infiltrates bonds of friendship, 
romance, and sex within the novel so that individuals become things to possess through debt-
captivity and through articles of economic mastery. When Eliza Hadwin destroys her will, for 
example, Mervyn notes that “Marriage would render her property joint…but marriage was a 
contract awful and irrevocable” (224). Marriage, therefore, is not a sacrament, but a property 
exchange. The logic of the slave block travels even to the altar.  
Indeed, Brockden Brown presents Mervyn’s exchange of women, including his 
negotiation of Eliza Hadwin’s release in the presence of and at the expense of the unreleased 
slave girl, and his exchange of Hadwin for Acsha Fielding as romantic partners, as exchanges of 
women as property. This is formative: transaction as the bedrock of social and domestic 
organization. As Luck points out, Brockden Brown draws upon Locke’s argument that “property 
ultimately provides the motive for men to organize themselves into a society” (65). Arthur 
Mervyn spends the novel preoccupied by the problems and possibilities of equivalent exchange, 
and ends up exchanging two women as equivalent commodities. In so doing, he ultimately 
creates his own society by developing personal bonds that mimic property relations. 
This final synthesis of market ideology and personal experience serves as the culmination 
of the novel’s many conflations of domestic relations and the philosophy of value. For example, 
the doctor who takes in the sickly Mervyn notes the way this act of charity will tax his family, 
remarking, “no one knew better the value of that woman whom I called mine, or set an higher 
price upon her life” (7). The doubling of value in his assessment of his beloved anticipates the 
odd erasure of time and events that come in the novel’s hastily glossed-over final moments. Even 
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if such remarks are, on their face, benign, they suggest that the logic of commodification and 
valuation, so starkly presented elsewhere in the novel, and implicitly conjured in the specter of 
the trade of human bodies that looms over the protagonists’ Southern and Caribbean trading 
exploits, has come also to structure the social arrangements of courtship, love, and family for 
anyone living within the sphere of Atlantic influence. Love, companionship, help, and loved-
ones all have a particular value, and that value is no different from that of a commodified slave, 
an item of cargo, a dollar or a debt. 
Mervyn’s potentially less-than-altruistic motives in his sudden pivot toward Acsha 
Fielding, the woman he ultimately marries, signaled his moral shortcomings for an earlier 
generation of Brockden Brown Scholars, but a more complex interpretation of Mervyn’s 
decisions demonstrates that he is simply and correctly responding to the market-orientation of his 
society. Donald A. Ringe, for example, writes, “It is too much to say, perhaps, that Mervyn 
deliberately marries money, but the fact that material gain is never far from his mind when he 
contemplates marriage is surely significant” (77).  This is of a piece with Mervyn’s behavior 
throughout the novel. He is constantly performing heroic acts that have the added benefit of 
moving him closer to his happy, economically stable ending. Ringe continues, “His ability to 
attach himself to an older person who can provide him with the means for material success is 
nothing short of uncanny” (77). Similarly, in a 1981 review of the novel, Emory Elliott notes that 
“if, as it seems, Arthur has chosen the financial security which Acsha’s wealth offers over the 
life of social purpose, moral purity, and vigorous labors he has claimed to desire, then his earlier 
idealistic expressions are called into question” (144). Furthermore, Elliott argues, “in view of 
Mervyn’s final end—which is apparently to live in the greatest comfort with the expenditure of 
the least energy—and his readiness to use any means to attain his goals” (145). Indeed, even 
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recent critics have examined these moments for evidence of Mervyn’s moral failures. Elizabeth 
Jane Wall Hinds, for example, writes “Arthur cashes everything in for wealth: acquaintances, 
family, and ultimately even his stories” (Private Property 69). An ungenerous reader might 
conclude, from these generations-spanning analyses, that Mervyn is a liar, a cheat, and a thief. 
This may all be true, but it is important to intervene into these interpretations by acknowledging 
that Mervyn’s actions only make him better-suited for his cultural surroundings.   
Harsh critiques of Mervyn’s decisions in these instances only make sense if readers 
believe that the morality of Mervyn’s society is anything but transactional. Brockden Brown has 
given readers no evidence that this is so.  Elliott insists that Mervyn’s “search for identity, 
meaning, and authority is…spiritually empty,” but this assessment is incomplete insofar as it 
disregards the structure of the moral society that Brockden Brown has erected within the novel 
(158).  Hinds comes close to recognizing this when she writes, “His virtue, then, joins forces 
with a will-to-wealth to the end of a specifically capitalist success” (69). Readers must recognize 
that this is the only sort of success that the society Brockden Brown crafts demands or rewards. 
Mervyn remains, ultimately, a semi-sympathetic character, or at least a character groping his way 
towards survival within the moral universe of capitalism, because the novel permits Mervyn’s 
final choices to remain morally ambiguous. Otter asks “does Arthur’s impending marriage 
signify patriarchal victory or dependence? A tribute to, or the spoils of, virtue? A sentimental 
elevation, or a capitulation to the market?” (68). It is all of these things. “All is of equal value,” 
and good and bad, altruism and self-interest are all exchangeable, even equivalent incentives 
within the moral and economic cosmology of the market-oriented universe. Although Barnard, 
Kamrath, and Shapiro remind readers that, in the novel’s initial conception, Brockden Brown 
intended Mervyn to end up with Eliza Hadwin, his union with Acsha Fielding provides a more 
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nuanced, and thus more pointedly critical conclusion (xxxix). Mervyn’s search for identity and 
family is neither a last-minute authorial transgression nor “spiritually empty,” but adheres to and 
demonstrates the rules of the society in which he lives. Transactions and contract relationships 
are the normative models for social interaction in and around the Atlantic, so Mervyn not only 
can use marriage as a vehicle for economic exchange, but should.  
Indeed, a mutual circuit of economic transaction as love is the model of partnership at its 
most benign in the novel. Sian Silyn Roberts comments upon this contractual element of 
personal relations when she applies Enlightenment definitions of the individual and the 
community to the marriage plot. She writes, “According to the logic of the social contract, the 
individual voluntarily gives up his anti-social tendencies and enters into a mutually beneficial 
agreement with other individuals who likewise relinquish their disruptive qualities” (319). 
Following this reading, the essential element of exchange is what Mervyn’s relationship with 
Eliza Hadwin lacks and what his relationship with Acsha Fielding contains. Roberts writes, 
“Mervyn’s reluctance to contract with Eliza therefore stems from the logic of the contract itself, 
which would see the union of the constituent parties as supplying what is lacking in each. As 
Mervyn is well aware, neither of them has much of anything to exchange…Mervyn rejects 
Eliza—wisely, one could argue—because the product of their combined deficiencies would only 
result in something less than a complete individual at the level of the household” (321). 
Similarly, Bruce Burgett notes that, in the second half of Brockden Brown’s novel, Alcuin, 
published in 1815, marriage is “a purely civil and voluntary relation” (135). Burgett goes on to 
argue that Brockden Brown interrogates “an ‘actuarial’ model of (sexual) subjectivity, one in 
which consent is irrelevant since a subject’s behavior is significant only as part of a larger, 
statistically imagined population” (140). According to the same logic, by embracing Acsha, 
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Mervyn enters into a mutually beneficial relationship. Sociality, in this case, not only mirrors 
contract negotiations but is also directly premised upon contracted transaction.  
Furthermore, his embrace of Acsha attests to the power of the Atlantic marketplace and 
its transactional logic to tame the unruly heterogeneity of Atlantic geography. Barnard, Kamrath, 
and Shapiro argue that the text’s frequent gestures toward Acsha’s “tawney” complexion suggest 
that Brockden Brown resolves the novel with a new normativity, a racially and culturally hybrid 
form that unites the diversity of the Atlantic in one domestic situation (xl). Shapiro likewise 
notes that “As Arthur Mervyn ends with the romantic pairing of a plebian native (white, 
Christian) male and an exotic wealthy female, Brown proposes egalitarian miscegenation, rather 
than recolonizing the slaves back to Africa, as the best vehicle for overcoming racism in a 
postslavery society” (Culture and Commerce 264-5). To this, readers can add that “egalitarian 
miscegenation” dissolves barriers of religion as well as class and race. Acsha, for example, 
admits, “I grew more indifferent, perhaps, than was proper to the distinctions of religion…certain 
it is, that my destiny, and not a happy destiny, was fixed by it,” and goes on to recount her 
father’s bankruptcy and eventual suicide, as well as her former husband’s debts (308). What 
neither Acsha nor Mervyn announce is that they never would have found one another and never 
would have been able to bridge the gap of distance or of race or even of religious denomination 
if not for the fact that their mutual experiences with debt occur in a market-spirit cosmology that 
has taken on universal totality. And so, the future that Mervyn and Acsha establish is spiritually 
syncretic as much as it is hybridized, pointing toward a social reality that extends even beyond 
Locke’s largely secular vision of liberal democracy, in which commerce, cultural exchange, and 
religious universalism all work in-tandem to knit together social bonds—a future that is capitalist 
and aligned with certain theological precepts that function within and alongside capitalism. 
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Nevertheless, even as he posits the transactional nature of Atlantic sociality, Brockden 
Brown leaves the door open for readers to critique the innately hierarchical nature of market-
oriented personal and social relations. Shapiro argues that the second half of the two-part novel 
“charts Arthur’s revolution of racial consciousness as he moves from participating within the 
mania of structurally racist privilege to abandoning a ‘white’ status, which he comes to realize 
structures Philadelphia’s cultural and fiscal economy” (Culture and Commerce 278). He 
continues, “Mervyn’s union with [Acsha Fielding] conveys the claim that the traumatic history 
of Atlantic slavery and white fear of black agency can be removed in a time of revolutionary 
action through a new form of Woldwinite rational intimacy that withers away racial distinctions 
through education, citizen participation, and, most of all, sexual congress and the creolization of 
America” (290). This analysis necessitates some critique. Yes, Mervyn discovers the degree to 
which race structures his world; yes, he ultimately establishes a seemingly interracial domesticity 
that appears to pressure if not to explode that structure. But the novel never fully dismantles 
racial hierarchies. Because the novel ends with a gesture toward the continuing logic of 
equivalence, it admits the continuing authority of hierarchical thinking, including hierarchical 
thinking about race. If all remains of “equal value,” then Brockden Brown can essentially argue 
both for how society should be and for how it truly is. Races should be equivalent, but “value” 
remains a force for assessment and understanding the nature of life and the world. As long as it 
does, race will remain a valuable and evaluable signifier in the marketplace that is Mervyn’s 
society. Brockden Brown leaves it to the reader to judge what form of equality will come next.  
Here too, Brockden Brown invites his readers both to acknowledge the social propriety of 
these decisions and to critique their moral basis. For example, the oedipal nature of Mervyn’s 
attraction to Acsha is strongly hinted throughout their relation, and suggests that his story’s 
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resolution might really be a form of unnatural perversion of a moral ideal of intimacy and 
domesticity. At one point, Mervyn says, “Are you not my lost mamma come back again? And 
yet, not exactly, her, I think.” As if to drive the point home, he also asks, “what can I do to serve 
you? I read to you a little now, and you are pleased with my reading…I guide the reins for you 
when you chuse to ride. Humble offices, indeed, though, perhaps, all that a raw youth like me 
can do for you; but I can be still more assiduous” (318). The sexual connotations here are overt 
and testify to Mervyn’s guiding psychological urge to constitute the capitalist system as personal 
and embodied experiences—the economy made flesh. To the degree that the audience finds this 
off-putting, it is because Brockden Brown hints that the pairing is somehow wrong. Even so, it is 
as it must be for lovers in the Atlantic metropole. Chad Luck bears out this interpretation when 
he argues for “the possibility of amorous contact as a way to establish bodily and spatial 
boundaries” (58). That Mervyn’s encounters with women are encounters in which he discovers 
what is and what is not his own only further highlights the extent to which transactional logic 
orders his personal journey toward ostensibly normative stability in the Atlantic economy, but 
Brockden Brown never permits his novel to provide a full endorsement of the foundation of that 
stability.  
Moreover, the novel presents these issues as intimately tied to problems of personal 
identification, even in terms of gender and sexuality. Shapiro, for example, reading Edgar 
Huntly, sees Brockden Brown offering up challenges to heteronormativity, but ultimately 
presenting those challenges as socially destabilizing (218). The ending of Arthur Mervyn 
potentially serves a similar function, as it forecloses the anxious possibility of love emerging 
from its various homosocial relationships and settles upon heteronormative family-construction 
as part of Mervyn’s acceptance of and entrance into the world of Atlantic society and economy. 
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However, Brockden Brown still places heterosexual love squarely within the realm of the 
transactional. “All is of equal value” in a proper and properly transactional heterosexual love 
affair. Mervyn’s search, therefore, is for someone with whom he can carry out the nation’s 
normative transactions of love, sex, and property settlement. Otter reads the novel as 
“republican” in that “the health of the whole [society] depends on the character of its individual 
members” (67). This reading highlights the way in which Brockden Brown uses the construction 
of a normative and ostensibly healthy individual relationship to model the construction of an 
ostensibly healthy national polity.  Indeed, Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro largely read the 
ending as a “positive resolution” perhaps artificially affixed to the text (xix). Yet Brockden 
Brown remains subversive, establishing a family without ever fully dismissing his concerns with 
its transactional basis. And so, the familial foundation of the nation still marks it as a society 
beholden to the logic of captivity and transaction.  
 These experiences lead to larger philosophical and theological inquiries that, again, 
demonstrate its interests in matters that go beyond Lockean questions of liberty and democracy. 
Marriage, for example, is, as Mervyn recognizes, a contract modeled upon the “awful” covenant 
established between humanity and God and among humans on earth, but it is also an innately 
transactional relation. The relationship between man and wife, and between God and humanity, 
therefore, is not one of mutual protection, but of mutual possession. If such contracts are as 
“awful” as the originary covenant, then it is God who holds the ultimate promissory note. 
Brockden Brown, Verhoeven argues, believed in a “hypothetical omniscient intelligence: a 
manifestation of the determined order that—despite the progressive nature of human reason—is 
forever beyond man’s comprehension” (29). In a novel like Arthur Mervyn, that intelligence 
reveals itself as fundamentally market-oriented, operating beyond comprehension but through 
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financial transactions in order to arrange human affairs, and marriage is just one more market 
operation by which to do so.  
Should the reader lose sight of the providential nature of these intimate economic 
experiences, the novel makes its gestures toward interventionist spirituality and even 
supernaturalism increasingly overt. For example, in the final passages of the text, Mervyn tells 
readers “I went to my chamber, but what different sensations did I carry into it from those with 
which I had left it a few hours before! I stretched myself on the mattress and put out the light; but 
the swarm of new images that rushed on my mind set me again instantly in motion. All was 
rapid, vague, and undefined, wearying and distracting my attention. I was roused as by a divine 
voice, that said, ‘Sleep no more! Mervyn shall sleep no more’” (323). Although Mervyn is, at 
first, frightened, this moment actually announces his awaited happy ending when he awakens to 
the realization that he loves Acsha Fielding. The moment evidences the role of the 
interventionist, providential divinity that has been quietly at work in the background of the 
narrative.  
Eventually, Mervyn embraces the needs and dictates of the market economy and, in so 
doing, welcomes their evidently divine transactional thrust, along with their powers to delimit his 
actions in the world and in the economy. He writes, “The country was my sole asylum. Here, in 
exchange for my labour, I could at least purchase food, safety, and repose” (91). He returns to 
the scene of his disappointed beginning but, now, with a sense of the necessity of purchasing 
power in order to survive. Mervyn relives his journey through a harsh process of education, to an 
embrace of the market’s vicissitudes. He bemoans the fact that “The wretches whom money 
could purchase were, of course, licentious and unprincipled. Superintended and controlled, they 
might be useful instruments; but that superintendence could not be bought” (135). Yet, he also 
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describes poverty itself as “the worst of evils” (219). Even sickness and wellness are touched by 
the constraining logic of capital, as when a man notes of his dead friend, “I would have given 
half my fortune to procure him accommodation under some hospitable roof” (122). There are 
limits to the good that money can do, but, without money, few could survive long enough to do 
anything at all. And so, humans have little choice but to accept that the seemingly supernatural 
mechanisms of the market will use them for its own ends, with little regard for the health, safety, 
and desires of the individuals it repositions and uses up in order to enlarge itself. 
Unreliable Identities and Uncertain Borders 
Brockden Brown builds upon the anxiety produced by an increasing embrace of market 
exchange by demonstrating that commodity logic remains shaky, unreliable ground upon which 
to found community. The sometimes-narrator of the novel, Doctor Stevens, for instance, relates 
the tale of Thetford, “the uncle of him whose fate had been related by Mervyn, and was one of 
those who employed money, not as the medium of traffic, but as in itself a commodity. He had 
neither wines nor cloths, to transmute into silver. He thought it a tedious process to exchange to-
day one hundred dollars for a cask or bale, and to-morrow exchange the bale or cask for one 
hundred and ten dollars” (173). This critique prefigures Marx as it draws attention to the way 
that currency acts as the symbolic locus of more complex commodity exchanges and as a binding 
repository, an object with no inherent meaning but with the power to possess and control all who 
touch it. It also demonstrates the innate instability of those transactions. The Atlantic market is 
organized around the logic of commodity-backed symbolic currency equivalence, but the value 
of equivalent exchange is subject to volatility and change, keeping individuals bound to the 
whims of a market in which they must participate, but which they neither control nor fully 
comprehend. The narrator continues, “It was better to give the hundred for a piece of paper, 
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which, carried forthwith to the money-changers, he could procure a hundred twenty-three and 
three-fourths. In short, this man's coffers were supplied by the despair of honest men and the 
stratagems of rogues” (173).  Mervyn is initially leery of the exchange of currency for its 
allegorical, representational power because it only stands in for something; it is not the thing 
itself. It might act as a disguise used to dupe greedy or desperate investors or as a contract used 
to bind him and force him into yet another impossible moral quandary.  
The deceptive unreality of money introduces broader themes of essentially unstable 
personality, intentions, and the natural world into the novel. For example, a series of evidently 
forged bills rests at the heart of Welbeck’s plot to defraud Clemenza Lodi of her inheritance. 
Thinking the bills counterfeit, Mervyn casts them into a fire, only to discover, moments later, 
that their falseness was, itself, a falseness. In a kind of double-negative logic, they turn out to be 
real. Welbeck has only presented them as false in the hope that Mervyn will hand them over to 
him (160).  So the bills become the totems at the center of an odd logical puzzle that, ultimately, 
critiques the meaning placed upon essentially meaningless currency in the capitalist economy. 
The bills are both valuable and valueless—mere pieces of paper that, nevertheless, hold the 
totemic power of social exchange and universal equivalence as currency, and have the power to 
ensnare and control individuals under its sway. Again, Brockden Brown runs ahead of Marx’s 
interpretation of currency as a sacred repository for distant labor and commodity interactions, 
and as the means of social captivity in a capitalist society, but he also includes his own anxiety 
about the relative reliability of currency as a stand-in for reality. 
Brockden Brown’s depiction of shifting individual personages also critically exposes the 
unstable nature of the nation and its efforts at racial, classed, and geopolitical identity. Goudie, 
for instance, notes that, from the beginning of the Republic, “citizenship was equivalent to 
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whiteness” despite the fact that Americans were an uneasy hybrid people, at once evincing creole 
signs of connection to the Caribbean system to which it was connected and loudly rejecting such 
a lineage (Creole America 8). Shalini Puri similarly asks readers “to consider the range of ways 
in which different discourses of cultural hybridity have functioned as strategies for constructing, 
deconstructing, and reconfiguring trans/national imaginaries” (1). Hybridity, she notes, helps to 
describe the population and society produced through the rupture and rearrangement processes of 
cultural formation in the Atlantic (48). Nevertheless, “hybridity and hegemony have...been 
crucially linked…the former providing a vehicle for both populist nonclass integration of the 
masses and more utopian desires” (50). The hybrid status of figures like the Caribbean-derived 
Clemenza Lodi, the “tawney” Acsha Fielding, or even of the promiscuously identity-shifting 
Welbeck allows them to present the utopian vision of integration, even as they represent the 
disturbing effects of covert infiltration, embodying a nation that draws strength from its hybrid 
population but remains insecure about its own cultural identity within the Atlantic. Goudie 
addresses this dual-state when he describes America’s “paracolonially,” a state of being part 
colonizer, part colonized (11). This underscores Brockden Brown’s use of Mervyn to 
demonstrate the way that the nation can act as a victim and as a victimizer at the same time. It 
also returns readers to the question of racial thinking. Goudie observes that the novel examines 
the development of a faulty racial consciousness that disrupts the imaginary and ostensibly stable 
American self (178). He writes, “Brown’s carefully structured examination of the impulse 
toward such classification lays bare the logical inconsistencies and infinitely mutable nature of 
such impulses” (185).  If racial classification is untrustworthy, then so is the nation’s emerging 
geographic, classed, or racial caste system.  
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The inability to match a face to an internal, inherent identity suggests the impotence of 
racial classification, but also the fragility and permeability of modes of classification. Goudie 
notes that “blackness and the fear of black insurrection are urgent issues in the novel” (63). Both 
blackness and the possibilities of insurrection are pressing themes in the novel, but they initially 
emerge from its emphasis on the untrustworthy and unstable codes upon which the nation is 
founded. Even more pressing is Brockden Brown’s sense that the emerging nation was cloaking 
itself in language of ideals that did not match its actions. Goudie writes, “These attempts to 
classify relations between faces and language in the novel are crucial because they are 
symptomatic of a much more systematic effort to put a pretty face on the illogical structures 
underpinning the nation’s foundational discourses and institutions” (65). Observing a new nation 
wearing a polite mask of freedom and speaking the words of liberty, all while practicing violence 
and slavery, Brockden Brown crafts a novel in which masks and coded language abound and in 
which the possibility of social rupture—whether as a liberating or as a destabilizing force—
remains ever-present. 
This critique extends as well to attempts to use an ostensible national identity to expand 
territorial claims in the Atlantic. Chad Luck suggests that Edgar Huntly responds to the 1737 
“Walking Purchase,” in which John and Thomas Penn essentially duped the local Delaware 
people into giving up a much larger tract of land than they had intended. Luck argues that the 
novel “raised questions, specifically philosophical questions, about the nature of private 
property, about the process of boundary formation, and about the organization of lived space…in 
effect, the novel yokes more abstract investigations of boundary, property, and space to the 
particular circumstances of late eighteenth-century Pennsylvania” (36-7). In this, the novel 
presages the increasingly tense issue of the nation’s expanding identity raised in later texts like 
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Richard Henry Dana’s Two Years Before the Mast. There, as in both Edgar Huntly and Arthur 
Mervyn, tests to the geographical limits of the nation become tests of the nation’s ideological, 
spiritual, classed, and even racial identity. Brockden Brown proves that such questions can and 
perhaps should be raised in an urban space, just as they can be raised at the unsettled borders of 
the nation or in the shifting oceanic spaces that surround it.  
In the urban-set Arthur Mervyn, the hero bursts into rooms in which he does not belong, 
ruptures the codes of feminine and masculine space, gains access to houses into which he has not 
been invited. These are lessons in the limits of his access and in Mervyn’s ability to transcend 
those limits by claiming command of space and by asserting his own protective proprietary 
claims over the women who reside in those spaces. Luck argues that “spatial boundaries get 
produced via a continuous process of small-scale phenomenological encounters between the 
individual and Other” (38). He continues, “The phenomenology of spatial boundaries is closely 
tied to the discourse of private property. To limit and to bound through contact with the other, 
the narrative implies, is also to take possession” (64). Mervyn’s transgression into the brothel 
where he finds Acsha Fielding, for example, is a similarly possessive discovery event, a moment 
in which that which is beyond Mervyn’s proprietary claim is made clear but in which he 
vocalizes his desire to extend that claim as a form of acquisition. These are personal interactions 
that suggest the nation’s own uncertainty over and attempts to extend geographic and ideological 
sovereignty.  
The porosity and navigability of the city further underscores the Atlantic’s challenges to 
the nation’s claims to sanctity and authority. In fact, as Otter points out, the unique layout of the 
city was a subject of a great deal of discussion among writers of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries (11). At once rigidly structured around the logic of a grid and, in Brockden 
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Brown’s novel, labyrinthine, Philadelphia is, like the nation it represents, both highly ordered 
and frayed, both rationally logical and impossibly complex. It is an extension of the post-
revolutionary drive toward greater urbanization, but also a space that continues to offer the same 
confounding psychological morass as the dense frontier wilderness. Brockden Brown’s 
ambivalent presentation of Mervyn’s behavior and goals within this confounding setting 
demonstrates his anxiety about the ideological and moral direction of the nation at the very 
moment when the nation was in the process of asserting its orderliness, its cohesion, its 
sovereign identity, and its claims to Atlantic power. 
One crucial literary tool that Brockden Brown utilizes in order to develop his critique is 
his perspective: both metropolitan and oceanic. His Philadelphia is both a wilderness frontier and 
a national capitol within the Atlantic world. It is also, crucially, an emerging center of the United 
States’ political and imaginary identification. The city birthed the nation’s foundational 
Declaration and Constitution, served as the nation’s first capital, and, as Daniel Walker Howe 
points out, almost became the permanent capital again after the War of 1812, only to lose out in a 
narrow House vote in 1814 (67). It was also an important port city for the young nation, a direct 
connection to the economy and culture of the greater Atlantic. And so, as Brockden Brown 
makes clear, Philadelphia was an economic, cultural, and national urban center, even as it 
remained, relative to other ports like those in the Caribbean and Europe, a subordinate and even 
peripheral economic and political space. It was a capital city and an Atlantic frontier at the same 
time. 
The arcs of the characters of this novel, therefore, remind readers that, as Ralph Bauer 
writes, “the discovery and conquest of America, in particular, was a thoroughly trans-(or, more 
accurately, ‘pre-’) national and trans-linguistic process" (8). This is true insofar as the 
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“discovery” of America is concerned, but Brockden Brown turns readers’ attentions to the trans-
linguistic and trans-cultural processes inherent to, but so often occluded by, the formation of the 
post-revolutionary state and to the development of individual identities within that state. Arthur 
Mervyn’s titular protagonist, his collaborator turned captor, the duplicitous Welbeck, and the 
economically captive or disappointed women over which they contend traverse the Atlantic 
space, pushed on by economic shocks that occur elsewhere in the Atlantic, bound by economic 
compacts, and in search of economic stability. Brockden Brown uses these experiences to 
suggest the instability of what Immanuel Wallerstein calls "geoculture," a conception of national 
self and boundary defined by the "periphery of and in response and in relation to a 'center' 
culture...the manifestation of, and the undergirding for, global capitalism" (11). Wallerstein’s 
focus is upon the issues of “center” and “periphery” in the larger world that the Atlantic signifies 
in this novel. However, to understand Arthur Mervyn, readers must also recognize that Brockden 
Brown emphasizes the frontierist elements of these “global” issues in order to underscore the 
personal crises that arise for the individuals whose lives are shaped by and embody the 
geopolitical realities of their day.  
As a frontier or wilderness, the city offers unique threats to the individual whose difficult 
task it is to navigate a daunting social, economic, geographic, and even spiritual space. Andrew 
Weinstock argues that “Brown…played a foundational role in establishing the haunted American 
wilderness as an archetype of American Gothic literature” (29). Moreover, he contends that 
“Brown’s achievement was to become the first American author consciously to appropriate the 
woods and their attendant anxieties for his Gothic romances” (33). This is true, but does not go 
far enough. Brown’s additional but underappreciated achievement is to present the urban space, 
itself, as a kind of wilderness, a space that trades the foreboding wood for the foreboding urban 
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landscape, but maintains the former’s sense of moral uncertainty and physical peril. As Elizabeth 
Jane Wall Hinds puts it, Brown’s Philadelphia is “a wilderness disguised as a city” (Terror and 
Wonder 109). In fact, Arthur Mervyn is set in both the frontier and the metropolis, and disease, 
debt, and depravity travel freely between both spaces, suggesting their intimate correlation. The 
novel’s protagonist navigates a fluid landscape of uncertain moral, legal, philosophical, and even 
geographical laws, in spaces in which identities shift and convert, in which one can never be sure 
of what threat hides around the next corner, in which people can be whisked away to unfamiliar 
territory, perhaps never to return, and in which individuals are under constant threat of capture 
and captivity—in short: a wilderness in the very heart of the would-be urban American nation. 
Once again, Brockden Brown elevates these cultural concerns by personalizing them, 
performing the North American metropole’s struggles to establish and maintain identity as 
dramas of ambivalent personal identification. Goudie notes that “Brown mobilizes the figure of 
‘creole degeneracy’ as a trope through and against which to inventory the state of the nation’s 
character and culture. Unlike Northern secessionists, however, Brown exploits that disruptive 
figure not to critique the potentially deleterious effects of U.S. Western expansionism but rather 
the ways in which the nation’s rampant participation in the West Indian trades undermines the 
would-be model Republic’s claims to hemispheric exceptionalism” (Creole America 178). 
Uncertain identities, and the stakes they raise for national identity, however, go far beyond racial 
performance. Throughout the novel, friends are revealed as villains, villains are revealed as 
different villains, and everyone seems to harbor some secret. Even Mervyn holds a secret to his 
own identity in the opening passages of the novel that can only be revealed to the reader, and to 
Mervyn’s audience, Doctor Stevens, toward the end of the narrative. Unstable identities also 
allow the narrative to pile up its sublimations of nationalist and racialist anxieties. Remarking 
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upon the meaning of Mervyn’s oft-mentioned resemblance to other characters, including other 
non-white characters, Goudie writes “Convulsions in empires past and present, and volatile 
paracolonial relations between the West Indies and the United States, become embodied in the 
maze of relations heaped on Arthur Mervyn’s besieged though still pretty face” (190). Similarly, 
regarding the possibilities for Mervyn as a model for citizenship, Shapiro observes, “Rather than 
experiencing commercial culture as a Franklinesque platform of opportunities or Smithian realm 
of mutually civilizing satisfaction, he suffers it as an asphyxiating and battering cell of 
containment through unfair exchanges” (Culture and Commerce 276). Nor does he experience it 
as an Equianoesque ladder. Rather, these shifting identities suggest a national character that 
relies upon transactions to unite individuals and their true selves—if such a thing even exists—as 
well as to unite them to other people in society. 
The novel also uses its urban frontier setting to explore potentially destabilizing threats to 
the spiritual meaning of life itself in the Atlantic. As Weinstock points out, Wallace, the missing 
fiancé of Mervyn’s country benefactress, Sarah Hadwin, who Mervyn seeks and thinks he 
glimpses before finding himself trapped in an empty house, “is essentially a zombie.” Weinstock 
explains: “the impression of Philadelphia that Brown creates…is one in which the line between 
life and death has dissolved. The living are buried too soon and the dead—Wallace, Welbeck, 
even Arthur himself—keep coming back” (84).  The very basis of reality is unstable in this urban 
wilderness, boundaries— even the boundaries between life and death—are unclear, and life is 
organized simply around profit, loss, deception, and potential capture and captivity.  
The Ruling Genius and Providential Authorial Control 
Despite all of this uncertainty, or perhaps in response to it, Brockden Brown explicitly 
gestures towards an interventionist and ordering deity in this novel, one that covertly holds the 
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fibers of a dense web of social indebtedness and captivity in order to undergird social, economic, 
and transnational relations. At first, Mervyn struggles to discern this fact, but, as he comes to 
recognize it, he also grows into his own role as the arbiter of narrative reality. 
The process by which Mervyn grapples with the moral and spiritual consequences of his 
embeddedness within the Atlantic marketplace is difficult and treacherous, not least because he 
struggles to comprehend a system that might appear random and still contain divine organization. 
He notes, “Wealth has ever been capriciously distributed” (46). Even so, he foolishly “almost 
acquiesced in the notion that some beneficent and ruling genius had prepared my path for me” 
(45). At first, this contradiction suggests that Mervyn is confused as to whether fate and the 
universe are organized or random. However, Mervyn’s confusion really lies in his belief that the 
economically organized natural world is “beneficent.” He explains that he “was conscious that 
my happiness depended not on the revolutions of nature or the caprice of man. All without was, 
indeed, vicissitude and uncertainty; but within my bosom was a centre not to be shaken or 
removed. My purposes were honest and steadfast” (235). In time, he will come to understand that 
it is not caprice, but the push and pull of living in a society—which is to say an economy—
inhabited by other people and structured by a divinity that acts through the market. The market-
oriented universe in which Mervyn finds himself appears unforgiving and uncaring. It 
reproduces and enlarges itself, with no concern over whether individuals either comprehend or 
survive its dictates, because, while one individual experiences loss, another experiences gain, and 
the cosmology of economy and society remains intact. The “ruling genius” seems to exist, even 
if it is not “beneficent.” There is a god, the novel suggests, a ghost in the machinery of exchange-
capital, but it is hardly interested in revealing itself to individuals like Arthur Mervyn. Instead, it 
focuses its attention on constructing a moral and economic system that so limits free movement 
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that individuals must succumb, obey, and accept their forced mobilization. This is providence as 
social determinism and market manipulation.  
Even the worst excesses of the market serve as demonstrative evidence of providence’s 
power to orchestrate events. Doctor Stevens, for example, while considering the inevitable 
demise of Welbeck, emphasizes the way the market limits free choice and human volition. He 
announces, “Mr. Welbeck, you are unfortunate and criminal. Would to God I could restore you 
to happiness and virtue! But, though my desire be strong, I have no power to change your habits 
or rescue you from misery” (146). The market will permit what it will, and, just as Welbeck was 
incapable of escaping, so too is Doctor Stevens incapable of rescuing him. This is, in a word, 
predestination. But it is predestination of a particular sort, organized around the logic of 
limitations and constraints placed upon human volition and activity. 
Nevertheless, despite the ignominious end to which the narrative leads him, Atlantic 
history belongs to Welbeck. Why? Because Welbeck’s failures fuel the further development of 
the system that first made him rich and then destroyed him. It is the dark father-figure, Welbeck, 
who, even in his own dissolution and demise, ultimately teaches Mervyn how to survive within 
the market-driven Atlantic urban society. Shapiro observes this point, writing, “Welbeck is only 
a single manifestation of a much broader rehierarchizing of the bourgeoisie at the century’s end” 
(Culture and Commerce 272). As for Mervyn, himself, Hinds notes that, “Arthur executes 
perfectly…the role of late-eighteenth-century American capitalist citizen…with a theatrical 
sensibility, a capacity to shift roles according to need and situation [an] entrepreneurial sort” 
(Private Property 72). This description leaves out the morality that Mervyn models for the nation 
as well. The world that Mervyn and Welbeck inhabit is a coherently organized system, what 
Arendt calls a “public,” in which values “come into being whenever any such products are drawn 
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into the ever-changing relativity of exchange between the members of society” (Arendt 164). 
This world is organized around the amoral logic of the ledger-book, rather than around the 
mutual social-moral covenant, and so individuals might rise or fall as valued commodities, 
succeed or fail as participants in the market, all while reaffirming the power of the Atlantic 
economy and its logic. And yet, Brockden Brown insists that readers attend to the spiritual 
dimensions of this society in ways that Locke or Marx or Arendt do not. The figure who 
understands the nature of this public and providentially-organized world will not only survive 
but prove elect. Over the course of the novel, Mervyn accepts his identity as the sort of person 
that the Atlantic’s “ruling genius” demands. 
This occurs not despite but because of Brockden Brown’s invitation to question Mervyn’s 
personality, intentions, and self-justifications. At various points in the novel, Mervyn offers 
competing explanations for his own background. This instability does not merely create an 
unreliable narrator. Instead, it generates the possibility that the transactional self, the self that can 
be exchanged and shed like the costumes Mervyn sometimes wears, mirrors the natural universe 
that transports and transacts persons as if they were equivalent and exchangeable commodities in 
the market. In fact, this thematic undercurrent accentuates the text’s relationship to the guiding 
political philosophies of the era of its production. Frank Shuffelton, for example, argues that the 
United States, itself, emerges from multiple sources. It was, he argues “peculiarly a creation of 
written texts” ranging from the Declaration and Constitution to Paine’s Crisis to Jefferson’s 
Notes on the State of Virginia to the variously-authored Federalist Papers (90). This text also 
permits multiple authorship to initiate the plot and the world it depicts. It therefore personalizes 
and performs the national foundation process. Given the text’s allusions to an interventionist 
divinity, readers should expand upon this point to include a theological perspective. The novel 
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reflects the boundaries of the market, the nation, or of the divine kingdom—a space of 
equivalence and exchange, where multiple selves are possible, and, as the text states explicitly, 
“all is of equal value.” 
The text becomes the site wherein competing realities can share space, mingle, convert, 
and exchange. This is not merely identity curation, but a definition of identity modeled upon 
market logic. Describing the necessity of trust that emerged from the breakdown of older  landed 
forms of wealth, Ian Baucom writes, “the decoupling of public personhood from those inherited 
and landed forms of property which tie individuals to a fixed, traditional community of 
obligations and the concomitant collapse of a republican practice of virtue as the fate of a 
citizenry...the invention of an abstract, anonymous, mode of personhood invested not in the 
inalienable claims of the locale but in the well-being of an anonymous collective” related by 
interest and debt, more than by anything else (56). Readers might consider the possibility that 
Arthur Mervyn embodies this process in one person, acting as a singular encasement for the 
equivalent and exchangeable “anonymous collective” that Baucom describes. With this in mind, 
all of the roles that the produced self plays in enlightenment thinking bear scrutiny: as an 
individual, the self manifests among and against society’s othered alternatives. As a model of 
personal freedom, the self manifests among and against the unfree. As a model for national 
citizenship, it situates transaction as the ultimate national character. Finally, as a spiritual 
value—the self as the soul—the self exists as a spirit that can be moved, traded, or converted 
according to the needs or desires of the market and its governing hand. The text insists that 
readers can and should exchange Mervyn’s identities because he lives in a world in which those 
identities are innately exchangeable. All is of equal value, indeed. 
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Amplifying this theme, the novel insists that authorship, and the productive authorial 
voice are crucial elements in a world that appears unstable, even as it contains order. Welbeck, 
for example, makes use of “biloquism”—a favorite trope of Brockden Brown from, for instance, 
Wieland—a handy tool for deception but also a symbolic effect of the novel’s view of economy 
as a series of distant and interlocking authoritarian voices. Welbeck confesses “I desired to 
escape detection, and repelled your solicitations for admission in a counterfeited voice” (148). 
The voice doubles the act of counterfeit instantiated through the false bills. Here the text raises 
an important question that the author apparently recognizes has no answer: if a thing with no 
materiality can wield material power in the real world, what is its value and how does it 
reproduce value? This is a dual critique: of equivalent commodity capitalism as a system rooted 
in empty signifiers, and of a system of inescapable tricks and traps rooted in transactional 
relations. Shapiro recognizes the importance of this narrative mode as well. He writes “Mervyn’s 
motives seem hieroglyphic at times because Brown is placing pressure on familiar modes of 
narrative perspective to indicate the coming to dominance of commercial political economy as a 
historical passage that requires a different form of representation than is currently available to 
him…this procedure is used by Brown to craft a new relation between literary production and 
social transformation and suggest how progressives might intervene within a world that is 
rapidly altering toward conservative and capitalist predicates” (Culture and Commerce 259-60). 
It is fair to agree that Brockden Brown uses narrative to model a response to a cultural shift 
“toward conservative and capitalist predicates,” but he also uses it to model something else: the 
spectral but evaluable self that exists within the divinely-ordained natural world of financial 
relations. This is a self that possesses exchangeable value that can be dislocated from the 
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material self and accounted against other individuals within the equivalence-oriented cosmology 
of the natural world.  
As the author of multiple narratives of self, Mervyn occupies this role of master or god 
over the text. To that point, Shuffelton quotes Cathy Davidson who describes the American after 
1800 as the interpreter “which is to say…a creator of events” (91). With this in mind, Mervyn’s 
multiplicity of interpreted and interpretable selves and narratives mirrors the American citizen as 
interpreter-cum-creator of a new national public. Again, this is a useful critique, but one that 
leaves out the text’s evident interest in the spirit. Mervyn speaks and brings realities into being, 
and his audience can only listen and attempt to piece together something firm and reliable. The 
novel will conclude by essentially asserting that all realities are equally valid and exchangeable 
as they derive from the same manipulative authorial master or divine source. The narrator stands 
in for what Mervyn calls the “ruling genius,” the ordering, interventionist intelligence that keeps 
its true motives obscure but arranges people, commodities, and even narratives, for the sake of its 
own enlargement and cultivation. Mervyn’s shifting self-presentation only further underscores 
the one element that unites them: the embrace of market logic.  
Brockden Brown’s disruptions of the supposedly stable narrative self could, Shapiro 
argues, only have come at a particular historical moment. He writes that they “were only possible 
within the 1790s larger indeterminacy as a semiperipheral temporality, a transition between two 
longer waves of social organization, which creates the space for otherwise suppressed 
possibilities to appear” (260). It is true that the upheavals of the 1790s provided Brockden Brown 
with a unique opportunity—or responsibility—to depict instability from levels personal, social, 
national, and philosophical. However, it is limiting to call this a mere transitional phase. Rather, 
it seems clear that Brockden Brown foresaw an oncoming transactional age and created a hero 
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who would learn how to navigate it. This is why the novel ends as it does: with an expectation 
that the reader will judge what has come before and what will come after in moral and pragmatic 
terms. The author tasks his reader with judging Mervyn’s development into a citizen capable of 
surviving in the new age, and with judging the political, social, and spiritual parameters of that 
age. 
Transaction as Transmission and the Plague of Judgment 
The novel develops its model of divine intervention from disinterested authorship to 
active judgment as a response to the personal and moral stakes of one individual’s connections to 
the wider Atlantic world of exchange, particularly to the exchange of human bodies in the slave 
trade. This element of the text emerges from its most politically charged symbol: the plague that 
seems to emanate from business dealings with slavery. Throughout the novel, the specter of 
infection comes explicitly from trade with the West Indies and, implicitly, from the moral and 
real contagion of business relations with Caribbean slavery. Mervyn recounts the tale of “a youth 
who appeared to be French, who was wholly unacquainted with our language…[who] had been 
seized with a violent disease” (70). This young man’s fever seems to be a kind of revenge for the 
designs of his father, Vincento Lodi—relative to Mervyns first imperiled woman, Clemenza—
who “had flattered one of his slaves with the prospect of his freedom but had, nevertheless, 
included this slave in the sale that he had made of his estate” (72). The assassination of the elder 
Lodi is the slave’s revenge for manipulation, but the spread of the disease reminds readers that 
slavery’s vices, its horrors, its moral degeneracy are as endemic to its nature as is its profitability. 
As Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro note, the connection between the disease and Caribbean 
slave-backed business dealings has dominated much recent Mervyn scholarship (xxxi). Indeed, 
they argue that the “city’s corruption is produced by a damaged social environment” that comes 
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about in the wake of the Haitian revolution (xxxiii). The disease then is also revenge upon a 
market that draws the immorality of slavery along trading routes that link all of the ports and 
spaces of Atlantic culture and commerce. As a result, even economic and national development 
incur moral and economic debts that must be paid by suffering.  
 Consequently, the plague represents harsh judgement upon a city that claims to spurn the 
trade, even as it profits from it. As Goudie points out, “[Benjamin] Franklin proposed two treaty 
articles to his British counterparts that sought to neutralize the West Indian trade issue as 
potential source of ongoing conflict. More precisely, Franklin hoped that the West Indian trades 
might continue to benefit the New Republic economically without the United States becoming 
entangled in a commercial war with Britain…that might jeopardize the short-and long-term 
stability of the nation” (55). The disease that spreads to Franklin’s Philadelphia suggests the 
impossibility of this hope: a society cannot both profit from and condemn slavery at the same 
time. 
A city founded as a religious haven for Quakers, and the center of the American 
Republic, Philadelphia is also a city bound to an immoral trade. As a result, both it and the nation 
it represents are potential targets for divine retribution. Brycchan Carey observes that, during the 
colonial period, Quakers, who were especially concentrated in Philadelphia, remained 
economically tied to slavery. As a result, early campaigns were for the end of “perpetual” slavery 
after “a vague ‘term of years’.” Such calls “maintain the appearance of taking a stand while 
allowing slaveholding Friends to conduct business as usual” (65). This was the policy including 
among figures like John Fox who, after experiencing Barbados first hand, became quite vocal 
antislavery opinion leaders. At the same time, even early Quaker abolitionist rhetoric struggled 
to distinguish between the unfreedom experienced by chattel slaves and the constrained freedom 
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experienced by laborers in the emerging Atlantic market. Some Quakers, like Morgan Godwyn, 
for example, noted that slavery threatened “the economic rights of poor colonists, whose wages 
are depressed when they have to compete in the same market as slaves” (161). These debates 
reveal a religious community deeply troubled by the ambivalent implications of the market that 
defined the eighteenth-century Atlantic. Although the religious sect moved, ultimately, toward 
officially banning slavery in 1758, it struggled with its members’ personal involvement, their 
community’s reliance, and their city’s commitment to Atlantic slavery. Moreover, the Quakers 
who sought to come to grips with the moral wages of slavery remained fully cognizant of the 
broader Atlantic context of society and market of which Philadelphia was a part. Carey points 
out, for example, that writers like Anthony Benezet recognized that “the campaign against the 
Atlantic slave trade must itself be a transatlantic campaign” (212). Brockden Brown draws upon 
this history, presenting Philadelphia’s links to the Atlantic trade as an explicitly moral and 
spiritual crisis that was not, by the year of the Yellow fever epidemic, at all settled. The city’s 
sinful past remains active in its present as death follows the market’s links between the city and 
its slave-trading partners  
The novel’s conflation of immoral economic transaction and contagion become personal 
issues for Arthur Mervyn, allowing the protagonist of the novel to embody the nation’s own 
connections to the slave trade, its struggles to assert a more righteous moral standing, and, 
perhaps, its groping discovery of a path towards possible redemption. As Mervyn takes hold of 
the duplicitous bills from Welbeck, he wonders “What, said I, is my title to this money? By 
retaining it, shall I not be as culpable as Welbeck?” Only a paragraph later, Mervyn will explain 
that “the city…was involved in confusion and panick, for a pestilential disease had begun its 
destructive progress…. the malady was malignant, and unsparing” (99). The close metonymic 
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relation of money and malady anticipates what is to come for young Arthur Mervyn: by 
accepting the seemingly-false notes, he does in fact become as culpable as his untrustworthy 
benefactor. In so doing, he exposes himself to the same fate or invites the same signs of 
providential rejection. Both men contract the plague shortly after their dealings with the ill-
gotten money. In this case, the epigrammatic phrase, “all is of equal value,” implies transaction 
as transmission. All can equally exchange commodities or diseases or diseased commodities 
within the Atlantic’s moral and literal marketplace. 
The plague provides the backdrop for Arthur Mervyn’s many personal and moral 
dilemmas, but its conspicuousness invites critics and readers to approach the novel primarily as 
an attempt to grapple with the traumatic shock of Philadelphia’s plague experience. This makes 
it, in the words of Stacey Margolis, “all too easy for critics to assume that Arthur Mervyn is a 
novel about contagion” (346). As a result, Arthur Mervyn has held a great deal of critical interest 
for its depiction of the plague outbreak through which Philadelphia suffered in 1793. Strong 
analyses of Brockden Brown’s work by critics like Goudie, Shapiro, Luck, Weinstock, Mark 
Kamrath, and Timothy Francis Strode read the novel as thematically centered upon issues of 
transmission, outbreak, and exposure. In fact, Brockden Brown’s portrait of a city under siege by 
illness draws upon a history with which the author was intimately familiar. As Weinstock points 
out, “during the summers of the 1790s Yellow fever epidemics occurred annually in large 
American cities, especially those along the Eastern seaboard. In 1793…the disease claimed over 
2,500 lives in a roughly six-week period between late August and September, and more than 
5,000 died overall—almost one tenth of Philadelphia’s total population” (18). Brown even 
contracted and recovered from the disease in 1798. However, any reading of the novel that stops 
here is incomplete, for the plague only exposes and underscores Brockden Brown’s questions 
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regarding the theological nature of the economy that allowed that transmission to occur, and the 
economic nature of a divine intellect that would not only permit that exposure but orchestrate it. 
Indeed, the outbreak first reveals the contours of Philadelphia’s hierarchical society, and 
then implies the moral problems produced by those hierarchical relations. As Barnard, Kamrath, 
and Shapiro observe, even death in the Atlantic metropole was classed and raced given that the 
urban poor and the urban non-white classes died at higher rates than wealthier citizens who could 
retire to the country (xxiii). So the plague is also a marker of class contact and class division. It is 
also potentially a theatrical display of Atlantic providential capitalism’s insistence that wealth 
signified virtue. It furthermore traces the complex connections of the entire Atlantic market and 
world. Margolis, for example, argues that the novel “is at once an example and an analysis of the 
rise of an early information society…Brown’s novel both imagines a world threatened by 
revolution and reckless financial speculation and recognizes how little anyone understood the 
hidden ties that made a decision in one place wreak havoc in another” (344). Margolis recognizes 
that the links that the novel traces between sometimes unnamed business partners also signal the 
emergence of a more intensely-connected world, held together by routes of information, trade, 
and debt finance. She argues that “there are no…evocative chains of transmission in Arthur 
Mervyn. Instead, the disease emerges in seemingly random locations throughout the city, 
destroying some individuals and leaving others untouched” (349). Margolis also notes that the 
incomprehensibility—for the characters and for readers—of the disease mimics the 
incomprehensibility of the Atlantic economy’s networks of exchange. Meanwhile, Barnard, 
Kamrath, and Shapiro link the unpredictability of infection to the social ruptures of the period, in 
order to argue that the disease underscores “underlying concerns with commercial corruption, 
Caribbean slave revolution and abolition, and the larger social transformations of the 
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revolutionary 1790s” (xxi). It might be better to bring these critics together to note that the 
disease marks the way that disruption actually, and, perhaps, counterintuitively, unites Atlantic 
society. This is a society produced by social disruption, with only market equivalence remaining 
stable. As a result, when critics describe the transmission of Yellow fever in the novel as an 
element of the “unpredictability” of those networks, they minimize the novel’s moral and 
spiritual argument. 
In fact, the transmission of Yellow fever from the Caribbean to Philadelphia is highly 
predictable if readers interpret the disease as either an outbreak of the slave trade’s social and 
moral ills made manifest, or as divine judgment for the way those networks of information and 
trade have built up around the sins of slavery, violence, and economic dehumanization.  Samuel 
Otter agrees, pointing out that Brockden Brown “implies the dangers of mobility and 
importation” by tracing a winding epidemiological path amongst “dwellings, bodies, money, and 
texts that circulate between the mainland and the plantations and upheavals of the West Indies 
and particularly Saint Domingue, often cited by importationists as the likely source of the 
epidemic” (59). If readers approach the disease as a moral problem, a new spiritual argument 
emerges. The providential deity that orchestrates events in the novel and in the Atlantic market 
may, simultaneously, intervene to punish participants in that market. If so, then, in an economic 
culture bound to and built upon violent unfreedom, no one is safe, even the innocent may suffer, 
and all of society is culpable for sins that have allowed the nation to prosper. 
With this in mind, the novel might properly be read as an ongoing series of anxious 
questions about the future of the Republic. Central to those questions is the plague—potentially a 
communicable result of exchange with the broader Atlantic, and potentially a source of 
providential retribution for economic involvement in the Atlantic slave market. Rightly so, for, 
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as Otter points out, this epidemic raised serious doubts about the sanctity of the nation’s 
temporary capitol, and about the potential for the nation itself. He writes, “The medical and 
social crisis in Philadelphia led to reflections over the character of residents, city, and nation. 
There was concern about the vulnerability of national boundaries, worry that the fever had 
spread to the mainland United States from revolutionary Saint Domingue” (26). And so, the 
novel is about infection, but that infection is potentially as allegorical as it is historically-rooted. 
Ostrowski argues that “the Yellow fever is a judgment on the people of Philadelphia for their 
indulgence in luxury,” a contention that coheres with his sense that Mervyn, himself, is a 
speculator and, therefore, an individual exposed to judgment through contagion (15). So the 
“ruling genius” of the novel both produces a society, and, evidently, enforces harsh justice 
against that society.  
Why divinity might do this is at the heart of Brockden Brown’s most vexing questions, 
but the answer may be found in the novel’s forward-looking perspective. xlviThe novel leaves the 
nature of the plague undetermined. Is it a form of divine judgment? Is it a symbolic link between 
the spaces of the Atlantic, bound together by a market that produces death just as it produces 
commodities? Is it a symptom of a closely linked but amoral Atlantic universe that extends from 
the maritime markets, to urban centers, and even to frontier spaces? Is it all of these things at 
once?  The only clue appears when the novel makes a crucial shift from presenting a purely 
evaluative God to presenting a judgmental God. Both versions of the divine are innately 
interventionist, but one intervenes only to reproduce itself, while the other intervenes to punish 
or to reward. 
Once more, Brockden Brown uses the text’s structure and the role of the reader to model 
this divine form. Shuffelton argues that “the end of literature lies in ‘judgment,’ and civic 
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virtue…is merely a byproduct of the performance of judgment necessary for both readers and 
citizens” (92). However, Shuffelton does not address the theological connotations of this move. 
Ultimately, Brockden Brown leaves it up to readers to evaluate and to judge the nature of the 
society he has just dramatized, inviting them to occupy the new godlike position of judge over 
events, characters, and realities in the novel. Shuffelton goes on to say that Brockden Brown is 
“playing a language game about the nature of judgment itself that simultaneously values the 
procedures of rationalized legal judgment and undermines its pretensions to sufficiency in 
regulating human life” (96). In fact, as Shuffelton notes, Mervyn presents himself as a kind of 
social outsider open to the reader for ultimate judgment. Indeed, Shuffelton notes that the 
“silence” of the ending leaves it to the reader to decide the ultimate morality of the text (107). 
Shuffelton attributes this to the ambivalent nature of the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, to which 
Brockden Brown responds by making judgement of the “other” an individual and personal act.  
Shuffelton limits his view of “judgment” to the political and the moral, and his recognition of the 
text’s performance of uncertain feelings surrounding such measures as the Alien and Sedition 
Acts is well-taken, but Brockden brown also invites readers both to participate in God’s 
judgment of Atlantic society and to critically examine any deity that would orchestrate and pass 
even a neutral verdict over such a society.  
For Brockden Brown, there was no denying the inextricability of political, personal, and 
theological issues, and, therefore, no denying the inextricability of questions about the divine 
from questions about the state. Brockden Brown’s father was, as Shuffelton points out, “one of 
the Quakers exiled from Philadelphia by the revolutionary government” (93). His views of the 
republican rupture were, therefore, bound to be ambivalent. This is not all: Brockden Brown’s 
views are not strictly in line with Quaker orthodoxy, and, therefore, unite political and 
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theological degrees of ambivalence. He implies a universe guided by a providential hand that 
judges and punishes in instances in which people cannot or do not. Shuffelton argues that, in the 
novel, crimes are frequently punished in private, rather than in unreliable courts (101). However, 
the disease is a very public form of judgment meted out by a mysterious but, in the eyes of the 
primary characters, actively interventionist God. 
And so, in his search for a way to use money to do good in the world, Mervyn questions 
whether only his death will release his money into the world in a productive capacity. He writes, 
“The evils which had befallen this city were obvious and enormous. Hunger and negligence had 
exasperated the malignity and facilitated the progress of the pestilence. Could this money be 
more usefully employed than in alleviating these evils? During my life, I had no power over it, 
but my death would justify me in prescribing the course which it should take” (137).  In this 
moment—surely intended by the narrator to demonstrate his virtue through suffering—Brockden 
Brown presents Christian self-sacrifice as both an economic and a spiritual operation as Mervyn 
meditates upon the possibility that his death might not only relieve himself of sin, but also 
cleanse the economic and social world around him. 
At the same time, Mervyn also wonders whether his attempts to assist the various 
unfortunate women in his life might not uncover a way to pay off his own personal moral debts. 
He muses, “It occurred to me…that my death might preclude an interview between us, and that it 
was prudent to dispose, in some useful way, of the money which would otherwise be left in the 
sport of chance” (155). His desire to dispose of the money, to use it for good, evidently keeps his 
disease at bay. That Mervyn does not die, while Welbeck does, is thus potentially a result of his 
finding a cure, or a sign of his virtuous election as one willing to do the work of improving and 
preparing the ordinary fallen world. That is: the dispersal of accursed money. Otter suggests that 
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readers should approach the bifurcated text by imagining “the first part as diagnosis and the 
second part as cure” (61). This makes allegorical sense whether the fever stands in for social 
corruption or, as Otter argues, “tyranny.” It also makes sense in light of the larger spiritual 
argument that Otter does not take up. The “diagnosis,” in this case, is sin, specifically the sort of 
economic sin that evolves from relationships of debt and involvement in the slave trade. The 
“cure” may be Mervyn’s rejection of money that comes directly from the trade of enslaved 
bodies.  
At the crucial moment, Mervyn’s intentions do have some effect—if not upon the world, 
then upon his own soul. Of his salvation from the disease, he remarks that, “Some inexplicable 
principle rendered harmless those potent enemies of human life. My fever subsided and 
vanished. My strength was revived, and the first use that I made of my limbs was to bear me far 
from the contemplation and sufferance of those evils” (133).  The language is clear. Indeed, in 
the very first words of the text, the narrator names “the evils of pestilence.” One might be 
rescued from this evil only by an “inexplicable principle.” Here, the “principle,” might be read as 
merely the rationalist’s word for providence. Given this arc, the disease is not evil at all. It is one 
more tool that divinity uses to orchestrate its will. It is a trial through which individuals like 
Mervyn are judged. His desire to do good with money marks him as virtuous or elect, and he is 
delivered.  
This optimistic reading implies that there is still hope for the nation to reject unfreedom, 
whether in the form of chattel slavery or in the form of debt-bondage. There is another option: 
Mervyn may prosper precisely because he has come into contact with the most debasing 
elements of Atlantic trade. Goudie wonders whether productive trade in the Atlantic can only be 
conducted by a figure that, like Mervyn, has been inoculated against “potential contagion 
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signified by the West Indies.” Notably, Mervyn’s happy ending appears “only after being 
exposed to the pervasive presence of West Indian figures circulating through the American urban 
landscape” (Specie 69). In this reading, Mervyn’s successful interaction with a morally debased 
marketplace allows him to interact with it and to come away unscathed. 
An even more pessimistic reading suggests that the nation might well establish its future, 
as Mervyn does, only by going through a crisis of self and, ultimately, securing Atlantic 
capitalist liberty at the cost of the chattel slaves it leaves in bondage. Brockden Brown may be 
suggesting that Mervyn, Philadelphia, and the nation will ultimately and unfortunately reject 
revolutionary possibilities and choose to accept a morally fallen state within the marketplace. 
Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro argue that “Brown’s circle sees slavery in radical-Enlightenment 
terms as an illegitimate use of force that typifies premodern societies but that is not part of any 
eternal human order” (xxxv). Perhaps so, but Brockden Brown also appears to warn that slavery 
might be part of an “eternal” order that will come about and proliferate if the modern era 
continues to embrace the morally problematic practices of Atlantic debt and slave capital. The 
lack of moral or even true narrative resolution in the novel allows readers to ponder this 
possibility. If readers recognize that Brockden Brown has constructed a moral universe that is 
structured around capitalist modes of transaction and exchange, then Mervyn achieves his own 
personal autonomy by claiming liberty for himself, but only selectively extending it to others. 
Mervyn’s fate suggests that there might be a way for the nation to thread the moral needle within 
the Atlantic market, but there is no evidence that it has, no guarantee that it will, and no 
assurance that, having done so, it will not backslide.  
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Conclusion 
The fearful uncertainty of life in a market-oriented social system—whether at its center, 
in San Domingue, or at its peripheral, but urban, frontier, in Philadelphia—has personal, moral, 
and spiritual stakes. For example, Mervyn tells his readers that “it seemed as if I were walking in 
the dark and might rush into snares or drop into pits before I was aware of my danger” (56). As 
David S. Reynolds notes, authors like Brockden Brown evoke the language of the pulpit 
meaningfully. Brockden Brown writes here in the mode of a late jeremiad. However, by 
emphasizing the pitfalls of contemporary social life but neglecting to present an obvious schema 
by which to repair it, Brockden Brown offers a critique of the nation’s economics, society, 
politics, and spirituality that is a good deal less optimistic than even the jeremiad generally 
presents. Considering the fate of the treacherous Welbeck, Brockden Brown similarly writes, 
“His career would have continued some time longer; but his inveterate habits would have finally 
conducted his existence to the same criminal and ignominious close” (99). In this text, as in the 
most perilous jeremiads, the fall is sudden, inevitable, and steep. By evoking the language of the 
sermon but taking a financial episode as his subject, Brockden Brown suggests the conflation of 
both ways of thinking. Moreover, he suggests the co-instantiation of finance and spirituality by 
suggesting that the uncertainty into which Mervyn is plunged threatens both his spiritual and 
economic futures. 
Moreover, Brockden Brown draws attention to the way that this conflation contributes to 
the inextricability of captivity from post-revolutionary expansion. Captivity is not a foreign 
experience to the national center, but an endemic feature of national organization, and this raises 
tense moral challenges for the individual. David Brion Davis addresses this logic when he points 
out the intimate link between the emergence of an Enlightenment national identity and the 
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economic circumstances of the Caribbean. He writes that “the Age of Revolution coincided with 
the economic decline of the older sugar colonies in the Caribbean. It also witnessed the peak and 
gradual decline of the African slave trade…But [if] the Age of Revolution had intellectually 
isolated the major slaveholding regimes, it had also, with the exception of the British West 
Indies, increased their independent political power” (83). This may be so, but Brockden Brown 
insists that the echoes of the slave economy remain as the links that permit Atlantic societies to 
establish stability through trade and debt. He is not alone in presenting debt as a kind of 
foundational moral decadence. Davis writes, “Sugar and slaves were not a source of opulence, 
once discovered, but of debt, wasted soil, decayed properties, and social depravity” (62). Davis’ 
work builds upon Eric Williams’ observation that investments from the slave trade fueled 
markets and also recirculated slavery’s profits through investment in banking, heavy industry, 
and insurance (98). As a result, Davis writes, “the Revolution may not have been disruptive 
enough to destroy the existing social order, but it did result in a period of uncertainty, self-doubt 
and unpredictable identity” (279). It is exactly this doubt that Brockden Brown examines as he 
considers the paradoxical relationship between revolutionary liberty and bondage. He surveys a 
society securing its national future without shedding the vestiges of unfreedom that define its 
past and present. As a result, the nation’s very social, economic, and philosophical foundations 
and initiatives remain brittle, open to manipulation, and potentially exposed to rupture. Such a 
society demands much of the individual who wishes to navigate within it. 
Mervyn ultimately proves, despite his claims of naiveté, an animal well-suited to the 
market-driven world, able to contort himself into whatever shape necessary to survive and even 
to thrive. Elliott admits as much when he writes, “to survive his desperate situation, Mervyn 
must be able to transform every event that occurs to him into an opportunity and be able to re-
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create his own identity into a new personality which would engage the attention of others enough 
to allow him to gain access into society” (152). Similarly, Barnard, Kamrath, and Shapiro note 
that “Brown clarifies problematic individual perceptions by reference to social structures. The 
novel’s characters are mainly bearers of social positions, and their often unstable mental 
processes are the results of manifold pressures” (xix). Shapiro sees a generational shift among 
scholars, from those who, like Elliott, questioned the “individual character as nationalist 
allegory,” asking “to what degree can Arthur Mervyn be comfortably consecrated as a typically 
mythopoetic American spirit?” to a critical consensus that readers should pay more attention to 
“the narratives social contexts for the period’s gendered economy, epidemiological debates, and 
construction of scientific racism” (269). It is, however, possible to reconcile these readings. It is 
the very instability of Mervyn’s depiction of self that makes him well-suited to prosper within 
his period’s contextual preoccupations with gender, transmission, race, and class constructions. 
Readers must therefore now intervene into scholarship that recognizes Brockden Brown’s 
importance as a social critic, to emphasize the author’s interest in moral, philosophical, and 
theological inquiry as well. Bryan Waterman notes that “cold war-era” scholars like Ringe and 
Elliott “found Brown’s prose ponderous, his plots disjointed, his morals didactic, and his 
nationalism questionable…for critics of this era who were attempting a history of American 
authorship, Brown was either a failure for his inability to transcend gentlemanly amateurism and 
make literary writing a viable profession, or he was an unfortunate example of the difficulties 
faced by would-be writers in a society too attuned to nation abuilding and money making to 
support a literary publishing industry.” Waterman, however, notes that later readers first 
embraced Brockden Brown’s salacious gothic plots and then began to recognize the importance 
of his cultural criticism (175). Yet, even if critics like Barnard, Kamrath, and Shaprio, writing a 
   Green 419 
 
generation after critics like Ringe, and Elliott, represent a growing critical recognition of the 
text’s sociological perspective, critical fissures persist. Waterman notes, for example, that 
“recent criticism divides into two camps: one that reads Brown’s work symptomatically, looking 
for evidence of early America’s political unconscious or Brown’s own political 
partisanship…and another camp that, though it sometimes runs the risk of overdetermining 
Brown’s political radicalism, reads him as a diagnostician of his culture more than a participant 
in its ideological or partisan conflicts” (236). What none of these readings do is to connect 
Brockden Brown’s personal, political, and social critiques to the questions he raises about the 
soul. This then is perhaps the way to reconcile the competing schools of criticism that Waterman 
names: Brockden Brown’s novels are not exactly moral fables, but they are interested in raising 
moral and theological questions that are both personal and more broadly social, in an Atlantic 
world in which spirituality and market ideology function as one and the same.  
Moreover, these issues help to illuminate studies of Brockden Brown as an author 
invested in the issue of authorship, itself.  As Tawil notes, Brockden Brown has been recognized 
as a “self-conscious” writer. He writes, “The phrase is apt because it registers Brown’s abiding 
awareness of his writing and its goals…yet a certain formal self-consciousness is also woven into 
the novels, themselves. Surely one of the most notable and familiar aspects of Brown’s fiction is 
its nearly obsessive concern with reading, writing, interpretation, and the whole realm of 
signification more generally” (105). This represents an important step in Brockden Brown 
scholarship, and one that allows readers to make an even more exciting leap. In his 
representations of authorship and reading, Brockden Brown investigates the most complicated 
philosophical issues of his age: the morality and theology of production of value and assessment 
of value, in a society organized around transactions of value. 
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How, asks Brockden Brown, can God both orchestrate and condemn transactional 
practices? Because the market-oriented world he investigates is truly evaluative and 
transactional, generating plots and personalities that hinge upon characters’ attempts to produce 
and to understand value, and upon readers’ abilities to judge and to exchange value. In the end 
Brockden Brown transfers godlike power from one mode to another and from one source to 
another, from the socially and personally generative mode borne of equivalence, embodied by 
the ambivalent Mervyn, to a mode of narrative and social judgement, embodied by the audience 
itself, from the authorial narrator to the judgmental reader. In so doing, Brockden Brown evokes 
the difference between the god who creates and the god who judges, both of which exist at the 
same time within the Atlantic marketplace. 
To recognize this is hardly to throw aside the cultural or political intentions of the novel. 
In Arthur Mervyn, the North American metropole establishes itself, just as its representative 
character does: through an exchange of persons, a conversion of identities, a repositioning of 
souls, a purchase of self at the cost of another or a settled relation of mutual possession. The 
emerging nation’s soul is likewise subject to the debts it contracts through trade and business, 
including trade in human lives. As long as the nation remains involved in the economy of flesh in 
the Atlantic, it remains bound to that system’s vices, exposed to apocalyptic contagion, or even 
damnation. Likewise, the nation’s dual ignorance and complicity matches Mervyn’s own. It 
remains a nation of unfree persons who wrongly think themselves heroic, simply because they 
resist seeing the shackles by which they hold others, and by which they too are held. “All is of 
equal value,” and that value places the individual and the community within the realm of a 
divinely orchestrated marketplace that, they might discover, is not as “beneficent” as they might 
wish or pretend.  
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Chapter 6 
The Ghosts of Atlantic Capital: George Lippard and the National Apocalypse
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George Lippard’s novel, The Quaker City, or the Monks of Monk Hall, published serially 
between 1844 and 1845, presents the urban Atlantic at its very worst: as a trap loaded with 
enticing opportunities to gain advantage in an economy that runs on the exchange of souls and 
bodies, a trap that men from every sector of society attempt to master but that none can control, a 
trap set to spring on one and all. The novel is, in many ways, a prototypical urban gothic 
narrative. It is also a charged assault on the philosophical and political assumptions of an 
increasingly nationalist culture built upon a hypocritical understanding of liberty purchased 
through unfreedom. In it, ostensible heroes compete with supposed villains over the bodies and 
virtues of imperiled young ingénues. In it, a mysterious sorcerer holds sway over a harem of 
dehumanized undead women, whose very existence speaks to the market of flesh upon which the 
Atlantic economy survives and thrives. In it, events happen according to the orchestration of a 
seemingly providential hand that really belongs to a demonic consigliere. In it, the Atlantic 
marketplace appears both eerily supernatural and devastatingly familiar, evincing signs of divine 
intervention through degrading, often violent market interactions taking place in the very heart of 
the urban metropole. In it, finally, the sins upon which an Atlantic nation is built render its future 
bleak. The novel posits the mutual instantiation of capital and providential supernaturalism as 
both productive forces in the Atlantic, and as debasing threats to individuals, nations, and social 
moral ideals. Monk Hall is America, Lippard argues, a hive of vicious schemers and conjurers in 
the Atlantic cultural and financial economy, both made powerful and doomed by a debased 
union between capital and spirituality.  
The novel is organized around a number of intersecting plots, all of which, when taken 
together, offer a vision of Philadelphia, the United States, and the greater Atlantic economy as 
moral and personal hells. Two men make a bet over the seduction of a woman, only for one man 
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to turn on the other. Another man plans complicated schemes of phony land sales. A priest 
attempts to take possession of and to exploit a young woman. A sorcerer oversees a harem of 
undead women. Over all of the schemes presides a figure of seemingly endless depravity who 
secretly harbors designs of upward mobility, even as he is haunted by visions both of the 
violence that has helped to elevate him, and of the nation’s capital-driven post-democratic future. 
These plots diverge and reconvene, tangling endlessly and, at times, confusingly. Yet they 
present a coherent vision and a coherent argument: the urban metropole would not exist without 
an economy of vice and unfreedom that is given the backing of divine ordination, but that same 
economy abuses, traps, and destroys individuals as it plunges society forward, toward a post-
democratic reckoning.  
For all the apocalyptic gestures that seem to foreclose national or spiritual potential, 
however, the novel maintains ambivalence about the outcome of that reckoning. Some characters 
do evince spiritual growth, although they remain trapped in a spiritually fallen world. Other 
characters appear to transcend class boundaries, although they do so in covert fashion. The novel 
even offers a vision of the future where class and racial differences have been utterly dismantled, 
but presents that vision as equal parts enticing and horrific. It is, above all, a future-oriented text. 
It builds upon its own cynical reading of American history and its own dim view of the nation’s 
present to ask what the future holds for the polity, the economy, and the moral culture of the 
Atlantic society.  
This ambivalence arises, in part, because instability attends the city’s and the nation’s 
identifying codes, moral structures, and even geographic boundaries. The Quaker City is closely 
connected to Westward expansion, to the cotton fields of the Southern plantation economy, and 
to the slave markets of the Caribbean. In the novel, Philadelphia appears as a central hub of this 
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web of commerce and exchange because, by 1845, Philadelphia had established itself as a central 
part of a much larger nationalist economic and political project. In addition to Philadelphia’s 
crucial role as a trading  hub, for example, Daniel Walker Howe notes that coal helped 
Pennsylvania to become “the geographical center of industrialization” during the 1830s and 40s 
(535). Nevertheless, the circularity of exchange that happens within Monk Hall speaks to a wider 
exchange culture that maintains the cultural practices of a syncretic and mobile Atlantic 
economy. This larger society continues to reveal the North American metropole’s cultural, 
ideological, and economic dependence upon the currents of Atlantic trade.  
The Quaker City therefore also challenges notions of where religious and cultural 
practices reside—whether in the Atlantic’s periphery or at its center—by situating fortune-tellers, 
astrologer wizards, and racially hybrid figures in the very heart of the urban cosmopolitan space 
of Philadelphia. The city itself is bound to and subordinate to a more expansive Atlantic market. 
Philadelphia’s status as a liminal space, a transitory route through which people and commodities 
are meant to pass, marks it as the Atlantic’s frontier, rather than its center, even if the politicians, 
businessmen, and religious figures who cavort and scheme in Monk Hall mark Philadelphia as an 
emblematic site of American national formation and market participation.xlvii  
This liminal perspective of the city involves dismantling notions of America’s racial, 
geographical, or class-oriented cohesion. The central characters in The Quaker City, like the 
sadistic, but indisputably clever host, Devil-Bug, the diabolical anti-priest, Ravoni, or the 
disguised con-man, Fitz-Cowles, are haunting figures of the Atlantic’s heterogeneous past and 
present, vital fixtures of an Atlantic nationalist space that denies their existence. They 
demonstrate that, as a result of Atlantic commercial and cultural intercourse, no identity—
national, racial, spiritual, or even individual—is fixed or is isolated from the machinery of 
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finance that takes on spiritual authority in the Atlantic. Fitz-Cowles’ hidden "Spanish" heritage, 
for instance, suggests an expansive and multidirectional view of history such as the kind critics 
like Ralph Bauer propose, even as his projects of Westward expansion suggest the deceptive 
capitalist schemes upon which the continental nation was built (Bauer 13). The novel therefore 
implies an under-articulated hemispheric history that challenges the Quaker City’s claims to 
Atlantic centrality and identification.  
For example, the hidden creole status of Juan Larode, in the guise of the ostensibly 
Anglophonic Fitz-Cowles attests to the simultaneous importance and erasure of Spanish 
conquest in North America. Anna Brickhouse notes this history when she investigates Spanish 
Catholic incursion into the Chesapeake, as well as North American historicist efforts to cast that 
history as one of failure, in contrast to English claims to “First Discovery” (212).xlviii She writes, 
“Busy fashioning themselves in chaste and temperate opposition to the ‘all-devouring Spaniard,’ 
[Anglophonic historians] sometimes recorded in their writings—but did not seem to wonder 
about or to investigate—the signs that a Spanish settlement had preceded their own colonial 
endeavors” (191). Yet here in Monk Hall is an occult remnant of North America’s narratively 
and historically erased past, and an integral element of its Westward-facing future. Lippard uses 
Fitz-Cowles and, to an even greater extent, the hybridized Devil-Bug to challenge attempts at 
historical occlusion, along with attempts to center American history on claims to liberationist 
Yankee Northern heritage.  
Monk Hall is a unique space in which the protective cohesion of national borders and 
national identification can be performed, in order to be challenged. Phillip E. Wegner writes that 
“if ideology creates the synchrony or place of a given social reality, then utopia marks its 
potential for diachrony or historical becoming” (18). The nation is always an imaginary utopia 
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for those elite groups who benefit from its codes of racial, gendered, and classed hierarchy. 
Wegner insists “Utopia becomes ‘useful’ as a literary form precisely to the degree that it enables 
its audiences to think through…various scales of personal, cultural, and epochal transition” (31). 
However, the space of Monk Hall forcibly defies this vision of community and reality. Identities 
constantly shift, not in transition from one stable identity to another, but in a state of permanent 
flux. Monk Hall, itself, is a space that allows Lippard to explode utopian myths of the state, and 
to establish the terms of the dystopia toward which the state rushes. Wegner observes that “space 
itself is both a production, shaped through a variety of social processes and human interventions, 
and a force that, in turn, influences, directs, and delimits possibilities of action” (11). Monk Hall 
is just such a space—a production of a hypocritically debased Philadelphia, and a toxic influence 
on the society around it. The monks of Monk Hall enter but never leave, even as their debauched 
immorality spreads like a contagion, from the Hall to the city to the Atlantic trade routes that link 
the city to the wider world.  
And so, the market in which the men of Monk Hall conduct their trades is universally 
deceptive and captivating: even as they conspire to capture, possess, exchange, and exploit other 
people—especially vulnerable, white women—the so-called “Monks” of Monk Hall become 
ever more bound to each other’s possessive leverage. Lippard presents the Monks in a society 
not of mutual cooperation, but of mutual debt and captivity. Each man holds power over others 
because of his knowledge of his vice and sin, even as others hold him in their thrall by the same 
means. Each owns a debt on others, and finds himself indebted to others. Even knowledge—
knowledge of the criminality of one’s fellows—has a competitive market value, rather than a 
socially constructive function. 
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Like the signers of the Declaration, the Monks ensure their election by signing pacts with 
each other, with the blessing of an approving deity—in this case, the organizing intelligence of 
the Hall, Devil-Bug—and in the presence of the unfree. They use these pacts to engage in social 
relations but also to convert themselves, to achieve new identities and, they hope, to ascend to a 
higher social status, by forcing someone else to fall. As Shelley Streeby notes, "In Lippard's 
account, the ‘Book of God’ and the ‘Declaration of Our Fathers’ fail to protect the poor and 
laboring because the rich and powerful exploit, crush, and cannibalize their bodies, and then 
interpret these two documents in self-serving ways, emphasizing a disembodied soul and an 
abstract citizen" (450). Conversion and circulation, exchange and commodity equivalence, 
contract-oriented social election, and the machinations of an interventionist divinity—all of the 
hallmarks of capitalism as divine providential technology appear in Monk Hall and all are 
granted the ritualism, and the supernatural and allegorical significance of a universal spirituality 
held together through commerce. Election, however, becomes entrapment, possession, and loss 
of agency.  
If the model of the binding social contract, upon which Atlantic community was 
premised, was a sacred compact, this universe’s model is the contract Fitz-Cowles makes with 
his duped investors. This is only right, given that, at the time that Lippard was writing The 
Quaker City, the market of individual and even spiritual value had long infiltrated the legal and 
social codes of Atlantic economies and social polities. For instance, Edward E. Baptist singles 
out one local example when he describes how, “in 1828, Edward Barnes paid eight of the 
twenty-seven people enslaved on his Mississippi cotton labor camp a total of $28.32 for picking 
on Sundays, the day of the week when it was technically illegal for enslavers to force field labor” 
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(129). Barnes’ actions implicitly recognize that both labor and the Sabbath have a certain value 
within the same marketplace, and, in fact, that labor has greater value than spiritual observance. 
In the context of this breakdown of Atlantic codes of sociality, morality, and 
identification, the novel offers up a dark inversion of the economically successful individual, a 
singular figure who succeeds in the Atlantic economy not because it is pious or trustworthy, but 
because it has learned to prosper in a world that is violent, decadent, and captivating. In this 
world, Devil-Bug is the central emblematic figure. Devil-Bug uses the economy to commodify 
his prisoners and even to commodify himself, on his way toward shedding his humanity almost 
utterly as the walls of the economic Hall come crashing down around him. He uses it as the 
mechanism that will ensure personal destruction, spiritual debasement, and national calamity. 
Yet, in so doing, he also models modes of if not personal survival, then generational 
advancement. So the focus of the novel is placed firmly upon masters who will soon discover 
their own enslavement and upon the marginal figures who covertly navigate the fallout from that 
unsettling discovery. 
Moreover, as its plot plays out, Lippard makes clear the fact that the Atlantic economy 
has not bound itself merely to Christianity, but to an emphatically providential form of 
Christianity. Even within a Quaker city, the divine hand intervenes materially in human affairs. 
Moreover, it unites individuals in a universal kingdom and offers demonstrations of personal 
election. In some cases, that election is surprising—Devil-Bug’s daughter, for instance, 
experiences rewards that imply her election despite her father’s utter depravity—or ironic—the 
deceitful Gus Lorrimer thinks himself elect and preserved only a short time before damnation 
overtakes him. In all cases, the interventionist divine acts through economic forces. At times, it 
even does so through the unifying powers of earthly market-based vice. 
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The novel’s treatment of sin as a force that unites all of the branches of society through 
economic bonds of mutual mastery and submission takes center stage in the passage entitled 
“Ravoni the Sorcerer.” The mysterious sorcerer, Ravoni, creates a society with all the rituals of 
religious devotion but dedicated simultaneously to decadent humanism and to captive, 
dehumanized possession. Indeed, Ravoni’s church invokes slavery quite directly. At one point, 
he sneers at Devil-Bug, “‘Slave!... How dare you cross that threshold unbidden…to your knees 
dog! Am I not your master?” (400). Elsewhere, the text goes further, explicitly announcing a 
Christological typology for the master-slave relation and for the evaluative logic of the 
supernatural economy. Even Judas, it seems, had his place in the market.  Luke Harvey, a 
wealthy man reclining in Monk Hall notes, “Judas Iscariot…went and hanged himself after he 
sold his master…wonder how full the town would be if all who have sold their God for gold 
would hang themselves? Hooks in market house would rise” (35). The comment links the market 
to divine reciprocity, finds an avenue for personal profit in the downfall of a sinful society, and 
notes the pervasiveness of a kind of capitalist exchange that proves spiritually blasphemous and 
personally captivating. Mastery and slavery are invoked as spiritual conditions rather than as 
legal states, but these moments reinforce the sense that slavery is the essential model for social 
relations in this society because religious belief empowers it, because it empowers capitalism, 
and because capitalism and religion work together as mutually reinforcing elements in the 
church-market of Atlantic culture and commerce. It is Ravoni who fully dramatizes the 
supernatural experience of mastery, Ravoni who reveals the occult centrality of slavery in the 
society of Monk Hall, and Ravoni who lays bare the full frightening spiritual implications of life 
in the Atlantic market.  
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The demonic priest is likewise presented as a supernatural embodiment of the economy’s 
uncanny or occult aspects. Both ethnically exoticized and possibly deathless, the novel even 
implies that he was present at the signing of the Declaration (423). Ravoni suggests a “simple 
and beautiful” utopian religion of sensualist humanism, but his project, like that of the nation 
itself, is innately corrupt or, perhaps, even demonic (424). It becomes clear that this is the 
universalist and syncretic faith of the providential capitalist Atlantic. It is a church of “Universal 
sympathy” that unites classes “from the slave to the prince” from any and all parts of the Atlantic 
sphere (447).xlix Truly, this is the new faith that capitalism brings into being. But it is no shelter 
from divine judgement. Quite the opposite: in fact, it is this religion that, although populist and 
inclusive, will lead society, irrevocably, toward social destruction and personal possession. This 
is a vision of the market run out of all human control. It is supernatural and universally 
inclusive—all are members of the elect of this church—but election here means equal moral and 
economic hazard along with equal commodification and control. 
Lippard’s interest in using the generic codes of the urban gothic to interrogate society at 
all levels was not confined to The Quaker City, although the novel, despite its erratic structure, 
offers a fully-formed critique of the nation and the market in moral terms. l Christopher Looby, 
for instance, also notes Lippard’s interest in disembodiment as an element of social interaction in 
his writing for the Spirit of the Times periodical. There, Lippard wrote occasionally about a 
character named Flib who, Looby argues, possesses “a kind of fantastical equivalent to the 
pretense of disembodiment and depersonalization that any number of scholars of early American 
literature and society have claimed underwrote the fiction of the early print public sphere itself.” 
The magical ring that Flib wears “literalizes this self-abstractive function” so that Flib acts as 
“the otherwise uncredited and invisible functionary of the print sphere” (5). Looby’s contention 
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that depersonalization underwrote the publishing industry of which Lippard was a part is 
instructive: the market with which Lippard had most direct contact was one that magnified the 
impact of seemingly invisible investors and capitalists, and that used the labor of writers without 
always offering them attribution, name, or personhood, in return. This is the model of market 
that Lippard places at the center of Monk Hall’s multi-faceted economy. In fact, according to 
Looby, Flib’s invisible infiltrations expose the corruption at the heart of society’s institutions, 
including “the box office of a theater…the Court of General Sessions, and the post office…a 
bank…where his invisibility enables him to gain access to the directors’ room of one of these 
‘temples of the Money-God’” (6). All of this anticipates The Quaker City’s presentation of a 
classed society united through vice, a society in which concealed misdeeds are given the ironic 
aegis of a social “Money-God,” and a national culture in which money-matters are 
indistinguishable from political ideology and even occult supernaturalism.  
The Philadelphia of the novel is a product of America’s founding as a philosophically and 
economically capitalist culture, a space that is emblematic of the nation’s embrace of capitalist 
ideology as a sacred guiding ethos and of its reframing of providential design around market 
operations. Democracy subordinates itself to the dictates of the market, freedom collapses into 
despotism, and social interactions resemble captive markets of exchangeable flesh. The market 
of vice empowers the logic of slave commodification to extend beyond the slave block and to 
structure social relations between even ostensibly free white individuals in the Atlantic. Readers 
discover late in the novel, for example, that the novel’s supposed hero, Byrnewood Arlington, 
seduced a woman who killed herself after becoming pregnant. Moreover, his rise through the 
novel, from cad to champion, is facilitated by the fall of its villain, his supposed friend, Gus 
Lorrimer, who essentially does the same thing to Byrnewood’s sister, Mary. Thus, all of the 
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novel’s characters, whether overtly villainous or ostensibly heroic, are engaged in the business 
and practices of commodification and exchange. All of them are engaged in the competitive 
game of exchange capital, their fortunes rising and falling as they transact over other unfree 
persons. 
All men die. Societies die. Death is, perhaps, the only reliable constant in the world of 
The Quaker City. Lippard insists that the self-serving union of the exchange economy with 
Christian vocation and conversion logic can come only to this conclusion. The society founded 
upon and enlarged by such values is, according to Lippard, already one that resembles Monk 
Hall, more than it does any proper church or market floor. It is already a den of competitive, 
vicious, and unreliably transformative cheats and slave-traders. Looking ahead, Lippard argues, 
the nation and Atlantic culture more broadly will bear out the results of such a social foundation. 
It will become a space in which every individual’s unfree status is made plain, in which the few 
masters work the machinery of both market and church to keep the slaves in chains. It will 
become a space in which the demonic Devil-Bug, ever less human, ever more sadistic, is the 
model individual, the man made in the image of a god that doles out suffering for its own 
pleasure, and is, ultimately, disinterested in who gains or loses so long as the market continues to 
run.  
The Quaker City’s many spectacles of violence, and social, political, personal, and 
spiritual anxiety evidently held a great deal of appeal for Lippard’s readers. As D. Berton 
Emerson points out, the novel was “reputedly the most popular nineteenth-century novel prior to 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin” (105). Leslie Fiedler notes that the novel sold 
60,000 copies in its first year of publication and continued to sell 30,000 copies a year through 
the year of Lippard’s death in 1854 (Fiedler vii). David S. Reynolds likewise observes the 
   Green 433 
 
“record-breaking pace” with which the book sold (Reynolds xii). In 1845, there was, evidently, a 
market for these anxious investigations into the moral future of Atlantic national society. 
Nevertheless, critics, recently including Emerson, Looby, and Sari Altschuler have taken 
particular note of the roots and effects of the text’s digressive, even, perhaps, incomprehensible 
structure. These critics offer a number of explanations for the unusual nature of the text, mostly 
involving its serial publication history and Lippard’s authorial proclivities, but readers should 
also consider the possibility that the novel’s unusual structure models its arguments about 
sociality, the nation, and the moral universe that the individual must navigate. Looby argues that 
the novel’s seriality creates a “public” readership, a group of people “gathered in anger at the 
malfeasance he was exposing” (13). This is intriguing, and should come coupled with a 
recognition that the novel also performs the unifying function of supernatural vice: the novel’s 
many parts and digressions are unified only by the market within which the actions are bound 
and by Devil-Bug’s occult interventions into individual and social lives. The novel, then, is also 
a model of the market-oriented moral and social cosmology that Lippard describes, a social and 
multi-vocal space held together by common—and commonly debased—goals of economic 
competition and supernatural mediation. 
The novel’s serial publication also offers critics legible evidence for the author’s evolving 
ideas, particularly about American politics and political activity. Looby, for example, argues 
that, in contrast to the more fully formed democratic activism of Lippard’s later career, The 
Quaker City is “an unexpected, hectically improvised, and unpredictable production”(3). This 
can be true, but it should not halt readers from recognizing that Lippard’s critique goes beyond 
social or political criticism, in order to take on the philosophical assumptions of an Atlantic 
society and national polity. Lippard interrogates a society that increasingly insists upon the 
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divine irreproachability of its claims to moral and market liberty, and finds that society both 
wanting and hypocritical. It is true that the first half of the novel revolves around the drama of 
Byrnewood and Mary Arlington, targeted by Gus Lorrimer, along with a darkly inverted 
romantic competition between Albert Livingstone, Dora Livingstone and Fitz-Cowles, while the 
second half becomes significantly more detached from conventional plot or character, with the 
prophetic dream that Devil-Bug experiences—probably written during a break in publication 
after December 1844 and March 1845—acting as a kind of launching pad into more atypical 
territory (Altschuler 85). However, the inconsistency is not so great as it seems. 
The second half heightens and amplifies the anxious moral ambivalence at work beneath 
the surface of the first half’s more conventional plots. After all, the heroes of the novel are never 
far removed from their villainous foils. Altschuler’s reading of the novel’s indebtedness to 
newspaper and penny-paper formats is essential, but it would be reductive to suggest that 
Lippard merely changes formats or authorial goals as his novel evolves from its original 
publishing methods (Altschuler 95). D. Berton Emerson likewise recognizes that Lippard’s 
compositional intentions and faculties evolved as the narrative progressed alongside the author’s 
politics. He points out that “at decade’s end, Lippard’s pro-labor anticapitalist politics would 
take on more coherent (albeit still unedited) shape when he came to run his own periodical, also 
named The Quaker City, from 1848 to 1850” (106). This is one explanation for the messy 
production and stylistic digressions of the novel. Another is that The Quaker City represents a 
politics of chaos out of which emerges possibilities for resistance or manipulation, along with a 
theology that follows a similar course. The novel contains a consistent element of supernatural 
intervention that gives order to seemingly chaotic events, apparently for its own sake. This 
market-oriented but inchoate intelligence only becomes clear as the novel moves towards its 
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conclusion, in which social and personal production and destruction, along with social 
production and destruction, coalesce around an image of commodification as the ultimate and 
perhaps sacred event of human life. 
The novel, therefore, incriminates economics and politics, American identity-curation 
and hegemony, racial classification, class-formation, and social interaction in the Atlantic as 
moral issues and spiritual problems. Fitz-Cowles’ duplicitous nature implicates the process of 
national expansion as part of a larger Atlantic drive toward power established through trickery 
and violence. Meanwhile, the twofaced Gus Lorrimer, the ambivalently heroic Byrnewood 
Arlington, and the women they use as playthings or victims reveal the extent to which the 
capitalism of the Jacksonian period built upon some of the most troubling economic trends of the 
post-revolutionary era to evolve into a perverse game of mastery, exploitation, and competition 
with spiritual and even supernatural effects that invited destruction. The apocalypse glimpsed as 
a dream in the novel argues for the end result of national and racial identities that assert stability 
as they disguise their heterogeneity, of polities that pretend to freedom even as they practice 
slavery, and of democracies that build paeans to virtuous, expansive liberty upon the haunted 
graveyards of the expended and unfree dead. 
The Original Sin: Slavery and State Formation 
Whether they wanted to admit it or not, Atlantic societies like Philadelphia, were 
complicit in the reproduction of a slave economy and had either to willfully or ignorantly turn a 
blind eye to the violence that attended that economy. Edward E. Baptist helps to contextualize 
this point when he observes that even outwardly antislavery societies were utterly dependent 
upon the maintenance of the slave economy. He writes, “neither Britain nor any other country 
that followed [America] down the path of textile-based industrialization could have 
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accomplished an economic transformation without the millions of acres of cotton fields of the 
expanding American South. To replace the fiber it imported from American slave labor camps 
with an equivalent amount of wool, Britain in 1830 would have had to devote 23 million acres to 
sheep pasture—more than the sum total of the island’s agricultural land” (128). The novel 
demonstrates the all-consuming power of this market, by demonstrating the harsh stakes of 
challenges to that power. One of Fitz-Cowles’ commercial partners describes doing business 
with “a planter from the South,” and, a moment later, relates a disturbing episode in which they 
“Roasted an Abolitionist…for tryin’ to steal my niggers. Lynched a Yankee, the day afore that, 
for sellin’ me some Jersey cider for sham-pane!” (Lippard 218). Even beyond the overt 
invocation of slavery and white-supremacist terrorism, the message of the text is clear: Northern 
business depends upon Southern slavery, and to meddle with this reciprocal system is cause 
enough for execution. If this fact offends the sensibilities of Philadelphia’s Quaker-derived 
Yankees—or even Lippard’s own readers—it is only because they are too blinded by hypocrisy 
to see their own seat at the banquet being served in Monk Hall. 
Indeed, the geography of the city and the architecture of the Hall both reinforce the 
inextricability of moral and economic practices throughout the Atlantic. Samuel Otter argues, for 
example, that “rather than departures from the famous grid of symmetry and propriety, [Lippard] 
represents a foundational instability linked to the city’s political history and contemporary social 
violence” (169). The city is, at once, highly ordered and confounding, a rigidly structured social 
and economic hierarchy that functions also as a dense thicket from which individuals may never 
emerge. Otter also points out that Monk Hall itself is structured around a revolutionary-era 
foundation joined to the architecture of a decadent new urban style as well as to the Second Bank 
of the United States (173). The Hall is the literal and symbolic link between the deceptive pieties 
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of the nation’s received history and its destructive economic culture. Similarly, Otter argues that 
in The Nazarine, the unfinished 1846 sequel to The Quaker City, Lippard uses the geography of 
the city to present “a burgeoning capitalist ‘North’” in contrast to its “iniquitous ‘South,’ bound 
to slavery and transmitted in the register of the gothic” (186). The city thus contains both the 
nation’s North-South unity and its disunity, the Northern city’s attempts to alienate slavery and 
its irrefutable ties to the slave industry.  
Appropriately, these symbolic links offer locales in which the business of Atlantic slave 
commerce can explicitly take place. Discussing The Killers, Lippard’s novel, serialized in 1849 
and reprinted in 1851, Otter notes that Lippard “points to the continuities between slave traders 
(the fathers) and race rioters (the sons), situating the events that occur on a discrete Philadelphia 
night in systems of commerce that extend across the eastern Seaboard and into the Caribbean” 
(190). Likewise, Luke Harvey, a character connected to The Quaker City’s central figures 
through complicated links of disappointed relations and investment, frankly notes the way that 
Northern wealth maintains intimate and troubling bonds to Southern slavery. He muses, “Got 
lots of money—a millionaire—no end to his wealth. By the bye, where the d—l did he come 
from? Isn’t he a southern planter with acres of niggers and prairies of cotton?” (38). Cotton 
speculation is an important driver of business in Monk Hall, where businessmen discuss “a large 
purchase in cotton” made by “the respectable house of Grayson, Ballenger, & Co.” The 
speculators expect the planter, “Mr. Ellis Mortimer [to] visit Philadelphia, with a letter of 
credit…for one hundred thousand dollars” (40). That this letter of credit is, ultimately, a forgery, 
only reinforces the immorality of a system that, nevertheless, maintains centrality in the Northern 
economy. 
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Lippard forces the nation’s many transactional social arrangements and sins to coalesce 
in one social space, the beating heart of a local, national, and trans-national culture grown rotten 
with vice. Doing so brings attention to the central place that even the least savory elements of the 
Atlantic economy held in the urban metropole, no matter how much the figures of national power 
might attempt to deny or distance themselves from them. The metaphorical and literal center of 
society is not the church or even the trading ship, but the slave block, situated in an urban square 
that exists not as an open public space, but as an enclosed cell. The grid that Otter discussed as 
being both central to Philadelphia’s conception as a rationally organized city and, in its 
intimidating density, a challenge to those claims, becomes, in Lippard’s text, a warren for the 
sinful, a prison for the condemned. 
It is important to add to Otter’s social critique an appreciation for Lippard’s spiritual 
argument. The Quaker City is a city founded upon religious principles, so the “instability” 
produced by the links between its past and present also evolve from the city’s moral 
development as a spiritual space that was, nevertheless, linked to innately immoral economic 
practices. Neither space, nor history, nor theological strictures can isolate this Quaker society 
from its links to the broader Atlantic trade of the enslaved. 
An antislavery “Quaker City” whose lifeblood is slavery and slave violence, Philadelphia 
is demonstrative of a national culture that asserts liberty on the backs of the enslaved. Early 
critics, like Raymond Williams, for example, critiqued Quaker hypocrisy by tallying the profits 
some Quakers made from the slave trade (Williams 43). Similarly, Brycchan Carey argues 
persuasively for a slightly altered timeline of historical consideration for the Quaker antislavery 
movement. Rather than settling on 1758, the year in which antislavery discourse codified into 
official Quaker practice, he looks much further back to consider the dialogues and discourses 
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that brought antislavery to the fore. London Quakers had, “on paper at least, banned Friends 
from trading slaves in 1713 and, when this was ignored, did so again in 1727” (1). Nevertheless, 
this remained a contentious issue—and one that centered upon the Philadelphia hub of American 
Quakers. Early on, Quakers recognized that, in order to obey their belief in the “inner light” of 
all human beings, they had at least to treat their slaves better, but whether to cease the trade or 
even to protest the trade were separate issues, entirely. This debate took place especially in 
Philadelphia because there “Quakers came into contact with slaves without being economically 
dependent upon their labor...there was a higher concentration of Quakers in Pennsylvania than 
anywhere else...Friends were both the spiritual and secular power in the land…and the 
withdrawal of the Quakers from colonial government in 1756 in protest over the Seven Years 
War” (32-33). The Quaker City is, therefore, a title both deeply ironic and deeply appropriate. 
The debate over a city or a community’s involvement in the slave trade was very much alive to 
Lippard, drawn from a long history of violent discontent over the issue, rather than a mere 
abstraction about the nature of freedom. 
Furthermore, Lippard’s presentation of Monk Hall as an intimate microcosm of the 
society at large allows his focus upon slavery both to cross the ostensible boundaries between 
secular and ecclesiastical debates, and to demonstrate that, in a Christian-inflected capitalist 
cosmology, economic, moral, and class-oriented questions about involvement in the slave 
economy were inextricable from one another. Otter, for instance, links the riots that roiled the 
city during the 1840’s to their implicit legal sanction, arguing that Lippard intended to critique 
the city’s overall support of classist and racist antidemocratic violence (179). In fact, the novel 
itself produced such an outcry that it almost incited a riot when the Chestnut Street Theater 
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attempted a dramatic performance in 1844 (180). Lippard therefore does not limit his critique to 
the Quakers of Quaker City, but extends it to the whole of post-revolutionary American society. 
As Devil-Bug, notes, Monk Hall is home to all of Philadelphia’s elite. In fact, Monk Hall 
uses mutual culpability in the slave trade to unite all levels within the nation’s social hierarchy. 
“Here in fine were men of all classes,” writes Lippard, “poets, authors, lawyers, judges, doctors, 
merchants, gamblers, and –this is no libel I hope—one parson” (56). Lippard unites these diverse 
figures in a singular space, allowing Monk Hall to act as the nation in miniature, implicating 
every profession, every vocation, and every individual in the interconnected violence, decadence, 
and moral compromise of attachments to the Atlantic economy of violence and mastery. 
Lippard’s is a philosophical challenge, taking aim at all of the elites that make up Yankee 
American society and that have most profited from the union of Christian narratives of virtue to 
capitalist social structures. Crucial to this challenge is the novel’s presentation of a providentially 
interventionist spirit-world—rather than the more disinterested but individualized God espoused 
by the Quakers—as the true motivating force within the mechanisms of Atlantic capital. With 
this in mind, he looks at the social edifice that providential capitalism has erected, recognizes the 
hierarchical demarcations of class, religion, race, and politics, and implicates everyone within the 
society represented by the debauched Monk Hall. 
Furthermore, Lippard’s interest in the city’s riotous social upheaval demonstrates the 
similarity between class-oriented discontent, anti-abolitionist violence, and nativist white 
sentiment that influenced his view of the nation at an uncertain crossroad. For instance, in The 
Nazarene, Lippard used the historical backdrop of violence in Philadelphia’s Kensington district 
between Protestant nativists and Irish Catholics to demonstrate the way that classist and racist 
violence was more complicated than a simple black or white issue (Otter 182). Otter reads this as 
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evidence of Lippard’s investment in the relative liberties of the white working-class. This is so, 
but, as Timothy Helwig notes, by presenting scenes inspired or directly evocative of anti-
abolitionist violence side-by-side with scenes revolving around violence directed at working-
class Whites by nativist Whites, Lippard implicitly suggests the similar condition of white 
laborers and their enslaved black counterparts (Helwig 89).  
The Quaker City demonstrates Lippard’s ongoing concern with the social and personal 
effects of labor conditions that challenged white working-class laborers to confront the similarity 
of their condition to that of the enslaved. For example, Lorrimer admits, “The town swarms with 
such fellows, who will sell themselves to any master for a trifle…they hire themselves to me for 
the season—I use and, of course, despise them” (Lippard 22). Likewise, during Devil-Bug’s 
prophetic dream, he sees slavery presented as an element of society that crosses class and racial 
boundaries: “Then came the slaves of the city, white and black, marching along one mass of rags 
and sores and  misery…so they went trooping by the slaves of the cotton Lord, and the factory 
Prince” (389). In this dystopic vision, white wage-slavery is no different from black chattel 
slavery, and the logic of the latter has structured the rituals and hierarchies of the former. 
Even if Lippard was more concerned with the plight of white wage-slaves than with that 
of black chattel slaves, his displacement of the chattel experience onto white bodies, combined 
with his warnings about the nation's apocalyptic future, are of a piece with common early 
nineteenth-century antislavery concerns. Walter Johnson, for instance, writes, "Opponents of 
slavery argued that the institution should not be allowed to establish deeper roots in a new region 
of the United States. With slavery, they argued, spread the threat of a rebellion that could 
destabilize not only the region, but the whole nation" (31). Lippard offers the outcome of 
revolutionary fears on full display. A society that maintains links to slavery and that limits the 
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democratic possibilities of even its ostensibly free laborers will come to moral, political, and 
literal ruin.  
Moreover, the resemblance of white wage slavery to black chattel slavery was an ongoing 
concern for Lippard. Discussing Lippard’s 1853 novel, New York: Its Upper Ten and Lower 
Million, Helwig argues that “Lippard’s inclusion of black slavery as a pressing social ill, and his 
designation of slaveholders as oppressors, shows how the popular writer linked chattel slavery 
and the working poor and indicates his growing commitment to end chattel slavery” (89). This is 
correct, but does not go far enough. Lippard appears just as committed to demolishing wage-
slavery as he is to critiquing chattel slavery. And so, his critique is not strictly focused within an 
abolitionist context, but, instead, demonstrates his critique of culture that degrades, abuses, and 
dehumanizes any and everyone caught in its race, gender, and class hierarchies. In fact, Lippard 
was, according to Otter, “uncomfortable with the abolitionist movement,” prioritizing white 
working-class freedoms from wage-slavery over the freedom of African Americans who, despite 
the author’s sympathies, remain subservient or disguised characters in the novel (181). And so, 
Lippard uses the tropes of captivity to articulate the worst fears of white readers: that in a world 
structured around indebtedness, commodification, and captivity, all persons become potential 
subjects of captivity, capture, and unfreedom. 
At the same time, these scenes of captivity indict American chattel slavery as a 
production of an immoral, even evil economy that binds American culture just as Monk Hall 
appears to house men from every class or field in the American economy. The degenerate host of 
Monk Hall, Devil-Bug, for example, places Mary, Byrnewood Arlington’s sister, into the hands 
of Lorrimer for the sake of seduction and ruin and claims, “I’ve sold the girl to you for one 
hundred dollars, and you shall have her” (Lippard 348). The Quaker City suggests that captivity 
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might not demonstrate a violation of social norms at all, but might, instead, exemplify them. In a 
society in which the real commodification, captivity, and trade of human beings is commonplace, 
the ostensibly free begin to worry—rightly, according to this novel—that their freedom is 
contingent and might be stolen or revoked at a moment’s notice. Devil-Bug merely makes 
explicit what is elsewhere treated implicitly or, in the case of Byrnewood Arlington, treated as a 
tragic circumstance of class inequality. The women in this novel are used as commodified things, 
bodies to be sold for an equivalent sum or to be captured for their potential trade value. This 
projection of slavery onto white bodies performs a dual-function, simultaneously invoking white 
slavery as a special kind of horror, and critiquing American involvement in the broader Atlantic 
slave trade.  
The arcs of all of the characters in this novel suggest at least partially thwarted attempts 
to achieve transcendence through evocations of a form of liberty hobbled by the slavery at its 
heart. Eric Sundquist argues that “revolutionary millenarianism” could exist only in a place 
where religion dominates society and collapses the distance between it and secular power 
structures. In the 1800s, he points out, church rhetoric largely adopted liberationist rhetoric and 
secular spaces secularized religious values (77). Characters like Byrnewood evidently wish to fit 
themselves into this kind of liberationist narrative and, in some respects, this is the story of 
Byrnewood’s spiritual redemption and his discovery of his own liberationist instincts. 
Nevertheless, if an escape from sin and an escape from wage-slavery go hand in hand, none of 
these characters ever fully do escape. Or, if they do, the novel gives readers enough evidence to 
understand that they will not escape for long. The “revolutionary millenarianism” that Sundquist 
describes largely fails, even though the Quaker City quite explicitly “collapses the distance 
between [divine] and secular power.” Sundquist further discusses the “linguistic and conceptual 
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tautology at the heart of slavery—what is a thing and what is a person? What is and what is not?” 
and insists that “Only violence could truly break through this circular dialectic” (182). This novel 
is rife with violence, but, again, it is self-defeating and sadistic violence. The Widow Smowlet is 
murdered for a handful of change; Devil-Bug murders simply for the pleasure of it; Byrnewood’s 
attempts at heroism see him reduced and sidelined for most of the novel; the heroes in The 
Quaker City attempt to use violence to untangle the knot of their own subject status, only to 
discover that the knot cannot be undone by force. 
On the other hand, late in the novel, Devil-Bug and his daughter will achieve what, 
Lippard suggests, so many among the white working-class—ostensibly Devil-Bug’s racial and 
class superiors, if still the victims of the capitalist aristocracy—cannot. He will essentially 
smuggle his daughter, Mabel, into a higher echelon in the racial and class hierarchy of the 
Atlantic. Still, even this victory comes about through violence, emerging covertly from the ruins 
of social collapse and death. 
Hierarchies of the Living and the Dead 
The novel treats violence and death as social productions, reflections of the capitalist 
machinery that relies upon violence to perpetuate the hierarchies of the Atlantic, and death to 
extend the Atlantic’s logic of mastery and control into the afterlife. As Vincent Brown notes, the 
division of cemeteries functions similarly to reinstantiate hierarchies of class, wealth and power. 
Discussing funerary practices in Jamaica, Brown observes, “White funerals enshrined the pursuit 
of wealth and white-supremacy as society’s first principles.” Moreover, he suggests that the size 
and location of memorials was used “to signal [a person’s] achievements, aspirations and claims 
to status through final rites of passing, in the process enacting and affirming hierarchical 
principles of social value” (78). Furthermore, he notes that “the graduated fees for progressively 
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more prestigious burial palls and grave lots gave the parish and the church a stake in the 
reproduction of social hierarchy” (85). Although Brown is writing about Caribbean chattel 
market cultures, Lippard invites his readers to apply the same perspective to the nationalist and 
commercial center of republican life in Philadelphia. Violence, death, and the grave are all parts 
of a class system that props up the local and national culture, and, as the novel’s characters 
engage in violence or find themselves haunted by their violent histories, Lippard presents that 
class system as all-inclusive and powerful enough to transcend the boundaries of life and death, 
rationality and supernaturalism. Joseph Roach notes that “the cemetery grows on the margins to 
define the social distinction of the fictive center: the dead will dwell in separate houses suitable 
to their status” (53). Lippard’s novel both demonstrates and challenges Brown’s and Roach’s 
readings of the cemetery’s role in society. Lippard recognizes the hierarchies that transcend 
death, but, within Monk Hall, collapses the distance between the living and the dead, so that the 
living must confront their exploited, sacrificed, or marginalized victims. 
Monk Hall is both a staging ground for class and race hierarchy and a haunted cemetery, 
a space filled with supernatural reminders of the violence that attends the maintenance of 
Philadelphia society. The narrator describes Monk Hall in such a way as to suggest that the 
discarded or ruined individuals touched by the economy remain in a kind of circulation even 
after their demise. They are the ghosts that Devil-Bug sees; they are Devil-Bug himself, the self-
proclaimed “soul” at the center of the Hall. This novel conflates the graveyard and the market 
floor, presenting both as constitutive elements of a society in a fallen state. Lippard describes the 
way “it looked just like the house which all the restless spirits in the city, gentlemen and lady 
ghosts, who frequent graveyards nightly, and prevail very numerously in Christmas-time, about 
the halls of old mansions, would choose for their scene of assemblage, in case the spiritual 
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fraternity, determined upon a National Convention of all the ghosts in the union; a sort of death s 
head festival, with the Skeleton-God himself in the chair” (199). In fact, there is no excess in this 
novel: the people who die represent both their own loss and someone else’s gain. The absent 
dead, the violence of mastery, and the death that allows this society to perpetuate itself, all 
maintain presence in Monk Hall. Avery Gordon reminds readers that, “ghosts are never innocent: 
the unhallowed dead of the modern project drag in the pathos of their loss and the violence of the 
force that made them” (22). Monk Hall thrives on this “pathos.” It is a home for the economy of 
souls and sins, standing as a comprehensive market that keeps both in interactive contact. 
Because death and loss both still have values in an economy, some remnant, ghostly aspect of 
absent persons remains in circulation. In such an economy, there is no ultimate loss or absence, 
only the evacuation of persons into their purely symbolic or allegorical epitaph as figures on a 
balance sheet in the ledger-book that is modern Atlantic capitalist society. 
These haunting spirits exert material influence upon the characters in the novel, 
reasserting the state of presence-in-absence by which the market binds them and keeps them in 
circulation within Monk Hall. Devil-Bug, for instance, is haunted by the people he has had to 
harm on his way to his position atop an economic hierarchy of vice. “It’s been there ever since,” 
he muses, “If I sleep, or if I’m wide awake, it’s there always on my left side, where I hain’t got 
no eye to see it, and yet I do I do see it” (105). Even Bess, the young woman who helps Devil-
Bug, but who is moved by Byrnewood’s sister’s plight to reform and help her escape, recognizes 
these ghosts, exclaiming “Don’t you see the corse [sic] at your side” (278). Similarly, the 
murderous Widow Smolby also appears to be haunted by the people she has lost on the way to 
gain. She recalls “Her daughter, for whom she had mourned so long, was forgotten when she 
remembered the five thousand dollars stolen from her house that very morning by the Jew, 
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whose accomplice lay sleeping on the bed” (209). George Handley suggests that readers of 
Atlantic texts need a poetics of the forgotten or suppressed to account for the historical patterns 
of eradication in the Atlantic (27). Readers, he argues, need a form of literature that “recognizes 
oblivion” (27). To recognize such oblivion is also to recognize the social processes that have 
produced it. Although Handley does not address this link, Lippard does: the mutual co-
instantiation of market and spirit-worlds are parts of an all-encompassing haunted Atlantic 
cosmology. The providential capitalist marketplace itself is the “oblivion” to which Handley 
refers.  
In the case of The Quaker City, haunting draws attention to the grim equivalence at the 
heart of the Atlantic spirit-economy—for example, one daughter and five thousand dollars. Even 
in their absence, loved-ones retain a value, even if that value is expressed in loss. Noting that 
“the phantoms of [Devil-Bug’s] murdered victims rose before him,” Lippard reminds readers 
that the dead are at once the necessary prices paid for advancement in the economy of Monk 
Hall, and posthuman echoes that remain in circulation in its economy (369). Avery Gordon 
addresses this lingering presence in other Atlantic contexts, noting that “the ghostly haunt is a 
form of social figuration that treats as a major problem the reduction of individuals ‘to a mere 
sequence of instantaneous experience which leave no trace or rather whose trace is hated as 
irrational and ‘overtaken’’” (20). Similarly, Ian Baucom describes “mourning”  as “the 
determination to exchange some lost thing for a viable substitute [like insurance]” and 
“melancholy” as “the decision to keep the sense of loss folded in with what remains” (135). 
These readings should be united, in the case of The Quaker City, with a recognition that the 
culture that Lippard addresses is neither wholly commercial nor wholly spiritual, but both at 
once, feeding upon the “ghostly” effects of the market to extend its powers, and asserting a 
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spiritual component to the “exchange” economy. Devil-Bug is, in a sense, mourning his own 
crimes and, in so doing, both calling forth the violent social processes of the competitive 
economy he inhabits, and revealing the persistence of commodified subjects in the market’s 
ledger-book of equivalence. The dead are never really forgotten, only transformed into losses so 
that another may gain. 
Devil-Bug’s Dream: The American Project’s Self-Immolation 
Lippard explicitly argues that the market that helped to found the nation will also ensure 
its impending doom. The novel’s primary antagonist, Gus Lorrimer, is, in fact, related to the very 
beginnings of the nation: “From father to son, since the family had first come over to 
Pennsylvania, with the Proprietor and Peace-Maker William Penn, this temporary derangement 
of intellect, had descended as a fearful heritage” (147). Likewise, the con-man, Larkspur, 
describes the death of the Widow Smolby by declaring her, “Dead, my darlin’, as the ‘Nited 
States Bank!” (351). The novel is acutely aware of a past national history that binds capitalism to 
Christianity in an unholy union, the present economic circumstances that, in Lippard’s day, 
reduced so many to poverty and ruin, and to a potential future for the nation that only builds 
upon this history to erect a state that resembles Monk Hall itself. 
This historical context helps to ground the novel as a critique of the nation’s founding 
principles and of its current business practices. The Quaker William Penn’s colonialist and 
spiritual enterprise founded the city that turned into the spiritually-oriented colony that 
functioned as a center for profit and politics for the nation that Lippard now critiques. Lorrimer 
demonstrates the preexisting moral inadequacy of this original colonial event.  With this 
background established, Lippard turns his eye toward his present moment, to the Jacksonian 
drive to dismantle the banks, an act that introduced instability into the market and which, here, 
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suggests the essential unreliability of both the economy and the lives of the people trapped 
within it. The novel tells the tale of a missing person, for example, in the context of “the spring 
of 1836, when this town as well as the whole Union was convulsed with the fever of speculation” 
(61). Daniel Walker Howe explains this fever, writing that “the unpopularity of banks among 
working people derived not only from their age-old suspicion of the wealthy but more 
immediately from the uncertainty of paper money” (382). The distrust and financial instability at 
the heart of the novel therefore stems directly from the economic upheavals of the Jacksonian 
period. In response, Shelley Streeby observes that, for Lippard, “capitalism drains the sap and 
blood from the heart of republican institutions and entitlements, transforming words like freedom 
and equality into meaningless abstractions and making the U.S. democracy a more murderously 
efficient engine for powerful exploiters of bodies rather than a vehicle for the transcendence of 
inequalities. The solution as Lippard imagines it involves world revolution, not the gradual 
refinement and perfection of U.S. democracy" (454). The Quaker City thus uses its temporal and 
geographical setting to critique a national culture erected upon a foundation of debt-duplicity and 
captivity, and to suggest what comes after: the possibility of generative or degenerative social 
upheaval. 
The nation has a fatal flaw, Lippard tells his readers, that has always been present and 
that will ensure calamity. The racial and class hierarchies upon which the nation was founded 
and upon which it continues to thrive are so powerful that even their destruction may unleash 
their obliterative potential. By founding the nation as a capitalist enterprise, and by imbuing both 
nationalism and capitalism with the spiritual significance of universal religious directive, the 
founders guaranteed the failure of their democracy as a democracy, in order to ensure its success 
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as a capitalist venture, ostensibly favored by God. Lippard uses Devil-Bug’s dream to dramatize 
the philosophical and even supernatural implications of this trade. 
If the novel has a unifying figure it is the demonic Devil-Bug, the operator of the titular 
den of vice. As such, Devil-Bug wields critical authority in the text, particularly in the form of 
his prophetic dream announcing the market-driven failure of the United States. Devil-Bug’s 
dream looks back at the nation’s founding as a capitalist state, and looks forward to its 
destruction as a result of capitalist practices run out of control.  Moreover, this capitalist critique 
is couched in a supernatural context, implying the mutually constitutive nature of material and 
supernatural worlds. The ghost in Devil-Bug’s dream shows him that “the lordlings of the 
Quaker City have sold their father’s bones for gold…blasphemed the name of God…have turned 
the sweat and blood of the poor into bricks and mortar…they tear down Independence Hall and 
raise a royal palace in its ruins!” (Lippard 372). This reversion to a royalist dystopia functions as 
the pivot for the novel’s backward glance and forward critique, suggesting that the sin of 
founding America as an Atlantic market-driven capitalist state has undermined its essential claim 
to democracy and will, in the end, return it to its pre-democratic state. All this because the 
businessmen of the thriving American metropolis “cheated the poor out of their earnings, wrung 
sweat from the brow of the mechanic and turned it into gold, traded away the bones of their 
fathers, sold Independence Square for building lots, and built this palace for a King!” (374). 
When Devil-Bug cries out “Good folks…Don’t you see yer town is alive with dead!” it is clear 
that the city, like Devil-Bug, himself, is haunted by a betrayed past and an inevitable capitalist 
post-democratic apocalypse (377). 
Devil-Bug returns to the theme of inter-class and inter-vocational guilt in the breakdown 
of morality and democratic ideals in the nation, when he exclaims, “America was born, she grew 
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to vigorous youth, and bade fair to live to a good old age, but –alas! Alas! She was massacred by 
her pretended friends. Priest-craft, and Slave-craft, and Traitor-craft were her murderers” (388). 
The parallelism of this list once again asserts the equality found among trades united in the 
depravity of this stage of providential capitalism’s development: priest, slave-driver, financial 
traitor, all are alike the central drivers of this sinful economy that has come to define Atlantic 
society. There are no escape routes—not through the church, the economy, or even sly self-
interest. The collusion of all of the worlds of the spirit, of politics, of personal advancement will 
ensure the violence that will greet the guilty and the innocent—if anyone may be so described—
alike. Readers should not take Devil-Bug’s close rhetorical relation of “Priest-craft, and Slave-
craft, and Traitor-craft” for granted. The phrase articulates the fact that his society has tightly 
bound self-interested duplicity to the immoral Atlantic slave trade and given such an economy its 
literal blessing. 
Furthermore, the prophetic dream reinforces the mutually constitutive nature of 
supernaturalism and economics in the novel as it simultaneously looks back to the biblical 
injunction against raising false-idols in the book of Exodus, and looks forward to an apocalyptic 
moment in which the avaricious nature of Atlantic capitalism will undo America’s claims to 
freedom and democracy. The ghost points to a message written in the sky, lamenting “Wo Unto 
Sodom,” and announces that “To-morrow will be the last day of the Quaker City. The judgment 
comes, and they know it not” (378). Raising the specter of an apocalypse like the one that befell 
the biblical city of Sodom, the spirit promises divine retribution for sins that have, throughout the 
novel, taken on an explicitly capitalist nature. When that retribution does come, when Monk Hall 
is destroyed, readers see again that it has been the society in miniature, an economy of vice 
produced by the union of capitalism and supernatural belief in its processes, collapsing around 
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itself. D. Berton Emerson argues that the novel “grapples with alternative political possibilities 
of regenerated, localized democracy, a politics that shared the spirit of ‘city democracy’ yet 
imagined possibilities beyond these labor-focused efforts” (104). However, this novel is a 
critique of a culture that is equally economic and spiritual, so these “imagined possibilities” 
extend beyond the politics that Emerson describes. The novel functions here as a jeremiad, 
warning of sinfulness, finding a biblical typology with which to compare society’s present 
circumstances, and arguing for renovation through social revolution.  
However, Lippard leaves the nature of that revolution open to interpretation: whether it is 
something to be feared or embraced is, to some degree, open for debate. When the apocalypse 
does come, the novel warns or promises that it will destroy the class differences that have 
empowered and doomed society at the same time, but it will also unleash indiscriminate violence 
and anti-democracy. “What cared the Poor if they too shared the ruin?” asks the novel, “Was it 
not triumph to see the rich and corrupt dragged down from their high places—was it not triumph 
worth all the deaths in hell?” (383). The possibility of this class-blind destruction acts as a kind 
of class-revolution, which plays out Devil-Bug’s mutually constructive and destructive urge, 
dismantling class hierarchies but demonstrating a willingness to tear down all of society in order 
to do it. In so doing, Devil-Bug undermines eighteenth and early nineteenth-century notions of 
what freedom means altogether. 
To this point, freedom has come at the cost of subordination, premised upon the ideal of 
mastery and subservience. Moreover, freedom has depended upon demarcations of the unfree. 
Lisa Lowe notes that  John Stuart Mill “offered a precise hierarchy of states—for example, the 
‘savage’ is above the ‘slave,’ the European above the ‘savage”—to characterize a good 
government as that which deduces what is necessary to progress and improvement for a 
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particular people” (114). Lippard and Devil-Bug violently push back against this hierarchical 
perspective. However, at the same time, Lippard critiques the nationalist directives of both the 
corrupt banking schemes he describes and of the Jacksonian efforts to break up the banks as a 
means of violent nationalist populism. Howe, for example, directly links the bank crisis to 
nationalist expansion and genocide in such a way as to underscore the full and troubling scope of 
the characters’ plans to invest in Western expansion, tied to the failure of the banking system, as 
well as to the national desire for violent domination. Howe writes, “Jackson’s Bank War…Indian 
Removal and the Maysville Road veto…set the pattern for Jacksonian Democratic support for 
continental imperialism and white-supremacy” (386). Fitz-Cowles, the novel’s characteristically 
fraudulent debt speculator, presents his scheme of western expansion as both a commercial and 
nationalist project. He insists, “The plan is feasible…but there’s a rough desert to pass through 
before we reach the mines. Plenty of Mexicans and Texans—not to mention the Indians and wild 
beasts” (Lippard 169). On both counts, commercial and national, this is a dishonest scheme, and 
its inclusion in the novel suggests Lippard’s sense that the nation’s militarist and commercial 
expansion projects are equally debased. They may extend the nation but, in so doing, will only 
extend the flawed ideology of debt capital, trickery, and violence that underwrote America’s 
foundation and has always underwritten the nation’s expansion. 
The novel’s violence, therefore, presents the social revolution that Lippard imagines as 
retribution for social and economic sins, even as its grotesquerie and uncontrollability imply the 
potential dangers of class revolution. Emerson notes that “subsequent moments in the sequel 
show less confidence in the reform potential of national rhetoric” (122). Lippard’s novel thus 
both exacts revenge upon the architects of social and economic instability and criticizes the 
Jacksonian urge to rashly and violently seek revenge. In the church of the mysterious, 
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blasphemous sorcerer, Ravoni, for example, Lippard offers the spectacle a man who was “the 
President of the Bank that broke,” executed as part of a ceremony that doles out retribution to the 
worst among the sinners against economic justice (405). Lippard describes the way that “the 
legalized Robber lay beside the wretch whom he had plundered. The well-fed Bank President 
who not ten hours past, had refused the starving Mechanic one solitary dollar, now lay beside the 
victim of his lawful fraud…Say, was not this the justice of God?” (413). David S. Reynolds 
explains the historical context surrounding this moment. He writes, "In 1837 most of the nation's 
banks suspended specie payment, refusing any longer to redeem their paper notes in hard money. 
The great depression of 1837-44 put nearly a third of Americans out of work at a time when 
hundreds of banks were failing and when some leading bankers were being tried for criminal 
activity" (xxxiv). The effects of the violent retribution dramatized in the novel are therefore 
ambivalent, both socially leveling and uncontrollably destructive. How could it be otherwise? 
For the culture Lippard describes runs on fundamental moral ambivalence, meting out liberty 
bound to captivity, justice bound to violence, and revolution bound to destruction. 
The dream, therefore, is not strictly destructive, and certainly contains potential signposts 
for how to move forward. Emerson, for instance, argues that the novel abandons “an initial 
reliance upon national principles such as ‘Liberty of the Press’ and symbols like Independence 
Hall that would provide remedy for the social, economic, and political wrongs on display in 
Local Philadelphia.” He continues, noting that “In their place, the sequel grapples with 
alternative political possibilities of regenerated, localized democracy, a politics that shared the 
spirit of ‘city democracy’ yet imagined possibilities beyond these labor-focused efforts” (104). 
The novel, suggests Emerson, is innately radical, eschewing belief in national politics to embrace 
localized political possibilities, all while recognizing the innate rot in social structures. 
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“Shuffling the seduction plots to the background and discarding faith in nation scaled practices,” 
writes Emerson, “the latter numbers of The Quaker City spotlight a different set of bodies, 
particularly those of the dismembered and haunting variety.” Emerson explains, “these register a 
complaint against political power divested from material bodies in local spaces and rerouted to 
distant sites of national governance” (107). As is so frequently the case with Lippard scholarship, 
this analysis focuses upon Lippard’s political intentions. In this, the reading is deeply instructive. 
However, Lippard seems to have had more on his mind. He critiques not only a “divested” 
political system, but also an economic and philosophical system that privileges disembodied 
authorities and empowers those authorities to make utilitarian use of individuals as dehumanized 
things within a market-oriented universe. 
Many critics have claimed that Devil-Bug’s dream pulls back the curtain on Lippard’s 
own political beliefs (Reynolds xl). However, if the dream represents Lippard’s antislavery and 
even anti-capitalist politics, it does so in highly ambivalent fashion. Instead, the dream is a vision 
of Atlantic—particularly United States—society both produced and undermined by its own 
hypocritical claims to liberty.  It is not only a critique of the nation’s commitment to unfreedom, 
but rather a recognition that the nation would never have come into being at all without 
committing its original sin. Emerson argues that “the narrative betrays no evident concern with 
expansionist politics,” but Devil-Bug’s dream implicitly suggests otherwise (113). America is an 
unfree state, the spirit demonstrates for Devil-Bug. To imagine it as anything else is to imagine 
its obliteration. And so, the future that Devil-Bug prophecies can only ever be both productive 
and destructive, a terrifying harbinger of post-democratic dismantling of social norms, as well as 
a potential release from the grip of those same norms as forces of classed, raced, and gendered 
captivity, and as producers of slavery.  
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Devil-Bug can only imagine liberty brought about through the leveling powers of 
violence because the world he inhabits lives and breathes violence. The market runs on 
competitive violence and the apocalypse Devil-Bug envisions is the natural outcome of that 
system, a process by which he gains the ultimate advantage by destroying the system altogether. 
True to Lippard’s forward-looking, but ambivalent, anxious perspective, even the process by 
which false hierarchies fall does not guarantee the liberation of the souls captivated by 
capitalism’s imprisoning mechanics. Instead, the logic of mastery and hierarchy by which 
Atlantic capitalism instantiates itself, a logic that has been taken up as both a nationalist credo 
and a sacred gospel, may be so all-consuming and powerful that its collapse may only ensure that 
all shall alike experience perdition.  
The Economy as Black Mass 
Both the uncontrolled violence of even a circumscribed class rebellion and the 
recirculation of the dead throughout the economy bring readers to Ravoni’s church, where the 
abstraction and depersonalization of human beings for the sake of the market becomes 
horrifically literal. For example, when Ravoni revives the woman who has killed herself after 
Byrnewood’s seduction, she is not reborn as a class-liberated independent soul; rather, she 
becomes Ravoni’s undead servant. The raising of the dead here is presented not as a promise of 
future reward, but as a vision of a zombie apocalypse, explicitly reactivating tropes of white 
female captivity in this urban gothic milieu and with more apocalyptic significance (Lippard 
452). All might be reborn, the novel suggests, into this new universal society, brought together 
by trade and vice, but they will be reborn as captive subjects to their masters. Each individual is 
potentially the enslaved commodity of another market participant. The zombie, the revived 
woman, evacuated of her personhood and made into a mere commodity to be traded, possessed, 
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exchanged, is the vision of the future that Ravoni’s Atlantic cult promises. Such figures are the 
“willing slaves of his magnetic glance” and become valued commodities in a bank of power, sex, 
and wealth (527). 
The undead perform, in race-swapped fashion and as fantasy, what was a disturbing 
reality for so many black women throughout the Atlantic slave economy. Such women were 
treated as things to be traded and treated as if non-human. They were to be bought and sold, put 
to work, exposed to sexual exploitation, and discarded.li Baptist points out that even poetic 
descriptions of figures like the “Sable Venus,” who captivated the hearts of white writers and 
planters, implied, through obscuration, the marketplace of sex, violence, and labor that satisfied 
the lusts of white masters, and helped to reproduce the needs of the slave economy. He writes of 
a poem written by Jamaican planter, Bryan Edwards, in the 1790s, that a “depiction of the Sable 
Venus as a goddess who lures white men into sexual bondage is nonsense. The poem is about 
buying slaves. Edwards was not ruled…he could buy each of them. Or all. After purchase, 
taking, consuming, could replace longing” (236). Ravoni’s walking dead are the true 
embodiments of the white working-class’ nightmare: white bodies subjected to the same logic, 
made utterly subservient, despite their racial classification, and made to haunt Monk Hall as 
reminders of humanity denied. 
Their dehumanization also suggests the multivalent experiences of transactional 
equivalence in the novel. White can be exchanged for Black; freedom can be exchanged for 
slavery; the living can be exchanged for the dead; everything has a price and a commodified 
equivalent in the material and supernatural market of Monk Hall. These equivalent conversions, 
coupled with acts of commodification, help the market to reproduce itself. Individuals can be 
equated with things open to transaction, and identifying elements of race, nationality, even life 
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acquire a particular value that can be exchanged within the market. These transactions are the 
engine by which the economy of vice and commodified flesh achieves the velocity necessary to 
move forward and, the novel argues, to arrive at its prophesied apocalypse.  
Sex and sexual longing were always inextricable from mastery, transaction, 
commodification, and possession in the Atlantic marketplace. Ravoni’s church only amplifies the 
drama of commodification endemic to the Atlantic market’s many theaters of mastery and, 
particularly, of sexual exploitation. As Altschuler notes “enslavement, erased lineage, and threat 
of rape together suggest the conditions of black slavery” in the drama of Mabel who is first taken 
captive by Ravoni, then sold to Parson Pyne who intends to rape her and then sold again to Fitz-
Cowles (98). Thus, as is characteristic of so much of the novel, Lippard houses this troubling fact 
in the bodies of white women, creating an anxiety among his white readers that becomes more 
personal and direct, perhaps, than even their potential antislavery sentiments. This too responds 
to the presence of unfree bodies among ostensibly free Philadelphian society and commerce. 
Baptist writes “American religious reformers had begun to identify nonmarital sexuality as a 
major social problem, in part as a reaction to the way the increased mobility of young adults 
brought new temptations into their lives. Commercial quickening turned New York and other 
cities into hunting grounds for prostitutes looking for traveling businessmen, and vice versa” 
(237). Partially because of society’s elements of captivity and mastery, and partially because of 
its intense and hastening mobility, throughout the urban and plantation Atlantic, sex became a 
market unto itself. Lippard reframes this reality as a blasphemous supernatural event in order to 
underscore the broad threat that the market of flesh, whether free or unfree, posed to the 
morality, the soul, of the nation. 
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Byrnewood’s seduction experience likewise underscores the ways in which class and 
commodification entwine with hierarchies of sex, spirituality, and race in the novel, in 
Philadelphia, and in the nation. Lippard writes, “A poor girl, a servant, a domestic...these are fair 
game for the gentleman of fashionable society; upon the wrongs of such as these the fine lady 
looks with a light laugh and supercilious smile” (417). Byrnewood’s sister’s own seduction and 
ruin are treated as a tragedy elsewhere in the novel, yet this woman’s is treated as both her own 
fault and Byrnewood’s mild indiscretion. The difference is stark and presents a rather radical 
attack against the social double-standards that follow class and economic inequality. David S. 
Reynolds observes that "Capitalism, in Lippard's view, governs not only politics, justice, 
religion, and the press; it also controls the deepest aspects of human relations, most notably sex" 
(xxxvii). At the same time, Otter argues that the novel demonstrates the way that democratic 
potential is violated in Philadelphia (166). And so, the spiritual potential of the city and of the 
nation are both violated through engagement with debased and debasing forms of forced 
transactional sexuality. Any reading of the nature of capital or democracy in the novel must also 
contend with the full scope of Lippard’s critiques: politics, economics, liberty ideology, class, 
and sex are all implicated in the nation’s moral future. 
Lippard’s critiques of the sexual exploitation taking place within labyrinths of power 
such as Philadelphia expand beyond the local or even the national. The sexual exploitation of 
women, for example, was central to the reproduction of the Atlantic slave economy. Baptist for 
instance, graphically notes the way that masters seeded and reproduced crops, people, and people 
as crops, throughout the slave system. He writes, “The white entrepreneur will risk many things, 
but not the chance that this hybrid kernel’s own seed will fail to run true and leave his production 
anemic in a year of high prices.” And so the planter “fucks his wife…fucks the sixteen-year-old 
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light-skinned girl from Maryland, also bought with last year’s crop,” and, through violence 
“fucks the men too” (215-7). These readings are indisputable, as well as bluntly shocking, 
frankly confronting readers with the realities of sex as a form of violence and as a tool by which 
to exert authority. However, to fully understand how and why sexual capitalism gains so much 
power, readers must see it as Lippard does, as part of a debased moral and spiritual ethos that has 
come to define the economic and religious culture of the nation and of the Atlantic of which it is 
part.  
As the novel’s various seduction plots remind readers, bodies and the desire surrounding 
the use of bodies was an essential element of the Atlantic economy and of its dependent 
societies. Baptist, for instance, writes, “Slavery permitted unchecked dominance and promised 
unlimited fulfillment of unrestrained desire. That made the behavior of entrepreneurs particularly 
volatile, risky, profitable, and disastrous. Then, in the 1830s, as white people, especially men, 
tried to build southwestern empires out of credit and enslaved human beings, they sought out 
more and more risk. This behavior planted the seeds for a cycle of boom and bust” (234). As the 
novel establishes the competitive game of sexual exploitation played by Lorrimer and 
Byrnewood, or when it later turns to the supernatural harem overseen by the decadent priest, 
Ravoni, it underscores the way that passion created an economic market to be fulfilled and to the 
fact that bodies provided the sources of fulfillment. In this way, the possession of people—
especially women—is a simple matter of supply and demand economics. Nevertheless, it is also 
a matter of spiritual values, a question of the essential nature of human beings. Are they mere 
things or are they individuals with souls and minds? The text argues that the Atlantic economy, 
and its basis in a system of human captivity and transaction, presents only one logical conclusion 
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to the question. Individuals can only fight, and often fail, to resist the pressure to be 
commodified. 
Sex, like politics or land accumulation, is part of the competitive nature of avaricious 
capitalism, as well as a vehicle for the transmission of vice. Thus, the body, the soul, and the 
pocketbook are all equally presented as conflated sites of moral and economic struggle. Nancy 
Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse note that the women caught up in these transactional 
games "begin as wordless objects in an exchange among men, but...evolve into bodiless subjects 
of writing. In so doing, they distinguish an earlier, apparently more primitive aristocratic culture 
from one in which every literate individual matters” (25). Just so, the women in this novel are 
both the commodities over which men vie and the embodiments of a system that uses debt, 
contract, and duplicity to commodify and victimize all of its captive subjects. They are both 
embodied commodities and disembodied signifiers of value and wealth. However, Armstrong 
and Tennenhouse do not address Lippard’s use of conflated material and supernatural logics 
within the Atlantic economy and culture to sustain this dual state of objectification and 
abstraction. This is crucial: in The Quaker City, individuals’ bodies may be for sale, but their 
souls are part of the bargain as well. 
Ravoni’s enchanted harem literalizes the mutual coinstantiation of bodily captivity, 
personal commodification, and spiritual possession. The captivity of Ravoni’s victim’s is total. 
He possesses their bodies, minds, and souls, all at once. If this were not unsettling enough, 
Ravoni’s power to capture and kill wayward businessmen, as well as his evident mastery over 
Devil-Bug, suggest the way in which this sort that supernatural captive experience can cross 
lines of class, race, and gender. Because society is established upon a foundation of literal 
commodification and control, it has the potential to extend the logic of dehumanization, violence, 
   Green 462 
 
and transaction beyond the confines of race-based chattel slavery. It is this anxiety that Lippard 
exploits when he shows society transforming into a diabolical and universal economy of 
supernatural possession. 
The ritualism of Ravoni’s acts of mastery also underscores the importance of occlusion to 
the function of the economic and spirit worlds of the providential capitalist economy. Providence 
and the market both function in ways that remain hidden or indecipherable to the individuals 
they affect. In the church of providential capitalism knowledge is a valuable and limited resource 
and knowledge of the market of God only ever offers flickering glimpses of the divine market’s 
motivations and ends. Stephen Greenblatt notes the way that these forms of mastery are 
instantiated through contract language that one party necessarily cannot understand and, 
therefore, cannot answer to. If they cannot answer, he argues, then they abdicate their right to 
dispute (60). Greenblatt writes only of the colonial encounter experience, but Lippard’s novel 
invites readers to see the way that the inscrutability of economy, religion, and economy wedded 
to religion also perform similar feats of control in the post-revolutionary Atlantic society. 
Ravoni’s church offers a similar experience to that of Greenblatt’s colonizers and colonized. In 
fact, readers might keep Greenblatt’s colonialist critique in mind as they consider Lippard’s 
contention that society was always, from the first moments of Atlantic encounter, through its 
republican revolutions, and toward its market-driven future, premised upon rituals of mastery 
designed to entrap without ever being fully understood. Ravoni’s supernatural possessions are 
the colonialist acts of capture and command being carried out throughout the Atlantic world. 
Seen through this lens, readers can reconcile the contradictions of Ravoni’s church, to 
understand how it can appear humanistic even as it thrives on dehumanizing control, or how it 
can promise paradise while exercising bloody violence. 
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Ravoni’s universal church is, at least in part, a simulacrum of the urge that energizes the 
nation and the broader Atlantic society to conquer, dehumanize, command, and claim possession 
of the bodies, minds, and souls of colonized persons, by way of essentially cloaking its intentions 
to do so in ritualistic language, including the ritualistic language of humanism or liberty. As 
Emerson notes, “In spite of the emancipatory rhetoric…Ravoni is more demagogic than 
democratic, his magnetized followers described as fanatics who blindly follow his bidding” 
(130). In fact, the “emancipatory rhetoric” might also be read as a failure of the nation’s 
liberationist impulses to carry through on its promises. Ravoni, for example, invokes “slave” as a 
term of scorn to indicate and perhaps to instantiate his magical mastery over Devil-Bug, 
highlighting the master’s power to announce and to enforce his own power and liberty by 
assigning unfreedom to his subjects and, particularly, to raced and classed others (400). 
The indecipherability of this system obviously generates philosophical puzzles for the 
individuals caught up in it. Struggling to comprehend the deliberately incomprehensible nature 
of this world, Gus Lorrimer transforms his own doubts into a tense meditation upon the 
instability of life. He wonders “Life? What is it? As brilliant and as brief as a champagne bubble! 
To day a jolly carouse in an oyster cellar, to-morrow a nice little pic nic party in a grave-yard. 
One moment you gather the apple, the next it is ashes. Every thing fleeting and nothing stable, 
every thing shifting and changing, and nothing substantial!” (Lippard 24). The intentional 
indecipherability of the market has come to define reality itself. It is not meant to be understood, 
and so it presents instability to the observer and to the market participant. This indecipherability 
is so powerful that it bleeds from the market to overtake the processes of nature, reality, and, one 
might argue, the text as well. 
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Time, for example, seems both elastic and highly controlled in the novel. The first 
passages of The Quaker City establish a prophetic temporal endpoint, but time appears to stretch 
and bend. Within Monk Hall, moments last indefinitely, days pass in moments, and Devil-Bug’s 
dream takes him far into America’s post-democratic future. All of this results from Lippard’s 
contention that the nation is not a stable community but a porous anti-community, a hall in which 
the only relations are dishonest ones, and the only connections part of larger games of debt, 
mastery, and possession. Such a system warps reality itself, in order to produce the outcomes 
desired by the ordering providential intelligence that orchestrates events. This makes personal, 
social, national, philosophical, and even narrative structures difficult to discern for the characters 
in and the readers of the novel, even if it does not make providential economic operations at all 
random. To live through them is to experience confusion, but these operations suggest an 
underlying authority working through the market, an authority with such power as to transcend 
rational boundaries and to produce supernatural experiences.  
The Fortune-teller who appears in the earliest sections of the novel similarly draws 
attention to the hidden orchestration of events in the world of Monk Hall.  Heretofore friends, 
Byrnewood and Lorrimer, seek one out in order to know their own fortunes, as much out of fun 
as out of a real desire to gain an upper hand in the economy and in their games of seduction and 
abuse. The fortune-teller informs them that, “This little room has seem them all within its walls, 
begging from the humble man some knowledge of the future!” (27) She goes on to predict “I tell 
ye, by the Living God who writes his will, in letters of fire on the wide scroll of the firmament, 
that in the hand of the dim Future is a Goblet steeped in the bitterness of death, and that the 
goblet one or the other must drink, within three little days!” (30). Early on, Lorrimer believes he 
has bested his friend, insisting, “‘you will at least admit, that I have won the wager—’…as he 
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fixed his gaze upon the death-like countenance of Byrnewood Arlington” (99). Prophecy, in this 
case, is a game of competitive advantage, not unlike the capitalist world the characters inhabit. 
However, like all things in the market, prophecy can offer glimpses of providential arrangement, 
but resists full communication. Events in the world mirror the logic of the market: they are both 
legible to those with special and advantageous knowledge, and difficult to discern by the 
ordinary participant in the economy. When the prophecy does finally arrive, it is actually 
Lorrimer who dies, not Byrnewood (567). This ironically comes after Lorrimer uses the occasion 
of his seemingly successful destruction of Byrnewood to comment upon the sadistic but remote 
modes of influence inculcated by the market interactions of their society. He notes, “I employ 
neither force, nor threats, nor fraud, nor violence! My victim is the instrument of her own ruin 
without one rude grasp from my hand, without one threatening word, she swims willingly to my 
arms!" (127). Far from refuting the power of prophecy in the text, the reversal reveals the 
ineluctability of predestined events, alongside the individual’s meagre abilities to read or predict 
such events for his own gain. Humans may, for a time, think they’ve mastered a system that was 
set into motion before their arrival or think they’ve discerned their own elect security, but they 
will, in the end, fall before the system’s own needs and relentless demands. Nothing, it seems, is 
more powerful or more confounding than providence and its marketplace. 
The indecipherable market is not the only manifestation of the supernatural or explicitly 
Christian-oriented elements of the Atlantic economy to be found in the novel. Far from it. For 
example, Devil-Bug’s jokes imbricate commodity fetishism and grace in the same value system. 
“There is one thing cheap—very cheap” says the Reverend Dr. Pyne at one point in the novel. 
“And that’s mackerel!” responds widow Smolby. Pyne answers, “No, sister, you mistake me. I 
meant grace, sister, grace. And talking of grace, sister, if you have any small sum about you, 
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which you would like to invest in a Heavenly Bank, here is an opportunity which should not be 
slighted” (203). This is, in the world of the novel, one of only two ways to imagine the 
supernatural sphere: as either a market—such as Ravoni’s—or as a bank. Taken together, 
Lippard presents a spiritual culture in which providence acts in secret according to the logic of 
market transaction, and grace is a commodity to be acquired, stored up, or spent.  
The novel also reinforces its depiction of providence as a force that intervenes in the 
world, but that remains indecipherable or unpredictable to the individuals who live in the world, 
when it engages with a jeremiadic interpretation of social sin creating fearful spiritual, economic, 
and personal peril. Lorrimer, planning to seduce Byrnewood’s sister and murder Byrnewood by 
dropping him through a trap-door, muses, “Why man, death surrounds you in a thousand forms 
and you know it not. You may walk on Death, you may breathe it, you may drink it, you may 
draw it to you with a fingers-touch, and yet be as unconscious of its presence, as a blind man is 
of a shadow in the night” (103). Devil-Bug, in his customary role as both dark jester and sharp-
eyed critic, uses the common language of “falling” to describe the fates of Byrnewood and his 
sister. He says to himself, “The brother fell in that ‘are room, and the sister fell in that; about the 
same time. They fell in different ways though. Strange world, this” (123).  This event, which 
Devil-Bug describes as a “bargain,” unites the concepts of the fallen state—the society of Monk 
Hall is, undoubtedly, a fallen one—with that of the fallen woman, and channels both events 
through the fall of a heretofore sinful man, Byrnewood (123). Byrnewood’s fall suggests a 
metaphor that should be read as, at once, social and spiritual. Otter attends to the social 
dimensions of this fall when he writes, “a slight gesture or the weight of a heel might result in 
catastrophe” (176). Otter, however, does not address the, perhaps, more obviously evocative 
nature of Byrnewood’s fall: social and economic falls can also implement or might, in keeping 
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with providential theology, constitute evidence of un-election, damnation. All of this is backed 
and initiated by Devil-Bug and Lorrimer’s financial pact. So, the economy is the vehicle for 
damnation and, eventually, for Byrnewood’s salvific election. It is a system of rising and falling, 
debt and credit, vice and virtue, all existing alike in balance on the moral and economic ledger 
sheet that Devil-Bug keeps and maintains. 
In this sense, Devil-Bug, of all people, is the novel’s demonic god, the intelligence 
operating the gears of the economic and literal machinery of the moral system that is Monk Hall.  
At one point he insists, “Hur-ray for Monk Hall, say I! It’s the body, I’m its soul!” (299). If 
Monk Hall is a synecdochic stand-in for the economy at large, then Devil-Bug too is a stand in 
for the economy’s motivating intelligence. Yet, like whatever providential intellect governs the 
market, he keeps his own methods and goals hidden, and always seems to fill the stores of his 
own personal bank, whether his clients do or not. Indeed, Altschuler reads the pit at the bottom 
of the fall “not merely as a Gothic device and repository of dead bodies, but, quite literally, as 
the location of Devil-Bug’s repressed memories” with which the character eventually reckons 
(92). In this way, Monk Hall projects Devil-Bug’s increasingly complex psychology even as he 
embodies his society’s increasingly debased spiritual culture. The successful figure in this 
society of captivity and control is not the master or the boss who acts in the open, but the 
secretive subject who seems to be doing the bidding of others, but only to achieve his own ends. 
Devil-Bug is hardly the novel’s hero, but he is its central organizing figure and the person who 
navigates Monk Hall’s economic and architectural corridors with greatest ease and comfort. He 
is, in Lippard’s view, the man for the modern moment.  
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Zombies and Bugs: Hybridity and the Prototypical Atlantic Figure 
Devil-Bug, along with his underlings, Mosquito, and Glow-Worm, all also embody the 
dehumanization that follows their subject status, although whether that dehumanization is 
liberating or destructive remains to be seen. Their very names speak to their non-human aspects. 
Because they are made to serve, they lose their humanity. David S. Reynolds notes that “The 
cumulative effect of Lippard’s posthuman images is to summon up a materialist world in which 
people, animals, and things are put on the same level” (51). He also observes that “Animal 
comparisons in the novel are often made in a posthuman spirit of stripping humans of 
anthropocentric specialness” (54). This logic applies as well to the men who do business in 
Monk Hall, who lose their humanity, their particularity, and their identities, as they exchange 
their freedom for wealth. Devil-Bug makes these dehumanizing practices explicit as his constant 
exposure to Monk Hall’s debasing practices seems literally or at least textually to deny his 
humanity. 
And yet, his dehumanization seems to complete the process by which he comes to 
embody the market itself, in all its sharkishness, its secrecy, and its disruptive Atlantic hybridity. 
Devil-Bug is written as a physically hybridized figure, composed of features that suggest 
the racial, cultural, and even physical syntheses that the Atlantic market inculcates. Lippard 
describes him as “a strange thickset specimen of flesh and blood, with a short body, marked by 
immensely broad shoulders, long arms, and thin distorted legs. The head of the creature was 
ludicrously large in proportion to the body. Long masses of stiff black hair fell tangled and 
matted over a forehead, protuberant to deformity” (51). According to this description, Devil-Bug 
is less man than “creature,” an animal with ape-like features that express his inner 
dehumanization. Lippard takes this description further, calling into question Devil-Bug’s status 
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as a white man or as a man at all. He describes his “flat nose with wide nostrils shooting out into 
each cheek like the smaller wings of an insect, an immense mouth whose heavy lips disclosed 
two long rows of bristling teeth, a pointed chin, blackened by a heavy beard, and massive 
eyebrows meeting over the nose” (51). Only a few moments later, Lippard will describe 
Mosquito and Glow-Worm in similar terms with faces “marked by a hideous flat nose, a 
receding forehead, and a wide mouth with immense lips…two rows of teeth protruding like the 
tusks of a wild boar…a sharp pointed chin” (52). Nevertheless, it is this very hybrid status that 
allows Devil-Bug to navigate Monk Hall so effectively. Devil-Bug is both servant to all and 
servant to none, a liminal figure on the outskirts of a white-supremacist society who embodies 
white business culture’s mastery and submission all at once. He is in a constant state of 
conversion, never settling into any mold, racial, human, or otherwise. Devil-Bug is an 
embodiment of all of the Atlantic system’s most unsettling traits, the Hegelian struggle for 
mastery incarnate, the racial hybridity and interrelation made flesh, the mobile individual who 
appears to have come from nowhere and to appear everywhere. 
Devil-Bug’s hybridity thus speaks to the racially and culturally mixed nature of Lippard’s 
metropolis, which is also presented as both a source of anxiety for characters and readers wedded 
to the Atlantic’s hierarchies of race and class, and as a potential escape from the restrictive limits 
of those hierarchies. Chad Luck addresses this last point when he writes, “We might just as 
easily conclude that Lippard’s Urban Gothic form…reflects and refracts the same overarching 
anxieties about proximity and heterogeneity that animate the narratives themselves. That is, 
Lippard’s narrative juxtapositions, his shifts of tone and perspective and his omnivorous 
intertextuality all enact in formal terms the proximity and heterogeneity of city life” (133-4). 
Even if the nation remains committed to divisions between and hierarchies of gender, class, and 
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race, the providential divine, the spirit operating the gears of the economy and the society within 
the walls of the community instantiates a hybrid society when it binds cultures together through 
capital exchange. Devil-Bug is a kind of vanguard for this experience, and one that is open to 
interpretation. His hybrid status suggests the connective nature of Atlantic society, and points 
towards its increasingly interconnected future. Just as Devil-Bug’s dream suggests both the 
collapse of limiting hierarchies and the destruction of the Republic as a whole, the hybrid figure 
represents both a source of classed and racial fear and a promise that the borders of class and 
race might prove open to dismantling.  
Dehumanization in the novel is, therefore, a double-edged sword, an operation of control 
that suggests the overwhelming power of the Atlantic society organized around codes of mastery, 
as well as a haunting reminder of the human beings caught up in the Atlantic’s commodifying 
trap. Walter Johnson points out the vexing logical puzzle of dehumanization when he writes, 
"historians have generally concluded that the writings of [slavery's defenders] 'dehumanize' 
African-American slaves. This formulation has the virtue of signaling their repudiation of [these] 
views, and of reasserting a normative account of humanity as the standard of historical ethics: 
these are not the sort of things that human beings should be allowed to say about one another.” 
He observes that “a troubling problem remains...countless...slaveholders and racists in the history 
of the world were fully able to do what they did and say what they did, even as they believed and 
argued that their victims were human" (207). This is an important point, and one that, perhaps, 
helps to explain Devil-Bug's hybrid status. He is both subhuman and fully human—subhuman 
because lack of humanity is the only possible excuse for his treatment as a slave, his exclusion 
from normal social relations, and his instrumental status within an economy of moral 
decrepitude, but human because he is a stark reminder that the violence and moral degeneracy of 
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Monk Hall, or of Philadelphia, or of the United States, or, indeed, of the entire Atlantic cultural 
economy impacted and implicated not things but people. In this light, his narrative arc makes 
more sense. He can be seen as a villain by those who wish to see him as such, but he performs 
heroic, or at least semi-heroic actions as the text goes on. He is the humanity denied by slavery 
and the humanity that haunts slavery, all at once.  
Lippard emphasizes the fearful aspects of this hybridity not because he fears interracial or 
inter-class sociality, but because he knows that it represents a threat to the racist, classist, 
geographical and constricting codes upon which his society has structured its own national 
identity. In fact, Devil-Bug’s shifting hybridity also underscore society’s market-modeled, but 
uneasy balance of seemingly opposed social elements and signifiers.  Altschuler argues that “the 
media history of The Quaker City is inextricable from its history of race” and that transforming 
the “once-black Devil Bug into his protagonist” required Lippard to move away from a text 
modeled upon journalistic generic conventions to one that was less realistic but more focused on 
hybridization and ambiguity. Indeed, Altschuler explains that Devil-Bug’s visage and language 
also evolve and take on more complexity as his inner-life becomes more multi-dimensional (80). 
She goes on to note that Devil-Bug’s racial signs transform as the text’s antislavery themes 
become more pronounced (97). Nevertheless, his hybridity remains. As a result, if the text is read 
as a whole, the reader is confronted with hybridity that becomes a sign of humanity just as potent 
as it is a sign of sub-humanity. 
Nor is this hybrid signification ever fully resolved. As Altschuler herself notes, “Fitz-
Cowles assumes the narrative weight of Devil-Bug’s moral and physical blackness, when the 
final installment reveals him to be not only dark-skinned but more importantly a tool in the 
popish plot of his father, “a Mexican Prince!” (100). It is true that Devil-Bug evolves throughout 
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the text, becoming more complex as well as more central to the plot. However, just as 
representations of race and media were always central pillars of the serialized text, so too was the 
concept of hybridization, admixture, and contamination. A reading of the text as a moral and 
philosophical critique as much as a political broadside will reveal that moral ambivalence, a 
hybrid morality composed of both vice and virtue in exchangeable balance within a market-
oriented social space was always the narrative’s central preoccupation. 
Class and racial instability also gestures toward the social heterogeneity that the Atlantic 
market’s flux produces, and demonstrates the dual allure and anxiety produced by geographical, 
and ideological links that unite cultures throughout the Atlantic. The racially ambivalent figures 
that reside within and around Monk Hall embody, for instance, the self-colonization that Jennifer 
Rae Greeson identifies in narratives set in the American South (250). Here, the Southern gothic 
other is literally internalized. The other is within, both threatening and instrumental to the 
workings of society. The geographical, ideological, racial, or hierarchical other is apart from and 
a part of the social and economic interactions of the nation, carrying out and orchestrating events 
in occult fashion.  
As the text lifts the veil on the secret and often hybridized operators within the market, it 
also reemphasizes the performative aspects of both racial and class identification in the nation. If 
Lippard implies that figures like Devil-Bug hold the keys to operations within the American 
sector of the Atlantic economy and culture, then he also exposes raced, classed, and even 
gendered presentations of mastery to accusations of a kind of hollow insecurity. Along similar 
lines, Eric Lott argues that the racial performances of the minstrel stage were deeply ambivalent 
expressions of both desire and revulsion, sites of repression and recognition of the cultural other, 
bringing the African American culture into an American mainstream, even through mockery, that 
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were also central to American class formation throughout the 19th century. Lott writes, “On the 
one side there is a disdain for ‘mass’-cultural domination, the incorporation of black culture 
fashioned to racist uses; on the other a celebration of an authentic people’s culture, the 
dissemination of black arts with potentially liberating results” (17). Devil-Bug comes from an 
earlier gothic tradition, yet he, in essence, performs minstrelsy in order to simultaneously engage 
in class formation and to subvert class and race hierarchies. Lippard presents him as a racist 
caricature in order to exercise a latent desire to shatter the codes of racial distinction. However, 
such an exchange has a high price: Devil-Bug must become an utterly debased, scarcely human 
figure, must sink ever further into depravity, to find his own sources of autonomy and to 
purchase his daughter’s upward mobility. If the white middle class is premised upon its 
ostensible status above the laboring unfree classes, Devil-Bug’s descent into dehumanization 
insists that positions of mastery are negotiated and tenuous. They are not innately guaranteed and 
must be purchased. Devil-Bug essentially turns himself into the figure that must be reduced and 
made captive in order for another to rise above wage-slavery.  
If the text is interested in interrogating racial performance and hybridity, then its 
presentation of masculinity and femininity should also come under scrutiny as both racial and 
class-oriented performances.  Lott, describing the gendered erotics of black-face minstrelsy notes 
that, “the construction of masculinity in a capitalist dynamic where power in the body substituted 
for power in the workplace was obviously only partly transgressive...Cohen has suggested that 
working-class men live their class subjection by dissociating themselves from the structural 
position of their labor and assuming ‘imaginary positions of mastery linked to masculine ‘pride 
of place’” (130). Lippard’s novel does contain elements of racial minstrelsy and burlesque—
particularly in the dialect spoken by Devil-Bug and his underlings, Mosquito, and Glow Worm. 
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However, more than this, it contains masculine figures striving for mastery and feminine figures 
attempting to escape commodification. That they frequently fail reveals the grim joke of the 
novel’s other burlesque. The men who use masculine performances of sex and camaraderie to 
insist upon their own mastery are really someone else’s captives or subordinates, and the women 
who resist seduction or maintain feminine innocence rarely escape debasement or even 
involvement in violence for long. The characters in this novel are destined for some form of 
captive unfree labor. Their attempts to assert mastery through performances of hierarchical 
identity—men over women, white over black bodies—are, therefore, performances only.  
Devil-Bug seems to understand the way that exchange logic makes him subject to 
indebtedness and unfreedom in a way that the other characters do not. And so, ironically, he 
approaches his subject status with clearer eyes. He attempts to rescue his daughter from Ravoni’s 
death cult and offers himself as a slave in exchange for the will and papers that can ensure her 
financial liberty. Ravoni counters by offering gold in exchange for the girl (458). When Devil-
Bug submits to indenture to pay for his daughter’s freedom, he acknowledges that the anxiety 
that produced minstrelsy has real valence: the white-supremacy that has permitted a white 
working-class to imagine itself as free is simply laughable in a text in which every character, at 
some point, must submit to another.  
An Escape from Monk Hall 
In the end, Devil-Bug’s self-destruction might offer the only form of transcendence 
available in the novel. Paul Gilroy notes that, while Hegel is right to place the master-slave 
relationship at the center of modernity, “he wrongly assumes the slaves acquiescence to bondage 
over death when, in fact, the slave experience forces us to consider the slaves’ preferences for 
death as freedom over any form of unfreedom” (63). Although not specifically figured as a black 
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racial subject, Devil-Bug’s self-orchestrated demise might suggest a similar kind of resistance 
displaced. He feels the grip of Monk Hall’s inescapable commodification and enslavement 
tightening around him, and, essentially, opts out, through a violent and haunted suicide. In fact, 
Reynolds argues that “Toward the end of the novel, Mosquito and Glow-worm accomplish a 
kind of metaphorical slave revolt, when Devil-Bug, arranging his own suicide, has them push the 
boulder that crushes him” (47). Similarly, Altschuler rightly announces Devil-Bug’s suicide as a 
moment in which he “lays himself open to his own demons and announces himself as the story’s 
main event” (93). Timothy Helwig explains the stakes of this undertaking when he writes, “In 
The Quaker City Lippard represents the virtues and hopes of the northern white and free black 
working-class through the racially ambivalent representation of black characters…the novel’s 
foremost voice of working-class protest belongs to the sardonically witty Devil-Bug” (105). 
Devil-Bug’s unresolved hybrid status and his suicidal escape allow him to function as a 
multivalent vehicle for protest: he clearly challenges the parameters of class in the text and in the 
city, and also potentially experiments with the limits of resistance to race logic. He even 
challenges the audience’s expectations of heroism and villainy, good and evil. His violence, his 
manipulation of other characters, and even the covert but ultimately victorious passing of his 
daughter into the white middle class are all different forms of race, class, and spiritual rebellion. 
Furthermore, Lippard also uses Devil-Bug to make room for the possibility of self-
destruction in exchange for another’s class-transformation. Mabel, Devil-Bug’s hidden daughter 
who covertly makes her way up the social and economic ladder, suggests the ways that a liminal 
figure might challenge rigid class structures. The corrupted priest, Parson Pyne, claims to have 
adopted the wealthy merchant, Livingstone’s, daughter—with the intention, evidently, to abuse 
her—in order to gain access to Livingstone’s fortune. However, she is, in fact, Devil-Bug’s 
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daughter. As a result, her inclusion into the business class by means of a will allows Devil-Bug’s 
legacy to achieve the anti-aristocratic and even potentially anti-racist social mobility before 
which the businessmen of the novel tremble. Devil-Bug gloats at the prospect of “Old Devil-
Bug’s daughter among the grandees o’ th’ Quaker City!” (556). The event allows the low-class 
Devil-Bug to covertly undermine rigid class structures, even as he enforces them elsewhere in 
order to control and to manipulate others. By means of violence and duplicity, Devil-Bug finds a 
way to succeed in the market, to become upwardly mobile, even if that mobility is displaced onto 
his daughter. Devil-Bug’s trick is, like most of the novel’s depictions of hierarchical ascension, 
linked to liberty achieved through elevating despotism. Here is a character actively, albeit 
secretly, attempting to ascend the ladder of class in his society. To do so, he will force others into 
submission or tear down the pillars of his society for his own gain. In this way, Lippard 
implicates the mythology of upward mobility within Atlantic capitalism’s deviousness and 
violence. Devil-Bug’s use of the mechanisms of violent control and his subversive infiltration of 
hierarchy is not merely an aspect of his singular characterization in the story. Rather it is a 
natural outgrowth of a society built upon the hypocrisy of freedom gained through slavery, and 
advancement achieved through trickery and violence.  
Mabel’s ascension therefore reinforces the market-oriented form of transcendence in the 
novel and invites readers to interrogate the theology of election premised upon economic 
success. Indeed, Devil-Bug’s discovery of his daughter’s survival and rise even pushes him to 
invoke a more benign divinity than has existed anywhere else in the text to that point. He 
exclaims “I do believe there is—a God—that’s a fact!” (243). Again, however, it is important to 
note that, if Devil-Bug is correct, than the divine has presented itself only through market 
functions and market-oriented supernatural interventions. God acts through dreams, prophecies, 
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and miracles—yes—but only for the sake of producing a particular market order and of 
repositioning individuals within that market and its economic ladder. God acts through the 
market and the hierarchies of the market reflect divine intention. 
Although death punishes Devil-Bug’s worst offenses, his sacrificial submission and 
demise, along with his strategic victory through Mabel over his society’s class boundaries, earn 
the reader’s conditional sympathy. He is certainly demonic, but he is also the figure through 
which Lippard most directly expresses his frustrations with society’s and with capital’s various 
hypocrisies and vices. In his introduction to The Quaker City, Reynolds observes that "Unlike 
the hypocrites in mainstream society, Devil-Bug does not wear a false face" (Quaker City xl). If 
this is so, then Devil-Bug’s amorality is partially excused in the text because of his 
commodification. Moreover, his unclear status as either the master of Monk Hall or the servile 
facilitator of the Monks’ misdeeds also allows him both to embody and to rebel against his 
society’s inhibiting structures. Discussing Margaret Garner in the context of Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved, Avery Gordon notes that “as a slave woman she was legally property or chattel and 
thus, according to the law, she could not be tried for murder because only a person could have 
committed such a crime” (160). The same might be said of Devil-Bug here. As a person, he 
commits murder and is punished with death. As a thing, he cannot commit murder, so he can sell 
himself in order to purchase his daughter’s class advancement. As a hybrid of person and 
commodity, he can arrange an ending that is both obliterative and transcendent.  
Conclusion 
The novel closes after a fittingly ambivalent moment, with a personal escape that only 
portends the ultimate inescapability of the market, and the inevitable victory of commodity logic 
in the nation and in the Atlantic. After his final defeat, all that is left of Lorrimer is a portrait—a 
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fetishized object overflowing with significance that haunts Byrnewood and makes the 
centerpiece of an altar (Lippard 574). Bess, redeemed from her role as Devil-Bug’s assistant, 
commands Mable, Devil-Bug’s secreted daughter, and Mary, rescued from Lorrimer, to observe 
the portrait that is all that remains of Mary’s erstwhile seducer. Bess orders the other women to 
“kneel, and thank your God that after the long night which has darkened your life, the day has 
dawned at last!” (352). In this moment, communion becomes a recognition of the power of the 
novel’s debauched transactions, Lorrimer’s purchase of Mary becomes a blessing, and 
Byrnewood’s violently transactional rescue of his sister makes Lorrimer into a debased idol—
fitting for a debased social, national, and spiritual world. At the same time, Lorrimer becomes a 
lifeless fetish object, while the women remain subordinate captives to his memory and to his 
influence. Emerson argues that “the revised focus from women’s bodies to more generalized 
bodies in parts” that occurs as the novel progresses, “indexes the consequences of the 
predominance of abstracted national politics divested from material bodies.” He continues, “The 
numerous spectral bodies register a desire to reanimate the more radicalized and contingent form 
of democracy that was embraced by everyday people in the revolutionary era.” In fact, Emerson 
argues, “the anxiety of white male patriarchy in the early numbers is rechanneled in the sequel 
into an alternative vision of materialized democracy that pushes back” (124). This is an 
intriguingly optimistic reading of the text, and it, in fact, helps to make sense of the potentially 
liberating obliteration of Devil-Bug in the novel’s final chapters. However, the anxiety that 
Emerson discusses never fully dissipates. In fact, if the characters achieve renewed materiality, 
they do so as Lorrimer does, reconstituted as fetish objects that remain locked within a universe 
of commodification. 
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In the end, Lorrimer offers a vision of providential capitalism at its most complete. He 
persists as evidence of a process, both sacred and ordinary, in which the logics of the market and 
the supernatural become one force of nature that uses commodified individuals to enlarge itself. 
Moreover, within this market-oriented universe, mobility and captivity have conspired to 
instantiate community, but at the price of numerous and often violent sacrifices. In fact, Bess, 
here a moral authority, will not live to reach the ultimate conclusion of the novel, becoming, 
instead, a sacrifice used to cleanse herself of her own prior sins. And so, even if some characters 
find their way toward a kind of personal liberty, all remain, to some degree, expendable 
commodities in the market. All of these processes are given the aegis of a sacred moment. For 
good or ill, the economic processes into which these characters have been and remain locked are 
the machinations of an interventionist divinity that acts through the market upon individuals who 
have only circumscribed power to resist or even to understand its whims and needs. 
This final insistence upon the inextricability of unfreedom from freedom is only 
appropriate, given that The Quaker City brings the anxieties of the Atlantic marketplace home to 
North American shores with particular emphasis upon the fears of the white working and 
business classes. These classes were, throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
engaged in work that either acquired their hierarchal position against the implicit subservience of 
a black underclass or that actively traded in enslaved bodies or commodities that had been 
cultivated by unfree men and women. Even in the absence of direct relations with the slaves and 
slave economies of the Atlantic, the business practices narrated in the novel produce anxieties 
about the tenuousness and reversibility of freedom.  
The rhetorical and ideological conflation of spiritual and economic value systems that 
Lippard here critiques strategically presented colonial society and national expansion as divine 
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ordinances. However, even as the logic of covenant and contract united spiritual, political, and 
capitalist directives, the societies founded upon that union were always less stable than they 
cared to admit. Meanwhile, the figures that such societies attempted to resign to the margins—
figures like Devil-Bug—were, in many ways, more representative of their Atlantic age than the 
pure white, Christian, colonialist polity that early American historians, politicians, and writers 
imagined. These were individuals who recognized that the logic of conversion was both spiritual 
and economic, and used this knowledge to position themselves within an Atlantic world that was 
polyglot, shifting, and perilous. Despite Devil-Bug’s apocalyptic dream, his daughter’s ascension 
offers a slim measure of hope that capitalist mobility might allow the progeny of a hybrid figure 
to ascend. Yet that hope is deeply ironic. Devil-Bug’s family’s victorious smuggled ascent only 
comes with the promise of Atlantic society’s ultimate destruction. 
With all of that in mind, Lippard insists that the logic upon which the edifice of 
providential capitalist trade and culture was erected deserved the apocalypse that Devil-Bug sees 
coming. The conversions of identity, the acts of commodification, the procedures of mobility, 
and the directives to capitalist expansion that mark the business and social life of Atlantic 
cultures all achieve monumental power when granted the auspices of a universal spiritual culture.  
They also become inescapable, and the disturbing implications of their logic become frightful 
potential outcomes for any and all individuals who must interact with the Atlantic market of 
souls and commodities. The nationalist and providential capitalist society that readers encounter 
in The Quaker City is defined by its imposition of occult intelligence, mobility, and exchange in 
the Atlantic, but there is no guarantee that these are forces for good. In fact, the novel suggests, 
the reality of the Atlantic providential capitalist market may be, at best, amoral and, at worst, 
immoral, dehumanizing, and evil. 
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The fears of dehumanized labor that Lippard narrates will persist and proliferate as the 
Jacksonian period moves into the antebellum, postbellum, and globalized future. Even 
generations later, while discussing zombies in Haiti in the 1930’s, Zora Neale Hurston would, 
like Lippard, remark upon the prevalence of such fears and would discuss the ways in which the 
process of zombification turns an educated intelligent person into an unthinking beast of burden 
(Hurston 181).lii What she describes is the anxiety of captive labor transformed into religious 
theology. What she describes is the future that Devil-Bug glimpsed made real.  
The globalized future will bring even more economic uncertainty, even more racial 
anxiety, even more disruptive attacks against the sanctity of the body and the spirit as the market 
grows ever more powerful and all-consuming. Thus, Lippard proves a kind of herald for a broad 
Atlantic fear over the personal effects of supernatural providential capitalism. He demonstrates 
the way that processes of transformation, sacrifice, and captivity will continue to persist, even as 
nations and cities become more established. He reveals, in fact, that the processes of Atlantic 
displacement and admixture, the experiences of mastery and submission, and especially the 
realities of personal and social commodification remain active, even as Atlantic communities 
attempt to occlude their heterogeneity and embrace a hegemonic myth of a national future. 
The future that Lippard predicts reveals the anxiety hidden in projects and narratives of 
providential Atlantic cultural expansion. Over the altar of Atlantic commerce, providential 
spirituality and capitalist exchange met and married. As they did, they brought humans into the 
universal church of a divine market and revealed the mind of God to humanity through economic 
transactions. But God was manipulative. God demanded sacrifice. God was a ledger book of 
profit and loss and the hand that recorded the balance. In the Atlantic market, providence and 
capital clasped one another in the bond that forged modernity, and individuals and communities 
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were left to navigate the treacherous waters produced by their union. Lippard suggests that 
perhaps the only way to escape this seemingly inescapable grasp would be to destroy the 
providential capitalist Atlantic system altogether. That the subjects of his concern persist long 
after the publication of his novel admits that providential capitalism successfully foreclosed other 
social possibilities. Providential capitalism would, as time and history wore on, prove more 
formidable than even Lippard imagined. The engine that drove revolutionary, post-revolutionary, 
and even early nineteenth-century Atlantic cultural development would also prove the engine, 
the mind, the ghostly hand to arrange and to conduct the future. 
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Providential capitalism, the marriage of a guiding divine will to capitalist commerce that 
empowered, connected, and defined Atlantic societies throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, was, at once, productive and destructive, ennobling and humiliating, expansive and 
limiting, transcendent and dehumanizing. It was, at best, unsteady waters over which to connect 
the philosophical, ideological, political, and economic edifices of Atlantic cultures. It was a 
similarly perilous environment in which to establish national polities, or spiritual or local 
communities. Nevertheless, during the Atlantic’s revolutionary period, and from the late 
eighteenth and into the early nineteenth centuries, societies attempted to assert fixed national 
identities, to embrace national inheritances, or to pursue expansive futures through Atlantic 
providential capitalist philosophy. They used it to justify hegemony, to codify social hierarchies, 
and to reproduce a specific form of capitalism premised upon a form of economic election. Even 
so, the people who lived in the societies linked through Atlantic trade and exchange remained 
ever at risk of being washed away by the same Atlantic currents that brought those societies into 
being. The national home, the cities and capitols that writers, politicians, and citizens 
increasingly attempted to grasp, remained elusive, ever-shifting, and precarious. By midcentury, 
for example, the antebellum period and the Civil War would reveal the fissures that lay at the 
heart of the supposedly unified national identity that the United States asserted during its 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods. The signs of instability were always there for those 
who cared to look. Assertions of Yankee settlement and inheritance were always arguments for a 
specific economic ideology rooted in a concept of imbricated value and success as election. The 
metropolitan home was always really just a part of the Atlantic’s centerless periphery, and the 
national identity was always marked more by a latent hybridity and mobility than by racial, 
national, spiritual, or economic stability.  
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If Charles Brockden Brown’s Arthur Mervyn, Or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 taught 
readers anything, it was to remain suspicious of the national character, even at the moment of the 
nation’s birth, and to maintain ambivalence about America’s political, economic, and spiritual 
future. George Lippard’s 1845 novel, The Quaker City, or the Monks of Monk Hall, demonstrates 
where that uncertainty would lead. Shelley Streeby notes that "If Lippard rejected New England 
Puritanism as the source of an American self, neither did he embrace a middle-class identity. In 
fact, he was quite hostile to the very idea" (447). Streeby’s reading is valuable, but Lippard’s 
hostility was not only directed toward middle-class American identity. It builds upon anxieties 
glimpsed in texts like Brockden Brown’s to attack the value system upon which the Jacksonian 
middle-class was erected—a system that conflated capitalism and moral virtue, but that was 
actually debased, and made decadent by the grim logic of capitalism as a spiritual philosophy, 
and of spirituality and nationalism as capitalist projects. This was a value system developed 
along Atlantic trade routes and brought back to the Atlantic’s urban ports and national centers as 
the Atlantic economy expanded and asserted its universal influence. Worse yet, Lippard argues, 
the nation, founded upon the essential fact of violent demonstrations of power, and enabled by 
the endless deceptions of market capitalist competition, was rooted in and defined by its worst 
sins. It was, therefore, destined not for improvement and perfection, but for harsh judgement and 
damnation. Lippard examines his providential capitalist present, sneers at its supposedly pious 
past, and looks ahead to its apocalyptic future.  
Both The Quaker City and Arthur Mervyn expose the anxieties of the white working and 
business classes in ways that illuminate the hierarchical ruptures that would announce a new turn 
in Atlantic history. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the arrangements of power and 
liberty that emerged after the revolutionary period and organized the expansion of early 
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nineteenth-century Atlantic societies could no longer contain the explosive tensions of racial, 
classed, and national division that operated as the dark mirror of national paeans to expansive 
providential capitalist liberty. The business relations, the spiritual articulations, even the 
ideologies of the liberal self established and cultivated through the strict maintenance of the 
borders of freedom and unfreedom, election and damnation could not hold. And so, societies 
throughout the Atlantic experienced another period of violent rupture and reorganization 
However, these tensions were always visible to those who cared to look. And so, these 
narratives revolve around the experience of captivity within a city that acted as a potent symbolic 
repository for the nation’s claims to liberty and advancement. Lippard, like Brockden Brown, 
subverts these claims. Despite the mobility that organizes the trade-oriented urban gothic 
societies that serve as the settings for each of these novels, individuals find themselves bound 
ever more tightly by debt commitments and manipulations. Eventually the literal dramas of 
captivity that motivate the plots of these novels allow the abstract experiences of debt captivity 
to become personalized and frightening experiences of possession, loss of agency and power, 
submission, and indenture. These texts thus underscore anxiety over the liberty to be found in a 
society that runs on captivity, domination, violence, and exploitation. This expressive 
disposition, at full bloom in these urban gothic texts, is the grimmest of all potential outcomes of 
the post-revolutionary period’s commitment to providential capitalism. 
Providential capitalism emerged from the post-revolutionary moment as one of a number 
of competing ways of seeing, and ways of producing, a modern and interconnected Atlantic 
world. Critics have long recognized these competing modes of understanding and maintaining 
political and social power. Hannah Arendt, for example, noted that “Locke discovered that labor 
is the source of all property…Adam Smith asserted that labor was the source of all wealth…in 
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Marx’s ‘system of labor’…labor became the source of all productivity and the expression of the 
very humanity of man” (Hannah Arendt 101).  Moreover, Arendt recognized the nonmaterial 
explanations such theorists offered for the production of economic and political expansion. She 
writes, “Just as Marx had to introduce a natural force, the ‘labor power’ of the body, to account 
for labor’s productivity and a progressing process of growing wealth, Locke, albeit less 
explicitly, had to trace property to a natural origin of appropriation in order to force open those 
stable, worldly boundaries that ‘enclose’ each person’s privately owned share of the world ‘from 
the common’” (111). Indeed, she recognizes the seemingly supernatural dimensions of these 
theories of social organization when she writes, “the Platonic god is but a symbol for the fact that 
real stories, in distinction from those we invent, have no author; as such, he is the true forerunner 
of Providence, the ‘invisible hand,’ Nature, the ‘world spirit,’ class interest, and the like, with 
which Christian and modern philosophers of history tried to solve the perplexing problem that 
although history owes its existence to men, it is still obviously not ‘made’ by them” (185). Her 
observations are astute. Providence and the invisible hand are but two names for the invisible 
forces acting in the marketplace. 
However, these are not simply abstract notions of how an economy evidently emerges 
from the disparate actions of self-interested parties. Rather, for so many individuals, social 
groups, and authors around the Atlantic, the invisible hand was a force to be taken literally: the 
guiding mechanism of an interventionist providential god. Arendt never pursues the full 
conflation of providential theology with capitalist ideology that took place in the post-
revolutionary Atlantic. Nor does she pursue either the material productions that arose from that 
conflation or the many narrative interrogations of that conflation that attest to the personal and 
social prerogatives and anxieties that persisted in its wake. 
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Politicians who conflated spiritual and economic value systems did so for selective and 
strategic reasons. Doing so presented colonial society and colonial expansion as divine 
ordinances, and allowed writers and politicians to make sense and productive use of the buffets 
of Atlantic history and trade. Providential capitalism, a true marriage of market-oriented 
capitalism to providential Christian value systems, thus proved both more productive and more 
durable than any distinct value system in the Atlantic. However, even as these thinkers used the 
logic of covenant and contract to unite spiritual and capitalist directives, the societies they 
attempted to demarcate were always less stable and more syncretic than they cared to admit. The 
figures that these social architects attempted to keep to the margins, figures from the real Venture 
Smith, to the fictional Devil-Bug, emerged in writing and revealed themselves as, in many ways, 
more representative of their Atlantic age than the pure white, Christian, colonialist polity that 
early nationalist historians, politicians, and writers imagined. These were individuals who 
recognized that the logic of conversion was both spiritual and economic, and used this 
knowledge to position themselves within an Atlantic world that was polyglot, shifting, and 
perilous.  
As a result, when writers like Benjamin Franklin used the twinned language of virtue and 
profit to plant and expand a nationalist identity, his words remained dogged by the heterogeneity 
he denied. Franklin’s ideal American—clever, self-sufficient, virtuous, and economically 
ascendant—resembled Franklin and the other American founders less than it did a figure like 
Olaudah Equiano. Equiano, who saw his status as a commodity as an opportunity to trade for 
freedom, who saw his economic subordination as a call to personal transcendence, who saw 
exchange as election, was the true figure of personal Atlantic identity.  
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Other similarly landless groups, represented by figures like Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, John 
Marrant, or Briton Hammon, used their mobility to create alternative communities at sea. Like 
Equiano they looked to the two most important facts of their life—their labor and their 
spirituality—to attempt to navigate the treacherous waters of freedom and unfreedom. That some 
succeeded and others failed reveals the reality that even Equiano sought to elide: the economy of 
commodities and souls was always designed according to the logic of the ledger book. Every 
gain was matched by a concomitant loss. Every upwardly mobile individual had a downwardly 
mobile counterpart, plummeting beneath the waves of Atlantic commerce or languishing on the 
outskirts of spiritual and economic election. 
As white writers, like Royall Tyler and Richard Henry Dana, observed their own 
positions in the Atlantic economy, they recognized this reality too. They recognized that the 
nationalist and racial supremacy proclaimed by national compacts or implied by writers like 
Franklin was a rickety ladder upon which to hope to climb. When they fell, they fell hard, and 
discovered the harsh realities of subjugation, abuse, and commodification that had always been 
present in Atlantic providential capitalist society. They found that anyone—Christian, “pagan,” 
white, black—was subject to mastery by someone else. They found too that the spiritual election 
promised by the most optimistic providential capitalist writers really meant ownership within the 
market. If they belonged at all, they belonged to the mass of suffering laborers so frequently 
rendered invisible by proclamations of grace, predestination, and transcendence. They found that 
their bodies and their souls had value in the marketplace, but only as much as could be traded at 
any time and for any thing. 
Writers like Poe and Melville also observed this fact and constructed confounding 
metaphorical dramas to match the confusion and disturbance that attended the reality of their 
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commodity status. People were things, they discovered, things to be traded, converted, 
consumed, and sacrificed at the altar of the market. In the destruction of the body or the soul, 
these writers discovered not that there was no God, but that God addressed the world with cold, 
even cruel calculation. As they observed their subjection in the market, these writers and their 
characters looked for signs that their souls had value and discovered, to their horror, that the 
answer was yes. Yes, human souls have value, just as meat and rum have value. In this world of 
Atlantic commerce, the communion and the sacrifice of the body was repeated again and again in 
profane concessions to the all-consuming power of the market itself. 
With all of that in mind, writers like Brockden Brown and Lippard insist that the logic 
upon which the edifice of providential capitalist trade and culture was erected would become 
something of a trap. The conversions of identity, the contracts, the performances of mobility, and 
the directives to capitalist expansion that mark the business and social life of Atlantic cultures all 
achieve monumental power when granted the auspices of a universal spiritual culture.  They also 
become inescapable, and the disturbing implications of their logic become frightful potential 
outcomes for any and all individuals who must interact with the Atlantic market of souls and 
commodities. If, by divine right, one individual may or must profit or rise, another may or must 
fall. Similarly, if conversion promises election, it can also threaten captive damnation. Finally, if 
the essential basis of social obligation and nationalist identification is the covenant-oriented 
contract, it may not be wholly clear whether an individual will profit from the contract or itself 
victimized by it. The nationalist and providential capitalist society that readers encounter in texts 
like Arthur Mervyn and The Quaker City is defined by its imposition of occult interventionist 
intelligence, mobility, and exchange in the Atlantic, but there is no guarantee that these are 
forces that work for the good of the individual. 
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These possibilities are critically important, because they represent the way one 
arrangement of power, one philosophical engine came to dominate thinking, politics, and 
strategies and approaches to expression in the post-revolutionary Atlantic. The marriage of a 
specifically providential mode of religious theology to a specifically exchange-oriented mode of 
capitalist ideology overpowered other potential arrangements of power and community. It 
erected the social and economic frames that defined race, class, gender, and community 
constructions, as well as dictated the course of individual human lives. At the same time, it 
offered individuals and communities the expressive means to understand their positions within 
an economic and philosophical culture that was emergent in the post-revolutionary period and 
that would only become more powerful in the future.  
Far more than any distinct political, expressive, theological, or literary force, providential 
capitalism generated the post-revolutionary self. Providential capitalism operated behind 
Benjamin Franklin’s plucky but socially embedded citizen. It offered Olaudah Equiano material 
rewards as well as the means by which to understand his place in society and in history. At the 
same time, it delimited the borders of community for scores of diasporic black Atlantic writers, 
as well as for maritime white writers. When writers like Herman Melville and Edgar Allan Poe 
examined the situation of the individual within society, they did so in the context of a society that 
was adamantly exchange-oriented and not only spiritually motivated but providentially inclined. 
When urban gothic writers considered the individual’s relationship to the larger Atlantic 
economy or interrogated the future that that relationship might generate, they interrogated the 
often sinister implications of providence and capital acting in tandem upon the individual.  
At the same time, this philosophy was the key driver in the production of post-
revolutionary Atlantic culture. Just as it situated the individual and allowed the individual to 
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examine and, perhaps, to comprehend its position in an Atlantic society, it allowed local, 
colonial, and national polities to arise, to expand, and to assert identities in and around the 
Atlantic. Hegemonic expansion, nationalism, social hierarchies, even colonial experiments were 
all premised upon the logic of a divinely ordered marketplace and of a market-oriented divine 
will. Post-revolutionary society simply would not have taken the form that it did without the 
simultaneously generative and constraining logic of providential capitalism.  
Modern readers must recall that these ideas emerged from a moment of profound 
instability. The post-revolutionary moment both upended and codified political and social 
organizations. It both revealed the assumptions upon which prior social arrangements were 
premised and set the stage for future social structures. The colonial age gave way to the 
revolutionary period, and the age of nationalism and then of global hegemony emerged from the 
post-revolutionary era. As Enlightenment thinkers competed over political philosophy, Atlantic 
societies promoted and were sustained by an economy that they argued was divinely ordered and 
directed. At the same time, theologians reckoned with a definition of providential divinity that 
was economically active. This was more than capitalism. It was capitalism enmeshed with and 
directed by a providential hand. Autobiographies and fictions return humanism to this 
experience. They show modern readers the personal, local, and social experiences of life lived in 
a society structured by this ideological-theological marriage. 
And so, providential capitalism also underwrote the evolution of Atlantic expressive 
genres, as well as the material links of literary cultures in the Atlantic. The autobiographical self 
came into existence in the context of an economic and divinely instructed cosmology of 
meaning. The market offered signs and symbols, and writers read them through the lens of both 
providential theology and market capital. Questions of freedom, race, and nationality that 
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appeared in texts that took white captivity or national expansion as their themes were posed in 
the face of sometimes inscrutable divine will operating through the market. Writers explored the 
supernatural or uncanny experiences of life in a system in which individuals were transformed 
into commodities, allegories, exchangeable elements in a market-oriented universe they could 
hardly hope to comprehend. They developed the urban gothic form in direct response to and 
using the language of a society that blended economic participation with a theology of an 
interventionist but inchoate spirit-world. 
It is important to recognize the scope and evolution of this experience, for it truly was an 
evolving social force in the Atlantic. Just as Atlantic cultures transformed through transaction, so 
too did theology, economy, and individuals within societies. Nor was this event limited to the 
post-revolutionary era. Certainly the disruptions of the post-revolutionary Atlantic empowered or 
even necessitated the development of this philosophical and expressive disposition, but it would 
also go on to instruct later nineteenth-century political, economic, and expressive movements as 
well. In fact, it would go on to inform the twentieth century and to underwrite the individual and 
transnational experiences of our modern era. The mythology of a divinely ordered economy 
justifies the capitalist economy’s existence and persistence. It helps to sustain nationalities and 
social modes of identification. It is the inescapable context with which the present individual 
must contend.  
It was also the context that led up to the intense periods of national redefinition of the 
mid-nineteenth century, from North America, through the Atlantic, and in Europe, as well. The 
Fugitive Slave Act, for example, was no more or less than an insecure attempt to reassert 
unfreedom and dehumanization in the face of ongoing and increasingly undeniable efforts to 
reclaim the humanity that a supposedly free society denied to so many of its subjects. The 
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American Civil War was the inevitable apocalypse at the end of a period of national expansion 
driven by assertions of a divinely ordered economy that offered individual opportunities at the 
price of terrifying personal obliteration, and extended freedom to some at the price of unfreedom 
for others. 
And yet, after this violent contention with the meaning of freedom, Atlantic providential 
capitalism appeared stronger than ever. In fact, providential capitalism appeared to have emerged 
from this trial with renewed urgency, capable not only of reasserting nationalist claims to divine 
spiritual and economic right, but also of expanding beyond even the borders of Atlantic 
exchange. If the clashes of the mid-nineteenth century were the necessary reckoning with post-
revolutionary forms of providential capitalism, the outcome was a new and even more powerful 
network of power relations and hegemonic adventures that brought the ideology of divine capital 
and capitalist divinity to the world. 
If readers, critics, historians, or individuals are to understand Atlantic cultures and their 
place within it, if they are to comprehend the significance of the spread of Atlantic economic and 
theological logic to the globalized era, they must grapple with its historical emergence. They 
must recognize the cultural uncertainty from which it emerged, and the disruptive moment of 
revolution that gave it so much power. Post-revolutionary Atlantic social movements went on to 
dictate so many of the terms of their globalized predecessors. Given this fact, the newly global 
individual must admit the instructive and constructive power of providential capitalism that 
continues to reign. Commodification, exchange, election through economic success or failure, 
mobilization within a fixed market kingdom—all of these signs remain and all retain their 
valence in political, ideological, theological, and expressive pursuits. At the time of its 
emergence, providential capitalism foreclosed other potential political and philosophical 
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orientations. Our modern moment admits its final victory over society, over space, over 
theology, philosophy, and ideology, and, finally, over the self.  
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Notes 
                                                 
 
i Even early nineteenth-century Americanist critics like Walter Channing and sermonizers 
like his brother, William Ellery Channing, leaned on the tropes of providential capitalism in 
order to promote their own visions for what capitalist, industrialized American cultural polity 
should look like. Whether discussing the need for spiritual renewal or literary originality, both 
writers employed the New England puritan jeremiad form, despite the fact that they rejected 
Calvinist religious dogma. In their view, the nation is benighted or backsliding and must take up 
the vocation of reformation in order to seize its proper place in history as a cultural, military and 
economic world power. The Channings transform the vocation of colonial New England into that 
of the nation as it expands westward and southward. Thus they propose that the logic, the style 
and the reformative goals of puritan New England become the basis for national culture, against 
the southern, non-Anglophone, and racially heterogeneous, alternatives they dismiss.  They insist 
that the conversion, both economic and spiritual, which proved so effective in their native New 
England, be enacted on a national scale.  
ii Fuller also provides an important analysis of Miller’s use of both The New England 
Mind and “From Edwards to Emerson” as responses to the “groupthink” in both the anti-
interventionist left and the fascist right. Fuller also observes that “Miller’s preoccupation with 
Emerson during the 1950s and early 1960s suggests his increasing belief that the scholar was one 
of the most subversive forces in American society” (118) 
iii Fuller observes “For Bercovitch’s analysis of America’s rhetoric and ideology seemed 
to portend that all efforts to critique the United States were already prefigured and inscribed by 
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that power—that opposition was inevitably absorbed into a larger, seemingly inexhaustible and 
airtight consensus in the manifestly exceptional destiny of the nation. Within this context, 
Bercovitch’s work might be seen not only as a sustained involvement with the legacies of 
Mathiessen and Miller but also, at times, as the sorrowful requiem for those legacies experienced 
as no longer available” (125). 
iv Contracted liberty permits individuals to pursue their destiny, within the bounds of their 
social contract. Unfettered freedom, on the other hand, suggests a shapeless course, a society 
infinitely porous because infinitely determined by aggression, enmity, and implicit accessibility. 
Although this latter definition promises all individuals the possibility for rising, it also offers the 
peril of falling. And so, the new capitalist classes who structure the colonial societies establish 
contract as much to secure their own positions as to establish a model for how to grow the 
community as a legal entity. Later, this ideology will become essential for the founding of the 
Atlantic’s constellated polities, such as the one in the post-revolutionary United States. Thomas 
Jefferson, for one, will use the distinction between liberty and freedom articulated in Locke 
Second Treatise on Civil Government, Chapters 3-4 to argue for a national liberty that includes, 
un-ironically, an enormous population of unfree persons. Yes, the later American patriots will 
argue for the liberty to pursue their independent course, but they will do so within the structure 
of a presumed and even written contract that guarantees their own status, by denying it to others. 
Even in this secular cloak, the logic of selective election underpins revolutionary notions of 
liberty, national foundation, and economic expansion. This reflexive need to create documentary 
proof and to engage in official speech acts in the course of colonization by no means originates 
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in Massachusetts. Stephen Greenblatt, for example notes the number of early American explorers 
who issued "reassuring signs of administrative order—bureaucratic formulas already well 
established” (54). Greenblatt reads these orders as, perhaps, tacit acknowledgements of the moral 
impropriety of the colonial exercises they perform. Given the absurdity of attempting to use text 
to communicate across differences of language and cultural practices, Greenblatt asks whether 
figures like Columbus or, in this case, William Bradford, truly felt themselves in the right, or 
whether they simply attempted to use legal language to give the tenuousness of their claims to 
power more legal weight. Without explicitly saying so, Greenblatt here gets at the central point: 
in order to justify the mercenary goals that they clearly pursued, Christian imperialists of many 
different stripes converted mercenary action into Christian action, and made both one and the 
same. This was even more easily done in a philosophical world in which God was considered a 
partner in a capitalist enterprise. However, the Mayflower Compact of 1620 and Massachusetts 
Oath of a Freeman, written in 1631 and revised in 1634, distinguish themselves from the other 
similar colonialist texts that Greenblatt describes by tacitly admitting the extent to which this 
rhetorical formulation will—indeed, must—fundamentally alter the signers’ conception of and 
relationship to a supernatural divine. God is a tool to wield over non-Christian subaltern subjects, 
but, in the hands of the practitioners of providential capitalism, God is also a business partner in 
a market that includes the transaction of the unfree. 
v To see an early example of the intersections of race, economics, and Christianity at 
work in a colonial context see William Bradford narration of the native translator, Squanto’s, 
deathbed conversion. Bradford tells readers that Squanto “begged the Governor to pray for him, 
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that he might go to the Englishmen’s God in heaven, and bequeathed several of his things to 
some of his English friends, as remembrances, His death was a great loss” (72). As Anna 
Brickhouse points out, Squanto was educated in Catholicism by the Spanish. She, therefore, 
reads the deathbed conversion that Bradford narrates as a self-conscious attempt by Squanto to 
bring himself closer to the English and to ensure the proper dispersal of his goods after his death 
(44). Readers might, however, expand upon this to consider too how Bradford's narration uses 
Squanto's dying body to reenact the orginary process of conversion undergone by the English 
Protestants. Bradford’s Squanto turns away from Catholicism and embraces reformation 
providential Christianity, becoming a full member of the elect at this last moment. In this instant 
too, he disperses his possessions, now blessed because of his act of conversion, into the market 
where they can be traded, according to law and divine order, by his puritan Christian brethren. Is 
this evidence of Squanto navigating the expectations of Plymouth or of Bradford justifying 
Squanto’s enhanced role in both the community and in his narrative by having him undergo a 
similar conversion experience to that of the pilgrims? It is unclear, but Brickhouse, looking to the 
story of Don Luis de Velasco, the Algonquin slave who converted to Christianity, returned to his 
home and, by most accounts, killed the missionaries who brought him, suggests that there is 
sufficient evidence for the former. In fact, Brickhouse reads a number of similar instances of 
conversion, return, and resistance as asserting the successful comprehension and navigation of 
European expectations by displaced Native Americans. Many of these figures, she argues, 
request baptism because they understand the “legal consequences of conversion” (51). Similarly, 
Don Luis presents the Jesuits who will return him to North America with a “negocio,” a plan for 
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expedition to Ajacan (59). While this “negocio” is not explicitly an economic contract, it still 
demonstrates the speed and efficacy with which aboriginal individuals utilized contracts with 
Europeans for their own personal gain or security, even if Europeans used those contracts to 
exploit and annihilate native cultures. As with Don Luis and others, Squanto’s prior acquisition 
of English allows him to make productive use of his successful navigation of the routes of 
Atlantic commerce in which he was traded and now engages again in North America. Squanto's 
deathbed conversion thus asserts the extent to which dominated and commodified persons could 
selectively and for their own benefit employ the Europeans’ language and engage in the 
Europeans’ economic and Christian relations to achieve their own ends.  
vi For more, see also Alfred Cave, who demonstrates that Chesapeake settlers struggled to 
find the right way to navigate the tense interrelation of commerce, religion, and cultural contact.  
Relations between North American natives and European settlers not only established the 
guiding ideological ethos of colonization, conversion, and economic collaboration, but also 
helped to establish both class and racial borders. As Cave points out “no mestizo class emerged 
in Virginia. In 1705, the wealthy Virginia planter and amateur historian Robert Beverly, in his 
History and Present State of Virginia, declared that much of the interracial bloodshed that 
marred the colony’s first century could be attributed to settlers’ failure to take Indian wives” 
(98). In its ignorance to the bloodshed and forced conquest inherent to the development of a 
mestizo class to the south, this reading is short-sighted. Nevertheless, it remains true that, as 
Cave says, “To the English, intermarriage was acceptable only if the Indian marriage partner 
renounced Indian identity and embraced Christianity and civilization” (98). Religious conversion 
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and the establishment of “civilized” economic relations were, therefore, essential for the 
formation of colonial racial identity. Increasingly, colonial society came to be defined as 
capitalist, Christian, and white, all categories that required constant surveillance.  
vii For a full example of this, see the debate overseen by Brycchan Carey in Special 
Feature: Olaudah Equiano African or American. 
viii In Intimacies of Four Continents, Lisa Lowe quotes Vincent Carretta who notes that 
Equiano “commodified himself through his successful narrative autobiography; he retained 
copyright and kept most of the profits of the nine editions published between 1789 and 1974, 
earning an amount of British sterling equivalent to $120,000” (Lowe 61). 
ix John Marrant’s 1785 Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings with John 
Marrant…also explains the way literacy allows an individual to master his own fate and that of 
others. He meets an “Indian Hunter” and, later, becomes captive of the Cherokee nation, his faith 
in and constant conversation with a Lord they cannot see, works to convert his captors. After 
explaining—somewhat luridly and even delightedly—the tortures he should face as a captive of 
the Cherokee, Marrant describes how his prayer in English, translated into Cherokee, and 
accompanied by the “talking book,” converts his executioner, the daughter of the King and, 
ultimately, the King himself. He writes, “The Lord appeared most lovely and glorious; the king 
himself was awakened and the others set at liberty. A great change took place among the people; 
the king’s house became God’s house.” He then visits a number of other affiliated tribes, under 
the protection of his Cherokee friends and with their recommendation. Marrant’s narrative 
reinforces Equiano’s belief in literacy as a powerful tool by which to interact intelligibly and 
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profitably with the diverse cultures of the Atlantic, at the same time that it allows the elect 
individual to communicate with an unseen God and receive the rewards of grace. It also expands 
upon Equiano’s supernatural streak quite considerably. God fills Marrant with powers, described 
at times as a renewed and, frankly, strange understanding of nature. He announces that he “got 
across [a] tree without my feet or hands touching the ground… bit [grass] off like a horse, and 
prayed the Lord to bless it to me.” Yet, in this narrative, such behavior is evidence of Marrant’s 
ecstatic relationship to an interventionist and protective divinity. 
x See Baucom on the equivalence of money to commodity and back to money again in 
Specters of the Atlantic (25-29). 
xi David Brion Davis frames the question of slavery among revolutionaries like Jefferson 
around the central paradox of modern slavery. Hegel’s conception of slavery rests upon the 
struggle for mastery between two parties, in which one party is willing to die for mastery and the 
other, unwilling, submits to mastery. However, having done so, the submissive party becomes 
essential to the self-conception of the master. The master needs the slave to see him as a master 
in order to retain identity. This makes the master dependent upon the slave. The autonomous 
modern individual, therefore, is enslaved to the slave. For more on this, see Davis’ The Problem 
of Slavery in the Age of Revolution: 1770 – 1828 (40). 
xii Sir James Steuart’s 1767 treatise, An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy, 
places the routes of community mobility within the market squarely in the realm of divine logic. 
For more on this, see Ostrowski’s “Fated to Perish by Consumption: The Political Economy of 
Arthur Mervyn” in Studies in American Fiction. Vol. 32, No. 1 2004 
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xiii As Waldstreicher notes “Franklin criticized slavery, only to compensate by 
empowering slaveholders by letting them be overrepresented” in the new national government 
(214). 
xiv Perry Miller also claims they relied upon puritan texts for inspiration. He writes 
“leaders were prepared to organize their commonwealths and furthermore to acknowledge by 
force of logic several of the deductions which were later to furnish the political wisdom of a 
Locke or a Jefferson…these principles were declared no less emphatically in Puritan theory than 
in the Declaration of Independence.” See The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century 
(409). 
xv Hall expands upon the degree to which “London Merchants and finance capitalists 
were intimately connected with West Indian planters.” See pages 69-83. 
xvi See also Rediker and Linebaugh on the relative lack of religion among sailors. 
xvii For more on similarities between Cugoano and Equiano’s use of the “Talking Book” 
trope, see Wimbush, Vincent L. White Men's Magic: Scripturalization as Slavery. Oxford, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2012. pp. 61-63. 
xviii For more on this, consult also Byrd. 
xix Ian Baucom discusses this as well in Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, 
Slavery, and the Philosophy of History. 
xx Hester Blum offers a history of the publication of Dana’s Two Years Before the Mast 
in The View from the Masthead: Maritime Imagination and Antebellum American Sea 
Narratives. See Blum, page 174. 
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xxi Foucault describes this pleasure principle in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (1975). 
xxii This appears in The Many-headed Hydra. For more examples in Melville, see also 
“The Final Stitch,” from White Jacket. 
xxiii The auction of a dead man’s personal store was, as Rediker notes, commonplace 
(Rediker 197). 
xxiv Michael Taussig discusses the haunted dollar in The Devil and Commodity Fetishism 
in South America.  
xxv According to Reynolds, Pym seems “a caricature of the 1830s sensation lover [and, 
awkwardly]...a scrupulous observer who records factual information” (242). 
xxvi If, as Reynolds explains reform literature was largely premised upon the idea of the 
witness who would “lift the veil” on hidden vice for society to see, Melville, for example, draws 
upon and subverts this trope in the White whale—the white pasteboard mask is the veil to be 
lifted, but behind it is nothing (158). 
xxvii Shalini Puri also addresses these issues in The Caribbean Postcolonial: Social 
Equality, Post/Nationalism, and Cultural Hybridity.  
xxviii Michael Taussig notes “Maori reciprocity based on the belief that produced items 
contain life force of their producer—here though, commodity takes that life force and gains its 
own autonomy (28). Moreover, metaphors reinforce the sense of the market and commodities as 
alive (31). 
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xxix Taussig suggests that societies that develop capitalism naturally describe it in pre-
capitalist terms because these terms offer the only basis for understanding and describing 
everything new the society encounters (11). 
xxx Taussig writes “The social basis of capitalism works to obscure itself as nature, 
physical and biological and the animate character of things reveals their social basis but also the 
thingness of people and society” (8). 
xxxi Reynolds notes the way Poe uses tropes of religious literature in order to undermine 
the genre in Beneath the American Renaissance. 
xxxii As Marcus Rediker puts it in Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, “by the 
middle of the eighteenth century, the language of contract had in many ways supplanted the 
language of custom at sea” (150). Seamen, therefore took the contract very seriously, and would 
strike for any violation and highly prized the few among them with literacy (158).  
xxxiii Rediker describes this as “a system to calculate the direction and magnitude of social 
and economic forces, and to plot a course for the accumulation of capital and the extension of 
national power in a turbulent, expanding economic universe” (14). 
xxxiv According to Marcus Rediker the international Atlantic trading market was 
controlled by the whims—explicit or implicit—of an international free market. The seaman’s 
labor became a ‘thing’ a commodity, to be calculated into an equation with other things: capital, 
land, markets, other commodities” (75). 
xxxv Rediker writes, “Free-market and demographic forces did not produce free wage 
laborers at a pace fast enough to meet the challenges of an expanding capitalist system as defined 
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by English rulers, who therefore resorted to impressment to stock the maritime labor market with 
mind and muscle” (289). 
xxxvi Rediker writes, “Anglo-American seamen died in roughly the same horrendous 
proportions, and occasionally in even greater ones, as did the slaves themselves” (47). 
xxxvii For more on this theme, see Saidyia Hartman Scenes of Subjection (53).  
xxxviii Melville offers a similarly sexualized scene of food and consumption in Omoo, this 
time regarding the consumption of fish with a group willing and indulgent women. 
xxxix Here readers will recall Baucom’s discussion of the Zong massacre and its centrality 
to eighteenth and nineteenth-century structures of power and sociality. 
xl By contrast, in the second half of the novel, Redburn twice remarks upon 
“improvidence,” in a way that signifies human stupidity in the face of a natural universe that 
either does not care or actively conspires against human beings. First, considering his poor 
choice of clothing for the voyage, Redburn chastises himself for his own “Improvidence and 
heedlessness, in going to sea so ill provided…to make my situation at all comfortable, or even 
tolerable” (130). Then, reflecting upon the deaths of sick passengers, he explains that “the 
improvidence and shortsightedness of the passengers in the steerage, with regard to their outfits 
for the voyage, began to be followed by the inevitable results” (370). In both instances 
improvidence stands in for foolish human volition, whereas providence merely connotes human 
faith in a deity which may or may not exist, but certainly has no evident desire to deliver the 
individual from the worst the market has to offer. 
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xli As Rediker notes, because the seaman’s lifestyle was not overtly religious, it permitted 
“coexistence” and sailors remained tolerant and heterodox, and had little Biblical education 
(173) Indeed, rigid religion could become a dangerous problem in times of trouble when 
individuals had to rely upon one another (175).  
xlii Rediker reminds readers that sailors “shared the belief, present in high culture and low, 
that it was possible to predict the future from the signs of the present” this made “almighty 
nature seem more comprehensible and hence controllable” (181). 
xliii Rediker explains that “the seaman’s worldview combined Christian and pre-Christian 
beliefs, referents, and orientations” (184). For example, when crossing the equator for the first 
time, all passengers were required to participate in an initiation either of dunking (a baptism) or 
paying (a monetary form of tribute) (186). Rediker describes this in Between the Devil and the 
Deep Blue Sea, noting that “true to their tradition of irreligion, seamen stripped baptism of its 
religious meanings and used it to serve the ends of occupational solidarity” (189). 
xliv Readers should not, of course, collapse the distance between the forms of captivity 
practiced upon white women in Brockden Brown’s novel and those practiced upon chattel slaves 
as described by Baucom. These experiences are not commensurate in scope or in kind. However, 
Brockden Brown’s use of the white female subject as victim invites readers to consider the 
experience of captivity and captive violence from within the relatively safe confines of 
whiteness, while also challenging them to look out beyond themselves and to consider their own 
role in the whole system of chattel captivity. 
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xlv  Michael Taussig discusses beliefs in the potentially sacred or demonic nature of dollar 
bills for society undergoing the transition from precapitalism to capitalism. This may be the 
result: bills that contain the power potentially to rescue or to condemn. Here the experience is 
rendered in explicitly capitalist and allegorical terms, but the connection should not be lost. For 
more see, The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980. 
xlvi The novel is suggestive, rather than speculative. It offers the implications of the 
system it describes, but does not depict them. For more vivid, and more spectacularly conjectural 
renderings, readers should look elsewhere, to George Lippard’s 1845 novel, The Quaker City, 
Or, The Monks of Monk Hall: A Romance of Philadelphia Life, Mystery, and Crime, for 
example. This will be the subject of the following chapter.  
xlvii This is not to dismiss other readings—particularly readings that situate Atlantic 
modernity in oceanic realms. In fact, although they are not explicitly named here, the sailors who 
populate and perpetuate the Atlantic markets are implicitly evidenced. What connects the cotton 
fields of the American South to its sites of westward expansion, to the economic engines of the 
Caribbean, if not Atlantic maritime commerce and trade? Lippard focuses his reader’s attention 
upon the urban elements of this system, but the world of Monk Hall remains linked to the 
Atlantic maritime. Philadelphia is a port city, after all. For more discussion of the ways in which 
the Atlantic maritime markets and their ideological assumptions crept inland, especially in light 
of Fitz-Cowles’ expansionist designs, see Walter Johnson’s River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and 
Empire in the Cotton Kingdom. Harvard University Press, 2013. 
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xlviii Greenblatt discusses similar events in Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the 
New World. University of Chicago, 1991. 
xlix Interestingly, as much as it is presented as exotic and fearful, this moment might also 
represent the absorption of syncretic spirit practices from throughout the Atlantic world. For an 
example of the ways in which such practices were mobilized in occult fashion, see Toni Wall 
Jaudon and Kelly Wisecup. “On Knowing and Not Knowing About Obeah” Atlantic Studies, vol. 
12, no. 2, 2015. Here, Lippard presents the specter of spiritual syncretism as grotesquerie, but the 
possible critical resonance remains apposite: capital brings spirit practices together in seemingly 
magical fashion, generating both possibilities and perils for individuals and communities. 
l These tropes are offered to readers both salaciously and critically, intended both to 
satisfy a desire for lurid scenes and to challenge Atlantic socio-political power structures. 
Reynolds discusses this maneuver in Beneath the American Renaissance: The Subversive 
Imagination in the Age of Emerson and Melville. Harvard University Press, 1989. 
li Readers might also consult Saidiya V. Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, 
and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America. Oxford University Press, 2010. 
lii This also demonstrates the fact that terms like precapitalist, capitalist, and postcapitalist 
are probably misleading. In The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, Michael 
Taussig discusses transitional societies in terms of their encounters with capitalism. He addresses 
the fact that these societies frequently address capitalist practices in the “precapitalist” language 
of animism, supernaturalism, and the occult. Lippard’s book, and even these much later 
   Green 510 
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
depictions of capitalist societies reveal the fact that these views persist. They are not incidental to 
the onset of capitalism, but endemic to its design and practice, altogether.  
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